1. CONTENTS

1. CONTENTS.................................................................1

2. ABSTRACT...............................................................3

3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................3

4. INTRODUCTION..........................................................4
   4.1 Scope and Purpose of the Study.................................5
   4.2 Research Questions................................................6
   4.3 Methodology..........................................................6
   4.4 Thesis Structure.....................................................6

5. LITERATURE REVIEW...................................................7
   5.1 Introduction..........................................................7
   5.2 The Genesis of National Security and Security Studies......7
   5.3 Realist Security Literature.......................................10
      - 5.3(a) Human Nature, Anarchy and the Maximal State......10
      - 5.3(b) Rational Actor Theory...................................11
      - 5.3(c) The State as the Primary Referent....................12
      - 5.3(d) Structure-based Explanation............................13
   5.4 Conclusion...........................................................15

6. METHODOLOGY........................................................15
   6.1 Introduction........................................................15
   6.2 Rationale...........................................................15
   6.3 The Emergence of ‘Human Security’............................17
   6.4 The Human Security Framework................................18
      - 6.4(a) The Understanding of Power............................18
      - 6.4(b) Agent-based Explanation.................................20
      - 6.4(c) Epistemology.................................................20
      - 6.4(d) Structural Violence.......................................21
2. ABSTRACT
This study will employ the human security framework in order to reveal the dominant realist security paradigm as fundamentally unsuited to the pursuit of human emancipation in the realm of security discourse. It will be demonstrated how, in basing itself upon a positivist epistemology at odds with the study of human subjectivity, conventional security analysis relies upon a series of erroneous yet largely unquestioned assumptions concerning actors’ security-related behaviours. The way in which this has prevented the emergence of effective policy responses to the new, diversified range of security threats will also be illustrated. Finally, the overall utility of the human security concept is assessed as we seek responses to three key research questions through an engagement with the critical literature.

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4. INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter focuses our attention upon the diversification of security threats which has occurred with the onset of globalisation and outlines the profound challenge which this new agenda of threats poses to the outmoded realist security paradigm. Those factors and actors obstructing the re-conceptualisation of security along humanitarian lines are detailed and the state of insecurity which presently characterises the international system is posited as a challenge to the assumption that states are the actors best able to ensure their citizens’ security. The purpose of the study with regard to the three key research questions is subsequently outlined as is the methodology which will be used to answer these questions. Finally, an overview of the overall structure of this study is presented.

For some forty five years the grand narrative of the Cold War shaped orthodox security analysis. National security was equated with “the absence of a military threat or with the protection of the nation (state) from external overthrow or attack” (Haftendorn 1991: 4). However, recent events have shown that the narrow military focus of the realist security paradigm cannot adequately address the ever-diversifying range of non-state, trans-border security threats which have emerged in the post Cold War era and which stem from those globalising processes characteristic of this latest stage of modernity. Recent attempts to address security concerns by recourse to military intervention - the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as part of a global ‘war on terror’ for example – have had disastrous consequences, instead ultimately multiplying the insecurities they seek to remedy.

Given that the defining characteristic of the modern era is change and that emancipation has been conceived of as the means by which meaningful and enduring security is to be acquired for the greatest number of people (Booth: 1997), the concept of security should seek constant reflexive renewal in line with the shifting empirical circumstances it is intended to reflect and should place analytical emphasis upon human rather than state concerns. However, broadening the security debate both threatens the interests of the most powerful
actors in international relations (states) and runs counter to a powerful cultural norm which bestows validity upon theories based upon the length of time they have enjoyed intellectual hegemony rather than their ability to effectively elucidate empirical reality (ibid.). These obstacles mean that security discourse has more frequently been instrumental in the maintenance of an existing political order rather than the pursuit of social change (Campbell: 1992).

Landmark events in the trajectory of twentieth century international relations – the rise of extreme ideologies prior to the outbreak of World War II, the redistribution of global power prompted by the passing of the bipolar era and the technological advances synonymous with globalisation - all necessitate a profound questioning of the fundamentals of Hobbes’s notion of the social contract between state and citizenry (MacFarlane and Khong 2006: 107). In an era of highly diversified threats for which a conventional military response is inappropriate, should the state still be considered the fundamental purveyor of security for its citizens? The presently-existing cycle of global insecurity is characterised by the disastrously high human cost of the ongoing economic crisis which states have struggled to mitigate, an increase in intra rather than inter-state conflict and mass cross-border movements of people fleeing threats to their human security prompted by ever-widening social disparities in their home state. These all suggest that states frequently either constitute the biggest threat to their citizens’ security or are paralysed when faced with the plethora of new security concerns. A departure from the dominant, state-centric security paradigm is therefore urgently required if the social contract is to be fulfilled.

4.1 Scope and Purpose of the Study

It is the purpose of this study to re-imagine the ‘weakly conceptualised but politically powerful’ (Buzan 1991: 7) concept of security. The human security framework is applied in order to reveal the shortcomings of the conceptual tools and methodology of the dominant security paradigm – a paradigm predicated upon the reified notion of the nation state as the primary security referent and located within a now defunct Cold War-era security narrative. It is posited that the usage of the more sophisticated modes of analysis inherent within the explicitly normative human security framework should ensure that the
knowledge produced by security discourse is better suited to the realisation of human emancipation rather than serving primarily to allow states to project power and order, a defining act of the ‘now discredited realist orthodoxy’ (Acharya 1997: 318). The epistemological underpinnings of conventional security analysis will be revealed as devoid of emancipatory potential and the key monoliths at play in the debate - state, security and citizen - deconstructed in order to expose the politics instrumental in their production.

4.2 Research Questions

What is the overall value-added of adopting the human security framework in security analysis?

How does the human security framework differ epistemologically from the realist paradigm and how do its theoretical moves equip it to achieve human emancipation?

Which potential obstacles to the human security framework’s translation into workable policies exist and (how) can these be overcome?

4.3 Methodology

A qualitative methodological approach will be adopted in order to provide responses to the research questions above. Such an approach has been selected as it is deemed most suitable for the analysis of the body of literature which informs this study (Ratner: 2002). The process by which one particular security issue is incorporated into security discourse (“securitisaton”) and subsequently addressed through policy responses is examined through the lens of the case study of cross-border migration. The use of a case study will provide this study with the necessary empirical context and specificity to complement its analysis of the theoretical tenets of the security debate.

4.4 Thesis Structure

In order to locate this study within the appropriate academic context, a review of the conventional security literature will be conducted. The post-World War II emergence of national security and the militarily-focused academic discipline of security studies is detailed and the key tenets of the realist paradigm are
The human security framework is subsequently identified as the theoretical means by which the ultimate ends of greater security for individual citizens is to be acquired and the key strengths of a humanist approach to security are established. There follows an examination of the broader context of shifting global security concerns in the twenty first century. It is revealed how the challenges posed by the new range of trans-border security threats to the institutions of liberal democracy have resulted in policy responses concerned more with a normative commitment to a particular world view than a balanced consideration of actual threats. The migration-security nexus is taken as a case study and state responses to the perceived threat of mass migration is examined. In the analysis, the overall ‘value added’ of using the human security framework is assessed. With reference to the growing body of literature which critiques the human security concept, we interrogate its proponents’ assertions that the framework has achieved a definitive epistemological departure from the realist paradigm and that it can translate into workable policy solutions. This investigation allows us to draw conclusions regarding the ability of the human security framework to enrich the security debate.

5. LITERATURE REVIEW

5.1 INTRODUCTION

A review of the literature which facilitates the ongoing ‘intellectual hegemony of realism’ (Booth 1991: 318) will now provide the necessary background for our investigation into the continuing dominance of the statist security paradigm. The origins of the concept of national security are examined, the evolution of the accompanying academic discipline – security studies – charted and a brief review of the main theoretical tenets of realism which have played an active role in the production of hegemonic security knowledge will be conducted.

5.2 The Genesis of National Security and Security Studies

The end of World War II saw the emergence of the concept of national security, crafted largely by American scholars and policymakers and enshrined as a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy in the National Security Act of 1947 (Kinnard: 1980). As an approach concerned primarily with the protection of the
nation state from external attack, its aim was to prevent the resurgence of war and as such focused exclusively upon military security threats. The academic discipline devoted to furthering this concept – security studies – developed over subsequent decades and has been defined as follows:

“The study of the threat, use and control of military force…it explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war”.


Much of the scholarship which emerged during this ‘first wave’ or ‘golden age’ of security thinking (1955-1965) emanated from think tanks with strong links to the U.S. Defence Department. Green (1968) considers the resulting overly-militarised understanding of security concerns as a key limitation of this stage of thinking. In addition to its overwhelming preponderance upon military force, this traditional conception of security “borrowed almost wholesale from a microeconomic theory of markets, based on the assumption of egoistic value maximising actors (and)...a postulated unified state, conceived of as a rational actor” (Kolodziej 2000: 22). These flawed assumptions are discussed further in our exploration of realist literature.

This brief examination of the origins of national security policy reveals the far from neutral environment within which the concept was developed. Knudsen (2001) reminds us that these foundations would not have been naturally-occurring but specifically manipulated by politicians and policymakers with a vested interest in crafting them as such. Indeed, ‘golden age’ security thinking’s reliance upon a pessimistic conception of mankind mirrored the confrontational realist politics of the Cold War era and led both to the huge arms build-up which ultimately increased rather than alleviated global insecurities and the requirement for a strong state to fulfil citizens’ security needs. Acharya’s observation (1997: 318) that “frameworks of security and order devised by major powers usually mask the latter’s narrow self-interest” encourages us not to accept this orthodox conception of security as necessarily the best way to ensure citizens’ needs but to instead view it as the product of a specific
historical moment, a construct created according to the political priorities at the time.

During the period of Soviet-U.S. détente security studies as outlined above entered a period of decline as the disastrous consequences of U.S. military intervention in Vietnam became clear and the limitations of the ‘hard power’ approach to security were exposed. A range of liberal theories – the comparative case study method, close examinations of conventional warfare, discussions of nuclear weapons policy – embodied the empirical shift away from an explicit emphasis upon war towards a consideration of the historical, economic and regional factors complicit in the consolidation or erosion of security. These theories successfully highlighted gaps in the existing realist conceptual framework and authors such as Morse (1970) and Keohane and Nye (1972) planted the seed of ‘transnational relations’ and ‘interdependence’ within security discourse. However, shifting empirical circumstances - in this case the resurgence of superpower antagonism during the Reagan Administration – demand changes to ideational structures and there followed a resurgence of realist thought (Waltz 1979) as the study of war became important once more.

This trend has been aptly explained by Legro’s (2000: 425) notion of ‘tipping points’ which contends that new or oppositional ideas face an uphill struggle against continuity unless significant events occur, necessitating change. Such landmark events shaped the trajectory of security discourse in subsequent years and prompted the emergence of counter-discourses. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 starkly undermined the legitimation that economic development had as a means to security and caused support to coalesce behind the body of UN human security literature which had emerged in the mid 1990s. Appreciation grew for a wider range of security threats including human trafficking, illegal migration, environmental degradation – transnational concerns which the state was ill-equipped to address. However, Caballero-Anthony (2004: 176) sees the 9/11 terror attacks as constitutive of a counter tipping point, a hugely significant event which caused states to eschew the burgeoning holistic, ‘soft power’ approach to security. The intractable threat of terrorism has seen the state restored as the primary security referent with counter-terrorist policies urgent,
uncompromising and stringent. It is the recent resurgence of realist thought, the resurrection of the rhetoric of ‘national security’ and military intervention witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq which necessitate the following examination of the dangerous assumptions and underdeveloped modes of analysis inherent within the realist security paradigm. The following observation made by Buzan (1991: 11) aptly summarises the rationale for this investigation:

“The appeal to national security as a justification for actions and policies which would otherwise have to be explained is a political tool of immense convenience for a large variety of sectional interests in all types of state…the natural ambiguity of foreign threats during peacetime makes it easy to disguise more sinister intentions in the cloak of national security.”

5.3 Realist Security Literature

5.3(a) Human Nature, Anarchy and the Maximal State

The most basic tenet of realism and that which profoundly influences its response to security threats is its pessimistic conception of human nature, influenced by the classical writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes. In general, “human beings are perceived to have a problematic nature: they are uninformed, passionate, undisciplined, and even violent” (Poku, Renwick and Glenn 2000: 11). Prone to war, uncooperative, self-centred and unable to find fulfilment internally, mankind seeks inclusion within an external collectivity (Hegel 1953; Hobbes 1968). States compensate for the deficiencies of man (Waltz 1979) and are the essential component of the realist understanding of international relations. However, a debate over whether the state should be viewed minimally i.e. as no more than the sum of its parts or maximally i.e. as standing above the individuals which comprise it exerts a huge influence upon the security policies states are able to adopt. The minimalist interpretation of the state is based upon the previously-mentioned notion of the social contract between state and citizenry whereby the state is oriented towards those who comprise it. It is this type of state, answerable to its citizens, which is posited as most likely to ensure its citizens’ security needs and which will be examined in further detail later.
The following definition of the state (Weber 1946: 78) bears the hallmarks of the immediate post World War II era in which it was written, concerned as it is with the distribution of military power. The state is “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory”. However, realism’s force-centric conception of states and security has not been significantly amended in light of the onset of unfettered globalisation. Rosenau (1990) among others has recognised the growth of complex interdependence, the erosion of sovereignty, rapid advances in communications, the declining utility of force and the growth in scope for non-state actors as symptoms of the era of ‘post-international politics’ we now find ourselves in. Today’s expanding security agenda therefore reveals mainstream security thinking as time-bound and inflexible in the face of change (Booth 1991: 322) and only equipped to deal with a narrow range of military threats.

Krause and Williams (2005: 39) have questioned the extent to which states should be afforded centrality within contemporary international relations, reminding us that transnational corporations, international organisations and capital networks may well better represent the reality of the modern world than a statist conception of anarchy. However, anarchy remains the other essential component within the realist conception of international relations and is described by Graham and Poku (2000: 1) as “the axiomatic and unalterable principle of global life”. Within the disordered anarchic system, states compete for power and resources in order to secure their citizens’ wellbeing, with state action defined by Krause and Williams (2005: 39) as “the instrumentally rational pursuit of self-interest”. At this point it is essential to reveal the key assumptions which permit realists to conceive of the state as necessarily the most able protector of its citizens and consequently the primary referent in discussions of security as well as to conclude that the key actors in international relations behave rationally in their pursuit of security.

5.3(b) Rational Actor Theory

By employing rational actor theory to simplify and render actor behaviour predictable, the realist security paradigm has enjoyed considerable longevity and widespread applicability. Rational actor theory – also known as rational
choice theory – emerged as an explanatory framework within the school of microeconomics focusing upon the study of market behaviour. It was subsequently adopted within the realm of political science and applied to the analysis of the security calculations of states. The theory maintains that strong, unified states engage in a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of a particular action prior to choosing the most clearly value-maximising option.

The paradoxical assumption that the disparate group of variously-interested individuals who comprise a collectivity are a homogenous whole loyal to one over-arching shared security meta-narrative is a key failing of realism’s appeal to rational actor theory. Poku, Renwick and Glenn (2000: 13) among others have highlighted the inadequate separation of the security interests of the state and its citizens as obstructive to the fulfilment of individuals’ security needs. The difficult relationship that necessarily exists between the state, popular interests and the variety of values, claims and identities of the citizenry had been obscured by Cold War ideology yet has not been adequately re-imagined in the post-bipolar era. As there is no real option to rid the world system of states the security of individuals will therefore continue to be inseparably entangled with that of the state. However, by placing humanity at the core of security analysis – as the human security framework does - realism’s normative privileging of the state can be revealed as damaging and the scene set for a re-imagining of the appropriate role of the state.

5.3(c) The State as the Primary Referent

As the preceding discussion has shown, realism’s ‘premature theoretical closure’ has resulted in a range of unvoiced assumptions which in turn have led to the production of questionable yet hegemonic realist security knowledge and the existence of certain foundational ‘truth claims’.

“The most important of these (claims) concerns the centrality of the state as the subject of security and provides the basis for the exclusion of issues other than those of traditional military diplomacy from the field.”

(Krause and Williams 2005: 34)
In debating the appropriate referent of security – with referents defined by Sartori (1984: 24) as ‘the real world counterparts (if existent) of the world in our heads’ – it should be borne in mind that whilst it is generally accepted that states continue to play an important role within the international system, the exact role that they should and indeed can fulfil in relation to the provision of security to their citizens is hotly debated. Orthodox political theory has long afforded the status of primary security referent to states owing to their status as guardians of their citizens from internal and external threats. However, the following observation by R. B. J. Walker (1988: 25) provides rationale for the removal of the state’s privileged status as the primary security referent and the need to investigate new potential referents:

“The state itself, far from being the provider of security as in the conventional view, has in many ways been a primary source of insecurity…it is difficult to see how any useful concept of security can ignore the participation of states in “disappearances” and abuse of human rights in so many societies.”

The process of defining the primary security referent is far from a value-free, objective process of describing the world ‘as it exists’. It is an inherently political act with implications for both the theory and practice of security as well as the agenda of threats (Booth and Vale: 1997). The failure of those within mainstream security discourse to take seriously alternative referents such as individuals, ethnic and kinship groups or the global community of humankind can therefore be viewed as an entirely deliberate act designed to reinforce state hegemony. In shunning reflexive advancement of the concept and striving to maintain the status quo, it becomes clear that “security discourses are constitutive of the problematique that, according to the positivist contention, their practitioners supposedly merely observe” (Booth 1991: 10). We must therefore interrogate established ‘truths’ - such as the status of the state as the primary security referent - questioning the politics behind them thoroughly.

5.3(d) Structure-based Explanation

The absolute dominance of structure over agent within the realist paradigm is widely acknowledged (Booth 1997: 106) as another aspect of conventional security thinking which stifles the emancipatory potential of the discourse.
Human beings must be free to exercise their agency and have their individual security concerns heeded by a responsive state if they are to achieve genuine emancipation. This, however, does not occur within the presently-existing ‘security studies of exclusion’ (*ibid.*: 105) which sees individuals-level security concerns subsumed by those of the collectivity and excluded from policy responses. Indeed, the potential for damage to be exerted upon individuals by the operation of impersonal structural forces rather than other individuals is explored in depth within Galtung’s theory of structural violence (1969). The rhetoric of national security has repeatedly been employed as a smokescreen from behind which states have been able to perpetuate structural violence against their own citizenry (Alagappa 1998: 30). For this reason the analysis of security concerns should be firmly rooted within the subjectivity of human experience rather than far removed from, and therefore unaccountable to, the demands of citizens as is the case when analysis is undertaken only with the objective rationality synonymous with impersonal structures in mind.

A humanist conception of security requires a definitive departure from the dominant paradigmatic orthodoxy within which security concerns supposedly result from problems of interstate politics. This assumption places these security issues beyond the realm of the ethical or moral, does not demand alterations to the behaviour of states (Poku, Renwick and Glenn 2000: 17) and therefore blunts the potential for security discourse to achieve reflexive improvement. The following quote by George Kennan (1978: 205-7) aptly reflects the realist orthodoxy’s realpolitik understanding of its security obligations:

“Government’s primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience...these needs have no moral quality.”

However, a state which believes itself justified in its unresponsiveness to the ‘individual elements’ which comprise society and which crafts a security agenda without reference to the human concerns prominent within citizens’ lives is clearly more concerned with furthering its own strategic aims than ensuring the safety of its people. Policy responses to security threats are therefore more likely to be preoccupied with the potential destabilisation of political order and
the consumption of welfare resources than creating an environment conducive to its citizens’ wellbeing.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the emergence of the concept of national security and exposed the limitations of the war-centric lens it adopts for the analysis of security threats. It has been shown how, owing to a pessimistic conception of mankind, the maximal state is viewed as the best means by which citizens’ safety can be ensured in an anarchic world system with the state taken as the referential focus of security analysis. Realism’s emphasis upon structure at the expense of agency and its reliance upon the reductionist logic of rational actor theory have also been problematised. For these reasons the domain of conventional security studies has functioned primarily as a means by which states can project power and order rather than as a conduit for the realisation of human emancipation.

6. METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction

This section outlines the methodology which will enable this study to assess the value-added of adopting a human-centred approach to the analysis of security threats. Building upon our investigation of the deficiencies of the realist security paradigm conducted within the literature review, it begins by explaining the altered objects of analysis and value shifts which characterise the human security framework. It then examines this framework’s claim to be an approach well equipped to deconstruct the hegemonic state-centric security narrative. Owing to its reliance upon a set of critical theoretical underpinnings and analytical apparatus which diverge from those utilised within realist analyses of security, this framework claims to be better equipped to realise human emancipation than the orthodox realist security paradigm.

6.2 Rationale

It is believed that by employing the human security framework in our study, the vested interests of the powerful actors complicit in the production and
reproduction of security discourse may be exposed and the particular political context within which the hegemonic security narrative is anchored may be revealed. It is ultimately hoped that the adoption of the lens of human security will facilitate a re-imagining of the concept of security around the following key themes: how and by whom is the threat agenda to be determined? What should be – as opposed to are – the appropriate referent(s) when thinking about security? Which key theoretical shifts must occur if security discourse is to produce knowledge which prioritises human rather than state concerns, thus fulfilling the social contract?

A qualitative methodological approach will be adopted to facilitate our investigation of the research questions outlined in the introduction. The rationale behind the usage of a qualitative approach is based upon its widespread acceptance as the form of enquiry most suitable for the analysis of secondary data, in this case the body of political literature which informs this study (Ratner: 2002). Qualitative analysis is also the most suitable investigative approach through which the political interests of various actors and the power inherent within impersonal structures may be exposed. In acquiescence with the following assertion by Booth (1991: 319) this study takes the dynamic concept of emancipation as its normative basis:

“Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.”

It is widely believed that the state in the modern era is under threat because its capacity to adequately regulate the movement of people is being gradually undermined by new global processes (Marfleet 2006: 264). Given that state legitimacy rests upon its perceived ability to provide security for its citizens against such external threats (ibid.: 81), migration has become a critical security issue. The migration-security nexus and the attendant ‘migrant as threat’ narrative constitute a lens through which the factors informing state responses to perceived security concerns may be fruitfully analysed. This analysis takes place within the ‘Context’ section of our investigation. The setting of the security agenda may also be investigated with Knudsen (2001: 359) reminding us that “...the items on the political agenda of the day – any day – have no intrinsic
significance; they are there merely because effective political actors want them to be there.” The incorporation of particular issues into security discourse is therefore revealed as beneficial for social groups, institutions and practitioners of state policy seeking to re-assert their authority in the face of change.

6.3 The Emergence of ‘Human Security’

The concept of human security first gained widespread attention following its appearance in the 1994 *Human Development Report*, a document produced annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The report, acknowledging the call for a conceptual shift towards the protection of people rather than states witnessed in 1993’s *Human Development Report* (People’s Participation), argues:

“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust...Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.”

(1994: 22)

The 1994 report outlined the empirical content of human security and was designed from the outset to influence the following year’s World Social Summit for Social Development - otherwise known as the Copenhagen Summit – evidence of the clear strategic goals the concept has possessed since its inception (Krause 2004: 44). As an entity which - more than any other state or institution - embodies the mechanisms necessary for the enactment of profound theoretical and practical shifts in the security debate, the United Nations (UN) has acted as an incubator for human security with the concept advanced further through a series of major UN reports, most notably UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s *We The Peoples* (2000), Ogata and Sen’s *Human Security Now* (2003) and Annan’s *In Larger Freedom – Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All* (2005). Although the concept of human security is currently situated within the realm of the subaltern at the margins of security discourse, it represents a valuable means by which the security concerns of societies may be articulated. At a time when millions of individuals find their personal security
threatened by the global economic turmoil which has resulted from factors beyond human control, exploring and advancing the concept of human security has never been more vital.

6.4 The Human Security Framework

Definitions of security are established through the specification of referent objects and the values to be protected. It is now necessary to examine the values and objects of analysis prioritised by the human security framework and which differ profoundly from those which are central to conventional security analyses.

6.4(a) The Understanding of Power

Throughout the Cold War, “security was reduced to little more than a synonym for power with this appearance sufficiently convincing to stifle further enquiry into security as a separate concept” (Buzan 1991: 8). The realist contention that security is a derivative of power and that by reaching a position of dominance states acquire security has led to states pursuing power in their search for stability. Such an approach, however, ultimately increases instability:

“One state’s security can only be achieved at a cost to all states because the measure of security in this case is the distribution of power. Power being finite can only be re-distributed between states and cannot be enlarged.”

(Reich: 2004)

The human security framework’s normative privileging of emancipation rather than the traditional preoccupation with ‘power and order’ can therefore be revealed as one of its greatest strengths. The act of prioritising emancipation as a core value allows for an emphasis upon people, justice and change rather than states, military power and maintenance of the status quo (Booth and Vale 1997: 337) which both restores a human focus and allows security studies to keep pace with empirical reality.

Despite its focus upon emancipation, human security discourse must still necessarily consider the crucial role played by power in the formulation of security. It differs from conventional analyses, however, by seeking a definition
which does not encourage rivalry between states. Unlike the competitive definition of security which pervades, human security represents an inclusive good that benefits humankind as a whole and not just narrow sectional groups. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy have highlighted the benefits of conceiving of security as a shared good:

‘If traditional definitions of security focusing on state integrity in GPG terms are non-joint and excludable, human security is indivisible and non-excludable and puts the emphasis on universal, absolute and inviolable rights. One individual’s security from violence or poverty doesn’t cost another’s: on the contrary an increase in an individual’s human security increases everybody else’s.’

(2007: 186)

In eschewing the notion that states must battle each other in their search for security, shifting the referential focus to ‘the whole immanent global community of humankind’ (Booth and Vale 1997: 334) and therefore presenting disparate individuals’ security as immutably interlinked, human security as a public good encourages actors to conduct themselves in a more measured fashion and de-incentivises value-maximising activities such as waging war on one’s neighbours.

The profound transformation of motivations which the adoption of a theory of GPGs would engender led to the inclusion of the concept within the UN’s landmark Human Development Report (1994) which sought a new framework for international co-operation specifically equipped to deal with the new range of interlinked, trans-border threats emergent in the global era. By emphasising the interdependency of everybody’s security, states are made responsible both for protecting their citizens from a state of material deprivation and for facilitating an empowering environment whilst individuals and communities are duty-bound to engage with security debates and demand their rights from the bottom up, rather than having discourse imposed upon them from the top down (Kaul et al 1999a: 1). A theory of GPGs is well equipped to tackle those key issues which have so far proven impervious to solutions provided by individual states or entities acting alone - issues important to both developing and developed country members of the international community - and may help facilitate a
definitive departure from the inaccurate contention that states are the most able guarantors of security.

6.4(b) Agent-based Explanations

Given that structure and agency are the defining components of a society (Friedmann and Starr 1997: 1) the extent to which one or the other is privileged within security discourse will have a profound effect upon human security outcomes for members of that society. By consistently over-inflating dimensions of force within a strategic-military approach, security studies have long neglected “the more quotidien dimensions that shape the tenor of public life” (Klein 1997: 364). An overwhelming focus upon structure has long obfuscated the crucial issue of individual agency within the security debate. Proponents of human security have instead attempted to portray security issues as addressable at the micro and meso levels and not merely issues of ‘high politics’ removed from individuals’ daily lives. This requires space to be opened up within the public sphere for non-state actors to express their agency and participate in setting the security agenda. Indeed, the multiplicity of new actors latterly empowered by the spread of democratization and the plethora of civil society movements emerging worldwide demand nothing less than a new security framework within which they can be incorporated (Acharya: 2004).

6.4(c) Epistemology

In order for the aforementioned new actors to exercise the two distinct and crucial properties of agency - the power to choose and the power to influence social outcomes (Giddens 1984: 14-15) and make their voices heard in the setting of the security agenda, the human security framework diverges epistemologically from conventional security discourse. Traditional analyses of security are oriented towards positivism and rely upon fixed terms and rigid definitions which make them too inflexible to cope with the vicissitudes of empirical reality. The human security framework posits a subjective thesis of agency so that a contextually-aware understanding of actors’ security-related behaviours may be acquired. Given that an interpretivist conception of agency is fundamentally incompatible with positivism (Dessler 1989; Wendt 1987) proponents of human security abandon the natural science model and seek to
formulate new intellectual tools which enable them to analyse security issues within the subjective context from which they arose. This leads to:

“...a stress on culture, civilization and identity; the role of ideas, norms and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism and toward more interpretive modes of analysis.”

(Krause and Williams 1997: 49)

Indeed the diversification and complexification of security challenges in the twenty-first century necessitates the sophistication of the analytical apparatus used to investigate them (Sen 2000b) rather than reliance upon the traditional modes of analysis inherent within the realist paradigm.

6.4(d) Structural Violence

The preceding discussion of agency must necessarily be accompanied by an assessment of the insights into structure which the human security framework enables. In 2003 the Commission on Human Security – a research body set up to further the concept within the United Nations – published Human Security Now. This document enlarged the concept of human security to a new epistemology of threats and, crucially, structural violence. Co-chairs Ogata and Sen were no doubt influenced by the questioning of the institutions of organised violence which had been a key component of both Weber’s (1946) notion of the state and the classic source of modern security wisdom, Hobbes’s Leviathan (1968). Galtung (1969) moved the enquiry forwards by suggesting a theory of structural violence which maintains that ‘violence is built into structures and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances’ (ibid.: 113). This violence permeates all societal structures – social, political and economic – and, far from being accidental, is the outcome of human action. The inequalities which result are manifested as exploitation, poverty, misery, the denial of basic needs and marginalisation, all of which are factors contributing to a state of human insecurity. Galtung (2004) therefore views human security as primarily concerned with subsistence as this encapsulates the idea that citizens’ basic human needs must be met in order that human security can ensue.
6.4(e) The Individual as the Primary Referent

Conceiving of poverty as the main destroyer of security forges the critical link between a state of material want and the disruption of the peace, thus encouraging states to fulfil their responsibilities to ensure citizens’ welfare needs. It also contradicts the notion that humans wage war upon each other due to some innate violent tendency, instead demonstrating that violent unrest may be the only recourse of those driven to desperation by the conditions of material deprivation which those in power have allowed to come about, either through neglect or by design. In line with Galtung’s call for a focus on human needs, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007: 236) have advocated a shift in focus away from a macro-level concern with structure towards the minutiae which affect the lived existences of individuals in order to draw attention to the expanding range of ‘unconventional’ security threats.

“Changing the lens of security to people as referent objects allows for recognising insecurities beyond wars and violence, to what matters to people in their everyday existence and dignity. As such, it expands to non-military threats, or structural violence, such as inequalities or poverty.”

As outlined earlier, definitions of security are dependent upon the specification of both the values to be protected and referent objects. Having examined in depth the norms prioritised in the human security paradigm, our attention now focuses upon its adoption of the individual as the referent object of security studies rather than the state, as is the case in conventional analyses. Although some proponents of human security argue for the retention of the state as the primary referent (Knudsen: 2001) and some (Buzan:1991) argue for humans as ‘base units’ and states as the guarantors of security, these approaches both fail to problematise the key realist assumption that individuals’ security concerns are best addressed through the security policies of their states. By using human beings as the focal point of analysis we may “demolish the reductionist illusion that national and international sec are simply extensions to a concern with the fate of individual human beings” (ibid.: 35). Therefore, for the purposes of our investigation, a referential shift in favour of the human is suggested in the hope
that a means-end transformation may be enacted: from the state as the object to be protected to the state as the mere means by which the desirable ends of human security may be achieved.

Hedley Bull (2002: 22) among others has demanded a departure from the state-centric conception of security:

‘The ultimate units of the great society of all mankind are not states...but individual human beings, which are permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or that sort are not’.

In making this assertion Bull reveals states as mere transitory constructs which may not stand the test of time whilst their constituents embody the immutable human qualities which should always be protected, making them the rightful referents within security analysis. As constructs are always crafted within a particular political context, they can therefore be made to be as responsive or unresponsive as they choose with regard to particular security issues. Concentrating upon the security needs of individual members of a collectivity therefore bypasses these politics and allows the focus to return to the basic security needs of human beings.

The potential for states to act malignantly towards their citizens adds further impetus to Bull’s demands. As an instrument of power on an unrivalled scale and with the ability to exert this power through the institutions of organised violence, the state is able to systematically inflict harm upon its citizens. As Ayoob has argued from a Third World perspective (1989), the state-centric and contractarian underpinnings of the classic realist security paradigm have long obscured the fact that in many places the state does not act as the guarantor of security but rather constitutes the greatest threat to its citizens. Although legitimising the sovereign authority of the modern state, even Hobbes recognised that states frequently constitute a major source of insecurity (Walker 1997). The latterly witnessed proliferation of civil wars as opposed to conventional inter-state conflicts further supports the contention that human security threats often emanate from citizens’ own supposed guarantors of security (states) with the ascendancy of regional approaches to security in the
post Cold War era opening up the possibility that human security issues are better addressed in a multilateral forum than by individual states.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the concept of human security which emerged in the mid 1990s and which has since been advanced primarily by the United Nations. It has been argued that the human security framework is better equipped to render human rather than state concerns central within security analysis owing to its pursuit of a more equitable and non-competitive distribution of power, its prioritisation of agency rather than structure, its privileging of the individual rather than the state and an epistemological foundation which distances itself from positivism, making it entirely more appropriate for the study of human behaviour. There will now follow an examination of the contemporary security context which has necessitated the emergence of new approaches to security analysis.

7. CONTEXT

7.1 Introduction

This section examines the broader context of global transformation which has prompted the emergence of a new matrix of security threats which replace the familiar enemies of the Cold War. These concerns have proven impervious to the traditional method of agreements between sovereign states and necessitate a new framework of understanding. Firstly, the wide-ranging consequences of the integration of the world system under globalisation are outlined. Running parallel to the trend towards integration have been contradictory tendencies: yawning class chasms and the polarisation of rich and poor regions. Both of these tendencies erode human security which in turn has led to the explosion of transnational migration flows. Secondly, therefore, is an examination of the case study of increasing migratory movements as one of the ‘unwelcome’ symptoms of globalisation which has most profoundly challenged the conventional security analyses. In particular the reliance upon an increasingly outmoded understanding of a world system based upon nation states is problematised. Finally, we assess the way in which the human security framework is especially
well suited to the analysis of one of the defining aspects of late modernity, international migration (Cohen: 1996).

The recent exponential increase in the number of people living outside their country of origin justifies our selection of the case study of international migration. In 2010 the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are 214 million migrants across the world, this figure having increased 37 percent in two decades (World Migration Report 2010). This equates to approximately 3 percent of the global population now residing outside their home nation. As these figures illustrate, the ascendancy of neo-liberal globalisation has not only resulted in the liberalisation of the movement of goods, capital and services but also the movement of people. As migrants have become increasingly visible within receiving societies and the suggestion of cultural difference leading to societal breakdown reified, the issue of international migration has been incorporated into security discourse, or ‘securitized’.

However, the migration-security nexus should not be viewed as a given but rather as a construct crafted by certain groups and interests within a particular context. A case in point is the rhetoric surrounding immigration control which emerged in the United Kingdom prior to the general election of May 2010. As politicians operating with state security in mind sought to portray their respective parties as best able to protect citizens from the threat supposedly posed by migrants, we witnessed a cynical exploitation of the untapped resources of public grievance on this topic now seen to constitute legitimate political territory (Statham 2003: 167). It is therefore suggested that viewing the migration-security debate through the lens of the human security framework allows for a less prejudiced discourse and consequently more considered policy responses.

7.2 Globalisation and its Effects

The concept of globalisation has inspired an array of competing definitions and has been interpreted in numerous ways. According to Marfleet (2006: 1), world integration acts as a driver of increased prosperity and harmony:
“The liberating powers of the market are bringing benefits for all – there is a
general advance of economy and society, and reduction of political tension and
conflict. The old polarities – first world versus third world, North versus South –
are becoming less and less relevant.”

The intensification of global relations in the respective realms of commerce,
communications, technology, economic production and finance has certainly
enabled some non-state actors to maximise their profit-making potential and
reach previously inaccessible markets. Some clear ‘winners’ have undoubtedly
emerged as a result of unfettered globalisation. However, globalising processes
have also facilitated the diffusion of weapons and other security risks – from the
ecological to the military – and caused huge disparities in the regional
distribution of wealth, all of which have edged some groups into states of
human insecurity. As well as being a force for positive change in the lives of
some, globalisation clearly also embodies the potential to propagate
transnational harm to less well-positioned ‘Others’ on a daily basis (Poku et al
2000: 10). However, as our exploration of the phenomena of increased migrant
flows will evidence, policymakers usually adopt an uncompromising approach to
remedying the ‘unacceptable’ symptoms of the globalising process.

Although globalisation can be seen to characterise the latest stage of
modernity, it also presents a profound challenge to one of the aspects which
has long defined modernity – the nation state framework. The expansion of
multinational corporations and transnational organisations which has been
driven both by policies of economic liberalisation and the elimination of temporal
and spatial barriers through advances in technology has fostered a genuinely
global market system. In contrast to the vital role played by strong nation states
in fostering an economic dynamic within the traditional capitalist system, the
global market system has undermined the institutional and ideational suppo-
supports of the nation state system (Habermas 1998: 121). The ascendency of
transnational business interests has therefore challenged the ability of the
nation-state to assert itself as the primary focus of allegiance and ‘call the shots’
in global politics (Davies 2000: 45). A brief investigation of the purposes which
states serve enables us to understand why the questioning of their sovereign
integrity by a new set of globalist principles has been met with fierce resistance in some quarters.

The following observation by Habermas (1998: 116) demonstrates how invoking the construct that is the state can create the impression of political stability and continuity.

"Recourse to the organic nation can conceal the contingency of the historically more or less arbitrary boundaries of the political community and can lend them an aura of imitated substance and inherited legitimacy."

According to the realist contention, the state of anarchy which characterises the international system necessitates the existence of strong sovereign states to ensure citizens’ protection. However, the reification of the state obscures the reality that states are mere constructs. Benedict Anderson (2006: 6) describes nation states as imagined political communities – ‘imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members...yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.’

Globalisation has challenged the imaginings of liberal democracy as never before and despite widespread agreement within the international community that human-centred approaches to security are to be pursued in principle, converting the rhetoric into practical action has usually proven too controversial. The departure from the dominant statist worldview which an overt pursuit of humanist policies would demand would be an admission by states that they are increasingly redundant and could serve to precipitate their own downfall.

Security is one of the most fundamental goods which the state can provide for its citizens (Hobbes 1968; Ullman 1983). Given that the essential criterion of statehood is clearly defined territory, both literally and in terms of the identity and culture of a population (Bagaric and Morss: 2005), the growing porosity of state borders traversed by increasingly mobile populations and the differentiation of societies along multicultural lines both mount a strong challenge to the integrity and sovereignty of states. But what are the security implications of this trend? Booth (1991: 322) argues that continuing to make sharp distinctions between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’ within the realm of security is no longer appropriate. As Giddens (1990) succinctly observes:
“The intensification of worldwide relations (is) resulting in the reciprocal interconnections between local happenings and distant events.”

The erosion of state sovereignty opens up opportunities for the international community to intervene and protect those whose human security is imperilled. As media images of distant atrocities are transmitted instantaneously across the globe, the ‘responsibility to protect’ has never been more keenly felt by those at the helm of liberal democracies. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the immunity from external intervention capitalised upon by certain nefarious human rights abusers characterised the world system based upon sovereign nation states. However, as Owen (2004: 379) has acknowledged, the conflation of states’ own national security concerns with dilemmas of human security in distant lands has seen a growing interventionist trend. The United States-led invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks upon U.S. soil is one of the most notable examples of this tendency. Invading a sovereign state with the stated aim of improving the human security of one’s own citizens rather than simply because human suffering is wrong must lead to a questioning of the ethical underpinnings of these types of intervention. The blurring of the distinction between what is domestic and what is international and the acknowledgement of causal interdependence has substantially denigrated the norms of non-intervention and sovereignty. These developments have had both a positive and a negative impact upon human security outcomes worldwide (Macfarlane and Foong-Khong 2006: 229).

As the notion of state sovereignty has become increasingly redundant, the concept of popular sovereignty has emerged to reflect the growing emphasis upon the citizen as the actor who determines a state’s legitimacy or lack thereof. Indeed, in In Larger Freedom (2005) the United Nations advanced the notion that sovereignty is dependent on the adequate protection of citizens and, in doing so, a shift away from the state as the sole unit of international peace and security at the UN was enacted (Martin and Owen 2010: 215). The idea that the validity of the state is dependent upon the will or consent of its people is closely linked to Hobbes’s notion of the social contract between state and citizenry. When citizens are free to make demands on the state and exercise
the political power the social contract bestows upon them, an environment more conducive to the achievement of human security is facilitated. This is because the minimal state as imagined by John Locke is by its very nature oriented towards the interests of its citizens rather than its own interests per se and can be expected to respond to the security concerns raised by its members. The notion of popular sovereignty has therefore made states more answerable to their constituents, has undermined the realist contention that the state is the most suitable unit for the wellbeing and survival of human groups and has contradicted the conception of the state as an entity which stands above the individuals who comprise it (Buzan 1991: 40).

However, globalisation’s progressive undermining of the authority and legitimacy of nation states and their institutions has also impacted negatively upon the human security of certain sectors of the global population. The erosion of national sovereignty has necessitated the founding and expansion of supranational political institutions such as the European Union (EU). Although the existence of such organisations opens up the potential for a wider application of humanist principles, the centralisation of so much power within one single body opens up the possibility for abuse and a lack of accountability. Also, as has been the case with human security at the UN, agreement on the adoption of the latest ‘buzz word’ is all very well but unless a concept is anchored into a particular political narrative it will fail to translate into practical action. The incorporation of the relatively radical concept of human security into the mainstream security discourse of supranational institutions has arguably blunted its emancipatory potential.

Finally, the ongoing global financial crisis has brought into stark relief the potential for the increasingly integrated global economy to exert a devastating effect upon the human security of populations on the other side of the world. The global financial crisis was triggered by a liquidity shortfall in the United States banking system in 2007 after the national real estate ‘bubble’ dramatically burst. The collapse of financial institutions, the bailout of banks by their national governments and the downturn in both the stock and housing markets worldwide swiftly followed. Whilst the crisis may have originated in the United States, its effects have impacted negatively upon the living conditions of
blameless people worldwide. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has investigated the impact of the global recession upon rates of economic growth in developing economies (Cali and Dell’Erba: 2009). Growth forecasts in Cambodia show a decline from 10 percent growth in 2007 to almost zero percent growth in 2009. A slowdown of this magnitude within a Third World context where a large proportion of the population struggle to fulfil their subsistence needs has pushed many households below the poverty line. Opportunities to participate in the global economy in areas where there is a shortfall in cheap, flexible labour and remit vital funds to family back home have been seen to empower the world’s poor to change their situation. As these opportunities have dried up, however, the most vulnerable have become victims of a global financial system in which disruption in one region can wreak havoc worldwide.

Having assessed the human security implications of globalisation’s undermining of the nation state system and the principle of national sovereignty as well as the transformative effect it has had upon the world’s economic landscape, there follows a detailed examination of the case study of international migration as one of the symptoms of globalisation which has most challenged the conventional security discourse.

### 7.3 The Migration-Security Nexus

One of the most fundamental aspects of globalisation is the movement of people (Burgers and Engbersen: 1996) and immigrant flows now originate from virtually all states. As increased human mobility has become a defining aspect of the interconnected world, variously-motivated groups of individuals traverse the globe in pursuit of human security. Whether as asylum seekers fleeing persecution in their home states, as illegal immigrants, as legitimate economic migrants and settlers or in order to join their contemporaries in a diaspora group, globalisation has opened up new opportunities for individuals to improve their lives by relocating throughout the globe. Furthermore, the deterioration of ecosystems to the point where life is unsustainable, the occurrence of natural and man-made disasters and ethno-racial/religious conflicts are all factors which will ensure the phenomenon continues apace as the twenty first century
The disordered legacy of colonialism which has left the African continent especially plagued by high levels of human insecurity has caused hundreds of thousands of African migrants to attempt to gain entry into Europe annually. Despite the fact that migration is set to feature prominently in the socio-economic futures of the liberal democracies and already accounts for an estimated two thirds of European population growth (Papademetriou 2003: 49), until now the issue has not been sufficiently addressed in academic and policymaking circles.

At the beginning of the twenty first century, it had been acknowledged (Annan 2000: 42) that efforts to combat terrorism were pushing state security concerns to the forefront of discussions of international migration. The 9/11 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda the following year further fuelled the ‘migrant-as-security-threat’ narrative with discursive practices, as seen through the media vilification of certain migrant groups, portraying them as threatening agents (Ibrahim 2005: 163). The resultant ‘securitisation of migration’ discourse has in turn prompted increasingly stringent policy responses to the ‘threat’ posed by those whose human security is already endangered - Australia’s restrictionist policies towards asylum seekers and refugees, for example – and these policies in turn strengthen the discourse. At this point a cursory examination of Foucault’s knowledge-power maxim can enlighten us as to the crucial role played by discourse in facilitating the subtle exercise of power. According to Foucault (1980: 93):

“In any society there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise, and constitute the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”

These ‘truths’ feed into a body of knowledge, which itself is inseparable from the power implicit in its creation. Knowledge, consequently, is power. The production of the ‘truth’ that migrants threaten the liberal world which has been
achieved through the securitisation of migration discourse must therefore be viewed as an exercise of power rather than an assertion grounded in empirical reality. Given that discourse feeds into policy, increasingly anti-immigrant legislation has come about as a result and given that policy plays a key role in shaping the overall character of problems, the policies adopted will shape the tenor of our future understanding of the migration issue. As policies emanate from states, which we must understand as “quintessentially political entities” (Buzan 1991: 355), policies are inevitably crafted with reference to the domestic political priorities of the day:

“Domestic factors get in the way of a rational formulation of security policy. By doing so, they distort, impede and confuse the process by which the state deals with threats and, by implication, they result in less rational, less effective and possibly even counter-productive policies.”

(ibid.: 355)

The recently-witnessed securitisation of migration which focuses overwhelmingly upon the potential adverse consequences of the phenomenon – for example, the repeatedly-stated possibility that terrorists could infiltrate societies as migrants and perpetrate atrocities - rather than the many benefits it brings can be seen to do so simply because this reading of the situation fits in with certain political aims. In her examination of migrants’ livelihood strategies, Jacobsen (2002) points out that the presence of migrants actually increases the human security of a host society owing to the interdependence within and between communities that migrant economic activity promotes. Regardless of this observation, at present, securing national borders and shoring up the ethical-political self-understanding of the nation state are the priorities of liberal-democratic governments (Habermas 1998: 227). A brief investigation into why this is the case will now follow and enlighten us as to precisely how migration has been ‘hijacked’ by those anxious to protect the increasingly rigorously challenged nation state.

The following observation by Bagaric and Morss (2005: 26-31) sets the scene for our investigation into why the phenomenon of mass migration has posed such a challenge to migrant-receiving countries:
"A defining aspect of national sovereignty is that nation states have the right to determine which people are permitted to enter within their geographical borders. It is axiomatic that states decide which people to admit, how many, and from where. Migration control is therefore the quintessential act of the sovereign state."

The shifting boundaries and mobile populations symptomatic of the globalised world have profoundly challenged the institutions of liberal democracy, revealing their weaknesses. Through the enactment of ever-more restrictive practices – the recently-implemented cap on skilled non-EU workers entering the UK, the detention of asylum seekers and migrants in ‘holding centres’ across Europe - ‘the nation state, conscious of its historical achievements, stubbornly asserts its identity at the very moment when it is being overwhelmed, and its power eroded, by processes of globalisation’ (Habermas 1998: 124). Whereas the nation state was the actor best equipped to defend its citizens from the threat of military attack during the era of Cold War confrontation, the new range of intangible, non-military threats have confirmed its status as an increasingly irrelevant institution. Cyber-terrorism, for example, is increasingly acknowledged as one of the most serious threats to national security (Defence Select Committee: 2010). A military response to this type of threat is clearly inappropriate and this incentivises the adoption of more nuanced, ‘soft power’ approaches which investigate the motivations of individuals and groups driven to take particular actions. The redundancy of the conceptual tools and methodology of the realist framework becomes apparent when there is no discernable target towards which the nation state can direct its retaliation.

Giddens (1991) was the first to encapsulate the new range of non-military security threats under the umbrella term ‘ontological security’. Davies (2000: 40) recognises the concept as one concerned with:

“...the survival or sustainability of the identities of particular collectivities in the face of real or perceived existential threats and under changing conditions.”

A large influx of migrants qualitatively divergent from the native population mounts a profound challenge to the cultural identity of receiving nations, considering that nations are conventionally understood as ‘communities shaped
by common descent, or at least by a common language and history’ (Habermas 1998: 107). The trend towards cultural pluralism which has emerged in the post World War II era and the climate of relative tolerance and acceptance brought about through liberal politics has reduced the pressure for migrant groups to assimilate into mainstream society, thus increasing their visibility. Just as state sovereignty is eroded by porous borders, the homogeneity which underpins the nation state’s status as a cohesive unit is undermined by the arrival of large numbers of outsiders. In an attempt to protect the nation’s collective identity, repressive policies are therefore enacted. For example, the number of refugees permitted to resettle in the United States declined from 70,000 in 2001 to 27,000 in 2002 as a result of tougher security checks introduced in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Annan: 2005). The enactment of ever-more restrictive migration policies is a lamentable basis for an organised international migration regime. To conclude our investigation of the migration-security nexus, the benefits to be derived from the application of the human security framework are assessed.

The preceding investigation of the responses to the phenomenon of migration emanating from the liberal democracies has shown policies to be concerned to a far greater extent with defending the institution of the nation state than abiding by the principles set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (United Nations: 1948) a document which offers a sound normative framework for dealing with the issue but which has been over-ridden by states’ own concerns. The Declaration states:

“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

(ibid.: Article 13)

In order for the right to quit one’s own country to be practically achievable, people must be free to enter other countries at will. Increasingly strict entry criteria deny millions this right, leaving them either forced to make use of illegal channels or stranded in a state of chronic human insecurity with no hope of emancipation i.e. freedom from the restraints upon their ability to live as they would choose to. Just as the shift from national sovereignty to popular
sovereignty is advocated by the human security framework, its suggestion that the citizenship denied to those shut out by harsh immigration regulations can be replaced by a notion of global citizenship allows for a shift towards individual-level rather than state-level analysis. Due to its unique mandate, the UN should promote the advancement of this concept.

As a phenomenon concerned with human movements, migration is best addressed by a theoretical framework which places emphasis upon human concerns. For too long this vitally important issue has been treated as an obstacle to the governance and maintenance of the liberal world system. As Buzan (1991: 350) has succinctly observed:

“Posturing on security issues may have more to do with electoral needs and ideological pretensions...than with serious thinking about the issues themselves. If political cohesion cannot be built on the common ground of what people want, then it can be built on the common ground of what they can be bought to fear or hate.”

By employing the human security framework, we can return the focus to human concerns rather than allowing the securitisation of migration discourse to further the objectives of those seeking to advance a particular political agenda and who do not care if this involves promoting fear or hatred in order to do so.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an insight into the wider context of global transformation which has so dramatically altered the contemporary security landscape. It has also shown how globalisation’s gradual undermining of the key underpinnings of liberal democracy – the institution of the nation state and the norm of national sovereignty – has led to the enactment of security policies which concern themselves more with shoring up the state and its sovereignty rather than taking a reasoned, factually-aware approach to security issues, as can be observed in state policy responses to mass migration.
8. ANALYSIS

8.1 Introduction

Human security has permeated virtually all aspects of post-Cold War discourse on international peace and security: development studies, international relations theory, global governance models, sustainable development policy and military intervention practices (Owen 2008: 113). It is therefore now possible to reflect upon the impact of several decades of ‘human security in action’ and assess the extent to which the concept has succeeded in re-focusing our understanding of security issues around individuals rather than states. Having conducted a detailed examination of the transforming empirical context which necessitates a re-assessment of the conceptual tenets of security discourse, this section seeks to provide responses to the following research questions: 1) What is the value-added of adopting the human security framework in security analysis? 2) How does the human security framework differ epistemologically from the realist paradigm and how do its theoretical moves equip it to achieve human emancipation? 3) Which potential obstacles to the human security framework’s translation into workable policies exist and (how) can these be overcome?

The analysis that follows is based upon an exploration of the debates in the critical literature and is organised into three main sections which correspond to each research question. In assessing the overall value-added of employing the human security concept in security analysis we must measure its relative utility compared to the hegemonic approach. For this reason we must examine the possibility that the realist paradigm would, in the event of a resurgence of military threats, be better able to enrich our understanding of security issues than humanist approaches. In response to our second research question concerning the human security framework’s theoretical foundations, we then question whether or not the human security concept can be said to have achieved a genuine epistemological and methodological departure from conventional security analysis. Finally, the extent to which the heated ‘definitional debates’ are a distraction from the realisation of the concept’s ‘value-added’ potential will be assessed and it will be asked whether or not we can view the compromising of human security’s conceptual integrity in order to
facilitate its translation into workable policies as a necessary evil or an ill-advised move which will blunt its emancipatory potential. Based upon our analysis of these three key questions, we can conclude by making an informed judgement regarding the overall contribution the human security framework can make to security discourse.

8.2 What is the value-added of adopting the human security framework in security analysis?

Ascertaining exactly how the human security framework can enrich security analysis is an inherently difficult task. As Kaldor et al (2007) remind us, the concept does not seek ‘victory’ as such but instead aims to create an environment conducive to the pursuit of humanist principles. As a consequence, it is difficult to definitively ‘measure’ the concrete level of success which has thus far resulted from the incorporation of human security into security discourse, although attempts at quantification include years individuals within a society spend living outside a state of generalised poverty (King and Murray: 2001). However, as an organising framework the concept has enjoyed indisputable success. A powerful uniting force, it has united a diverse coalition of actors, synthesised disparate discourses – basic needs, human development and human rights – and imbued post-positivist/critical security studies with the direction and momentum which it had previously been lacking. As suggested in our introduction, change is the defining characteristic of the modern era. Uvin (2004) suggests that human security is a dynamic concept able to unite various different fields of social change - humanitarian relief, development assistance, human rights advocacy and conflict resolution - and as such is highly appropriate for the analysis of security threats in an ever-transforming, globalised world.

The concept has also prompted unprecedented co-operation between the development and security communities (King and Murray 2001: 589), the former keen to capture the superior financial resources associated with foreign policy and military security and the latter looking to expand its reach into unchartered, humanist territory. The promotion of dialogue between these two oppositional camps should be viewed as a positive development as it helps to move security
discourse in an altogether more progressive and less antagonistic direction. Kaldor et al (2007) also draw our attention to the cohesion which human security has fostered between domestic security and foreign policy, owing to the concept's contention that, in a globalised era, visiting transnational harm upon foreign 'Others' through ill-advised overseas activities is likely also to result in domestic repercussions. A case in point is the radicalisation of Afghan Muslims whose homeland has been invaded by coalition forces and who have subsequently perpetrated terrorist acts in the West. Adopting an holistic, humanist approach to security which acknowledges the interlinked nature of threats would deter states from pursuing such value-maximising activities.

As we assess the utility of the human security framework it is crucial to overcome the erroneous yet widespread assumption that the concept is intended to completely replace conventional security analysis. Human security principles can, in fact, be implemented within existing structures and help to temper realist security rhetoric. The argument that the implementation of human security requires a complete paradigm shift in security discourse is frequently set forth by critics who brand it a ‘radical, yet rather optimistic package’ (Gasper: 2005). Yet as Owen (2008) points out, this paradigm shift has arguably been underway for some time now and should not be portrayed as an insurmountable obstacle to progress. As the preceding chapters have illustrated, the modes of analysis and conceptual tools of the realist security paradigm have been unable to adequately address the broadened range of security concerns which has emerged as a result of globalisation. However, whilst acknowledging the flawed methodology and assumptions of the realist paradigm, dichotomising between the human security framework and conventional realist security analysis is not the most fruitful way forward. The creation of an unhelpful binary between the state or the individual as the rightful referential focus within security analysis, for example, pits these actors against each other when in fact we should be seeking a more equitable balance of power between the two and recognise that the achievement of security in one of these domains is a pre-requisite for security in the other.

Although the preceding analysis has outlined the ways in which the human security framework can enrich security analysis, in denying that the realist
framework has any utility whatsoever we would run the risk of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ and jettisoning some of the valuable insights which the realist security framework has previously provided, albeit during a particular time period and in relation to particular empirical circumstances. For example, Buzan (1991) does not suggest that realism lacks validity per se but rather that its analytical tools and assumptions have only a circumscribed utility when it comes to investigating the presently-existing empirical situation. Consequently, many recent security developments fall outside of the explanatory limits of the realist paradigm, which is where the human security framework comes in. Morgan (1999) has accurately observed that theories, whilst useful at certain times, find that their utility diminishes as change occurs which in turn necessitates the creation of new theories. During the Cold War when the spectre of military attack loomed large in the security calculi of both blocs, realism’s privileging of the state was justified. As the actor with the greatest capability to inflict harm upon individuals, an aggressive, militarised state could only be countered by other such ‘strong’ states. The state consequently enjoyed privileged status as the actor best equipped to ensure citizens’ security:

“Realism’s appropriation of the term security rests on the assumption that interstate war is the greatest threat to personal safety and freedom. This may or may not be the case at any given time.”

MacFarlane and Khong (2006: 252)

However, the repercussions of climate change, the growing polarisation of wealth resulting from rampant globalisation and the emergence of new and intangible threats such as cyber-terrorism have replaced hostile states as the most fearsome threats in security discourse. The utility of the realist framework has thus diminished. At the present moment, post-positivist approaches are better able to enrich our understanding of the contemporary security landscape although this is not to say that this situation could not change at any moment.

Indeed, despite the passing of the era of Cold War bipolarity, the resurgence of military threats should not be considered an impossibility. For example, the increasingly frequent displays of military aggression which North Korea directs towards the South have seen the United States pledge to defend its ally at all
costs with China, for the time being, remaining loyal to the DPRK. In the event of an escalation in violence, the human security framework’s preoccupation with normative and referential shifts which occurs at the expense of a detailed study of power and order would leave it unable to address the more pressing concern of trying to avert a war. We can therefore conclude that the human security framework, although well-suited to the advancement of humanist principles in security discourse during the presently-existing period of relative stability, would be less able to deal with imminent physical threats if they emerged in future.

8.3 How does the human security framework differ epistemologically from the realist paradigm and how do its theoretical moves equip it to achieve human emancipation?

Underpinning human security’s claim to be an approach better equipped to achieve human emancipation is its departure from the positivist epistemology central to realist security discourse. Proponents of human security argue that the intellectual lens of realism which focuses primarily upon military threats is both insufficiently broad to address the diverse range of security concerns which threaten human existence in the globalised era and likely to lead to unsuitable policy responses. They also suggest that the positivist epistemology which underpins the realist conceptual framework is fundamentally unsuited to the study of human subjectivity.

The following quote by Krause and Williams (2005: 42) aptly expresses this most fundamental failing of the realist security paradigm:

"In neorealist theory, the key to understanding the rational nature of reality is rationality itself. In epistemological terms this means that the discipline must treat the phenomena under consideration as objects. The nature of human action and subjectivity has provided a consistent difficulty for such an epistemological stance…"

By committing itself to a scientific conception of reality, realism’s methodological and ontological insights have been prone to error, uninformed by the subjectivity they seek to reflect and subsequently more committed to specific normative political commitments than the empirical reality of the security problems they are supposed to address. Booth (1991: 24) therefore views an unbundling of the
positivist theoretical tenets of security as a pre-requisite for emancipation, which this study and his seminal critical text ‘Security and Emancipation’ both believe should be the ultimate goal of security studies. The human security framework represents a suitable conduit for a departure from positivism as it acknowledges that individual human action results in a reality rooted in \textit{subjective} practices and structures (Krause and Williams 2005: 50). Realist security studies have attempted, on the other hand, to prove their legitimacy by making an erroneous yet powerful theoretical commitment to scientific \textit{objectivity}. This results in a focus upon structures rather than agency and since the socio-economic, domestic, political and normative contexts within which agents operate go unexamined, the resulting models of actor behaviour are shallow and policy options limited (Kolodziej 2000: 24). Policy responses which result from human security discourse, however, are more nuanced, contextually aware and cognisant of the rationale behind actors' security-related behaviours, making them less likely to adversely affect citizens' lives in their implementation.

Employing a post-positivist theory such as the human security framework allows us to question the hegemonic ‘truths’ set forth in conventional security discourse which prevent more empirically-grounded accounts of reality from emerging. Post-positivist approaches also allow us to return an ethical focus to the politics active in the production and reproduction of this discourse. The past decade has seen the resurgence of a conservative, hard power approach to diplomacy, and this has come to erode the ethical principles set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations: 1948). A critical approach anticipates change, engaging thoroughly with the contemporary transformations of political life, turns its own techniques in on itself and invites constant renewal as times and circumstances change (Booth 1997: 107). The trend for Western democracies with long and respectable records of respect for human rights to take advantage of 9/11 and the ensuing the ‘war on terror’ to erode checks on state power and undermine their humanist principles evidences the urgent need for a re-planting of ethics in the realm of international politics (Zalman and Clarke 2009). The human security framework should therefore be used to challenge the neo-realist orthodoxy which undermines so many of the humanist
principles which are pre-requisites for human emancipation and which were advanced in the post-World War II period.

8.4 Which potential obstacles to the human security framework's translation into workable policies exist and (how) can these be overcome?

Despite possessing an intellectually strong foundation, human security has been troubled by discord between theory and practice. A wide variety of critical security thinkers consider the dichotomous debate concerning the relative merits of a broad or narrow conception of security as one of the biggest obstacles to the concept’s translation into successful policies (Ewan: 2007; King and Murray: 2001; Thomas and Tow: 2002). At present, there exists no widely accepted or coherent definition of human security and the aforementioned authors view this lack of consensus as wasting the energy and momentum developed through the academic literature which, if only the concept’s internal divisions could be overcome, could translate into empowering policies.

Stoett’s (1999) gradient of minimalist to maximalist definitions of human security illustrates the vastness and complexity of the debate. Under a minimalist definition, citizens’ safety from relatively traditional (violent) threats – armed conflict, human rights abuses, organised crime – is prioritised i.e. their freedom from fear. The rationale behind the adoption of such a narrow definition is that this enables the concept to ‘accrue greater analytical and policy value’ (Thomas and Tow 2002: 178) as less items are included in the security agenda and can therefore be addressed in greater detail. However, delimiting in this way belies the influence of positivism and pays no attention to contextual factors (Ewan: 2007). Straying into positivist epistemological territory can be avoided by employing a maximalist definition. Such a broader understanding is favoured by the Commission on Human Security and incorporates the notion of structural violence and a range of non-traditional threats, conceiving of a state of security as freedom from want. However, this approach has also been widely criticised on the grounds that it renders the concept so elastic as to blunt its utility as an analytical tool, with the resulting threat agenda branded a ‘useless shopping list of threats’ by Krause (2004).
The possibility that more and more issues will be subsumed within the human security agenda and become ‘securitised’ items is certainly problematic. The act of ‘securitisation’, according to Newman (2010), signifies the failure of politics in addressing an issue and prompts a switch to ‘emergency politics’. Policy responses are consequently more likely to be military in nature and easier to ‘push through’ within a mood of heightened urgency and panic (Martin and Owen: 2010). The decreasing rate of approval for asylum applications resulting from the post-9/11 securitisation of migration is an example of this trend. A securitised item does, however, go straight to the top of the policy agenda but as MacFarlane and Khong (2006: 242) assert:

‘Attaching the label of security to an issue does confer the potential that it will get more attention and resources, but this is a praxis-related move that does not add up to analytical clarity.’

Although it could be argued that the means of securitisation may justify the ends of greater policy inclusion and financial resources, this is a destructive course to pursue and sets a dangerous precedent for increased state intrusion into previously impenetrable domains. As we have previously discussed, invoking national security can facilitate the erosion of fundamental rights.

However, the dichotomous debate between a broad or narrow definition of human security, the potential problem of over-securitisation and the analytically-useful-versus-conceptually-accurate divide can all be overcome by using the threshold-based definition as proposed by Owen (2004). One of the key advantages of employing a threshold-based conceptualization is that it is rooted in the original UNDP definition and represents ‘a conciliatory way forward in a fractured debate’ (ibid.: 373). Threat inclusion is limited by severity rather than by cause which avoids the reductionism of choosing which threats to privilege and which to exclude. It also prevents too many disparate issues being subsumed within the security agenda and allows us to focus solely upon the most critical issues. This limits the number of concerns deemed ‘top priority’ level threats and avoids creating a climate of fear which, as we have already noted, leads to knee-jerk policy reactions. Martin and Owen (2010) have also praised the threshold approach for its success in combating the ‘creeping
fuzziness’ of United Nations human security discourse which had threatened to bring about the concept’s drift towards irrelevance.

MacFarlane and Khong’s (2006) proposal that human security should be conceived of as freedom from organised violence could also overcome the potential for conceptual overstretch. The authors utilise Paris’s (2002) notion of ‘multidimensional extensions of security’, proposing the vertical extension of security down to the level of the individual but resisting its horizontal expansion to keep the list of threats manageable. Only physical threats based on actual violence are considered, threats which require a tangible perpetrator, and this move adds conceptual clarity and a much-needed analytical focus to what frequently seems to be an unmanageable concept. As Owen (2008) among others has stressed, human security urgently requires greater analytical coherence if the concept is to survive.

Finally, we shall now examine some of the potential pitfalls of the adoption of the human security concept as a policy framework. Bellamy and McDonald (2002) among others have been alarmed by this trend, witnessed in Canada and Norway most notably, as they see it as the adverse incorporation of human security into the very structures it is supposed to be challenging. Tan See Seng (2001) shares the authors’ concern that the incorporation of human security into the dominant, statist security discourse will blunt the concept’s emancipatory potential:

“Human security attempts to solve a complex human dilemma by recourse to the very institution i.e. the state – or the discursive commitment to its ontology – that in part created that dilemma in the first place.”

It is in order to avoid the concept’s co-optation by the malign structures of the state that we should not try and conceive of human security as a policy agenda but rather as an investigative tool which can be used to mount a radical critique from outside these structures, argue Bellamy and McDonald (2002). The increasing adoption of the concept in a ‘problem solving’ role within the existing parameters of conventional security discourse evidences an inadequate interrogation of the knowledge about security and insecurity produced by realism’s ontological and epistemological assumptions (Newman: 2010) and
although the concept’s success in furthering the cause of human welfare is admirable, this has come at the expense of achieving the theoretical depth necessary to mount a strong challenge to the structures of power which would bring about long-term emancipation.

Nevertheless, despite this criticism, Newman is correct in suggesting (ibid.: 92) that as a ‘policy-oriented intellectual agenda’ human security has achieved concrete progress in influencing political practitioners to orient policies towards human concerns. The founding of the International Criminal Court and the banning of landmines are two notable developments (Hubert: 2000) with the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) commitment to developing new tools in order to measure not only health but also other domains of human security (King and Murray 2001: 606) another example of the concept’s successful translation into practice. The human security experience can therefore be seen to provide valuable lessons for other post-positivist perspectives such as critical security studies which, in order to maintain its agenda’s theoretical integrity, has refused to be drawn into a problem-solving paradigm.

8.5 Conclusion

In this section we have assessed the utility of the human security concept through the lens of the critical literature which enables us to make a number of assertions. Firstly, that the human security framework has achieved considerable success in promoting co-operation: between the oppositional development and security camps, between the disparate basic needs, human rights and human development discourses and between domestic and foreign approaches to security policy. Secondly, that the concept does enrich our understanding of security issues under the present conditions of relative stability within the international system but, in the event of a resurgence of military threats, could find itself replaced by realism as the approach able to offer the best understanding of actor behaviour. For as the preceding analysis has shown, employing realism to analyse security threats can allow for valuable insights and we should not dichotomise between humanist and realist approaches but rather seek co-operation between these discourses where possible. Thirdly, although the practical application of human security principles
requires their incorporation into hegemonic structures which could be said to impinge upon the concept's theoretical integrity and analytical accuracy, the payoff in terms of progress achieved in ‘pushing the envelope’ of human welfare in security discourse justifies this necessary compromise. Finally, although the fierce definitional debates have threatened to obstruct the successful translation of human security principles into practical action, human security discourse has now reached a point of sophistication that it can generate its own solutions to its internal divisions with the threshold and organised violence definitions constituting two prime examples of this development.

9. CONCLUSION

The disciplinary authority enjoyed by the realist security paradigm since the mid-twentieth century has allowed it to set itself up as the standard by which competing conceptions of security must judge themselves. Having placed itself at the centre of a linear, forward-moving trajectory of scientific progress (Krause and Williams 2005: 37) realism has long occupied the role of judge in relation to the rival truth claims of alternative world views. Bearing in mind the synonymy of knowledge and power (Foucault: 1977), realism’s hegemonic status as the domain within which ‘legitimate’ security knowledge is produced has allowed state policymakers to wield power - orchestrating the state’s next strategic security move and prioritising the pursuit of a particular political or ideological agenda rather than ceding any of this power to citizens through the act of emancipation.

This study has interrogated the dubious, de-contextualised and insufficiently critical foundation of realism which represents the conceptual context within which the entire security debate occurs. The human security framework has been forwarded as a credible alternative conception of security which allows the analytical focus to be returned to individuals rather than states which is essential if human emancipation is to ensue in the realm of security discourse. Crucially, it has been shown how in distancing itself from the positivist assumptions of realism, the human security framework is far more flexible in the face of change: better equipped to deal with contemporary political transformations and better able to keep pace with the ‘hectic empiricism’ which
is likely to characterise security in the coming decades. For as Croft and Terriff (2000) remind us, liberalism by its very nature must persistently mutate and change and as long as liberalism provides the ideological paradigm informing political preferences and choices, change will be a permanent feature of the empirical political environment. It should be noted that although this study maintains that realism is the ideology underpinning the hegemonic security discourse, this contradiction arises because states aggressively protect the gains they have amassed due to their privileged position within a liberal global market system.

Our literature review traced the origins of the concept of national security and security studies to the immediate post-World War II period when the menace of military attack loomed large in the security calculi of both the Allied and Soviet blocs. However, as our investigation of the ever-evolving empirical security context revealed, the cessation of superpower rivalry and the onset of globalisation have radically altered the threat agenda and left realist modes of analysis unable to cope with the new array of non-traditional security concerns. The threat posed by trans-border phenomena such as mass migration to the institutions of liberal democracy – the nation state, national sovereignty – have seen states defiantly attempt to prove their legitimacy through the enactment of policy responses which have come to impinge upon the most basic of human rights and freedoms. The value-added of adopting the human security framework is therefore that it is concerned primarily with furthering the cause of human wellbeing rather than protecting a particular vision of a world system based upon nation states.

Despite the weakness of its analytical moment, human security is built upon firm normative foundations and as such encourages a long-overdue return of ethical principles to the realm of security thinking which for so long has been pre-occupied with the pursuit of power and order. It is hoped that this will oblige the international community to fulfil its ethical responsibilities and seek the realisation of adequate standards of human rights and governance. Human security has attracted considerable criticism although this study maintains that internal divergence has been overplayed by realist critics keen to see the concept ‘buried’ and, as the preceding analysis suggested, fruitful ways to
overcome these divisions are progressively emerging. It is now incumbent upon
the concept’s proponents to continue to seek constant reflexive renewal in order
to address the presently-existing analytical deficiencies and to enact
methodological changes which will allow human security it to operate as a
useful tool in the policy battle. Finally, as Croft and Terriff (ibid.) have accurately
observed, theories will always lag behind empiricism and for this reason we
should remain realistic about the ability of any theoretical framework to predict
change accurately or facilitate the production of indisputable ‘truths’ in the realm
of security.
10. BIBLIOGRAPHY


