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Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' Empirically Challenged

Bertelsmann Foundation | September 2009

A study by the Bertelsmann Foundation in cooperation with the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research has proven that the number of cultural conflicts has risen dramatically over the past 25 years. One of the most popular theories in international relations in the past two decades - Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" - has been challenged by this study. Whereas Huntington argued that culture is a driving force in the development of international conflict, the study found empirical evidence that the majority of conflicts take place within states not between them.

Nearly half of the conflicts studied for the period 1945 to 2007 contained cultural dimensions. Ever since the end of the Cold War, cultural conflicts have outnumbered every other type of conflict. However, cultural concerns such as differences in religion or language do not provoke conflict by themselves. Rather the presence of a "youth bulge," i.e. a large number of young men between the ages of 15 and 24, is a crucial prerequisite to the development of conflict. The potential for aggression in a society is further augmented by the lack of economic growth, the absence of available arable land, and insufficiently developed democratic procedures. When these criteria meet up with religious and ethnic hatreds, the readiness for conflict heightens further. The Bertelsmann study proves that this scenario is played out increasingly within states, to a hitherto unknown extent. Examples ranging from Yugoslavia to the Caucasus to Sri Lanka lend credence to this notion.

Now that Huntington's thesis regarding the cause of international conflict cannot be reaffirmed, where does that leave the much debated cultural conflict between the West and Islam on the international stage? According to the study, four out of five cultural conflicts meanwhile take place within states. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" hence appears to have far greater explanatory power at the intra-state level than in the international realm. Cultural potential for conflict would therefore appear to affect a state's internal policies far more greatly than its foreign policies. Within a state, the potential for conflict is determined by the presence of a "youth bulge," in combination with the ethnic and/or linguistic fragmentation of a country. Hostilities will be far more likely to break out in the presence of cultural divisions, but they are not a priori defined by them. If one takes into consideration that cultural conflicts within state borders have in recent years increased in frequency and intensity, one might consider moving Huntington's theory out of the international relations textbooks and into those for government classes.

This summary was prepared by the Atlantic Community editorial team from "Culture and Conflict in Global Perspective – The Cultural Dimensions of Conflict: 1945-2007" published here by Bertelsmann Foundation.

Sat, Oct 10th 2009, 05:05

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One, the idea of a Clash of Civilizations by Prof. Huntington was not a prescription but merely a comprehension of particular trajectories though he did not study the causal factors behind such trajectories. Again the idea that there are more conflicts that take place within states rather than between states merely helps underscore the causal factors behind such possibilities of particular trajectories: the medieval project of an unfinished crusade that somehow has a twisted "radical marx or mao" getting mixed up with religion. That continues to be much-needed-to-be-studied phenomenon. This arresting of that trend and finding it getting localized merely makes the task easier: of identifying the actors that are most interested in such a "Clash of Civilization". One does know that the Vatican has been accorded the status of a state. Apart from that, one would find the absence of state actors behind such spurring of trends and trajectories that culminates in an academic observation of the Clash of Civilizations!
However, the separation of conflicts that accrue as part of the intrigues of a regional security complex and those that accrue out of the activities of these non-state actors (the global uncivil society - someone with enough resources seems to have taken the movie Matrix too seriously here) are becoming increasingly difficult to separate. They need to be. This localization merely indicates the frustration of medievalism and indicates the continued localization of medievalism and its arrest within the state boundaries. A cursory study of the causal factors merely yeilds this medievalism at play!

Tags: | civilizations | uncivil societies | non-civilizations | trends |

Sat, Oct 10th 2009, 16:03

Jai Singh, NA, (7)

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Perhaps I am just not seeing it, but is there an English language translation of the study on the Bertelsmann Foundation website? It is a bit difficult to express agreement or disagreement with the summary when the underlying data itself remains opaque secondary to the language barrier on the part of the subject commenter. I would be particularly interested in seeing how the authors of the study treated post-colonial and post-socialist states in their sample as a number of such 'states' were created without proper consideration of the populations contained therein and were held together through the threat of force rather than through appealing, principally, to a sense of national identity. It is hard to argue that a 'culture' predicated on national identity, when ethnic, confessional and tribal allegiances are more accurate indicators of 'culture,' even when suppressed, provides an empirical challenge to Huntington's hypothesis (the caveats and stated limitations of which must also be included).

Mon, Oct 12th 2009, 22:44

Laura Christine Wolfs, University of Nottingham, (2)

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I cant help but think that this is not a particularly surprising finding.
young men between the ages of 15-25 during the lack of economic growth, ie they are probably unemployed, leading to internal conflicts is something everyone will have witnessed whatever country they come from. In more developed countries with more stable democratic procedures etc we can then witness a rise in far right or far left activism, hooliganism or whatever else is available for young people to blame the system or let out their agressions. Further, these groups are said to be the most subjective to manipulation which makes them an easy target for extremist politicians to use them as a mobilising actor.

I do hence agree that the lesson learnt from the Clash of Civilisations is applicable to everyone of us and also that it means we have to provide more support for local actors to strengthen democratic procedures in their own country, especially during times of economic crisis.

Thu, Oct 15th 2009, 11:24

Clayton Macdonald, , Silver Contributor (35)

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The very title chosen for Huntington's hypothesis - "Clash of Civilizations" defines it. It places primacy on cultural difference as the cause of conflict. This hypothesis, therefore, has perhaps enjoyed some acceptance because it seems to reduce, or even eliminate, the possibility that the cause (perhaps only a possible, more likely the most probable cause) of conflict is disparities of outcome and opportunity.

Huntington's hypothesis that conflicts are caused by cultural difference is appealing - there's not much that can be done about that except to beat the heathens at their own game and we've got the firepower and the moral high-ground to do it. Let's go!

The empirical evidence, and common sense, showing that conflicts are caused by real or perceived disparities of outcome and opportunity are far less satisfying - at least to the current winners. It suggests that a solution to conflict can only be found by helping those who have been, and perceive themselves to be, the losers. It means that, instead rushing across the finish line first and reveling in being a winner, we must stop short and provide assistance to those who are limping and to those who started the race from a more distant location. We must, in short, seek to ensure that everyone crosses the finish line at nearly the same time. Even if that means going back to help those who are farthest behind.

The latter hypothesis is profoundly unappealing to the majority of winners and even would be winners. Yet, is it more unappealing than war? Apparently so.

Tue, Nov 3rd 2009, 19:25

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Huntington's theory was formulated during the very first year of the post-Cold War era and heavily suffers from a Cold War notion of conflicts: basically, a struggle between irreconcilable ideologies and set of values. For Huntington, a post-ideological world would have been moved by religions and cultures. Not exactly a revolutionary idea, for religion is ideology. But what the theory underestimates is economy. Indeed, conflicts are primarily over scarce resources such as land, water, and raw materials. Ideology, culture and religion are effective instruments to fuel the conflict, not a cause. Can we really say that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is not about land and water? Or can we say that the wars in Yugoslavia were not propelled by an economic collapse? An interesting book (Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, 2005) shows clearly that the primary goal of bin Laden was to regain control over the natural resources of the Muslim world.

The aforementioned study is hardly surprising but interesting for two aspects. First, it underlines that "[t]he potential for aggression in a society is further augmented by the lack of economic growth, the absence of available arable land, and insufficiently developed democratic procedures". This seems to corroborate the idea that democracy is indeed a meta-institution to "enable higher-quality growth" (Dani Rodrik, 2000). Second, it points out that "four out of five cultural conflicts [...] take place within states". It is clear that an international conflict is profoundly different from an internal conflict. For one thing, we can much more easily identify actors of an international conflict (states) than of an internal one. Therefore, an international relations theory is not what we need. A good starting point is the study made by Amy Chua (World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, 2002) where she analyzes how economic imbalances within a society can generate a backlash against the ethnic and market-dominant minority.

Tags: | conflicts | civilizations | democracy | ethnic conflict |

Tue, Nov 10th 2009, 17:18

Florian Kuhne, Freie Universität Berlin, Gold Contributor (116)

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I just dont know why conflicts inside countries should not be driven by culture differences??? See Sunni-Shia conflicts in Iraq or go to Africa, where almost every country is made up at least as far as barriers are concerned and the most different groups of people live together in one "nation". Sorry, but I do not see the point of this.

"Now that Huntington's thesis regarding the cause of international conflict cannot be reaffirmed, where does that leave the much debated cultural conflict between the West and Islam on the international stage?" Maybe this item should be addressed by the study, and not the "youth bulge", which is best known as having potential for conflict, as Ms Wolfs pointed out.

Tags: | Inner-State Conflicts |

Fri, Nov 13th 2009, 18:53

andrea di nunzio, university of Bologna, (1)

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Probably Samuel Huntington couldn't figure out how his essay, wrote in response to the extremely optimistic Fukuyama's book, The End of History, would be central in the future debate in the international relations. A small writing, later a book, concerning the importance of cultural issues in the new post cold war world.
After the wall, what? This is the question many scholar tried to answer after one of the two big superpower imploded. I think simply Huntighton wrote the luckiest, and the fall of the twin towers in this sense helped definetely his theory.
The conflict between Islam and Western societies was the empirical proof of it. But now, this study show us another truth: that Waltz's newrealism come again to be the stronger theory in the interational relations. Between states again the power is at the stake and every single action is driven by it. Again, or always. Because I think that Huntington's theory was just a little parenthesis in the realism predominance above others. He wrote it in 1992 and just a few years later it was empirically defeated. Realism was born with Tucidides, since war in the Peloponnesum and still worth.
Affirming that cultural concerns could be important (for war) just within states is fundamental: no international relations theory could be defined without being applicable between states.
Power in again and always been what leads states action. I think we have to re-start from this point to manage the future of the international relations.

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