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Thu, Jul 8th 2010, 21:32

Member deleted

To back such claims, you need to provide some more thoughts. But still, I agree with your main statement: Moving slowly on the Iran issue still strengthens China's position - And gives space to test their international position.

I would stress two or three aspects in regard to the China - Iran sanctions issue: First of all, the PR has no vital interest in Iran not having a nuclear programme. The multi-polar attitude is e.g. presented in the support of the Pakistani nuclear programme in the 90s. A limited nuclear capability reduces, as the majority of political think tanks in China seems to believe, the risk of intended war. When we look at aspects like regional political stability and aggressive patterns in state's rhetoric, the thinking seems loose. While the second claim cannot be applied if we reach out for a possible explanation, the first - China has no interest in fundamentally opposing a nuclear armed Iran - can in my opinion be maintained.

The second argument you respectively the article already named: It's China interest in accessing Iranian oil and gas reserves. Which is not only economic, but also indispensable for energy safety. So, China has not only no fundamental interest in a non-nuclear Iran in the first place, it has secondly economic links of certain value.

A third point seems to have it's relevancy in a more international arena. Confronting the U.S. in a more self-conscious way seems one of the main patterns we can determine recently. It, at the moment, mainly takes place in areas that are not of highest importance which could reach up to a serious breach in e.g. Sino-U.S. relations. But show characteristics of a demonstration of new power that longs for a relationship on par with the U.S. in a time the latter carries heavy burdens. The knowledge acquired via such power plays can possibly be transferred to several other scenarios, namely U.S.-Japan or the status in the Taiwan strait. (while only in the latter a weaker U.S. is in China's interest)

By not opposing Iranian nuclear capabilities, China can on the one hand oppose sanctions on a economic partner, while easily test the liability of the U.S.-Israel relation and the role of the U.S. and it's limits in an environment of a shifting power balance that definitely leaves the tracks of the uni-polar ages. This last but truly important argument is not sufficiently lined out in the review(ed) article. In almost every policy decision of certain relevance, we can, in my opinion, determine these or similar overlaying intentions hidden behind a curtain of very obvious reasons. The Iran dispute thereby is one more example of a smartly calculated pragmatic foresightedness by the CCP.