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Time Running Short in Afghanistan

Jackson Diehl, The Washington Post | June 14, 2010

Three factors are currently hindering US strategy in Afghanistan. ++ The first is a lack of commitment from European governments and the failure to figure out how to replace Canadian and Dutch combat troops withdrawing from Afghanistan this summer. ++ The second is a divergence of interests between the US and Karzai. ++ Third and most seriously is the "continued absence in the US command of a clear and coherent plan for pacifying southern Afghanistan -- one that seamlessly blends civilian and military initiatives."

 

 
 
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Morgan   Sheeran

Wed, Jun 23rd 2010, 15:40

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Interesting nominations for the top three hindering factors in Afghanistan. I agree that replacing Canadian and Dutch troops will be a challenge, but I don't think that they are in the top three challenges. A "divergence of interests between the US and Karzai" is a broad description to say the least. It is a description which sounds ominous but does not entirely hold water.

The terminations of Ministers Atmar and Saleh are by no means a sign of souring between Karzai and the US. While the relationship of Karzai and his brother remains problematic, and the author's analysis that the announcement of a troop withdrawal commencement date may cause ambivalence in the minds of many Afghan leaders, the results could hardly be described as a divergence.

Karzai's willingness to reconcile with the Taliban is supported by ISAF's actions. It is not, by any means, treated as a suspect action nor one that the Coalition will not help implement. In fact, the Coalition is actively training on how to facilitate and support such actions. While the author is no doubt doing his best at analysis, he is doing it through the lens of distance, where such actions do not appear on his radar. This provides the essential flaw in his interpretation.

The lack of commitment by Europeans is troublesome, but the greatest failure is the failure to train to execute the commander's intent in Afghanistan. Many of the Europeans consider themselves to be COIN-savvy already, although many do not apply even their own principles. But in failing to adapt to Afghan counterinsurgency doctrine, they become much less useful in the overall strategy. There are sufficient forces to make substantial progress in their individual areas of responsibility, but there is a widespread lack of actively employing the doctrinal concepts on the ground. However, these European partners are showing signs of interest in change. This is a positive sign.

The delays in Marjah and Kandahar are indications of how difficult establishing governance can be in a country with little or no institutional memory of how to govern. It is more indicative of the Coalition failure to mentor and train government employees over the course of the first 8 years of this endeavor than it is any indication of a lack of unified strategy. It takes time to build capacity, and just as the Afghans have little to no experience as administrators, the Coalition civilian agencies have little to no experience working to develop such capacities on this scale. This is a learning process. Learning is happening, though. Like any good commander, GEN McChrystal is not commencing an operation before all his assets are positioned. That is not a dismal sign; it is sound judgment.

Lastly, I deeply disagree with the author's conclusion that the trend lines do not look good. There has never been any lack of challenges in Afghanistan, of that you can be sure. Personally, I have been very critical of the conduct of the war in as far as the past approaches. However, nearing the completion of my second year in Afghanistan out of the past three years, I am feeling a sense of optimism that I have not felt before. I have the opportunity to travel around the country and see things from the perspective of a counterinsurgency trainer/advisor. I see multiple synergies developing as both our civilian capacity develops and the Afghans themselves develop capacity to properly analyze and solve the problems in communities that contribute to instability and fuel insurgency.

The current trouble surrounding GEN McChrystal is deeply troubling in that these positive developments are a direct result of his strategies, but we should know by the end of the day how that works out. Should President Obama find a way to retain the General, this momentum will continue to build. It is not a flood, it is a trickle. But that is a trend that the author of the article has no way of seeing. It is not being adequately documented, certainly not by the press. However, my analysis, on the ground, is that these positive trends are currently positioned to expand.
 

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