Corruption in Afghanistan:
Understanding and Controlling Police Corruption

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Second Reader: [ ]

Erfurt, July 8, 2011
Erklärung/Declaration

gemäß § 25 Abs. 1 der Prüfungs- und Studienordnung des weiterbildenden Studiums “Public Policy” an der Universität Erfurt


I affirm that the work I have submitted was done independently and without unauthorized assistance from third parties. All parts which I took word-for-word or nearly word-for-word from any sort of publication are recognizable as such. I did not use any means or resources other than the literature I have quoted. This work was not submitted in this or any similar form to an examination committee in or outside of Germany.

Erfurt, 8 JULY 2011 ___________________________ NIAMATULLAH SAYER
Datum/Date Unterschrift/Signature Name (Blockschrift/block letters)
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- The Costs of the ICCPC

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Anti-Crime Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Border Police</td>
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<td>ACSOR</td>
<td>Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Accountability and Transparency Program of UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Police</td>
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<td>ANPS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Police Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AREU</td>
<td>Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARoLP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Rule of Law Program</td>
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<td>ASGP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUCP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Uniform Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Control and Audit Office</td>
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<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Conflict and Peace Studies Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CCID</td>
<td>Central Crime Investigation Department</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capacity Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency Police</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAC</td>
<td>Directorate of Combating Administrative Corruption</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.S.</td>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Electoral Complaints Commission</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office of the USA</td>
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<td>GIAAC</td>
<td>General Independent Administration of Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOOAC</td>
<td>High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>IARCSC</td>
<td>Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPC</td>
<td>Independent Commission of Controlling Police Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Independent Police Complaints Commission UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWA</td>
<td>Integrity Watch Afghanistan</td>
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<td>JSSP</td>
<td>Justice Sector Support Program</td>
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<td>MACU</td>
<td>Military Anti-Corruption Unit</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance of Afghanistan</td>
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MOHE   Ministry of Higher Education of Afghanistan
MOI    Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan
MOJ    Ministry of Justice of Afghanistan
MOT    Ministry of Transportation of Afghanistan
MRRD   Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NDS    National Department of Security of Afghanistan
NTM-A  NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan
NYPD   New York Police Department
ODG    Office of Democracy and Governance
OEG    Office of Economic Growth
OIEE   Office of Infrastructure Engineering and Energy
OSSD   Office of Social Sector Development
RTC    Regional Training Center
SIGAR  Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
TI     Transparency International
UN     United Nations
UNCAC  United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP   United Nations Development Program
UNODC  United Nations Organization on Drug and Crimes
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
VCAs   Vulnerabilities of Corruption Assessments
VOA    Voice of America
Abstract

Corruption and corruption related issues are widespread in Afghanistan. It undermines the government of Afghanistan efforts toward efficient and effective state and democracy building. It is rampant, pervasive and entrenched to all areas of public sector in the country. Police agencies in Afghanistan are among the most corrupt state institutions, which generates gap and mistrust among Afghan people and the Afghan Government. This paper intends to respond to the notion corruption; particularly, this paper will focus on police corruption in Afghanistan. It has been defined as the misuse and abuse of police power and authority for personal and or group gain. Police misuse of power can take the form of various police misconducts; such as, corruption of authority, kickbacks, opportunistic thefts, police crimes and et al. that will be discussed in this paper.

What are the contributing factors that accelerate corruption among Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and how it impacts lives of ordinary Afghans? The Government of Afghanistan deemed corruption as a serious threat to its nation and democracy building efforts; therefore, sizeable efforts had been put in place to combat corruption in the country. These efforts created the establishment of various anti-corruption commissions and combating corruption agencies. However, the Anti-corruption national and international agencies are working to reduce corruption in Afghanistan, but it is emerging with the passing of time. This paper will provide a foundation and will suggest a few recommendations that can effectively combat corruption in the police sector of Afghanistan.
Zusammenfassung


Dabei wird die Frage geklärt was die Korruption in der Afghanischen National Polizei fördert und welche Auswirkungen diese auf das Leben normaler Afghanen hat. Die Regierung Afghanistans hat Korruption als ernstzunehmende Bedrohung für die Nation und den Aufbau einer Demokratie erklärt und essentielle Anstrengungen unternommen um die Korruption im Land zu bekämpfen. Trotz der Anstrengungen von nationalen und internationalen Anti-Korruptionsagenturen scheint sich die Situation nicht zu verbessern. Diese Arbeit wird die Grundlagen und einige praktische Empfehlungen liefern wie Korruption effektiv innerhalb der Afghanischen Polizei bekämpft werden kann.
Introduction

Corruption is a widespread problem all over the world, which undermines state and democracy building efforts and weakens the fairness, stability and efficiency, as well as enables country to deliver sustainable development to its citizens. (Shacklock, Sampford, & Connors, 2006, p. 1) It is a political and a public administration problem as well as a crime (Jacobs, 1999, p. 74) across countries. Similarly, it generates political and governmental crisis. In a public administration with widespread corruption, public administrators, bureaucrats, politicians as well as public servants exercise their power and authority to achieve private gain without any restraint. Such practices have harmful and negative impacts on the lives of ordinary citizens all over the world.

A large number of definitions about public sector corruption has been exist and mentioned in various literatures on the topic of corruption. For example, Transparency International (Transparency-International, 1993) defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Similarly, the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Ban Ki Moon once stated that “when public money is stolen for private gain, it means fewer resources to build schools; hospitals, roads and provide food and water treatment facilities”. (Moon, 2008) Moon further argues that “when foreign aid is diverted into private bank accounts, major infrastructure projects come to a halt”.

Public sector corruption has also been defined as, “degree misuse of public power for private benefit”, and the “likeliness to demand illegal payments in high and low level of government”. (Martinez-Vazques, Granado, & Boex, 2007, p. 5) However, the mostly cited and broad definition of public corruption that I have found is from the World Bank, which
states that corruption is the “abuse of public office for private gain”. The question raise here is that what is the abuse of power? Then the World Bank describes abuse of public office as:

Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or exhorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues. (World-Bank, 1997, pp. 8-9)

The cases of public sector corruption can be observed all over the world. It can be witnessed in developed countries; in developing countries, as well as in under-developed countries too. Afghanistan is a developing country started its trip toward development almost a decade ago. But existence of premature state institutions and years of conflict created barriers towards its development dream. Like other developing countries, corruption is a momentous and growing problem in Afghanistan. It destabilizes security situations, prevent development, and create barriers toward state and democracy building objectives in the country. Corruption generates serious threats to the notion of nation-building and it “is rampant and has become more entrenched in all areas of life”. (IWA, 2010, p. 9)

Currently, widespread systemic corruption is at its high peaks in the history of Afghanistan; it is blatant, pervasive and entrenched. (USAID, 2009, p. 1) According to a survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “the most prominent problem for the country, 59% of the population indicated corruption, followed by insecurity (54%) and unemployment (52%)”. (Costa, 2010, p. 28) Similarly, another survey conducted by the Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) states that “overall, 13% of Afghans perceive corruption to be the biggest problem facing their country…thus corruption ranks as the third biggest problem after insecurity (42%) and unemployment (19%)”. (IWA, 2010, p. 26)
Almost ten years ago, “the people of Afghanistan and the international community joined hands to liberate Afghanistan from the grip of international terrorism and to begin the journey of rebuilding a nation from a past of violence, destruction and terror”. (ANDS, 2008) However, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States of America, International community thrown out the Taliban regime that was ruling Afghanistan, released their assistance and started state building efforts in the country. But, underdeveloped state institutions, absence of an actual state-building plan, and weak governance inside Afghanistan caused that assistances provided for rebuilding the country, not being spent, organized and controlled properly; which in result, increased vulnerability of Afghanistan toward corruption.

According to the HOOAC, corruption in the country “has increased dramatically” and over the years, it “has emerged as one [of] the biggest challenges facing the country’s reconstruction efforts and strengthening national and sub-national governance”. (HOOAC, 2008)

IWA has conducted a country wide survey in 2010 to find out about corruption perception among Afghan citizens. They found that “corruption threatens the legitimacy of state-building, badly affects state-society relations, feeds frustration and the support for the insurgency, leads to increasing inequality”, and at the same time “violates basic human rights on a daily basis and impedes the rule of law according to Afghan standards, hinders access to basic public services, which impacts the poor most severely, and has a major negative effect on economic development”. (IWA, 2010, p. 9)

Corruption occurs in all sectors of public service organizations in Afghanistan. A document published by Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies Afghanistan (CAPS) revealed that though, “corruption is present in all offices and departments of the government, the most corrupt are those departments that maintain constant and regular interactions with the populace, such as the Afghan National Police (ANP), Judiciary, Municipality and…”
Similarly, a U.N. survey illustrates that “Bribes were most often paid to police, judges and politicians” (Costa, 2010, p. 28) As most of the corruption cases occur within ANP, the purpose of this paper is to focus on police corruption, particularly Afghanistan National Police.

Corruption in ANP is widespread; bribery and extortion by ANP officers is miserably pervasive, ANP officers’ demand goods from shopkeepers, small and large businesses, receives money in bribe from street venders, coordinates with drug traffickers, levy extra taxes on trucks on the highway checkpoints, and imposes unexpectedly fines on those unable to provide sufficient identification documents to police. The taxi drivers for example are often forced to pay traffic police in Kabul city between 100 to 500 Afghanis each day. (Luxenberg, 2010, pp. 6-9)

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study is to find out about the existence of corruption among Afghanistan National Police (ANP) personnel. Throughout the paper, I will describe the contributing factors that caused corruption among ANP personnel and its impact on the Afghans’ lives. This paper will reveal the current anti corruption measures in Afghanistan and will suggest recommendation for future work.

**Research Question**

Police corruption is a severe problem in Afghanistan and it needs to be controlled; the aim of this paper is to write about police corruption in Afghanistan. Though, this paper would like to **find out whether corruption exists among Afghanistan National Police? If it exists, which types do exist? What caused Afghanistan National Police forces to engage in corrupt practices; what impact does it have on the lives of Afghans; and in order to reduce corruption, what measures have been taken and what are missing?**
questions will be discussed further; and the paper will address the problem of corruption within ANP.

Hypotheses

In order to explain police corruption in Afghanistan, this study will focus on three hypotheses. First, that individual behavior of police officers such as their propensity toward corruption is responsible for existing of corruption among ANP officers. Second, organizational shortcomings, such as paramilitary structure of police agencies, weak and ineffective leadership have limited control over their departments and thus become facilitators of corruption among ANP officers. Third, society related factors, such as loopholes for corruption in the society and acceptance of a certain types of corrupt practices by society at all accelerate the process of corruption among ANP officers. These three hypotheses will analyze the nature and extent of corruption among ANP officers and this thesis paper will be discussed them further.

Research Methodology

This paper focuses on a case study approach about police corruption in Afghanistan, which is a mixed form of primary data including a research that I have conducted, and the secondary data, reports, police administration records, and et al. To define police corruption, this paper will rely on a number of literatures and books published as well as various researches conducted about police corruption in different countries. Moreover, this paper will use specific information about corruption in Afghanistan from various case studies, non-governmental organization and mass media reports too.

The question raise here is that why Afghanistan for case study? And specifically, why selected Afghanistan National Police? The reasons for selecting Afghanistan and ANP force as a case study was: First, existence of widespread administrative corruption caused that
Afghanistan became among the lowest transparent countries in the world. Transparency International, a German-based non-governmental organization, ranked Afghanistan at 178 out of 180 transparent countries in the world. (Transparency-International, 2010) Similarly, a research conducted by UNODC ranked the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan that is responsible for policing in the country as the most corrupt institution (Costa, 2010), while the IWA ranking suggests that 60 percent (IWA, 2010) of corrupt practices in the security sector of Afghanistan occur in the ANP forces.

Second, being an Afghan, I have worked in the private sector in Afghanistan. I was the program manager of a road construction company, and most of the time we needed permission letters from public service departments for transportation of construction equipment and material to the job site. As a result, we were facing numerous problems with the Ministry of Public Works in Kabul and with the police on the road. Hence, it really affects public sector development and harms lives of ordinary Afghans.

Third, the rampant and pervasive administrative corruption emerges day to day in Afghanistan. It is a poor country and most of the population live in severe poverty (UNICEF, 2010), but they have paid $2.5 billion (Costa, 2010) to the public sector in 2009. Moreover, the poor portion of the Afghan community has been affected very severely by corruption. Thus, these reasons made me interested to select Afghanistan as a case study and focus on the emergence of corruption among Afghanistan National Police.

Primary Data

The primary data from my master thesis is the survey that I have conducted to understand the accurate nature and extent of police corruption in Afghanistan National Police (ANP). I have selected three major cities (Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar-i-Shareef) of Afghanistan for the survey, and started to collect data and conduct interviews from 28th
February to 5th of April, 2011 in above mentioned locations. The question here is that why I have selected these three cities for the survey?

To answer this question, first reason was the security situations in Afghanistan. Among 34 provinces of Afghanistan 17 faced with lower security threats, 5 province face with medium security threats, and 12 provinces face with higher security threats (ANPS, 2010, p. 3), and the cities that I have selected for this study were among the lower security threats cities. The second reason is that physically and logistically, I was not able to travel to all parts of Afghanistan. Because, I had very limited time, as well as very limited financial support to conduct the survey. The third reason for selecting these three cities is that beside relatively secure cities, majority of the population lives in these cities. The selection of Jalalabad, dominated by Pashtons and Mazar-i-Sharif dominated by Tajik ethnic group was to compare the level of police corruption among two major ethnicities of Afghanistan. Kabul was selected because of being capital of Afghanistan and that most of the police controlling agencies including the MOI are exist there.

During the survey, I have visited various places and conducted face to face interviews with people, distributed questioners (see annex I) to the university students during their class hours; as well as, sent questioners electronically (per E-mail). I have distributed almost 500 questioners to the people and conducted more than 50 direct interviews. The questioners were mostly distributed to the students of universities and ordinary citizens, while the interviews conducted were mostly with police officials and ordinary policemen.

Selections criteria were anonymous for university students, and most of the students responded to the questioners were from the faculties of Law and Political Science. Among them, there were students from the fourth and third year of their study and a small portion of them were from the first and second year of their studies. Selective face to face interviews
averaging 45 minutes in length took place with ANP officers (Satunman) and ANP patrolmen (Satunkai) within and out of the MOI. The response rate was much higher among those who received questioners directly than those who received them electronically (79% and 30% respectively), while the overall response rate was 60%. I have received back more than 300 (exactly 302) responded questioners, and completed 50 interviews.

The reasons for selecting mostly students was that Afghanistan has very limited universities, and most of the students from different provinces are coming to the University of Kabul in Kabul, University of Nangarhar in Jalalabad, and University of Balkh in Mazar-i-Sharif. For example the faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Nangarhar had students from 22 provinces of Afghanistan. (Amen, 2011) Therefore, this case study has selected students to understand nature of police corruption not only in these three cities, but also in other provinces of Afghanistan too.

Secondary Data

In order to understand the nature of police corruption, this paper also need to focus on various other documents about police corruption. These documents includes, books regarding corruption in general and police corruption in particular, reports published by various governmental and non-governmental organizations, surveys conducted in the same field of study, various media reports, and et al. For example, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Police Perception Survey 2010 by United Nations Development Program (UNDP), research conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 2007, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) 2007-2010, corruption reports, and et al. will be used throughout this paper.
Limitations of Data Collection

In order to conduct a survey about police misconduct or specifically police corruption in Afghanistan, it is essential to obtain a permission letter from the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI), which is initially very hard to obtain. I have convincingly battled for obtaining the letter in various department of MOI for more than two weeks. Finally, I found the opportunity to meet with the Minister of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan, who ordered his administrative team for extensive cooperation and promised for an interview with him as well. However, due to lack of time I was not able to conduct a proper interview with him.

In addition, access to information within MOI was very limited and I was not able to obtain adequate information from the anti corruption department of the MOI. For example, I was not permitted to make a copy of their action plan of the Directorate for Combating Administrative Corruption (DCAC) of the MOI. For example, with almost one month later from the end of the year, the DCAC were not able to provide me a report of their activities during last year (1389). Similarly, connecting East region, Center and North region of Afghanistan was a time consuming task; I have spent almost two months conducting this survey. Lack of awareness about police corruption and general perception of people about corruption were other limitations that I have faced during the survey period.

In addition, limited and even non-existed scientific literatures about police corruption in Afghanistan are other limitations that were existed. However, there were a number documents and media reports available, but they were mostly about corruption in Afghanistan in general.

In general, this paper will explain the nature and extent of police corruption in Afghanistan in four chapters and will conclude the paper with a few recommendations.
First, this paper will explain very briefly the notion of police corruption in general; its definitions in various literatures; its types; and the mechanisms of measuring the nature and extent of police corruption. Chapter one will mainly focus on these issues,

Second, in chapter two, the paper will describe specifically corruption among various levels of Afghanistan National Police (ANP); for which it will focus on the history of police building in Afghanistan (from the past till present), formation of the current ANP forces and the existence of corruption among ANP officers. Furthermore, it will describe a typology of police corruption and it’s measurements in Afghanistan.

Third, with having some basic knowledge about police corruption within ANP, this paper will further explore and describe factors that lead to, or contribute to corruption within ANP forces. These factors are: 1) individual factors, 2) organizational factors, and 3) external factors, which will be discussed in chapter three. In addition chapter three will also describe impacts of ANP corruption too.

Fourth, the paper will include current measures that have already been emplaced by the government of Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior Affairs, as well as measures that are taken by international agencies. Last but not least, this paper will attempt to provide an overview of what is missing, or what needs to be done to reduce corruption among ANP forces.
Chapter One

Literature Review

1. Police Corruption

Universally police services are accepted to be a common good (Ayling, 2007, p. 341), which means that everyone can use it and all citizens of a country can benefit from it. Despite having benefits for individuals, they also contain fundamental gains for the society at all; such as, in the appearance of better, safer and secure societies in which citizens of a country want to live in peace and prosperity; in which citizens looking forward for their children to have a brighter future and safer living environment. Goldstein argues that the most important programs of policing are “those that demonstrate, for purposes of reducing fear and deterring crime, that the police have a presence in the community: that they are easily accessible, frequently visible, and caring in their relationships with citizens”. (Goldstein, 1987, pp. 8-9)

Punch (2009) quotes Robert Mark, Commissioner of the metropolitan police in the 1970s, where he states that “A good police force is one that catches more criminals than it employs”. Policing and police organizations are the key institutions for law enforcement in a country. According to Punch, “in a democratic society there is an expectation that law enforcement will follow both the rule of law and due process. Those who enforce the law should abide by the law; and should be accountable for their decisions”. (Punch, 2000, p. 301) Police officers have the right to use coercive force when required; they are assigned to enforce laws, not to break them. When they exercise their entrusted power in a proper manner, and do what they require to do and do not do what they are not required to do (Ivković, 2005, p. 31), they performed their assigned activities according to the laws, which generates trust among people and police organizations. However, when they abuse their assigned power, and do what they do not supposed to do and do not do what they are supposed to do, they abused
their power, which undermines trust among citizens and law enforcement organizations and they become “notorious law violators themselves: they steal. They accept bribes. They rob drug dealers, they sell drugs. They turn a blind eye when they see other police officers stealing or otherwise violating the laws”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 3) In order to understand police corruption clearly, it is important to define police corruption and how it occurs.

1.1. Defining Police Corruption

The job of policing and police corruption go paralleled with each other. (Punch, 2009, p. 1) The core duty of police organizations is to enforce laws and governmental regulations properly and provide police services to all citizens of a country on equal and regular basis. But, when these police officers and police organizations themselves abuse those laws and regulations, use their power for “private gain”, or perform actions, which they are not entitled to do and do not perform actions, which they are entitled to do, it can be named as police corruption. Goldstein states “corrupt police officer is like a fireman setting fires or a physician spreading diseases”. (Goldstein, 1977, p. 190) However, there is diversity among the scholars when defining police corruption, but it has been loosely defined in literatures as “deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical, or criminal behavior by a police officer”. (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 423)

Punch argues that Corruption occurs when an official receives or is promised significant advantage or reward (personal, group or organizational) for doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, for exercising a legitimate discretion for improper reasons, and for employing illegal means to achieve approved goals. (Punch, 1985, p. 14)
Similarly, Ivković (2005) illustrates that the police officer engaging in corrupt behavior, mostly motivated by achievement of personal gain. He defines police corruption as;

Police corruption is an action or omission, a promise of [an] action or omission, or an attempted action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer’s misuse of the official position, motivated in significant part by the achievement of personal gain. (Ivković, 2005, p. 16)

The Mollen Commission that was assigned to investigate allegations of police corruption and the anti-corruption procedures of the police department in the city of New York describes the severity of the problem, and states that “the problem of police corruption extends far beyond the corrupt cop. It is a multi-faceted”. (Mollen, 1994, p. 1) However, the “picture of police officers abusing their office for personal gain is itself disturbing, but the problem of police corruption extends well beyond the rule-violating behavior of a few officers” (Ivković, 2005, p. 3) Ivković states that “police corruption distorts police work, encourages the code of silence, promotes resistance to accountability, and undermines the legitimacy of the police and the government”.

Ivković raises questions and asks that can we distinguish between various types of police corruption? Or is it coherent to recognize all types of police violations such as, bribery, extortion, nepotism, favoritism, fraud, theft and et al. as police corruption? Or could these divers’ violations fit under the umbrella of a single form of police misconduct, namely police corruption? (Ivković, 2005, pp. 15-16) She argues that police corruption differs across countries and from agency to agency; and states that “most countries do not have a crime specifically entitled corruption, but even if they did, the definitions would probably vary at least as much as the definitions of street crimes across the world”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 16)
Similarly, some countries “may not even define some of the acts (e.g., bribery) as criminal at all”. (Newman, 1999, p. 20)

Finally, Punch (2009) points out to numerous types of police corruption; he distinguishes among various types, and states that “police corruption in its narrow, legalistic sense generally refers to: an officer knowingly doing or not doing something that is against his or her duty for some form of financial or material gain or promise of such gain”. (Punch, 2009, p. 19) What can be understood from this definition is that it mainly focuses at bribery and financial gains for a police officer or a group of police officers, not to enforce the law. But what he means by gain is that; gain “may vary considerably and not be financial”. He describes that gain “may be getting an arrest or a conviction, achieving status and receiving praise, public acclaim, and perhaps a recommendation”. (Punch, 2009, pp. 15-16) In order to understand police corruption very briefly, we have to understand various types of police corruption first.

2. Typology of Police Corruption

In contemporary world, police corruption is a global and universal problem, it exist in various forms all over the world. It is hard to distinguish between various forms of police dirty activities ranging from police deviant to police severe offences. Punch (2009) states that police corruption involves the “misuse of police power and authority, utilizing organizational position and resources largely to avoid preventing crime, to encourage crime by others, to engage in crime, to combat crime by illegal means or simply to exercise power for illicit ends”. (Punch, 2009, pp. 30-31) To touch this broader notion of police corruption, he considers three typologies for police corruption: 1) Typology of officers; 2) Typology by Roebuck and Barker; and 3) Levels of deviance. (Punch, 2009, p. 20)
2.1. Typology of Officers (Grass-eaters, Meat-eaters, and Birds)

A senior New York Police Department (NYPD) corruption investigator characterized three types of officers; 1) Grass-Eaters, 2) Meat-Eaters, and 3) Birds. (Punch, 2009, pp. 20-21) (Roebuck & Barker, 1973, p. 35) According to Punch, grass-eaters did not search for illicit gain or kickbacks but quietly accepting them as an unexpectedly offer. The second categories of officers that he introduces are meat-eaters who looked for the illicit gain in order to organize and regulate arrangements for offences. They deal with gamblers, or they would compromise a homicide inquiry with the intention of receiving illicit gain. He explains the birds and argues that these categories of officers are mostly forgotten, but they are interesting category because it determines a division of officers who avoid deviant practices. (Punch, 2009, pp. 20-21)

Punch constructs his own observation and builds a typology of police officers and their relationship to deviance and corruption. Similarly, he distinguishes between three types of police officers who are; 1) Uniform Carrier: this group of police officers who join police department for instrumental reasons and they don’t want to work very hard; 2) Mister Average: this group of officers seem to be reliable and work in satisfactory fashion, but not very much motivated; and 3) Professionals: this category of officers, joined police department as a profession and they believe that they can achieve results by good meaning skillful and honest. (Punch, 2009, pp. 23-24)

2.2. Roebuck and Barker Typology

The second classification contains eight categories or eight types of police corrupt practices that refer to a most widely cited typology in literatures. This typology has been created by Roebuck and Barker, which contains; (1) Corruption of authority, (2) Kickbacks, (3) Opportunistic Theft, (4) Shakedowns, (5) Protection of illegal activities, (6) The Fix, (7)
i. **Corruption of Authority**: In this case, the authority of an officer is corrupted, when they receive *unauthorized, unearned* material gains by virtue of their power or position in a police organization without violating the law. They receive free meal, drinks, sex, entertainments, discounts, services and et al. In addition, they receive rewards for violating departmental rules and regulations. For example, they receive payments from businessmen for “property protection extending beyond routine patrol duties; secret payments by property owner to police for arresting robbers and burglars at their establishments; payments by bondsmen acting as bounty hunters to police for the arrest and notification of bond jumper”. (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 429)

ii. **Kickbacks**: It occurs when police officers receive material gains for referring business to particular firms and companies, who are concerned about selling their services or goods to people with whom the police confront during their regular patrol. According to Roebuck and Barker, “corruptors are usually legitimate businessmen who stand to gain through a good working relationship with police officer”. (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 429) Normally, kickbacks are violations of formal departmental rules that will be responded with disciplinary actions; and are not generally defined or accepted as criminal law violations.

iii. **Opportunistic Theft**: this type of police deviance is not a planned activity, but rather happens when there is an opportunity available for some of the police officers. For example, they steal from arrestees, unprotected businesses, unprotected properties, victims of crime, traffic accidents, dead bodies, as well as keep a “portion of confiscated evidence” they find out during house raids, such as money, gold, drugs and et al.
iv. **Shakedowns:** Shakedown occurs opportunistically, when a police officer accidentally witnesses a crime, or in some occasion gains knowledge of a criminal violation, and he/she supposed to take necessary action, but instead he/she accepts bribe or personal gain not to follow the violator or making an arrest. For example, a violator of traffic regulations wants to offer bribe to a police officer for avoiding a traffic charge against him/her.

v. **Protection of Illegal Activities:** Police officers receive bribes and personal gain, in order to protect individuals and their illegal activities during normal patrol. Such gain could be from, prostitution, drug-dealing, gambling, illegal bars, pornography and et al. Similarly, police officers also receive bribes and personal gain from legitimate businesses and enterprises that operate illegally; for example, some businessmen, drivers, and other individuals have legal right to perform their activities in certain time and in certain locations but they pay bribes to police officers for illegal permission to operate outside the legal boundaries.

vi. **The Fix:** the Fix happens when a police officer undermines criminal investigation or criminal proceedings. Sometimes, police officer hide evidence or gives perjured testimony in return for some material rewards. There are, however, in case of traffic violations, some of the respectable citizens who want to avoid blemished driving records, pay to the traffic control police officers for not charging them.

vii. **Direct Criminal Activities:** In such cases, policemen intentionally and directly commit crimes against the person or property for receiving material gain, which are in violation of criminal law as well as departmental rules and regulations. For example, armed robberies, killings, drug trafficking, drug dealing and et al. performed by an individual police officer or by a group of police officers are the examples of these violations. Such
police officers are seem to be professional criminals and are prosecuting according to the criminal law.

viii. **Internal Payoffs:** Internal payoffs happens when police officers pay their supervisors to regulate their activities, i.e. they pay their supervisors for favorable adjustments of their holidays, working hours, working locations and et al. accordingly, sometimes police officers pay their supervisors and high ranking officers for their promotions, as well as for effortless assignments. (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, pp. 428-434) (Punch, 2000, p. 303) (Punch, 2009, p. 27)

ix. **Flaking and Padding:** what Punch means by this is that sometimes a police officer planting or adding to evidence to “set someone up” to ensure a conviction or a longer sentence for criminals. (Punch, 1985, p. 11) (Punch, 2000, p. 303)

### 2.3. Level of Police Deviance/Corruption

It has been already mentioned that police corruption is a universal problem. It has also been cleared that various types of police deviance exist around the world. When describing various police personal gains, and harshness of the problem, (Punch, 2000, p. 302) distinguishes between three broad categories of police deviance and adds a fourth category (Police Deviance) in his recent work of 2009. He describes these levels as:

i. **Police Deviance:** According to him, deviance is an *umbrella term* of all police activities, which disobey the internal regulation of a police organization, laws and the expectation of citizen. For example, not wearing police hat, not tighten shirt buttons and et al.

ii. **Police Misconduct:** What he means by misconduct is that some of low levels of corruption are *occupational deviances*; and he argues that such deviances can be found in other organizations as well. According to him, these activities are usually not violating the criminal laws, but mostly violate departmental rules and regulations and covered by
disciplinary codes. For example, a police officer drinks on duty, sleep during duty hours, not punctual, disrespect his/her superior, disregard of duty, and et al.

iii. **Police Corruption**: He uses the term *police-corruption* for a number of offences such as, abuse of power and authority, which is much broader than bribery and offences that fall under the criminal law. For instance, Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) of the United Kingdom (UK) argues that “Police officers do not abuse their powers or authority and respect the rights of all individuals” (IPCC, 2004), if police officers abuse their power; the incident will be referred for investigation under the Police Reform Act 2002. According to IPCC these activities includes: attempts to alter the path of justice, receiving payments or favours, corrupt *handler-informant relationships*, leaking top-secret information, withdrawal and deliver of seized controlled drugs, firearms or other materials’ and conspiracies in relation to all these. (see www.ipcc.gove.uk) Corruption for Punch is a serious offence; to him, whether or not the label of the criminal is attached to such offence, or how this offence is internally processed, investigated and prosecuted, “is a matter of internal definition and negotiation”. (Punch, 2009, p. 32)

iv. **Police Crimes**: Punch (2009) uses the term of *police crimes* for very serious offences and states that they are gross abuse of power. He points to a range of unjustified violence such as, armed robberies, rapes and murder…; also where offences relate to innocent victims chosen at random, and where they would be roundly condemned by nearly all police officers. (Punch, 2000, p. 302) (Punch, 2009, pp. 33-34)

At this point, Punch confronts with an obstacle between the definition of *police corruption* and *police crime*, and states that there is not any “watertight” definition for police corruption. Therefore, he makes a distinction between rather minor incident ranging from police misconduct, more serious offences considered *corrupt* and are officially criminal and very serious *crimes*, which are deeply criminal, in a sense that are unjustifiable for all other
police officers. He states that “then police crime would also be synonymous with corruption”.
(Punch, 2009, p. 33) He argues that if an on duty or off duty police officer conduct an offence
and use police knowledge, police resource and police authority, then they will fall under
corruption, “if its main component is abuse of office”. For instance, He states that:

if an off-duty officer uses his police badge and firearm to commit murder
during an armed robbery then this is ‘crime by cop’; if it led to covering up the
crime with the collusion of other officers and the altering of evidence then
those other officers would also be corrupt. (Punch, 2009, pp. 33-34)

3. Measuring Police Corruption

Even though, the need to understand the precise nature and extent of police deviance,
the measurement of police corruption is surprisingly underdeveloped. It is difficult to discuss
about police corruption without an understandable definition or even a widespread
understanding of the term in general and how it can be functional in the very particular
environment of policing. Lacking of a precise definition makes it complicated to measure
accurate nature and extent of police corruption as well as determining its causes. (Skolnick,
2002, pp. 5-7) Similarly, Jacobs (1999) argues that it is very difficult to find indicators of
corruption as finding such indicators in other crimes, he states that:

Unlike for most other crimes, there are no official data on the corruption
rate. How much corruption is there? Is the rate rising or falling? Is there
more corruption now than in previous decades? Is there more corruption in
one city than another, in one government department than another? Has
corruption decreased after passage of a law, announcement of an
investigation or arrests, or implementation of managerial reforms?
Corruption cannot be estimated by examining the Uniform Crime Reports or
the National Crime Victimization Survey. Thus, it cannot be determined
whether any particular anticorruption strategy or spate of strategies is
working. We are data deprived. (Jacobs, 1999, p. 79)

Unlike other crimes, it seems that very less attention have been paid to the notion of
measuring police corruption or to find about police corruption rate. For instance, should
corruption be measured by the percentage of those officers who engaged in corrupt practices
in a year or a decade or their entire career? Despite a lack of agreement over corruption rate
(Jacobs, 1999, p. 76) on the one hand, and lack of a universal definition for police corruption
on the other hand, the circumstances concerning measurement of police corruption, however,
may not be very frustrated. Jacobs (1999) argues that lack of a particular definition for corrupt
behaviors preventing us from measuring police corruption. He states that we cannot count all
types of police misconducts as police corruption. According to him, bribery, attempted
bribery, embezzlement and theft of services would be obviously count as a police corruption,
but should misappropriation of office supplies, personal phone calls, and misuse of sick
leaves be counted? (Jacobs, 1999, pp. 76-77)

The measurement of police corruption, whether it occurs directly or indirectly, is based
on the perception of real occurrence of corruption, which relies on an accepted understanding
of corruption itself. (Brown, 2006, p. 57) Despite the fact that there are no any universally
approved statistics available that shows the accurate nature and extent of police corruption;
there are, however, a number of other methods and sources exist to find out and estimate
accurate nature and extent of police corruption. Such as, surveys, experiments, sociological
field studies, independent commissions, internal agency records, and the records of the
criminal justice system. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 33-35) Though, all above mentioned sources and
methods are naturally limited and provide less information, but they might reveal an image of
the level and nature of corruption in a particular jurisdiction, in a particular time.
In order to find out about the accurate nature and extent of corruption, “the practical impossibility of measuring corruption, on the one hand, and the pressing need to obtain relevant information, on the other hand” (Ivković, 2005, p. 34), has placed social scientists in a state of emergency to use various techniques and methods for measuring police corruption; such as, conducting surveys, make experiments, case studies, interviews, and observations. Ivković (2005) illustrates a very broad data collection method for measuring police corruption at a police organization.

In this chart Ivković explains the levels at which police corruption could be measured at an organization. He starts with the estimates of the actual extent and nature of corruption in the bottom and ending up with the offenders sent to prison in the top. To explain further the
various methods of measuring police corruption, this paper will focus on a number of methods that were properly used by scholars for measuring police corruption.

3.1. Measuring Police-Corruption by Survey Method

A logical source of information about police corruption is someone who knows about it. (Ivković, 2005, p. 61) Conducting a survey about measuring police corruption within police organizations may not provide significant information. Survey of police officers to report their own or colleague officers’ involvement in corrupt behaviors will provide very less or even no information; because, the legitimacy of such surveys are doubtful and is very difficult to obtain adequate access to information regarding police corruption from police agencies or police officers. In order, to protect themselves from losing their job and not facing prosecution in criminal court, they are not willing to report their own or colleagues corrupt behavior. In addition, as they are member of police organization and are likely to support the code of silences, they are not willing to express their thought about existence of corruption within their organization, (Ivković, 2005, pp. 35-36) even if guaranteed confidentiality.

However, there are a number of surveys conducted to express police corruption and to lessen the impact of the code of silence within police organizations. For example, the one conducted by Thomas Barker in 1983; he asked police rookies to report on the frequency of corruption in their agencies, which in result, some of the officer come out from the code of silence and responded that “some of their fellow officers engaged in serious corruption”. (Barker, 1983, p. 34)

Another possible source to find out about police corruption is citizens’ survey who might have experienced incident of corruption themselves or have observed a corrupt transaction by others. (Ivković, 2005, p. 37) Ivković states that a “problem with public survey is that attitudes can be based on actual experiences or on general opinions about the police”.
(Ivković, 2005, p. 37) The outcomes of citizens’ surveys present relatively a contradictory image about police corruption; it depends on the respondents and the time and place where survey has conducted. For example, I was recently conducting a survey for writing this master thesis; I found that most of the peoples’ perception lays on the general perception regarding police corruption that is very evident in the domestic and international media reports.

Similarly, surveys across the world recommend that nature and extent of police corruption differs extensively. Gallup International conducted a survey in 1996, asked question from the citizen of 37 countries to estimate the extent of corruption of various public officials, including police. Their survey illustrated that one third of the respondents in Western European countries and Israel, and more than two third of the respondents in Eastern European countries, Asian countries, and Latin American countries reported that police corruption is widespread. (Gallup-International, 1996) There are, however, other methods of surveys that could be used to estimate the nature and extent of police corruption by asking citizens to report incidents of corruption (Ivković, 2005, pp. 38-39) where they offered bribes to a police officer or were victims of such incidents directly.

3.2. Measuring Police Corruption by Case Study Method

Another method, which is applicable in measuring police corruption, is the case study method. Such case studies include a focus on a single or a small number of police agencies by using combination of various means, such as observations, interviews, and analyses of documents. The likely benefit of these studies is that “checking and rechecking the information obtained via various methods increase the internal validity” (Ivković, 2005, pp. 44-45); while such kind of case studies needs very deep understanding and in dept information; therefore, it limits the number of agencies covering by each study.
Initially, very limited studies focus on police corruption; a significant number of police studies are community related studies, which in general include community metaphors and illustrate the relationship between police and community people as well. Consequently, these case studies often report the nature and extent of police corruption. (Ivković, 2005, p. 45) For example, the one conducted by Chambliss described the “Rainfall West” a corrupt city, which is “dominated by a complex web of relationship among legitimate businesses, illegitimate organizations, local journalists, politicians and criminal justice personnel” (Ivković, 2005, p. 45) that illustrates the complexity of the relationship between community and police agency.

Similarly, some of these studies only focus on a single police agency, which includes nonparticipant interviews and observations. Such studies frequently illustrate very brief information about the agency, but at the same time it tends to be only a snapshot, taken at a particular period of time and therefore not appropriate to follow dynamic changes in the police organization. Consequently the findings of such studies are limited to those agencies under focus (Ivković, 2005, pp. 45-46) and are not including outside agencies.

3.3. Measuring Police Corruption by Independent Commissions

Whenever, allegations of corruption increases in a country, the expectation of citizens also increase and they expect from their government to eliminate or at least reduce such allegations of corruption. Consequently, the government decides to establishment independent commissions to investigate allegations of corruption, determine the nature and extent, find the contributing factors (IWA, 2010, pp. 47-48), and recommend feasible solutions for reform. For example, the Knapp Commission in 1972 and the Mollen Commission in 1994 in the Unites States of America, and Anti-Corruption Commission of Afghanistan 2003, High Officer of Oversight and Anti-Corruption of Afghanistan 2008 and et al. All these commissions dealt with the allegation of corruption in various public service organizations.
Particularly, the Mollen Commission had established to investigate allegations of corruption in the NYPD in the city of New York in 1994 (Mollen, 1994), while the 2003 Anti-Corruption Commission of Afghanistan was established to develop “strategies to eliminate corruption and to promote a talented, competent and committed civil service throughout the Afghan Government” (EIRA, 2003) However, with the emerging path of corruption in Afghanistan, President Karzai in July 2008 issued a decree establishing a High Office for Oversight and Anti-Corruption. (HOOAC, 2008)

In essence, it is very hard to deny the presence of political influence on such commissions. The capability to recruit experienced police investigators contributes to the precision of corruption estimates. Ivković suggests that “using former police officers form the agency under investigation is beneficial because it provides internal information about corruption in the agency”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 48) At the same time, she points to the sensitivity of such recruitments and states that relationship between the former officer and the police agency may still exist that can alter the outcome of investigation. The extent and nature of police corruption that measured by various independent commissions, varies from widespread corruption of the “grass-eater” variety in the 1970s, to the less frequent forms of corruption of the “meat-eater” variety, discovered by the Mollen Commission in 1990s. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 48-49) Of course, it is important to illustrate that independent anti-corruption commissions are established in the past and still establishing to reveal the actual nature and extent of corruption ranging from the isolated or widespread (less serious forms) to the most concentrated and most serious and grave forms of it.

3.4. Measuring Police Corruption from Internal Agency Records

Another method that can be sued to reveal the nature and extent of police corruption in a police agency is to look deeply to the internal records of that agency under investigation.
For example, in the early 1990s, the NYPD where 35,000 police officers were recruited, the internal records of NYPD states that annually, there were 2,700 allegation of corruption in the agency (Mollen, 1994, p. 87) that is almost 8 in 100 police officers involved in corrupt deals. This amount decreased to 1,922 in 1995 (5 and a half in 100 police officers) and 1,726 (5 in 100 police officers) in 1996. (Baueris, 1997, p. 12) But the question raise here is that are these number illustrates the accurate number of corruption in the NYPD?

To simply answer this question, one can say no, not really. These numbers do not match with the actual extent of allegations of corruption in the NYPD. Ivković suggests that finding the actual extent of corruption and the reality of such internal agency reports, it is important to compare the number of complaints in an agency with the number of complaints based on the findings of a reliable source. For example, when the Knapp Commission reported widespread corruption in the NYPD (Ivković, 2005, p. 54), the record of the agency stated less than one allegation of corruption at the agency.

Mollen Commission’s findings suggests that the number of 8 corruption complaints per hundred officers per year do not give us the impression that the it is extremely low for a department in which the majority of police officers are not involved in corrupt activities, but, it give us the feeling that the nature of their crimes they committed, the corrupt officer perhaps produced a lot of other corruption related activities. It also happens that sometime people complains several time from one officer, but there might be more allegation of corruption inside the agency; when that agency investigate such allegations of corruption, it relates to the procedure of the agency dealing with the corruption complaints (Ivković, 2005, pp. 54-55), the police agency can close eyes on complaint and may withdraw them.
3.5. Measuring Police Corruption from Criminal Justice System Cases

The next level that can help us measure the nature and extent of police corruption is formal criminal justice system in a country. Here we can depend on “cases referred to prosecution, cases prosecuted, cases with convictions, and cases with imprisonment”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 55) In addition, cases referred for prosecution from various sources, such as individuals, investigation agencies, independent commission, and or other governmental organizations are also count in this category. Mollen Commission (1994) suggests that the most important sources to find about police corruption cases that are referred for prosecution is the police agency itself, but bellow limitations exist within a police agency.

First, due to heavy workload on internal investigators of the agency, the police agency “not only has no motives to investigate complaints diligently and refer cases of police officers…but actually has incentives to conceal cases”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 55) For example, Mollen Commission revealed that 230 cases of serious corruption concealed by the NYPD. (Mollen, 1994, pp. 96-98)

Second, the one who received information (prosecutor) regarding police corruption is also not paying attention to prosecute these cases. Both state and local prosecutors are willing to develop long-standing friendly relationship with police agencies, because they need to rely on police officers while investigating criminal, as well as, non criminal cases. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 55-56) However, there are fewer evidences about police corruption cases that are prosecuted, but it is possible to find and measure such cases about police corruption everywhere in the world. It will be nearly impossible to find out about the actual nature and extent of police corruption. Collecting actual data about police corruption, will guide us to select, utilize and place appropriate control mechanisms.
Summary

In general, police corruption is common everywhere in the world. Cases of police who violated both departmental and criminal laws can be witnessed everywhere in the world. Police officers who engage in practices that are not in line with their organizational rules and regulation; they do what that are not supposed to do and don’t do what they are supposed to do, they engaged in an improper conduct, which can be named police corruption. Moreover, various types of police misconducts such as corruption of authority, kickbacks, opportunistic thefts and et al. exists all over the world. However, to measure police corruption, it is very difficult to find a precise method, but it doesn’t mean that finding the nature and extend of police corruption is impossible. There are ways and methods such as surveys, case studies, independent commissions’ reports, reports of the criminal justice system in a country and et al. that can provide us information about the nature and extent of police corruption.

To find about police corruption in Afghanistan National Police, this paper will further describe the notion of police corruption in Afghanistan. Before understanding about ANP corruption, we have to know the process of police building in Afghanistan as well as its current features that will be discussed in the next chapter. In addition next chapter will describe existence of corruption within ANP, its typology and how it can be measured.
Chapter Two
Understanding Police Corruption in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, stories of police corruption are the hard topics of news media, as well as general public: they draw public attentions and make the discussion of police corruption very broad and severe. The current insecurity, insurgency, existing of warlords, drug economy, and absence of infrastructure, all caused Afghanistan to become a safe place for illegal activities of all sorts of people. According to a report, published by the British government and quoted by Daily Outlook Afghanistan states that “Corruption, desertion and drug abuse among the police recruits are serious problems in the way of turning the Afghan Police force into a professional, committed and reliable provider of safety and security to Afghan people”. (Rezaie, 2011, p. 5 para)

To bring security and stability to the country, not only Afghan National Police (ANP), but also Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the National Department of Security (NDS) are responsible. If these organizations accomplish their job according to their duty requirements, then their combined efforts will establish a peaceful environment for the citizen of Afghanistan. But, if they refuse to accomplish their duty as required, then the county will suffer and will remain as it is today. Corruption does exist in almost all sectors of the Afghan government; but, in this chapter, this paper will narrow the study only to the existence of corruption among ANP officers. Before starting the issue of corruption within ANP, it is essential to know about formation of ANP and their activities.

1. Formation of Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

Afghanistan National Police (ANP) is the prime law enforcement agency that operates under the command of Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan. The current institutional structure of the ANP is consists of several distinct entities. It includes, the Afghan Uniform (Civilian)
Police (AUCP) that is responsible for general police duties, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and Enabling Forces such as medical, logistical, administrative, recruitment, training and education. (ANPS, 2010, p. 22)

The AUCP is consisting of the ANP regional zones, the Traffic Police and the Fire and Rescue Department. The ANCOP mission is to maintain law and order utilizing proportional armed capability. It is the leading police force dealing with counter insurgency. ABP has the mandate to secure and safeguard national borders and maintain security in Border Security Zones. The AACP comprise of two categories that are investigative and intelligence police at all levels from MOI to regions and districts, they are then divided into seven sub categories. 1) Counter Terrorism, 2) Counter Narcotics, 3) Police Intelligence, 4) Criminal Investigation, 5) Major Crimes Task Force, 6) Police Special Units, and 7) Forensics. In addition, the APPF is responsible to protect key infrastructure, facilities, construction projects and personnel across the country. (ANPS, 2010, pp. 21-29) (Perito, 2009, p. 1)

The contemporary ANP has been developing consistently from 2002 onward. The initial number of ANP designed in 2005 was 62,000 while the current proposed number has increased to 134,000 by the end of October 2011. (Cornwell, 2011) In order to understand Afghanistan police force, this paper focus on the history of police force and its development throughout the time.

1.1. Historical Background of Police Force in Afghanistan

ANP is the prime organization of law enforcement in Afghanistan. However, throughout history Afghanistan was lacking a very strong, stable and an effective civilian police force. During 1960s and 1970s, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic have helped and provided assistance to train and develop Afghan Police Force (APF). Throughout that period of time, the Afghan police were consisted
of two types of police force; the one with a high training officers, and another mostly untrained and inexperienced police force (Wilder, 2007, p. 3) who were required by the constitutions of Afghanistan before 1992 to perform a two years of compulsory service.

The efforts made during this period, undermined by the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 that lead to the resistance of Mujahedeen groups all over the country. However, former President Dr. Najibullah has re-established the police academy of Kabul in 1989 after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, but once again it had shut down after three years by mujahedeen groups when they controlled Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan in 1992. They established a new government and discharged all those served in the Afghan army as well as in the Afghan police force. Due to intense factional fighting among various mujahedeen groups prevented any agreement to establish a new Afghan army or a new Afghan police, which in result, lead to a chaotic situation in the country. The Taliban obtained control of Kabul in 1996 and established a very strict religious paramilitary police force by the name of Amer bil maroof wa nahi anil munker (*Vise and Virtue Police, Religious Police*) (Wilder, 2007, pp. 2-3) (Amnesty-International, 2003, pp. 1-7) whose main responsibility was the implementation and enforcement of very strict and conservative rules of the Taliban government.

1.2. Current Police Force Development in Afghanistan

The contemporary efforts towards establishment of a new Afghan Police Force have emerged after the defeat of the Taliban regime in 2001. In the aftermath of the Taliban, in December 2001 various Ethno-political groups of Afghanistan, in which Taliban were not included, agreed in the city of Bonn of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn Agreement), to establish an interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai. As a result, the so called *Northern Alliance* militia groups who fought against the Taliban and helped coalition forces to defeat the Taliban gained control of most of government organizations. The vacuum that
was existed due to years of conflicts and the civil war required to be filled immediately. Therefore, it provided an ultimate way for those faction leaders to accommodate, legitimize and pay for their militia groups. Consequently, most of the police force positions filled by militia personnel who had very little or no police training or experience at all, (Amnesty-International, 2003, pp. 7-8) and were not interested to open the space for others.

To decrease the role of these faction leaders and to create a well trained police force, which will be capable of protecting Afghan citizens’ rights, the Afghanistan Police Law has been introduced in 2005 by the Afghan government that was required by the Constitution of 2004 of Afghanistan. The Police Law enacted on the basis of “the provisions of Article 56, Article 75 (3) and Article 134 of the Constitution of Afghanistan to govern the duties and powers of the police in order to ensure the public order and security”. (Police-Law, 2005, p. 1) Article 56 of the Afghanistan Constitution states that “Observing the provision of the Constitution, obeying the laws, adhering to public law and order are duties of all people of Afghanistan”, accordingly, article 75 (3) states that “the government shall have the following duties: Maintenance of public law and order and elimination of administrative corruption” and article 134 describes the duties of police; that is “discovery of crimes is the duty of the police”. (Constitution, 2004)

Article two of the Police Law (2005) defines police and argues that “The Police: include police officer, Satanman [non-commissioned police officer] and Satunkai [policeman] who are employed by and operate within the organization of the Ministry of Interior to ensure the public order and security according to the provisions of the law” (Police-Law, 2005, p. 1) The chain of command of ANP has been describe in article 4 of the Police Law.

**Article Four:** The police shall perform their duties under the leadership of the Minster of Interior in the capital, and under the guidance of the governors and district chiefs in the provinces and district respectively.
The border police and highway security police shall perform their duties under the leadership of the Minister of Interior both in the capital and provinces. (Police-Law, 2005, p. 3)

Article four has been later revised by advices from the United States of America (USA) police advisors to the Minister of Interior. As a result, the Minister of Interior issued an order and revised the article four of the Police Law, which the new chain of command ranges from “1) the Minister of Interior, to 2) the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs, to 3) Regional Commanders, to 4) Provincial Chiefs of Police, to 5) District Chiefs of Police”. (Wilder, 2007, p. 5) (PCCS, n.d., p. 1) This new order reduced the rule of the governor in operational chain of command. (MoI, 2006) Moreover, twenty-one duties and obligations of the police force have been described in article 5 of the Police Law, of which the important for this paper are:

1. Ensuring and maintaining public order and security;
2. Ensuring and protecting the security and legal rights and freedoms of individuals and society;
3. Preventing crime, discovering crimes and arresting suspects;
4. Protecting public and private property;
5. Fighting against the cultivation of poppies and marijuana, and the production and trafficking of illegal drugs;
6. Fighting against organized crime and terrorism;
7. Regulating road traffic;
8. Responding to and assisting victims of natural disasters; and
In addition, ANP forces are required to accomplish their duties according to their job requirements. Article 6 of the Police Law describes that “the police shall perform its duties within their specified area of activity according to the provisions of the law”. (Police-Law, 2005, p. 5) Police officers or policemen can perform their job in areas other than their responsibilities if they assign to do so or in case of emergency can perform action according the law provisions, but they have to inform the nearest police authority after their actions.

2. Size of the Afghanistan National Police

The number and organizational structure of all government institutions in Afghanistan are determined by their tashkil (Wilder, 2007, p. 7), which describes the nature and rank of each positions and their grade levels required for each institutions. According to the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), the Tashkil is one of the most important single documents, which empowers all personnel and equipments for ANP. After its approval by the Minister of Interior of Afghanistan, “it becomes a powerful legal document that allows recruiting officers to recruit, finance officers to pay, logistic officer to equip and build facilities for the ANP”. (EUPOL-Website, 2010)

The initial tashkil for ANP in 2005 included 50,000 Afghan Uniformed Police and 12,000 Afghan Border Police. (Wilder, 2007, p. 7) The figure of 62,000 for Police force was captured in an organizational document named Tashkil that describes the structure of the ANP, “Personnel end strength, command relationships, and unit/staff functions and mission description”. (Inspectors-General, 2006, p. 11) The tashkil was aimed to meet the security needs of the country, and that the Afghan government will be able to support and fund them in the long run. (Inspectors-General, 2006, p. 11)

In fact, the exact number of ANP is still not clear and it is very difficult to find the accurate number of ANP personnel. It was reported approximately 70,000 in 2006, higher than what was approved in tashkil in 2005. In addition, the Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan (LOTFA) report indicated that there were 78,541 personnel on ANP payrolls in 2008, but by November of the same year United Nations validation team had issued only 47,400 identification cards. (Perito, 2009, p. 12) Similarly, reported by the Reuters that “Afghanistan’s government does not know exactly how many people work for its national police force” (Cornwell, 2011), and the report of special inspector general of the Congress for scrutinizing how U.S. aid to Afghanistan spent states that Afghan government “cannot determines the actual number of personnel that worked for ANP because it has been unable to reconcile the number of personnel records or verify the data in four different personnel systems and databases”. (Cornwell, 2011) The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) audits also questions the actual number of police personnel in different systems; it states that the actual number of ANP in September 2010 ranged from 111,774 to 125,218, and planned number for October 2011 is 134,000. (Cornwell, 2011)

3. Existence of Corruption within Afghanistan National Police

Police are very important and are the “face of the Afghan government,…if the police are corrupt than the government is corrupt” (Caldwell, 2010) In an interview with Anderson Copper, Lt Gen. William Caldwell who has joined training Afghanistan police in November 2009, stated that: in order to bring security, ANP is more important than the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) he stated that “the army is there to protect the nation; the police are there to protect the people” (Caldwell, 2010) In essence, the ANP has very close relations with people and they interact with each other consistently. One of the major threats that undermines and distorts the relationship between Afghan people and Afghan police is the existence of corruption within ANP forces.

Existing of corruption within ANP officers is one of the major concerns for the Minister of Interior of Afghanistan, Afghan government and International funding agencies. Minister of Interior of Afghanistan has placed anti-corruption measures in his priority list. According
Corruption in ANP is widespread; it ranges from *pity corruption* on roads and streets of the country such as bribery, opportunistic theft, kickback, to *grand corruption* in high government positions in the Ministry such as drug trade related corruption. (Wilder, 2007, p. 52) Peter Galbraith once the UN second man in Afghanistan stated in an interview with Anderson Cooper that he had a particular incident with the ANP where his bodyguard had to pay bribe to a policeman for entering in the area near US Embassy in Kabul. He stated that if an ANP officer can do such practice with the people in his position, then imagine their behavior with ordinary citizens. He said that ANP forces are the most corrupt institution in the country. (Galbraith, 2010) Galbraith also stated that Afghan police are illiterate villagers, many of them are users of drugs, and they have a six weeks of training course, “so how you can teach someone in six weeks to read and write, to be a policeman, [and] to defend themselves in six weeks; it is just impossible” (Galbraith, 2010); to him, they are not policeman but someone who is entitled to extort money from his fellow citizens. Moreover, in a lecture at the Marine Corps University's Middle East Studies Galbraith stated that “we are very far from being able to have an Afghan police that can operate like a police force and, in fact, I don’t think we can achieve that at all”. (Wong, 2010, p. 2)

Former US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has publicly called the ANP as “an inadequate organization, riddled with corruption” (Miller, Hosenball, & Morea, 2010) Similarly, when asked Lt Gen. Caldwell about the existence of corruption within ANP, he responded that “first of all we have not formally trained them; and then we didn’t pay them right” and the money that we are giving them are not sufficient for a
family to live in Afghanistan. Thus “we have set the conditions that made the policemen [keen] to look for other ways to make money”. (Caldwell, 2010) Mr. Moqim, an Afghan police training officers is also on the same track with Galbraith. He argues that “We are still at zero…they [police] don’t listen, [they] are undisciplined, and will never be real policemen”. (Miller, Hosenball, & Morea, 2010)

Most of the Afghans believe that whole ANP force or a unit of it involve in committing organized crimes. They see police as a gang of criminals, which in fact, reflects on the activities of policemen throughout last decade that alter people perception about them. For example, there are reports that ANP run extortion rackets, participate in trafficking in narcotics and drugs, systematically steal from public assets, they showed favoritism towards a single ethnicity or a single political group, and even engaging in torture, rape, organized kidnapping and murder. So far, in the poll held by the United Nations, more than half of the respondents stated that Afghan police are corrupt. People in the rural areas suffer more than in the urban areas; they “accused the local police force of extortion, assault, and rape”. (Miller, Hosenball, & Morea, 2010)

IWA that conducted a survey in 32 of 34 provinces of Afghanistan with 6,500 respondents states that “the country’s interior ministry, justice ministry and intelligence agency are the most corrupt”. (VOA, 2010) The percentage of the governmental institution involved in corruption can be seen in the bellow graph, where the most corrupt entity in the Afghan government is the Ministry of Interior followed by Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and National Department of Security (NDS); 42 percent, 32 percent, and 30 percent respectively.
At in another survey conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) for United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2010, illustrates that most of the Afghans (65 percent) define “payment in exchange for favorable treatment as corruption”. According to the report, perception of corruption is widespread among ordinary Afghans. Approximately 85 percent think that corruption exists within government employees. However, the number for ANP is lower than the overall, but still it stays at 60 percent, and people reported about corruption within ANP forces. The other two categories, which thought to be the most corrupt, are the ANA and teachers, 42 and 40 percent respectively. (ACSOR, 2010, p. 15)

Source: (IWA, 2010, p. 30)

Note: I have created the chart personally, but the facts and figures are copied from IWA.
ACSOR (2010) survey report states that 52 percent of the people in the South West of Afghanistan are not in favor of ANP activities, and they think that ANP is not working as they required to do, while the number of citizen in favor of ANP is higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas, 91 and 48 respectively. (ACSOR, 2010, p. 5) The chart below shows the change in people perception in favor of ANP among various regions (urban and rural) of Afghanistan and its comparison with one year before.

Perception of corruption among Afghan citizens varies in various regions of Afghanistan. For example, the survey that I have conducted for writing this master thesis, confirmed existence of corruption among ANP officers, but the nature and extent of police corruption were different. For example, people in Mazar-i-Sharif were more in favor of ANP than people in Jalalabad, while in Kabul people were more natural. Respondents acknowledged that not only ANP, but also other governmental organizations involved in corrupt practices.

For the majority of the respondents, police corruption is as same as bribery and payments to police officers for favorable treatment. Additionally, perception of people about ANP corruption varies from department to department. For example, more than 30 percent
participants stated that traffic and highway police are more corrupt than other departments of ANP, such as Afghanistan Border Police (ABP), Counter Insurgency Police (CIP), Counter-Narcotic Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and et al. At the same time, 22 percent of the respondents complained about corruption within Afghanistan Border Police. Moreover, 20 percent blamed Afghanistan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) about corruption and 20 percent stated that corruption exist in Afghanistan Counter-Narcotic Police. 8 percent responded that informal police (militia/Arbaki) engaged in corrupt activities and fueling insurgency.

4. Typology of Police Corruption in Afghanistan

Types of ANP corruption are the same as can be seen all over the world. In Afghanistan, police officers do accept free meals, free cup of tea, bribes, as well as commit very serious offences. The Central Criminal Investigation Department (CCID) of the MOI has distinguished between various types of police corruptions. According to the document, police officers do accept free meals from hotels and restaurants, they do commit opportunistic theft. They receive bribes on the borders and permit smuggled goods, expired medicine, theft vehicle to enter the country. The do provide assistance to drug traffickers to transport drugs from one location to another in the country as well as provide assistance to the kidnappers.
The same document reveals that police officers pay their supervisors in order to appoint them in crowded locations for earning more than normal locations.

In sum, all types of police misconducts ranging from corruption of authority to kickback, to shakedowns, to protection of illegal activities, to opportunistic thefts, to internal payoffs, to sever crimes and even flaking and padding can be seen in the lines of ANP officers. They receive bribes from the street vendors on the streets of Afghanistan (Babakarkhai, 2005) as well as receive hundreds of thousands of money from drug dealers and smugglers.

5. Measuring Police Corruption in Afghanistan

Measuring nature and extent of police corruption, as it is complicated all over the world; it is also close to impossible in Afghanistan too. There is neither any specific survey conducted to illustrate the accurate nature and extent of police corruption, nor any particular commission assigned to investigate allegations of corruption within ANP officers. The agency internal records have also failed to maintain the records of ANP corruption. Therefore, most of the cases that are publicized are from the various media reports and surveys that are conducted to find the general level of corruption among public sector. In addition, general perception about existence of police corruption can help us making a rough estimation of police corruption in Afghanistan.

Summary

Police force building in Afghanistan has started during 1960s, when Afghanistan was ruled by King. At the time, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic helped Afghanistan to build its police force. During 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan police forces were consist of two types of police; the one with high training as police officers and the one with very low training and experience that were required by the Constitution of
Afghanistan to serve for two years in the security forces. However, the notion of police building and improvement was stopped during Soviet Union occupation in 1980s and during the brutal civil war of 1990s.

The current police building efforts started in 2002 after the defeat of the Taliban by International forces. But, years of conflict in the country on one hand and weak governmental institution on the other, caused Afghan police recruits to engage in law violating behaviors. As a result, corruption spread rapidly among ANP officers and created a major concern for the government of Afghanistan and international community. Typology of police corruption in Afghanistan are as same as witnessed in other countries; while measuring police corruption in Afghanistan is complicated. In order to understand Police corruption very well, next chapter will briefly discuss and explain the factors that contributes and generates police corruption in Afghanistan (causes of police corruption). Similarly, this paper will look out to find impacts of police corruption (consequences) on Afghan society and on Afghan government institutions as well.
Chapter Three

Causes and Consequences of Police Corruption in Afghanistan

1. Causes of Police Corruption in Afghanistan

As mentioned before that ANP corruption is widespread; its causes are also widespread, and there are a number of factors that contributes to the existence of corruption among ANP forces. Before considering prevention or elimination of police corruption, it is important to understand what make it possible and how corruption raised among ANP. Newburn states that in general causes of police corruption includes: “factors that are intrinsic to policing as a job; nature of police organizations; nature of police culture; opportunities for corruption presented by political and task environments; and, nature and extent of the efforts put in to controlling [police] corruption”. (Newburn, 1999, p. E.S) Similarly, throughout the history, police corruption has realized as an individual characteristic of a police officer. In the past, police organizations believed that police officers engage in corrupt practices because of their own low moral values. According to (Ivković, 2005, p. 63), in the past when cases of police corruption reached into public sphere, then police administration called them rotten apples and they were facing disciplinary actions very harshly and even firing for their jobs.

However, researchers and various commissions such as Knapp Commission 1972, Pennsylvania Crime Commission 1974, had proved that not only low moral value of individual police officers causes corruption, but also there are other factors, such as police administration, police culture and et al. that make the floor ready for police corruption. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 63-64) (Newburn, 1999, pp. 16-17) The Afghan Police Strategy (2010) describes five factors for administrative corruption, which mostly focuses on the organizational level. It states that “capacity of the law drafters, capacity of the law enforcement authorities, empowered custom over the law and jurisdictions, law enforcement
area, [and legal opportunities for corruption]” (CCID, 2010, p. 9), all caused administrative corruption to spread and became rampant within ANP forces.

In addition, when I was conducting research for writing this master thesis, I have asked questions about causes of police corruption within ANP, and found that most of the respondents not only blamed individual police officers for having low moral values, but they also stated that organizational and societal factors can also cause police officer to become corrupt. They named some of the contributing factors such as: weak institutions, illiteracy of recruits, poverty and unemployment, low level of salaries, use of drugs, lack of professionals within police organizations, favoritism toward a single ethnicity or a political group, absence of the rule of law, impunity, influence of warlords, lack of proper trainings, lack of proper resources, absence of patriotism and widespread culture of corruption caused police officers to became corrupt. There are, however, other factors too that causes police corruption, but this paper will bring them all under the umbrella of: 1) Individual Factors; 2) Organizational Factors; and 3) External Factors, which will be further explain in details.

1.1 Individual Factors

If we think that the situation set by the police agency in particular and the society in general very similar for all police officers, then “why do some police officers engage in serious misconduct, and others do not?” (Ivković, 2005, p. 64) Or why some of the police officers are more corrupt than others and some are less or even not corrupt in a police agency? To answer these questions, scholars agreed on a very important point and state that “the propensity toward rule-breaking behavior is not dispersed equally in the population, and some individuals are more likely to become involved in such behaviors than other”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 64) Therefore, to understand the propensity of individuals, this paper will explain some of the features that shape individual behaviors and moral values regarding police corruption.
1.1.1. Propensity of ANP Recruits Toward Corruption

What shapes the propensity of recruits towards corruption? Ivković (2005) stats that “everything else being equal, police officers who have a higher level of propensity toward corruption are more likely to act on it than police officers with lower levels of propensity”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 64) It is obvious that society and environment play a significant role in shaping individual’s behavior and their propensity towards corruption. But, the individual’s propensity toward corruption also depends to a great extent on their interaction with other individuals (Gatti, Paternostro, & Rigolini, 2003, pp. 7-8) and their relationship with the police organizations as well. Moreover, the propensity of an individual towards corruption is not static; it can be changed throughout time.

In Afghanistan, more than thirty years of war and insurgency, illiteracy, poverty and et al. shaped the attitudes of Afghans, particularly, the young generation. The young generation of Afghanistan has grown up in war and insurgency, and to a great extent witnessed law violations themselves, including corruption in their region and surroundings’. Most of the current recruits within ANP are the crops of the last three decades of war in the country. A large portion of them, if not all, have involved in serious law-violations during the war period. As a result, ANP recruits who previously engaged in serious law-violating behaviors are more likely to engage in serious misconduct after becoming police officers. Therefore, past experience of corruption plays an integrating part on the future of the ANP recruits. For example, an Afghan proverb states that if water in a canal comes once it will come again too. Thus, if a police officer who lived a deviant lifestyles and showed propensity toward corruption or crimes in the past; it is clear that if given opportunity to become a police officer again, will be more likely to engage in such corrupt activities.

During the interviews, a police officer who served in the ANP told me that he joined police force, because he thought police agency is a better source to earn money in bribe and
on illegal ways. He stated that he had served as a policeman during Mujahedeen regime but then was not enough opportunities and money available for him comparing to the present situation. *Now there are dollars in Afghanistan*, he stated, and we can earn more. (Personal Interview, 2011, pp. Mazar-i-Sharif) As a result, we can confirm that there are people with corrupt background within ANP that causes corruption within ANP forces.

### 1.1.2. Level of Risk Among ANP Officers

The second individual factor that causes corruption among ANP officers is the levels of risks engaging in corrupt practices. Criminal and criminal related literature frequently sees individuals as rational actors who “compare rewards and punishment of criminal behavior”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 66) According to Wilson & Herrnstein (1985),

> At any given moment, a person can choose between committing a crime and not committing it…the consequences of committing the crime consist of rewards…and punishments; the consequences of not committing the crime…also entail gains and losses. The larger the ratio of the net rewards of crime to the net rewards of non-crime, the greater the tendency to commit the crime. (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985, p. 44)

Police officers within ANP also calculate these rewards and punishments. If a police officer realizes that he can earn more by committing a deviant practice than not committing it; and if caught; there will be less or even no punishment; then, there is high probability that he will engage in corrupt activities. The disciplinary actions taken against the corrupt officers are not very harsh in Afghanistan. For example, in a police force of approximately 125,000 (during the survey period) there were only 274 (less than one [0.21] person in 100 police officers) registered cases of corruption within ANP, of which only 23 had referred for prosecution and the rest faced with the disciplinary actions against them. (Omer, 2011, p.
Interview) Consequently, the fear of being caught does no longer exist with ANP officers that cause the existence of rampant, entrenched and pervasive corruption among them.

I was interviewing a policeman without prior notification and information about the nature of the interview; he told me that he will continue accepting bribes because he earns very less as a salary from the government and the only money that he feeds his family comes from the gifts (bribes) that people give him. He stated that he has no fear of being caught; if they (government people) caught me, they will fire me and I am ready to be fired; finding other jobs are easy for me. (P-Interview, 2011)

1.2 Organizational Factors

Beside the problem existed with individuals; there are also other problems that exist in the police agencies in Afghanistan. Almost, all police agencies in the country are not totally untouched from the influence of political, social and economic environment around them; thus, the police agency itself has a key influence, if not the essential, on the level of corruption in the country. The organizational deviant practices start at the initial phase of recruitment and selection of new recruits, and continues with training and supervision of police recruits, various rules and regulations in the agency, their interaction with other organizations, that all provides opportunities for police officers to turn their propensity toward corruption into a real corrupt behavior. In a report by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) on police reform, described the MOI as a “shop for selling jobs” (Wilder, 2007, p. 52) that confirms its reputation as one of the most corrupt ministries in Afghan government. (Goodhand, 2008, p. 412) Eventually, this paper will explain some of these organization related factors that cause police corruption within ANP forces.

1.2.1. Para-Military Structure of the ANP Organizations

Not only in Afghanistan, but also in many other countries police organizations act like paramilitary organizations. Afghanistan is still in war with various groups, including Al-
Qaida, the Taliban, drug lords and et al. that puts ANP forces into chaotic situations; as a result, they need not only to accomplish their police duties, but also to fight with these illegal groups as well. The former Minister of Interior of Afghanistan, Mr. Hanif Atmar stated in a conference in the Netherlands that he regards the ANP forces as a paramilitary group; he stated that “the Afghan police should win the hearts and minds of the population, but it is really a sort of paramilitary group. There is a gap between the two that we should bridge, but the current difficult situation is threatening to only widen the gap”. (RNW, 2011) According to a UN diplomat, “it is a mistake to militarize the ANP. It will be hard to go back later”. (Friesendorf, 2011, p. 90)

About the paramilitary system of a police organization Ivković states that a “paramilitary-style hierarchical bureaucracy is characterized by numerous rules, clear lines of authority, secrecy, and the view that the war on crime is a primary end of policing”, (Ivković, 2005, p. 68) The similarity between the police and the military is that both have to be under strict chain of command, they have to be respectful to their supervisors, and comply with numerous rules and regulations. As a result, all these similarities give them the mentality and soldier-like perception. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 68-69)

Similarly, paramilitary organizations imposes a huge bunch of rules and procedures, and because of all these rules and procedures, most police officers, if not all, can not comply with all of them properly. Therefore, they intentionally or unintentionally end up violating some of these rules and procedures throughout their career serving as a police officer. A study conducted by McNamara in 1967 and quoted by Ivković 2005, states that “it is impossible to always follow the Rules and Procedures to the letter and still [does] an efficient job in police work”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 69) Hens, when a police officer’s violates these rules and procedures; it ties their hands and prevent them from reporting serious rule-violating behavior of their subordinates, fellow officers, and even superiors.
There are, however, bunch of laws, rules and procedures regulating ANP activities, which most of them adopted by the Ministry of Interior, but all ANP officers cannot comply with them. ANP has its own internal rules and procedures; for example, how to wear uniform, how to deal with the citizen, how to deal with the criminals, how to patrol and et al., but most of the police officers deal with ordinary citizen, criminals and others differently. For example, I was renewing my passport last year and went to a police department, where a police officer responsible for passport applications received my application and told me in a very cruel harsh way to wait for few days until my term arrives, he behaved like I am a criminal standing in front of him. The procedure of renewing a passport can be completed within hours, but it took me more than a week. Similarly, when I was asking from the MOI for a permission letter to conduct a survey for this paper, I faced with obstacles, and almost spent days until obtained a permission letter.

Despite the fact, that in some cases citizens want police officers to act immediately, but the nature of their duty and organizational limitations (rules, regulations and procedures) prevent them from acting accordingly; they require to complete formalities and comply with all regulations and wait for orders of their superiors. Though, the characteristic of the paramilitary approach of policing differs among police agencies and causes corruption among ANP officers.

1.2.2. ANP Leadership and Administration

In Afghanistan, police administrators and police administration play a critical role on the functionality of the agency, of which they are responsible. However, the Police Law in revised article 4 (1), has introduced the chain of command for police organizations, but the power of police chiefs are both explicitly and/or implicitly limited by the governor in provinces of Afghanistan, by the district governor in districts of the country, by politicians including member of the parliament and provincial council, by the courts, by the media, by
cultural boundaries, and by general public at all. All these mentioned individuals and agencies have an extensive influence on police agencies functionality. They have influence on the recruitment process of the new recruits within police organizations, their training processes, their ethics, their internal control mechanisms, their punishment and rewards system and et al. When police organizations and police chiefs making their action plan; it is essential that they should take all these individuals and organizations into consideration, and make their decision and action-plan accordingly.

The role of the chief and his stance against corruption is very important; Goldstein argues that chief’s stances both his words and actions against corruption “determines the agency’s effectiveness in coping with the problem”. (Goldstein, 1975, p. 40) If head of a police organization takes a strong position against corruption in his agency, it will make a large impact on other officers and they will not abuse their authority at all. The way the head of a police agency recognizes by other officers, depends on reactions he demonstrates. Other officers see that how he reacts when a police officer or a group of police officers accept free meal or tea from businessmen; on whom he reacts; and what is the severity of his reaction, for example, does he fire the deviant officers or just only advised him.

However, the stance against corruption in words is very evident in Afghanistan, and most of the politicians, ministers as well as the president talks about the elimination of corruption, but it is very important to take actual actions against corruption within ANP. The gap between words and actions has essential impact on the role of the chief. There is a say in an Afghan language that “don’t talk; prove it in action”. If a police chief who “talk the talk but don’t walk the walk” (Ivković, 2005, p. 72) not only reduces his credibility in the society, but also people see him as a hypocritical person.

In addition, not only actual stance of police chiefs but also the number of police chiefs is the major contributor factor of corruption. Afghanistan police forces are lacking adequate
leadership; although, there are a number of competent police chiefs within ANP, but their number is not sufficient. Additionally, there are the Soviet-era officers holding the office “causing stagnation in both personnel and ideology in the upper levels of the MOI. The lack of retirement security also depressed retention and contributed to increased corruption in the lower ranks, undermining police reputation”. (NTM-A, 2011, p. 4) The complexity of the war against Taliban and insurgent groups on the one side and the lack of leadership on the other, both can easily contribute to the factors causing corruption within ANP. Accordingly, there is a need for the rapid growth of the ANP, as international troops will withdraw from Afghanistan and the ANP and ANA will be gradually handed the responsibility of the country till 2014. Therefore, ANP is growing very rapidly, but it is very hard and even impossible to provided needed police chiefs that will take lead (Rezaie, 2011) and maintain security and stability in the country as well as control corruption among police force. Lack of leadership is not only having negative effects on ANP and their actions toward elimination of corruption in the present but also it will have negative effects in the future too.

In order to present examples about police corruption; I have personally observed a number of cases within traffic police in Afghanistan where a traffic police accepts money in bribes, free meal, free cup of tea, but the head of the organization turned blind eye on him or just transferred him from one avenue to another in the same city. Similarly, I have witnessed an incident on Kabul to Jalalabad road where a highway policeman had stopped a jungle truck not to enter the city during the day; then I have heard a loud voice from the room, might be the head of the police checkpoint, “get the money and let him go” he stated. Similarly, a document that I have received from the CCID of the MOI states that “trucks that are permitted [to enter cities] after 9:00 P.M. can illegally [enter] by paying police” (CCID, 2010, p. 15) during the day. In a similar incident on 16 April 2011, while coming to Kabul from Jalalabad, I saw a policeman receiving money from a jungle truck driver, of which I captured a photo,
but the policeman asked me to remove it, otherwise they will prevent me continue my trip to Kabul.

Likewise, a report published in the New York Times, quotes from a Ghazni province police official who recently forced out of his job stated that “provincial bodyguards demand protection money from smugglers, anywhere from $400 to $2,000 per truck, for safe passage through Ghazni” (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009, p. 2) What these incidents reveal are: that police chiefs not only denying taking a strong stance against corruption, but also they motivate their fellow officers to received money in bribe that they will equally or even partially distribute them among themselves.

In sum, both the police administrators and police administration are the key figures in a police agency, their stance both words and action and their tendency towards controlling corruption in a police agency plays an integrating role in the creation of an environment free of corruption. Their action and/or omission will not only have direct impact on corruption attitudes but will also have indirect impacts on other factors related to corruption. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 72-73) As a result, when police administrations or police chiefs don’t take necessary action towards the elimination of corruption, it causes police officers to engage in more serious forms of corrupt practices.

1.2.3. Lack of Resources for ANP

Another important organizational factor that causes corruption within ANP forces is lack of resources available for ANP officers. Shortfall of resources is a chronic problem with ANP; that has already caused a rapid rise in the level of corruption. ANP is lacking sufficient resources comparing to ANA, which enables ANP to comply with their job requirements. During last 10 years, the Afghan government, the U.S., and its allies mostly paid attention and focused on the ANA building, while they forgot the ANP role in stabilization of the country. Daily Outlook Afghanistan in an article argues that above mentioned organizations mainly
focused on “the ANA and its expansion and training, ANP has been increasingly neglected…

[Currently], the problems, shortcomings and disappointments caused by ANP are no hidden secret”. (Rezaie, 2011) According to the special report of the United State Institute for Peace, the problem of the ANP “to receive, maintain and account for critical equipment, including weapons, vehicles, and body armor; [is] widespread corruption; and consistent problems with pay and administrative support”. (Perito, 2009) As a result, it causes both ANP chiefs and ANP officer to misuse their power or to engage in rule violating behaviors.

For example, due to lack of resources, the ANP chiefs’ are not able to supervise, control and monitor daily activities of their subordinates at the checkpoints and in other locations, which give subordinates free-hands to perform their duties according their well. The police perception survey 2010 conducted by UNDP, states that “significant numbers (10 to 23 percent) report unnecessary police stops, use by the police of insulting language, excessive physical force, false accusations or coercion to participate in a crime”. (ACSOR, 2010, p. 6) In a video, taped by CNN Anderson Cooper shows a policeman who use marijuana before going on patrol (Cooper, 2010); hence, one can easily observe the absence of supervision. Similarly, a video tape released by TOLO television, showed the brutality of an ANP officer in the absence of his supervisors; where a driver complains from the highway police and the police standing behind beating him, because of his complaints. (TOLO-TV, 2008)

Moreover, lack of resources prevents police organizations to perform their duties on time and as required, and when needed emergency operations, they are not able to reach the place of incidents on time. For example, in April 2011, I was in Shar-i-naw area of Kabul city and I saw a man whose laptop and other documents were stolen from his car while stopped for drinking juice in the evening; he called the police who arrived more than 45 minutes after the incident took place.
In sum, lack of ANP resources not only causes ANP officers not to perform their duties on time, but also gives birth to corrupt behaviors within ANP officers too. Due to lack of supervision that caused by the lack of resources, police officers are more keen to run from their responsibilities. They are not willing to be in their offices on time, use their office time on other than their required duties; they do not want to control or monitor their fellow subordinates, and et al.; which itself creates an environment of corrupt behaviors within ANP forces.

1.2.4. **ANP Rules against Corruption**

Another organizational factor that causes corruption within ANP is the ANP rules against corruption itself. As discussed earlier that police agencies in Afghanistan operate like a paramilitary organizations, which illustrates that each and every activity of the police force should comply with internal rules and regulations. Furthermore, police agency may enact official rules that can be far from appropriate. (Ivković, 2005, p. 74) Ivković states “the ambiguity of a rule may signal the administration’s lack of concern about the issue or their inability to conceptualize it, regulate it, and control it. It may also serve as a justification for engaging in such behaviors”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 75)

However, recently, the Minister of Interior affairs of Afghanistan has taken strong stance against police corruption and placed anti-corruption measures in his priority list. (NTM-A, 2011), but written rules that prevent corruption within ANP, evidently, do not mean that corruption will disappear immediately or overnight, it rather provides an opportunity of punishment of those ANP offices who engage in corrupt behaviors.

In addition, formal organization rules may not be fully applicable on the ground, and the organization may implement informal rules that actually govern the police organization. (Ivković, 2005, p. 75) For example, policing in Afghanistan needs a police officer, not to accept any gifts from businesses or individuals, but being a member of the society they may
accept such gifts. Such discrepancies creates problem and police officers thinks whether to accept or reject gifts. As a result, the discrepancy between the formal rules that are the official rules and the informal rules that actually governs police organization may differ and cause corruption within ANP officers.

1.2.5. ANP Recruitment and Selection Process

Besides other organizational factors, police agencies in Afghanistan characterized by widespread corruption, are also more prone to have frequently failed in the recruitment and selection process of new recruits, which in sequence may have resulted in recruiting high number of the potential corrupt and deviant police officers into ANP forces. For example, those with the criminal background, drug addicted people, people with questionable moral and ethical values, or in general those who have higher propensity toward corruption (Ivković, 2005, p. 77) have entered the lines of ANP forces during last decade.

The need for accelerating recruitment process of ANP forces put the floor open for above mentioned categories of people to easily enter the ANP lines. In addition, in 2001, after the defeat of Taliban a huge number of militia groups who fought alongside with the coalition forces, have entered ANP lines. Most of them were illiterate militias who showed favor to their own tribe, ethnicity or political group, and had been recruited on the basis of tribal, political or societal connections. According to Major Randy Schmeling, who commands the American police mentoring team in Ghazni province of Afghanistan, “Right now, there is no meritocracy here” (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009) He states that ANP corruption affects everything; recruitment, promotion, assignments and even case resolution. He points out to a case where a police officer who was only a gate guards a year before, but paying bribes to his high ranking officials made him a “top noncommissioned officer” on the provincial police force. (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009)
In addition, need for rapid growth of the ANP forces, requires recruitment criteria to emphasize on minimum qualifications required to perform police job. It has been neglected that recruit who enters the ANP should have a crime free past history and all other required criterion, which ANP recruitment process is based on. The entry qualifications of age, height, health, and literacy are not adequate. In addition, the selection criteria of police recruits consist of signing a three year contract with the MOI that includes a picture and some basic information about new recruits; such as, name, age, and address. In addition two individuals preferably from the police force, if not a government official must vouch for the character and good conduct of the new recruits. (Krongard & Gimble, 2006, pp. 20-21) Hence, in a country with strong regional and tribal affiliation, unavailability of criminal records, and reliable sources of information, it is very hard to verify suitable candidates for police recruit (Krongard & Gimble, 2006, p. 21), which in result is not only a problem for the current recruits, but will also have negative impacts on the future recruits as well.

Keeping in mind the recruitment and selection criteria, it caused that a large number of illiterate, drug addicted, and et al. recruits entered to ANP lines. A three stars American General William Caldwell stated in an interview with Anderson Cooper of CNN that “almost 80% of ANP forces are illiterate…and around 20% use drug” (Caldwell, 2010), as well as taking part in the drug trafficking. The NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) also states that “in 2009, [almost] 86 percent of recruits who entered the police force were completely illiterate and innumerate”. (NTM-A, 2011, p. 4) According to the Government Accountability Officer (GAO) of the U.S., “12 to 41 percent of Afghan police recruits at Regional Training Centers [RTCs] test positive for drugs… [Similarly] many recruits who tested negative for drugs have shown opium withdrawal symptoms later in their training”. (GAO, March 2010, p. 33) Overall, the selection and recruitment criteria of the ANP recruits are not sufficient enough and cause existence of corruption among ANP officers.
1.2.6. Lack of ANP Trainings

Beside the recruitment and selection process, another contributing factor of corruption among Afghan police is lack of training and lack of coordination among various police training agencies. The Federal Republic of Germany has constructed the National Police Academy (NPA) in Kabul in 2002, and started a three years training program for police officers. (Krongard & Gimble, 2006, p. 7) As mentioned that the initial *tashkil* for ANP was 62,000 that includes 50,000 AUP and 12,000 ABP (Wilder, 2007, p. 7), which has later increased to 109,000 by October 2010, and 134,000 by October 2011. (NATO, 2011) (Friesendorf, 2011, p. 86). However, to fulfill the initial tashkil requirements, the German notion of training ANP officers was seen as more than difficult to reach the target of 62,000 initial police force, and it would have took years to reach to that target. Therefore, the U.S. started to involve in the training of the ANP as well. Currently, there are almost 25 countries and a number of international agencies involved in police training and reform process in Afghanistan. (Wilder, 2007, p. 18)

The need for rapid growth of ANP entered a large number of illiterate to the police forces and the training available for these illiterate recruits is a five weeks literacy training (Krongard & Gimble, 2006, p. 24) that is insufficient. The aim of training and education of police force should focus on the changing or reinforcing ethical values of recruits, and preparing them for their future work. (Ivković, 2005, p. 78) Instead of focusing on the ethical and moral values of trainees, the training mostly focused on the use of weapons and a military like training approach.

In general, trainings provided to ANP officials by the U.S. police training programs are questionable. For example, as far as duration concerns, most of the training program were short term, from eight-weeks long course in basic police skills for literate recruits, and a five-
weeks long course for illiterate patrolmen, with a fifteen-days transitional integration program. The methods of training were not effective, and the materials provided for training were of poor quality, the language of teaching and weak interpreters, as well as training facilities (warm classrooms in the summer and frozen cold in the winter), all caused the inefficiency of training programs. Furthermore, the training was not consistent and there were no follow up trainings and monitoring to examine those trained officer on the jobsite. Similarly, the lack of coordination among the U.S. and German training programs, weak leadership of the MOI who directly supervised ANP forces and inadequate funding caused the training program to become fail. (Perito, 2009, pp. 3-5), However, an ANPS have been developed by the new Minister of Interior for the years 2010 to 2014, but still the actual situation differs on the ground and training processes are still inadequate, which caused the rise of corruption among ANP officers.

1.2.7. **Lack of Experienced and Professional Supervisors**

Together with other contributing factors of police corruption among ANP forces, lack of experienced and professional supervisors also causes corruption among them. Police supervisors as well as their line officers’ role are very important in combating corruption. (Ivković, 2005, p. 84) In Afghanistan most of the police supervisors either are very old or have very less work experience to actively supervise their subordinates. (NTM-A, 2011, p. 2) Lack of experienced police supervisors is the issue that they cannot properly supervise their fellow police officers.

As mentioned before that ANP is a paramilitary organization (RNW, 2011), which needs to follow a large number of rules and regulation together with “out of imagination bureaucracy” (CCID, 2010, p. 14), sometimes line officers in a police agency focus their attention on police officers’ adherence to these rule and regulation. While adherence to them
at all times is impossible (Ivković, 2005, p. 84), but line officers push other police officers under their command to comply as required. It has two reasons: first, that the line officer want to take strong stance against corrupt practices in his organization; second, that line officer pushes other police officers to engage in corrupt practices and share the profit of their corrupt practices (mostly bribery) with the line officers too.

In addition, police officers pay bribes to their supervisors to appoint them in the areas where they can extort more money from their fellow citizens. (CCID, 2010, p. 14) According to Maj. Randy Schmeling, those who pay for obtaining jobs are an investment, which they intend to recover, with higher profit. He states that “jobs that bring more money, like posts near the Kabul-Kandahar highway that allow opportunities for extorting truckers and smugglers”. (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009) Similarly, First Lt. Craig Porte who is a military intelligence officer in Ghazni argues that “you could say that the corruption you are involved in is an investment in your future, and your family’s future…it is fairly common to buy position”. (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009) He stated that being a member of the police force you have to be involved in corrupt behaviors, or you would be seen as an enemy of those who are engaged in such practices.

A New York Times reports in 2009 stated that “police officials who steal truckloads of gasoline…and midlevel security and political jobs that are sold, sometimes for more than $50,000 money, the buyers then recoup through still more bribes and theft”. (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009) U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense 2006 report also illustrates that most of the time high ranking police officers in ANP take a portion out of each patrolman’s salary or other payments before paying policeman. The reports represents an example and states that “in one instance, a police colonel boasted to his RTC [Regional Training Center] counterparts that he always took a portion from the pay of every policeman in the province”. (Krongard & Gimble, 2006, p. 22)
A friend of mine who serves in ANP forces told me that their line officers and supervisors ask for bribes when selecting us for trainings and workshops. He stated that the one who participate in the workshops or training course out of Afghanistan has to pay more to the supervisors. (Personal-Interview, 2011) Similarly, the Christian Science Monitor in an article stated that “a police chief in a poppy-growing area could expect to pay [his supervisor] up to US $100,000 in bribes for six month period for a salaried position that pays US$60 per month”. (Baldauf, 2006)

In the survey that I have conducted, most of the respondents (98 percent) argued about the existence of corruption within ANP and stated that all police are corrupt, whether they are police supervisors or ordinary policemen, whether they are crime investigation police or traffic, and et al. They expressed their thoughts about not filing complaints of police rule-violating behavior, because they see police supervisors are more corrupt comparing to the ordinary police and if they complain against, noting will change.

Despite the fact that some police officers are old-aged (NTM-A, 2011) and the others have very less experience and professional background, some of the police officers who currently promoted to police supervisors positions are the peers of the police officers. They worked together, spent long hours on patrol together and possibly might engaged in some form of rule-violating behaviors together, and are now assigned to supervise them. All these factors make new supervisors vulnerable and tie their hands not to take serious stances against corrupt behaviors of their former peers. As a result, inexperienced and non-professional supervisors cause corruption among ANP officers.

1.2.8. **ANP Internal Corruption Control Mechanism**

Another contributing factor of ANP corruption is the internal corruption control mechanism of the MOI in general and the ANP in particular, which generates corruption
among ANP forces. The internal corruption control mechanism should be in place by ANP, which should include “input structures for the receipt of complaints ([internally and externally]), investigative structure ([who investigates]), and decision-making structure ([who make decision])”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 86) However, currently, the MOI has established procedures and control mechanism for corruption control, but absence of such procedures for years caused the existence of corruption within ANP officers.

To investigate serious cases of police corruption, on 7th of November 2010, the MOI, European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and Attorney General’s Office (AGO) has jointly established a Military Anti-Corruption Prosecution Unit (MACU) at the AGO’s office that will investigate major police corruption cases. (EUPOL, 2010) As far as complaint receipt procedures, police agencies characterized by widespread corruption are not willing to report their own corruption and the general public due to lack of awareness don’t know such procedures, therefore, they don’t want to file a complaint against police corruption. A survey conducted by UNODC states that “in most cases (63%) the reason for not reporting was its perceived uselessness… [And] in some cases, victims did not know to whom they could report the abuse (19%) or they did not feel that I was appropriate to report”. (Costa, 2010, pp. 32-32) In sum, the corruption control mechanism put in place by the MOI is not adequate and causing corruption among ANP officers.

1.2.9. Accessibility to Information

Finally, Afghans’ have very tough time having access to information. In Afghanistan, it is close to impossible for ordinary citizen to reach to the necessary information they required. Lack of accessibility to information about administrative procedures contributes to the notion of bribery among ANP agencies. When conducting research about police corruption, I faced with such problem. The head of a department in the MOI refused to provide me information,
because he doesn’t want to share information regarding corruption cases within police. Because he thought that I will document their crimes.

Similarly, the survey conducted by UNODC reveals the percentages of people who have access to information about administrative procedures are very limited. The survey states that “only one third of citizens in urban area (34%)…have [access] to information necessary to adequately understand administrative procedures”. (Costa, 2010, pp. 31-32) In addition, the survey states that the available information’s are also not clear enough to understand the procedures, which in result causes the existence of corruption among ANP officers.

1.3 External Factors

Beside individual and organizational factors, there are a number of external factors too, which have very deep influence on the level of corruption among Afghan police forces. In fact, “every police department, no matter how coherent and self-contained a unit, is necessarily an integral part of a larger political and social environment”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 88) Characteristic of the environment affect the level of police corruption in an agency both directly and indirectly. (Goldstein, 1975, p. n.d.) Both the environment in general and the police agency in particular, have positive or negative impacts on each other. (Ivković, 2005, p. 88) In order to discuss external factors that cause corruption within ANP, this paper will first look on: 1) Loopholes available for corruption; 2) Public view on police corruption; 3) Level of corruption in the society; and 4) External control mechanism of corruption control.

1.3.1. Loopholes Available for Corruption in the Society

Police officers and police agencies in Afghanistan are not separate from the general public; they are an integrating part of the general society. Members of police forces are at the same time members of a larger society; they both share common goals. But, to achieve these goals, police officers have very limited opportunities (Ivković, 2005, p. 88) available for
them, because of the paramilitary structure of police agencies in Afghanistan. It has been mentioned before that paramilitary system imposes a wide range of rules and regulations; they make police officers restricted and set barriers on their career advancement, which in result sets barriers on their salary increases as well. Consequently, low salaries cause the existence of corruption among ANP officers and “low salaries are often mentioned as a factor contributing to corruption”. (Simpson, 1977, p. 105) Rose-Ackerman, quoted by Ivković states that “if public sector pay is very low, corruption is a survival strategy” (Ivković, 2005, p. 88)

Surprisingly, what I have found during my research was that low salary is not a contributing factor of corruption within ANP; almost 24 percent of the respondents argued that low salary of police force cannot cause corruption; they stated low moral and ethical values of individuals, lack of Islamic literatures understanding, propensity towards corruption, lack of education, favoritism and nepotism are the major contributors of corruption in ANP forces. However, police salaries in Afghanistan are higher comparing to other public service providers, but still it is not in a level that police officers can live with it, feed their families adequately or get married with it (Wood, 2010). During the interviews a police officer said that it is true that current salary scale is higher for police, but then he stated that we (police) are also working more than other public service providers. *We work 24 hour a day* and the rest work 8 hours; therefore, we have to be paid 3 times higher than others. (Personal-Interview, 2011) Similarly, a police officer at Kabul International Airport stated that “Beside my salary, I would need to get another $180 or $190 a month just to survive. You couldn’t afford to live otherwise”. (Clark, 19th June 2007)

In addition, ANP officers spend most of their time either working alone (routine patrolling) or together with other police officers in a group. The environment that police officers are working has very low visibility, both from their supervisor and from general
public (Ivković, 2005, p. 89); therefore, it is very hard to supervise them and is very prone to engage in corrupt practices. Ivković argues that it is very hard to capture police corruption, because “citizen-police officer interactions may occur in private settings, without other witnesses present during the encounter” (Ivković, 2005, p. 88)

Finally, the nature of police job itself, with its “selective enforcement and discretion at the level of patrol officers generates regular contact with citizens willing to participate in quid pro quo arrangement”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 88) For example, Police officers assigned on patrolling in the center of Kabul city to remove vegetable cart from the road, but they receives money from vegetable sellers (street venders) who sell their vegetable on wheel carts, and turn blind eye on them. A vegetable vendor in Kabul stated that they “must pay bribes to government officials [police officers] to stay in business. (Cahn, 2010) Similarly, Zakayara a cart owner in Deh Afghanan bus stop stated that “the city police used to demand 20 Afghanis from him everyday”. (Babakarkhai, 2005) The same report interviewed a traffic police officer who admits that there is corruption among traffic police, but he states that low salaries are the main factor behind it and if salaries increase, this practice will be decreased itself. There are, however, other examples available that traffic police receive money in bribe from hotels and restaurants that doesn’t have park places and park their vehicles on the road. As a result, the loopholes existed in the community causes engagement of police officers in corrupt practices.

1.3.2. Public Acceptance of Police Corruption

In Afghanistan, general publics’ attitude itself may generate or degenerate corruption among ANP forces. Despite the widespread perception of police corruption among Afghans’, data reveals that there is still a high degree of tolerance among Afghans that allows certain behaviors of corruption. (Costa, 2010, p. 34) There are, some forms of police corruption, which are accepted by the general public, it itself contribute to the broadening or narrowing
the nature and extent of police corruption among ANP forces. For example, the government’s legislation enacts rules that prohibit bribery and *money in exchange for favorable treatment*, but people pay police officers and other public service providers; in order to foster the process of public services providing. A survey conducted by the UNODC in 2010, revealed that it is acceptable for many citizens of Afghanistan (38%) that civil servant ask for gifts to speed up administrative procedures. (Costa, 2010, p. 34) The graph below illustrates the percentage of adults’ population who consider selected behaviors acceptable by urban/rural areas.

Source: (Costa, 2010, p. 35)

Moreover, Afghanistan is an Islamic state and Afghans are not allowed to drink or operate business of alcoholic beverages; but people traveling to Kabul bring alcohol and share them with the police as well. For example, in April 2011, I met an Afghan citizen in Kabul who just returned from Russia; he told me that he purchased 25 bottles of alcoholic beverages in Moscow, of which 5 of them were for airport police (Personal-Interview, 2011) to pass successfully.
Similarly, the government bureaucracy needs a huge amount of time, but some people bribes police officers to speed-up this process, which in result increase vulnerability of police officer to engage in corruption. The CCID in the MOI, states that “most of the bodyguards, secretaries and even officers up to it. Colonel Ranks transmit forms (licenses for weapons, documents, [obtaining passport], driving license) of the businessmen, office to office in order to hand the permit authorities and to take their signatures”. (CCID, 2010, p. 13) In an interview with a police officer who serves in Nangarhar traffic police in the city of Jalalabad, described that people themselves bribes police officers. He stated that police officers may accept bribes, because they have very low salaries; but, if people don’t offer them bribes, it will be impossible for them to become corrupt. (Personal-Interview, 2011) As a result, in a community where practices of corruption are widespread and loopholes are available for police officers; accelerates the process and generate corruption among ANP officers.

1.3.3. External Corruption Control Mechanisms

Besides ANP internal corruption control mechanisms, there are other control mechanisms that can play very important role in the broadening and narrowing of police corruption. These other mechanisms are not part of the police control from the police agency, but it operates from outside. External mechanism of control includes a “heterogeneous group of institutions, from prosecutors and courts to the media and the public at large”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 93) Ivković argues that if external mechanisms function properly, it gives an indication to police officers that the risks of engaging in corrupt practices are very high and that, if they do want to continue engaging in corrupt practices, they intentionally accept the high risk of being caught, processed, and punished.

Although, corruption does exist in ANP forces, as mentioned before general public also tolerates some forms of corruption, and the agencies working in Afghanistan such as
prosecutors, courts, warlords, politicians (Baldauf, 2006), as well as the media, protects corrupt police officers, that they can do whatever they want and the risk of detection and punishment is either not exit or is very low. In countries where the rule of law is weak, national media plays a watch-dog role, which is very weak in Afghanistan. According to a survey by UNODC, “it is surprising that 43% of urban survey respondents believe that the media rarely or never addresses corruption related issues”. The survey also illustrates that “media coverage of corruption appears to be especially low in the South, where two thirds of respondents indicated that reporting on corruption appears on the media rarely or never”. (Costa, 2010, p. 34)

The culture of impunity and no punishment for high ranking police officers; also increased the number of police officers engage in corrupt practices. For example the former Minister of Interior Ali Ahmad Jalali once stated that there are more than 100 officials that engage in corruption, (Baldauf, 2006), but their name had not been released and no one had been prosecuted yet. Accordingly, the general public is also calm about the nature and extent of corruption among ANP forces. They do express their feelings, but don’t want to take action against police corruption, which in result causes corruption among ANP forces.

2. Consequences of ANP Corruption

Whenever corruption in a country is pervasive, it affects all features of lives; “It can affect the air they breathe, the water they drink and the food they eat”. (U4, n.d.) Similarly, corruption spreads in countries where “governance is weak, decision making is unaccountable, access to decision makers is dependent on restricted social networks and where management controls are weak”. (Achakzai, 2010, p. 2) In Afghanistan administrative corruption in general and ANP corruption in particular, permeates lives of ordinary Afghan citizens.
According to the consequences of corruption in the Afghan government, Hamidullah Faroqi, a former minister stated that “corruption and drugs undermine the rule of law, erode peoples’ confidence in the government, fuel insecurity, contribute to poverty and derail development efforts”. (IRIN, 2010) HOOAC realizes that corruption destabilizes security situation in the country, prevent development, and creates barriers toward state and democracy building objectives in Afghanistan. The agency also states that it is a fact; corruption harms the poor portion of a community excessively by altering resources that are anticipated for development; consequently, discourages the capability of the Afghan government to provide basic needs and services to ordinary citizens. (HOOAC, 2008) Huguette Labelle of Transparency International (TI) asked for immediate actions against corruption in Afghanistan. In a letter that he wrote to the heads of the state in the London Conference about Afghanistan, stated that “widespread corruption in Afghanistan continues to seriously undermine state-building and threatens to destroy the trust of the Afghan people in their government and their institutions while fuelling insecurity…corruption impacts their [Afghans’] daily lives, especially the poorest”. (Labelle, 2010)

Despite the fact that progress has been made in Afghanistan, still millions of Afghans live in severe poverty, with more than half of them live under the poverty line (Camille, 2010), they paid $2.5 billion almost 23% of Afghanistan GDP (Costa, 2010, p. 4) to government officials in bribe in 2009. (IRIN, 2010) However, the number shows a rough estimate, but for a country like Afghanistan, it is devastating. As mentioned that corruption within ANP is widespread; its’ consequences are also abundant. In an unpublished document of the MOI describes the consequences of police corruption as: a) police corruption reduces the trust of Afghans’ and international community on the law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan; b) ANP corruption feeds insurgency, terrorism, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and immoral behaviors; c) Increases poverty and prevents development; d) creates mistrust among various
government officials, and opens the way for enemies to enter the police force; e) People lose hope for the future; f) Increase gap between people and the government, which leads to foreign interventions; and g) Fuels insecurity and relapse of civil war in the country. (CCID, 2010, p. 17)

Similarly, the research that I have conducted, illustrates the consequences of corruption as: a) Increase criminality and crime rates; b) Increase mistrust among people and the government, which in result reduces cooperation of people with the government; c) Fueling insecurity and insurgency, as well as make an entrance for illicit groups to enter police force; d) increased injustice and unfortunate among people, increases poverty; and e) reduces the government revenue and prevent development of the country.

2.1. ANP Corruption Increases Criminality

ANP is the prime law enforcement agency in Afghanistan; it has assigned the job to protect rights of Afghan citizens from all kinds of criminal acts. Article 5 of the police law states that police are mandated to take preventive measure against crime, discover crimes on time and arrest suspects. (Police-Law, 2005, p. 3) However, finding correlation between corruption and other crimes need considerable amount of work, this paper will mainly rely on general perception among people that police have to protect citizens of Afghanistan according the laws, but when law enforcement officers themselves violate the laws, it provides an opportunity for other criminals to abuse them too.

An OXFAM reports states that “Afghan police are committing crimes such as child sex abuse, torture and killings with impunity”. (Harding, 2011) Hence, when criminals have the opportunity to escape from the laws, and if caught, “are able to receive lighter punishment or avoid punishment altogether, for their crimes” (Syed, 1997), they are more likely to engage in
criminal activities and more frequently violate the laws. As a result crimes rate increases in the country and most crimes take place.

2.2. ANP Corruption Increases Gap and Mistrust

It is a fact that people entrust power to police officers, in order to protect them and treat them according to the laws. But existence of corruption among ANP has severely damaged the reputation of the ANP and led to “widening the gap between the Afghan people and the government”. (Achakzai, 2010, p. 1) Achakzai states that due to widespread corruption, people of Afghanistan have lost their trust on the government and law enforcement organizations. The US Ambassador to Afghanistan Lt General Karl Eikenberry once stated that “ten good police are better than 100 corrupt police and ten corrupt police can do more damage to our success than one Taliban extremist”. (Doucet, 2006)

In the aftermath of the Taliban and establishment of the new administration in 2002 (Achakzai, 2010, p. 4), most of the people started to cooperate with the government, but pouring millions of dollars from donor countries into premature state institutions of Afghanistan, increased vulnerability of those in the high rankings to engage in corrupt practices. Ordinary Afghans are forgotten; which in result increased the gap between the ordinary Afghan people and the Afghan government.

2.3. ANP Corruption Fueling Insurgency

Existence of widespread corruption among ANP officers also derives people to join the Taliban and fuel insurgency. (Harding, 2010) The report states that Afghans are afraid of police activities and police corruption; therefore, instead of favoring the Afghan government, they favor the Taliban and join them. One of the most convincing findings of the IWA 2010 survey was that “50% of the respondents consider that corruption fosters the expansion of the
In addition, the survey states that the Taliban mobilize people against the government on the basis of allegations of corruption within the government institutions. An American soldier in Ghazni province of Afghanistan said that corruption within ANP is more dangerous for the Afghan government than the Taliban. (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009, p. 1) The same report revealed that it is very hard for American soldiers to distinguish between opponents; whether they are “few thousand Taliban who ruled villages through a shadow government of mullahs, or corruption so rife that it had deeply undercut efforts to improve the police and had destroyed many Afghans’ faith in government”.

Despite the fact that Afghans pay an average $160 in bribe a country where the GDP is mere $425 per year (Costa, 2010, p. 4), they also face with immoral and unethical behaviors of police agencies when having an interaction with them. Therefore, most of the people in rural areas instead of police agencies refer their cases to the Taliban for solution.

In addition, the survey that I have conducted most of the respondents argued that police themselves help insurgents on the borders to enter Afghanistan. Last year I was working as an intern with the Afghanistan Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), I have received a complaint about the engagement of a candidate who received bribes for the support and cooperation with suicide bombers to enter Kabul, when he was serving as a high ranking police officer in Kabul police department. In sum, police officers who engage in corrupt practices and let the insurgent to enter the cities of Afghanistan, not only harms lives of ordinary Afghans, but also fuels insurgency that destabilizes the security situation in Afghanistan.

2.4. ANP Corruption Increase Inequality and Injustice

Likewise, corruption in Afghanistan increases inequality and injustice among Afghan citizens. As mentioned before that Afghans paid $2.5 billion in bribes to government officials
during 2009 (Costa, 2010, p. 9), it directly affects their lives. Bribery, nepotism and most importantly discrimination against ethnicities, caused that government development aid are not equally distributed among Afghans. In fact, corruption increases burden on poor people and it harms the poor portion of the Afghan community excessively. It alters the resources that are anticipated for development that supposed to change the lifestyle of Afghans, but due to widespread corruption, the development aid money goes to the pocket of a few people. (HOOAC, 2008) As a result, it demoralizes the capability of a government to provide basic needs and services to its citizen; similarly, it encourages inequality and injustice, and discourages foreign aid and foreign direct investment in the country.

The same situation is true for ANP agencies as well. ANP officers pay for their position and promotions (Oppel & Rahimi, 2009), high ranking officers recruit their relatives (Saunders, 2008) and the merit based recruitment has forgotten. For example, during last decade, most of the positions in the MOI were filled by one ethnicity; therefore, the current Minister decided to reform the ranks and recruit process on the bases contextual opportunities for all ethnicities. (See NTM-A, 2011-MOI: year in review)

In addition, the government has established Priority Reforms and Restructuring (PRR) program that was mandated to recruit merit based employees, but the influence of corrupt officials on the organization failed the program to operate successfully. Those who bribed officials passed the PRR test and their salaries have been increased, but the other remained empty handed. Consequently, Afghans think that the government of Afghanistan is just a monopoly of a few individuals and general public are mostly separated from it. To them, the entire government, specifically police agencies are merely corrupt organizations that work to enrich a few police officers, push back Afghans from the government, and keep poor Afghans away from gaining opportunities that are anticipated for them; such as jobs, effective schools, access to health care, housing and et al. that affect their lives.
2.5. ANP Corruption Prevent Socio-Economic Development

Although, corruption increases criminality, fueling insurgency, increasing inequality and injustice in the community, it also prevents social and economic development of Afghanistan. The amount of money and resources that are anticipated for development activities in the country, are spent through illicit means and used for bribing corrupt officials. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) pillar 3 requires that the government should work to “reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”. (ANDS, 2008)

Hens, the existence of bribery, nepotism, and racial discrimination inside the Afghan government institutions (Shaakir, 2006) reduce state's authority and capability to effectively formulate and implement poverty-reduction policies. In addition, “economic frailty and dependency of the government on foreign aid hinders state's ability to address the issue of poverty in an effective manner”. The ANDS that was created in 2008 doesn’t have positive impacts on the lives of ordinary Afghans and they are still living in extreme poverty. The Human Development Report (HDR) 2010 reveals that Afghanistan is among the lowest human development countries, 155th in 169 countries (Klugman, 2010, p. 142), literacy rate among male and female is very low, 49 and 18 percent respectively; and the maternal and infant mortality rate is among the highest in the world, 1 in 11 and 199 in 1000 respectively. (UNICEF, 2010) As a result, the resources that were allocated in the ANDS are not used properly and Afghanistan still remained under-developed.
2.6. Corruption Distorts Reputation of Afghanistan

Together with above mentioned consequences, the existence of corruption in Afghanistan’s government institutions puts the legitimacy of the government into question. From day to day reputation of the Afghan government decreases. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked Afghanistan at 178 from 180 countries a head of Somalia and Myanmar. (Transparency-International, 2010) In addition, corruption in Afghan government is the headline of every news channel. Lack of governmental control on public service agencies leads to existence of corruption among them, and caused the stat’s inability to provide sufficient civil services to its citizen.

Existence of corruption connected with drug economy has stretched to all levels of the Afghan government from the police to the parliament, and is undermining the rule of law. (Glaze, 2007, p. 6) In rural areas of Afghanistan, farmers routinely bribe counternarcotics police officers to turn a blind eye on their cultivated opium farms. A Strategic Studies Institute study illustrates that “Afghan government officials are now believed to be involved in at least 70 percent of opium trafficking”. (Glaze, 2007, p. 6) The report also states that at least 13 former or present provincial governors are directly involved in the drug trade. It quotes the speech of the former Minister of Labor Syed Ikramudding who said that “except [from] the Minister of Interior [Hanif Atmar] himself, all the lower people from the heads of department down are involved in supporting drug smuggling”. (Glaze, 2007, pp. 6-7)

In 2007, Afghanistan has produced 92 percent of the world opium cultivating approximately 193,000 hectares of land. However, the number has decreased to 123,000 hectares of opium cultivation in 2010, but still Afghanistan is the leading producer of opium in the world. (UNODC, 2010) Both corruption and its creator, the drug, undermine state’s legitimacy and distort reputation of Afghanistan in the world. For example, last year I was
traveling in Germany with a German driver, when he asked my identity and understood that I am Afghan he refused to pick me up and stated that he doesn’t want to be caught by police. Hence, existence of corruption within Afghan government destroyed the reputation of Afghanistan and Afghans’ all over the world.

Summary

In sum, contributing factors of police officers engagement in corruption are widespread in Afghanistan. Police officers are more likely to engage in corrupt practices when their tendency toward corruption shaped by the way the police officer perceive that the cost he pays for being corrupt (moral, risks of being caught) is comparatively low than the satisfaction he earns from being corrupt. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 94-95) In addition, organizational factors such as weak leadership and administration capacity, inadequate supervision and control, designation of very low recruitment and selection standards for ANP recruits, insufficient training in ethics and general police duties; as well as societal factors such as acceptance of a number of corrupt behaviors by community people, and loopholes in the community for police corruption; generates and increases corruption among ANP officers; and are main contributors of corruption within ANP agencies, which imposes a wide range of consequences for Afghans.

Consequences of corruption are also widespread in Afghanistan. Corruption in government institutions that provide public services lead to widening the gap between citizen and the government of Afghanistan, it lays floor for impunity of criminals, drug production, insurgency and insecurity, as well as damages the reputation of Afghanistan among the international communities. Therefore, it is essential for the Afghan government and the international community to foster their efforts and ends the culture of warlords, drug lord, impunity, as well as corruption in the public sector. However, the government of Afghanistan
has taken a number of actions and took some control measures to eliminate or at least reduce corruption, but still much of the work is ahead. In order to understand the existing efforts against corruption, next chapter of this paper will focus on the efforts and measures already taken by the Afghan government and the international community.
Chapter Four

Controlling Police Corruption in Afghanistan

Though, a sizable efforts and corruption control mechanism, from the police agencies across the country itself, to the MOI, courts, media, independent commissions, and international community have been put in place to prevent corruption in Afghanistan. The scandals of corruption within judiciary, legislative, and executive branches (IWA, 2010) illustrates that members of the Afghan civil services engage in organized and very serious forms of corruption. The survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan suggests that police and judiciary are among the most corrupt institutions in the Afghan government; 42 percent of the respondents marked the MOI while 32 percent marked the Ministry of Justice as the most corrupt ministry in the Afghan government. (IWA, 2010, pp. 10-11)

However, with the existence of such widespread corruption, it doesn’t mean that Afghan government and international community has turned blind eye on it, they have taken sizable efforts to eliminate corruption in the public sector. The government of Afghanistan, together with international community, has committed itself to take tangible measures to eliminate corruption in the country. The Afghan government has given priority to “curbing corruption in several key national documents, including Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as well as the Afghan Compact” (Lal, 2010, pp. 8-9) Lal reveals that currently there are twelve institutions including police, the Attorney General Office (AGO), the Control and Audit Office (CAO), the High Office of Oversight (HOO), the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) and the Supreme Court that deal with the elimination of corruption. In order to address corruption control mechanisms put in place by the Afghan government, as well as international community, this chapter will analyze the existing corruption control mechanisms and the reasons for their lack of success.
1. National Corruption Control Agencies

The legal framework for the fight against corruption in Afghanistan is based on the Afghanistan Constitution (2004), the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the Anti-corruption laws. Though, organizational capacities of the Anti-Corruption organizations are weak and information about laws and regulations regarding corruption are not widely available (USAID, 2009, pp. 16-17), still government of Afghanistan has put a large number of efforts in place that combat against administrative corruption. This paper further intends to reveal and explain these efforts.

1.1. General Independent Administration of Anti-Corruption (GIAAC)

Widespread corruption has emerged in the new established government of Afghanistan from its birth in 2002. All governmental positions were occupied by warlords, former militias who helped coalition forces to defeat the Taliban. In order to endorse a culture of meritocracy throughout the government bureaucracy to reduce corruption, nepotism, and severe inefficiencies, president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan established an Anti-Corruption Commission named GIAAC in June 2003. The commission was mandated to “develop strategies to eliminate corruption and to promote talented, competent and committed civil service throughout the Afghan Government”. (EIRA, 2003) The General Independent Administration of Anti-Corruption (GIAAC) was also mandated to “promote awareness and…investigate cases of suspected corruption” (RNEA, 2007).

Initially, the GIAAC has established its offices in almost all provinces of Afghanistan and had successfully filed a large number of cases of embezzlement of millions of dollars against public officials. For the successful operation of the GIAAC, police and Attorney General’s Office (AGO) were both assigned to help the GIAAC in arresting, prosecuting and
investigation of corrupt officials. (Stanikzai, 2008) However, the GIAA C was not specifically mandated to investigate cases of corruption among ANP officers, but it had dealt with high ranking government officials in the Afghan government including police officers. In sum, political influence and lack of resources prevented the GIAAC to follow its mandate. There were two major contributing factors in the failure of the GIAAC.

- **Internal Capacity of the GIACC**

  During its initial days, as GIAAC started to deal with the cases of corruption of high ranking officials, it was lacking a separate budget to operate properly; therefore, the agency was not able to follow its mandate. In addition the head of the GIAAC, appointed by the president in 2007 had the background of criminality. Mr. Wasifi (the head of GIAAC) was arrested at Caesars Palace on July 15, 1987 for selling 23 ounces of heroin. (AP, 2007) As a result, the lack funding, support and lack of committed leadership caused failure of the GIAAC.

- **External Pressure on the GIAAC**

  Although, the GIAAC had faced internal funding problems and lack of committed leadership, it was also under a severe pressure from the political sphere. According to Zabihullah Esmati a former head of the GIAAC, the president himself intervened in the GIAAC activities. (Stanikzai, 2008) Mr. Esmati stated that some of the high ranking corrupt government officials had been exempted by the president decree itself. He stated, for example that a decree of the president has exempted 6 key government officials who were accused of corruption and fraud in the 2003 Hajj ceremony. Similarly, the former Minister of Education and speaker of the Afghan parliament (now member of the parliament) got a special exemption from the president to burn out his files in the GIAAC, (Stanikzai, 2008), because
of his accusation of embezzlement of $30 million in the procurement of furniture for the Ministry of Education and printing new books when he was the minister of education in 2002-2003.

In general, the efforts made by the GIAAC were not adequate and were not sufficient enough to tackle with the cases of corruption in a new established administration, full of warlords, drug lords, corruption and et al. and was not able to perform properly because of the internal problems and external pressures. The GIAAC was dissolved in 2009 and its activities had merged with a new established institution of oversight by the name of High Officer of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC).

1.2. Development of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy

When the allegation of administrative corruption increased and general perception of administrative corruption spread across different governmental organizations, President Hamid Karzai ordered the establishment of a commission based on the article 50 of the Afghanistan Constitution, under the leadership of Abdul Salam Azimi the Chief Justice and Head of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as participants from various ministries, AGO, and independent commission to “codify [a] strategy and [a] procedure of the administrative reform and struggle against administrative corruption by using long term; mid-term; and short term practical planning”. (SPACAR, 2006, p. 8) As a result, the commission held its first meeting on 24th August 2006 (SPACAR, 2006, p. 9) and agreed on drafting wide range of policies for various ministries and independent commissions to combat corruption. The new strategy also has taken the United Nations Convention against Administrative Corruption (UNCAC) into account and prepared their report, named Azimi Report. The report released in mid 2008 that comprised of a diagnosis of the current situation and
recommendations (a comprehensive anti corruption strategy to eliminate administrative corruption in Afghanistan) for action. (OECD, 2009, p. 4)

In addition, Afghanistan has also signed the UNCAC on 20th February, 2004 (SPACAR, 2006, p. 10) but its ratification required the approval of the Afghan Parliament that took place on 25th August, 2008. (Costa, 2010, p. 13) Moreover, prior to the Paris Ministerial Conference, in June 2008, Afghan government had boosted their effort against corruption, and drafted a new anti-corruption law, which in result, “foresees not only the abolition of the GIAAC, but also the creation of a new anti-corruption institution”. (OECD, 2009, p. 4) This new anti-corruption agency has mandated to oversee the implementation of the Azimi Report as well as coordinate anti-corruption efforts within the government of Afghanis. However, this new strategy includes information about police corruption, but they are very general and cannot describe specifically the notion of police corruption; it only suggests a number of recommendations that can help in understanding some forms of corruption within ANP not all forms of police corruption.

1.3. High Officer of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC)

Establishment of the High Officer of Oversight and Anti-Corruption is based on the Azimi Report. The importance of fighting corruption for stability and sustainable development of Afghanistan on the one hand, and the inability of the existed corruption control mechanism to deliver these needs on the other, forced the President of Afghanistan to issue a decree asking for the establishment of the HOOAC in July, 2008. (HOOAC, 2008) The establishment of the HOOAC reflects on the Afghan government commitment to set up an independent body to oversee and coordinate implementation of anti-corruption policies of the Afghan government. In addition, absence of unified efforts towards elimination of
corruption within Afghan government institutions, and the complex nature of administrative corruption, emerged the need for establishment of HOOAC as well.

Currently, HOOAC is the leading independent body for the coordination and monitoring of the anti-corruption strategies in various government organization of Afghanistan. The agency is responsible to directly report to the president, and is mandated with a “unifying oversight function to coordinate, supervise, and support all anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan”. (HOOAC, 2008) Beside its mandate a additional power entrusted to HOOAC in 2010 by the President; which has broadened its capacity and ability to register complaints, perform preliminary investigations and refer cases about corruption to the AGO for further investigation and prosecution.

The agency now has the authority to registers and verifies the financial asset declarations of government officials; simplifies government administrative procedures along with relevant institutions to reduce opportunities for corruption; provides expert assistance to government ministries and departments to develop their own anti-corruption action plans and oversees and monitors their efforts; and promotes public education and awareness about corruption and anti-corruption programs. (Osmani, 2010)

The first head of the HOOAC was Mr. Mohammad Yasin Osmani, currently replaced by Mr. Azizullah Lodin who was the head of the Independent Election Commission during 2009 presidential election that was reported with widespread fraud in the process of the 2009 presidential election.
In order, to achieve common goals with the HOOAC and enforce departmental anti-corruption strategy, MOI has established Directorate of Combating Administrative Corruption (DCAC), and created an Afghan National Police Strategy (ANPS). The DCAC is mandated to deal with allegations of corruption among ANP officers, as well as MOI officials. However, the department has very limited information and knowledge about police corruption, but they have drafted a 16 article action plan. The action plan is a secret and confidential document and is not allowed to be copied by others, even the member of the MOI other than DCAC department. The action plan includes a wide range of activities, but it does not focus entirely on the notion of police corruption, its causes and consequences, and merely focus on some preventive measures that are also not adequate.

Moreover, the ANPS suggests three pillars based anti-corruption strategy that will deal with; a) capacity building, b) prevention, and c) law enforcement. According to ANPS, it is essential to reduce corruption, in order to improve governance efficiency, accountability and credibility and serve the people of Afghanistan in a respectable manner. (ANPS, 2010, p. 15) Overall, the MOI measures against the elimination of corruption among ANP have very less impacts; during 1389 (2010-2011) in a police force of almost 125,000 (Cornwell, 2011), the MOI has registered only 274 cases of ANP corruption, of which mere 23 referred for the prosecution (Omer, 2011) and the rest faced with minor disciplinary actions.

2. International Corruption Control Agencies

Not only Afghan government, but also international agencies working in Afghanistan are concerned about widespread corruption. Together with Afghan government they also have started their efforts to effectively combat corruption in Afghanistan. Most of their efforts
combating corruption are mainly focus on strengthening governance and rule of law transparency and accountability. (USAID, 2009, p. 22) Some of these international agencies provided their technical assistance, while others are practically involved in corruption control activities in the country.

2.1. Unites States Government Anti-Corruption Efforts

The U.S. government efforts to fight corruption in Afghanistan are mainly focuses on “core governance and rule of law capacity development activities”. (USAID, 2009, p. 18) Their programs are mainly designed to strengthen transparency, accountability and effectiveness in the government functionality. The U.S. government agencies that are working to combat corruption are: the Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG) provides considerable support to build governance capacities via several initiatives; such as, Capacity Development Programs (CDP), Afghanistan Rule of Law Program (ARoLP); in addition, Office of Economic growth (OEG); Office of Social Sector Development (OSSD); Office of Infrastructure Engineering and Energy (OIEE); Provincial Reconstruction Team; Department of Security (DOS) and others are working very closely with the Afghan government to eradicate corruption in Afghanistan government institution.

For example, the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), together with the assistance from EUPOL, UK and others is strengthening the capacity of the AGOs Anti Corruption Unit (ACU) to “monitor, investigate, prosecute and appeal cases of corruption more efficiently, effectively and fairly”. (USAID, 2009, p. 20) The other international donor agencies, specifically assisting anti-corruption activities in Afghanistan are the World Bank led series of Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments (VCAs), the UNDP Accountability and Transparency (ACT) programs, the EUPOL and et al.
2.2. World Bank Led Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments (VCAs) Program

The Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments program address the typology of corruption, contributing factors of corruption, its consequences, and the nature and extent of corruption in various governmental institutions of the Afghan government. It also illustrates specific vulnerabilities to corruption in particular sector and agencies within the Afghan government. The program is focusing on: a) Strengthening Political Will and Leadership; b) Building Institutional Capacities; and c) Developing Credibility. (USAID, 2009, p. 21)

2.3. United Nations Development Program/ Accountability and Transparency (ACT)

The UNDP/ACT program, funded by Norway, Italy, and the UNDP itself is active since 2007 and assisting the Government of Afghanistan to improve its institutional capacity and policy environment to successfully implement its anti-corruption strategy. (USAID, 2009, p. 22) Accordingly, the UNDP/ACT “has focused on enabling the establishment of the High Officer of Oversight and is currently working closely with [HOOAC] leadership to build capacity of key program department”. Currently, ACT is providing its assistance to four Afghan government institutions including the Ministry of Interior “to implement key recommendations of VCAs including complaints and internal investigation capacities. [Moreover] ACT has helped to establish Integrity Promotion Offices in these institutions”. (USAID, 2009, p. 22)

In addition, UNDP is also funding other non-governmental organizations such as Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) to strengthen their efforts in the fight against corruption by strengthening civil society and media involvement. There are, however, numerous other donor assistance programs help Afghan government to develop transparency and accountability in the country. For example, the World Bank provides a large number of
technical assistance to government institutions for supporting transparency and accountability. The UNDP’s Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Project (ASGP) is mandated to build transparency and accountability capacities in the provinces and district of Afghanistan. Besides general international anti-corruption organizations there are police specific international agencies too that working to reform ANP and strengthen transparency and accountability among ANP agencies.

2.4. European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)

The EUPOL Afghanistan launched its mission in June 2007 following the Germany in the front regarding “Police reform and builds on the efforts of the European Union (EU) member states and other international actors in the field of police and the rule of law”. (Haendel, 2011, p. 1) The mission has extended until 31st May 2013 by the Council of the European Union on 18th May 2010. The aim of the mission is to contribute to the establishment of long lasting and effective civilian policing preparations under the Afghan ownership. Specifically, the mission has mandated to “monitor, mentors, advices and trains at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces”. (Haendel, 2011, p. 1) Among the major tasks that EUPOL Afghanistan operates in Afghanistan are:

a. Support the implementation of the National Police Strategy;

b. Contribute to the establishment of a proactive, intelligence-led police force with an appropriate command, control and communication structure that addresses corruption and respects human rights and gender aspects;

c. Support the development of criminal investigation capability;

d. Address the linkages to the wider rule of law allowing and efficient penal process;
e. Contribute in the field of police reform, especially through the International Police Coordinating Board. (Haendel, 2011, p. 1)

The strategic objectives of the EUPOL are to achieve missions’ goals, which are:

a. Develop police command, control and communication for the MOI and the ANP;

b. Develop intelligence-led police;

c. Build the capabilities of the Criminal Investigation Department;

d. Develop anti-corruption capacities;

e. Improve cooperation and coordination between Police and Judiciary;

f. Mainstream gender and Human Rights aspects within the MOI and ANP.

(Haendel, 2011, p. 2)

3. Evaluation of Existing Agencies and Policies

In Afghanistan, the legal framework for the fight against corruption in based on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the UNCAC, and the procedure of the HOOAC on the overseeing the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy. The challenges that are evident in other parts of the legal frame of Afghanistan are also visible in the area of anti-corruption; “the mechanism to adapt existing law upon the passage of other laws are weak” (Lal, 2010, p. 31) and the information about new laws and regulation are hard to obtain. However, there are almost 12 anti-corruption institutions working in Afghanistan to strengthening the national integrity system, but their work is insufficient and their public outreach is very narrow. Beside other challenges, they lack experts and professional employees, their legal jurisdictions are not well defined and in a number of cases their duties overlap with each others that make their processes more complex.
Beside the national anti corruption agencies, there are also international agencies too that operate to strengthen transparency and accountability in the Afghanistan. Most of these organizations are active in the file of providing technical assistance to the existing national anti-corruption institution as well as providing financial assistance for them.

**Summary**

To combat corruption effectively, the Afghan government and international community has put sizable efforts in place. The Afghan government had established the GIAAC in 2003 to combat administrative corruption followed by the development of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2006), and the establishment of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (2008). In addition, to combat corruption the MOI has also extended its mandate and established the Directorate of Combating Administrative Corruption and developed an Afghanistan National Police Strategy (ANPS).

Similarly, International agencies also launched their efforts to strengthen transparency and accountability in Afghanistan. The U.S. government, the World Bank, the UNDP and other international organizations has provided technical and financial assistance to the Afghan government, in order to effectively combat corruption in the public sector. Moreover, to make reform in the police, the EUPOL has launched its mission in Afghanistan that was mandated to make reforms in the ANP and strengthen its efforts of combating corruption in it.

In sum, all these efforts put in place by various national in international agencies had faced with a large number of challenges. For example the GIAAC was lacking adequate resources and budget as well as was under a strong political influence. The HOOAC is only monitoring the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. It is also not an independent agency but rather operates under the president’s office and responsible for
reporting to the president. The DCAC is lacking adequate resources and an accurate definition of police corruption. Therefore, this paper will suggest a few recommendations that will help combat corruption among ANP forces. The conclusion of this paper will contain: a) the improvement of the existing structure of the MOI that combat corruption, and b) requires the establishment of an Independent Commission of Controlling Police Corruption in Afghanistan that will be the concluding part of this paper.
Conclusion

Recommendations

Corruption control within ANP is a complex task; it involves not only controlling of the diverse and complicated structure of the ANP, but also covers a large number of heterogeneous functions, from controlling the top leadership in the MOI to monitoring activities of ordinary police officers in checkpoints. According to Ivković, police corruption control functions are too diverse; thus, they have to be performed by various institutions; such as, police agency itself, prosecutors, courts, the media, the citizenry (Ivković, 2005, p. 135), and the independent commissions mandated to perform these tasks. A number of corruption control mechanisms should be adopted by one specific organization such as police, while others need unified efforts from other institutions as well.

For example, detection of corruption cases has to be performed by police as mentioned in the Constitution of Afghanistan, while the investigation needs to be carried out by the prosecutors and the punishment by courts. Similarly, police agencies itself can take a number of disciplinary action against police light misconducts. Hens, the elimination of corruption needs combined efforts of all these institutions together with the establishment of a particular independent commission to find roots and causes of corruption within police force and recommend accurate and feasible solutions for them.

Being an Islamic state and a traditional society, a large majority (exactly 85 percent) of the respondents in a survey that I have conducted for writing this paper, stated that the applications of the Islamic literatures (Sharia Law) could be an effective tool to eliminate corruption among police forces in Afghanistan. They stated if ANP officers know the Islamic literatures regarding corruption; for example, Hadith of the Prophet states that “bribe giver
and briber taker are both in fire” (Abi-Dawood, n.d.), then they would never engaging in corrupt practices and corruption will be reduced itself. They insisted on the role of religious scholars (Mullahs) in campaign against corruption. Together with Islamic literatures, a light majority of the respondents (50%) stated that reform within the MOI and police agencies all over the country could have positive effects on corruption control. In the survey, the stance of governors, media, provincial councils, civil societies, and et al. are also considered very important.

Finally, in the light of recommendations and understanding of the diversity of police corruption in Afghanistan, this paper will propose two recommendations. The first will focus on the improvement of the current efforts of the MOI against corruption, and the second specifically requires the establishment of an Independent Commission of Controlling Police Corruption (ICCPC) that will deeply investigate police corruption, find its causes and recommend solutions for them. In order, to reduce corruption within ANP, all of these institutions required to work closely with each other.

**Recommendation # 1: Improvement of the Current Structure**

As mentioned in the causes of police corruption in Afghanistan that the current structure of the ANP has some discrepancies, which in result causes the engagement of ANP officers in corrupt behaviors and serious misconducts, even crimes. Therefore, this paper focuses on the areas that need to be improved within MOI and the police agency itself. The focus will be more on to: i) Monitor propensity for corruption, ii) Cultivate a culture intolerant of corruption, iii) Establish adequate supervision and accountability, iv) Set official policies and enforcing them, v) Provide resources for control, vi) Control the corruption control efforts, vii) Detect and investigate former corrupt officials, viii) Limit opportunities for corruption within ANP, and ix) Publicize true information about corruption.
Monitor Propensity Towards Corruption

In order to monitor propensity of recruits toward corruption, the process of recruitment is very important for building an effective police force. Therefore, it is essential to recruit those with lower propensity towards corruption. According to Ivković, police agencies may fail to search for recruits with lower propensity toward corruption, because of “negligence, inability to deal with recruitment and selection process, or willful enforcement of lowered standards”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 137) She argues that due to four reasons recruitment process can be affected. First, recruitment personnel could be overworked; Second, established recruitment criteria could be inadequate in terms of content; Third, established criteria could be neglected or could be enforced at a lowered standard; and Fourth, background information could be superficial. (Ivković, 2005, pp. 137-138) All these discrepancies are visible in the ANP agencies; therefore they needs to be improved subsequently.

First, ANP lacks professional and well experienced staff member to recruit and select talented recruits for police job. Therefore, it is very important that officers responsible for recruitment of new police force have to be increased and need to have adequate training and experience.

Second, the current recruitment criterion has many loopholes. For example, those who have completed 18 years of age, be an Afghan, graduate from 9th of 12th grade school, with the height of 165-170cm and are not wanted by criminal or investigative departments (Personal-Interview T. D., 2011) are not adequate for selection. The recruitment and selection criteria need to be improved and well structured.

Third, in most of the recruitment departments of ANP, politicians, member of the parliament, warlords, drug lords and et al. have influence on the recruitment processes, which
in result causes that recruitment officer neglect their internal recruitment process and recruit people with higher propensity toward corruption and favoritism towards their kin. Therefore, the recruitment process needs to be independent and free from any kind of political or kinship influence.

**Fourth**, the background information for the ANP recruits is very low or even not required. For example, having two letter of recommendation from a current police officer or a member of the Afghan government or from the community heads are not adequate for a person to be recruited. The background information about ANP recruits are missing in the records of the MOI, therefore, it is essential that MOI develop a record keeping method as well as strengthen the investigation of background information about new recruits.

- **Cultivate a Police Culture Intolerant of Corruption**

  In order to cultivate a police culture intolerant of corruption, it requires the police agency to establish clear boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors for police officers, as well as encourage police officers not to tolerate corrupt practices within their circle of command. In addition, police agency needs to build trust among people and accept allegations of corruption within the agency and investigate them properly. In a survey that I have conducted, most of the respondent had fear of filing complaints about police corruption, because they thought, if they complain, nothing will change. Therefore, it is important that police culture should be intolerant of corruption.

- **Establish Strict Supervision and Accountability**

  Lack of supervision caused the existence of corruption among ANP forces. In most cases of corruption within ANP, it has witnessed that weak supervision and lack of accountability leads toward serious forms of misconduct by police officers. Therefore, it is
very important that supervision needs to be strong and strict; the member of the ANP forces should be accountable to both internal police agencies and external control agencies; such as, the parliament, the governor, and the general public at all. In addition, a police supervisor must be accountable for his/her own misconduct as well as misconducts of their subordinates.

➢ Set Official Policies and Enforce them

However, laws and regulations of the Afghan government has prohibits most forms of corrupt behaviors, but they are not sufficient enough to deal with all forms of police corrupt behaviors. Similarly, the action-plan of DCAC within MOI has very less to deal with corruption cases and doesn’t clearly define the boundaries of police activities. Accordingly, the ANPS doesn’t contain adequate information about police corruption and only proposes a light prevention of corruption. Most of the ANP officers believe that payment in exchange for favorable treatment (bribery) is corruption, while other forms of corruption such as corruption of authority, Kickbacks, Opportunistic theft, and et al. (Roebuck & Barker, 1973) are mostly forgotten. Therefore, the MOI in general and ANP in particular needs to develop their own internal rules and anti-corruption policies that cover all forms of ANP corruption, and most importantly to enact these policies and follow them very strictly. These rules and policies must cover all acceptable and unacceptable behaviors as well as draw a line between allowed and prohibited actions for ANP officers.

➢ Provide Resources for Control

As mentioned before, ANP officers have very limited resources in hand to tackle and cope with allegations of police corruption. Due to lack of resources, whether they are human resources or capital resources, ANP officers cannot supervise their subordinates properly. To control corruption within ANP, the MOI has to allocate adequate resource for supervision and
control to the DCAC. The DCAC needs to be equipped with well functioning anti-corruption procedures, professional corruption control staff (detector, investigator, et al.), as well as equipments to reach incidents of police corruption on time.

- **Control the Corruption Control Department Activities**

  Though, the resources provided to the DCAC are not adequate, it is also important that the MOI should control the DCAC activities and don’t let them operate according to their personal well. It is most likely experienced that police officers or police investigation agencies who investigated the allegation of corruption within police, engaged in corrupt practices. (Ivković, 2005, p. 153) As a result, it is essential to have a second layer of protection and empower another agency to control activities of the DCAC and the MOI. This new institution could be the media, civil society, citizen group, or even a commission that this paper is asking for.

- **Detect and Investigate Former Corrupt Officials**

  Despite the importance of prevention of future allegation of corruption, it is also important that police corruption control agency, specifically the MOI has to detect and investigate those cases of corruption conducted by police officers in the past and have not been investigated yet. The benefit of this function is that it prevents future conducts of police misbehaviors. For example, if a police officers with past allegations of corruption receive punishment, the other police officers will not engaging in corrupt practice and will realize that if they engage in the misconduct and no one punished them on the time of allegation, but in the future someone might have open the case and then they may face with severe consequences. As a result, intentionally they will not engage in corrupt practices.
➢ Limit Loopholes for Corruption

As mentioned before that there are loopholes available for police officers to break laws, such as lack of supervision, nature of the police work, interaction with criminals and et all. Ivković argues that “monitoring actual police work, learning about the types of opportunities available, and introducing appropriate changes are unavoidable elements of control efforts”. (Ivković, 2005, p. 169) In most of these cases police officers engages in corrupt practices. Therefore, it is also important that MOI limit the loopholes available for police officers who engaging in corrupt behaviors. These limitations can be range from very strict and strong supervision, to frequent rotation of jobs, to appointment of undercover agents and et al. these measures will limit the opportunities for police officers engaging in corruption. For example, police agency with strong supervision are less likely to engage in corruption; similarly, frequently rotation of police officers limits their relationship with external corrupt bodies and member of police agencies with undercover agents are less likely to engage in corrupt practices.

➢ Publicize True Information About Corruption

Police agency is the primary agent of gathering data about police corruption for its own purpose of controlling. (Ivković, 2005, p. 173) It is also important that police agencies share collected information with the citizens too. Sharing true and accurate information will help police agency to keep their reputation as well as introduce corrupt officials to the general public. For example, the theory of the rotten-apple, which states that a few corrupt police officers destroy the reputation of police agencies at all; therefore, police agency needs to uncover these rotten-apples and build the trust among people.
In addition, if the government of Afghanistan wants to implement good governance programs, it needs to be accountable. The right to know or access to information are closely linked with the accountability, which is an important principle of good governance. (Lal, 2010, p. 31) It is very hard for citizens to make judgment about police activities without knowing information about them. Therefore, the government of Afghanistan should adopt the right to information and follow it. Similarly, the police agency requires adopting policies on dissemination of the true and accurate information.

In sum, Police agency itself suffers from existing of corruption within it; therefore, they should carry the heaviest burden of control efforts. They are mandated to perform or share a large number of control measures, including “detecting and investigating corruption, punishing corrupt police officers, monitoring the propensity for corruption, cultivating a culture intolerant of corruption” (Ivković, 2005, p. 176) and all those efforts that can reduce police corruption. The government, the Minister of Interior, police agencies themselves concerned about the existing of corruption within police force of Afghanistan. Similarly they have taken some steps toward elimination of corruption, but the reality is that most of these efforts are either too wide or too narrow and had very limited impacts on the level of police corruption in the country. Therefore, this paper recommends the establishment of a new Independent Commission of Controlling Police Corruption (ICCPC) that will be discussed further.

**Recommendation # 2: Establishment of an Independent Commission of Controlling Police Corruption (ICCPC)**

Together with the existing anti-corruption measures already taken by the MOI and the police agency itself, this paper recommends the establishment of a new Independent Commission of Controlling Police Corruption (ICCPC) that will deal with the cases of police
corruption both at the central level and provincial level, and will address the inadequacies of the current anti-corruption measures. The ICCPC will be independent from government influence; and politicians and bureaucrats will not be able to interfere in commissions’ functioning. They will be accountable to the citizens of Afghanistan through transparency in selection process and in terms of their functioning. In case of unaccountability, the citizen will have the right to file complaints against a particular member or against the entire commission to the Supreme Court of Afghanistan in Kabul and to the Provincial Courts in the provinces respectively.

- **Functions of the ICCPC**

  The ICCPC will have five commissioners in its main office in Kabul selected by a selection committee comprised of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Minister of Interior, Head of the Supreme Court, member of the Afghan Parliament, representative of mass media, and representative of civil society. Commissioners will themselves select one commissioner among them as the head of the ICCPC. The same committee will select three members of the provincial ICCPC in coordination with the governor, head of the provincial police department and representative of civil society from that province.

  Moreover, the commission will deal with the allegation of corruption within ANP forces; it will also investigate cases of corruption that are not investigated so far. It will review and find contributing factors that causes police corruption within ANP; consequently, they will find appropriate solutions. The commission will deal with all types of police corruption cases, ranging from pity corruption such as free meal or free cup of coffees on the street, to the grand corruption cases in the MOI contracts and drug related police corruption. A number of the functions for the commission and will be as bellow.
Corruption Control Functions of the ICCPC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Function</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>ICCPC’s Participates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitor propensity</td>
<td>Police Recruit Dep.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide resource for control</td>
<td>MOI, ANP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set official policies and enforce</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, Legislature</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish supervision and accountability</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, Media, Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivate intolerant culture</td>
<td>MOI, ANP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect and Investigate corruption within ANP officer</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, AGO, Media, ICCPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punish corrupt police officers</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, ICCPC, AGO, Courts</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigate former corruption cases</td>
<td>ICCPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control corruption control dep.</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, ICCPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve existing system</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, ICCPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit opportunities for corruption</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicize true and accurate information</td>
<td>MOI, ANP, AGO, Media, ICCPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the structure have been copied from (Ivković, 2005, p. 191)

➢ The Authority and Power of the ICCPC

To perform successfully, the ICCPC needs authority and power assigned by the legal system of the country. Like a successful corruption control commission, ICCPC will need the power and independence to investigate and prosecute allegations of police corruption within ANP very freely. In addition, the commission needs to be able to protect citizens who complain about police corruption, as well as provide immunity for those police officers...
willing to supply information to the commission, and will hide their identity from those police officers engaged in corruption and are under the investigation. Similarly, the ICCPC need to be able to file court cases against all level of corrupt officials from the top, to the ordinary police officers.

In addition, the ICCPC need to have the subpoena power that will provide opportunity for the commission to complete testimony of police officers and/or citizens if necessary; and need to have access to internal records of a police agency. During the investigation process, the ICCPC need to have the power to notify the list of moveable and immovable assets of the accused, and at the time of conviction, the damage will be recovered from the sale of these assets. Moreover, the ICCPC needs to have the power to register all movable and immovable assets of the high, middle and lower ranking police officers on annual bases, and if unregistered assets are found, they will become the focus of investigation by the commission. Additionally, the ICCPC need to be able to impose financial sanctions and also initiate trials against guilty police officers.

The ICCPC will launch a website that will contain information about the commission as well as it hast to reach general public through mass media. The commission will publish its proceedings every month; the number of cases received, number of cases investigated, the status of proceeding, and the number of cases pending, as well as the reasons for pending.

- The Costs of the ICCPC

The effectiveness of the ICCPC will critically depend on the resources available for its functionality. The estimated cost of the commission depends on the nature and extent of the commission, the budget available for corruption control efforts in the MOI, and the severity of the problem. In addition, it also depends on the tasks assigned to the commission. In sum, it is
important that the government spend and allocate a specific budget for controlling police corruption within ANP forces. However, the exact cost of the task will be hard to determine, but some rough estimates can be assigned to it, which also needs further assessment.
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Annex

Questioner

Interview Nr. _____________
Date: _________________
Location: ________________

My name is Niamatullah Sayer and I am doing my Master degree program at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, in Germany. I am going to write my master thesis about the existence of corruption in Afghanistan’s National Police as well as how to control such practices. To conduct research, I need your factual and real inputs. It is to ensure you that all the information, details, and other important data that you will provide me, will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. If you have any question or if you need any further information before we start interview, you may ask.

Q. 01: In general, what is your understanding about corruption?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Q. 02: Could you please define police corruption?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Q. 03: Do you think corruption exist within ANP?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Q. 04: Where does that corrupt practice happen?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Q. 05: Which departments of ANP seem to be more corrupt than others?
Q. 06: Which types of police corruption do you know?

Q. 07: Have you encountered any corruption cases so far within ANP?

Q. 08: If yes, which type of corruption was it?

Q. 09: Have you ever complained from ANP corruption to any governmental organization?

Q. 10: What are the causes of police corruption within ANP?

Q. 11: What are the consequences of police corruption in Afghanistan?

Q. 12: Do you think salary is the cause for existence of corruption within ANP?

Q. 13: How you or your organizations deal with corruption cases within ANP? (Optional)

Q. 14: From your point of view, what measures need to be taken to at least reduce some types of corruption?
Q. 15: Do you think police education can play an important role in reducing corruption?

___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________

Q. 16: Do you think police reform can play an important role in reducing corruption?

___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________

Q. 17: Do you have any further information to share with us?

___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________

My questions end here, if you have further detail or information, you can share it with me. At the end I would like to thank you for your valuable information and important time.