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Iraqi-Style Surge Will Not Fit Afghanistan

Hamida Ghafour, The National | October 8, 2008

John McCain wants to bring an Iraqi-style surge to Afghanistan to “turn around the war," but the inability to differentiate between the two countries will ensure failure in Afghanistan. ++ There, there is no sectarian civil war, no “Sons of Afghanistan,” and the proposed surge would not compare with Iraq’s. ++ Most importantly, Afghans want peace at “any cost, even if it means the return of the Taliban.” ++ America’s best shot for success is to harness this “desperate desire for safety and peace,” not to copy and paste the surge tactics.

 

 
Tags: | Iraq Surge | Afghanistan | John McCain | taliban |
 
Comments
Morgan   Sheeran

Mon, Oct 13th 2008, 21:42

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The surge in Afghanistan must be a surge in trainers and mentors to the Afghan government and its forces. The ANP are critical to the success of the IRoA, but are not universally perceived by Western leadership to be critical. They are not even perceived by all senior military officers on the ground as such.

Placing more American combat troops on the ground will only put them in the position of building more fortified positions from which the troops will sally forth and then withdraw back into the safety of the fortress, leaving the night to the Taliban. It will change nothing except to give the Taliban more targets to shoot at.

Increasing the advisor mission will enable advisors to more densely embed with Afghan forces to increase their training, leadership, logistics, and ethics. Afghans do know right from wrong, because they will not do wrong while you are watching. It will take some time before Afghans totally abandon their old ways of corruption, but they do learn by repetition and by discussion.

No, basing troops in the neighborhoods will, while providing security, cause a sense of occupation which is anathema to an Afghan. This will cause more damage than good. Local security must be an Afghan achievement provided by the ANP, backed by the ANA, and supported by NATO mentors, trainers, firepower (access to air assets,) and medical care.

Tremendous progress has been made by the ANA with NATO training and mentorship in the past six years. The same can be done with the ANP, but must be done in each of the 364 districts in Afghanistan. The ANA has a good reputation among the people, while the ANP often do not. This must be changed through their works, demonstrated through changing ethics as the result of NATO focus on these issues.

An Iraq-style surge, with American and other NATO forces providing the local security will not fly well in Afghanistan. Large Maneuver units would only build large Forward Operating Bases and operate out of them, sallying forth mostly in daylight and withdrawing to the safety of the FOB at night, leaving the night to the Taliban.

Working in the 364 dispersed districts will mean that NATO mentors will be in precarious positions from time to time, but remember; a basid tent of counterinsurgency is that the safer you try to stay, the less secure you really are.
Tags: | Afghanistan | ANA | ANP | counterinsurgency | mentor | ETT | PMT | surge |
 

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