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Atlantic-community.org members from the United States, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Poland, Turkey, as well as Russia, Finland and Azerbaijan, discussed the future of NATO in op-eds, as well as in a one hour Skype Strategy Session, which ended with a vote on the most important policy recommendations. The following policy recommendations are the result of this collaborative process. 

1. Align the scope of the Alliance with its capabilities.
The Alliance should focus its troop intensive operations on defending Europe and North America rather than engaging in stabilization missions in other geographic regions (Lawson). NATO should neither aspire to be a global policeman nor a humanitarian intervention force. It can however, continue to provide limited logistical support after earthquakes and floods etc.

Still, NATO needs to be very well prepared for out-of-area missions should serious threats materialize (von Ploetz). In light of decreasing defense budgets, NATO members should reduce other commitments to be able to prioritize training, equipping and funding of the NATO Response Force, because out-of-area missions require flexible troops with a high level of interoperability, utilizing advanced technologies (Spiessberger).

2. Create Global Partnership Council to institutionalize and deepen co-operations.
NATO should create a Global Partnership Council with military, operational, and political consultation mechanisms to build upon the existing partnership programs, as well the NATO-India dialogue and existing co-operation with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea (Seidler).

This "Partnership 2.0" approach will enforce the idea of cooperative security and balance the doctrine of deterrence, thereby improving NATO's global image (Christman). At the same time it would help pool resources for mutual benefits, primarily in regard to naval surveillance of the world's oceans to prevent piracy, proliferation, and terrorist activities, but less so for Afghanistan-type invasions. It would need to be communicated that the partnership council would not be directed against other states.

The new Strategic Concept should include a strong commitment to overcoming enduring obstacles against better cooperation with both the EU and Russia. Russian membership of NATO is not a viable option for the time being (Benitez), but the NATO-Russia Council can and has to develop concrete collaborations (Nikolits).

NATO should engage the South Caucasus countries without relying on an eventual path to full membership and can do so with an approach similar to the EU Neighborhood policy (Sumerinli). The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) frameworks should be strengthened and include public diplomacy programs.

3. Launch broad public diplomacy initiatives to make the case for NATO's existence.
NATO's Public Diplomacy Division should be expanded to focus more on the general public rather than cater to specialist circles. The public needs to be more directly and creatively engaged and NATO's civilian structure should be stressed. Specific attention should be paid to the Greater Middle East, for instance by providing more information on the internet in Arabic and hosting annual seminars with MD and ICI states (Scatamacchia).

Increased transparency is key to fostering public support for the Alliance. To this end, a working draft of the Strategic Concept should be published. Alternatively, the new Strategic Concept should be ratified by the parliaments of all 28 member states before it comes into effect (Davis).

This Atlantic Memo is based on the op-eds and/or contributions during the Skype Strategy session by the following atlantic-community.org members:

Jorge Benitez, Director of NATO Source and a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council - United States

Walter L. Christman, Associate Professor of Global Public Policy at the US Naval Postgraduate School - United States.

Ian Davis, Founding Director of NATO Watch and Senior Advisor to ISIS Europe - United Kingdom.

Jerzy S. Deren, Retired colonel conducting independent research on international security - Poland.

Oya Dursun-Özkanca, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Elizabethtown College - Turkey.

Olga Kolesnichenko, Freelance journalist and coordinator for military issues for YATA-Russia - Russia.

Greg Randolph Lawson, Director of Communications for a political advocacy organization - United States

Colette Mazzucelli, Adjunct Associate Professor in the Center for Global Affairs at New York University and in the Department of Political Science at Hofstra University - United States.

Daniel Nikolits, Graduate Student in International Relations at Humboldt University in Berlin - United States.

Luca Ratti, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Roma Tre University and the American University of Rome - Italy.

Ari Rusila, Development project management expert - Finland.

Donatella Scatamacchia, Graduate from the University of Naples with an MA in international relations and with a PhD offer by King's College London - Italy.

Felix F. Seidler, Student of Political Science, Law and History at Wuerzburg University - Germany

Klaus Spiessberger, Member of the German Council on Foreign Relations and currently working for PHOENIXgroup - Germany.

Jasur Mezahir Sumerinli, Head of the Doktrina Center of Journalist Union on Military Research - Azerbaidschan.

Olaf Theiler, National Expert in the Operations Division at NATO HQ in Brussels - Germany.

Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, Group of Experts, - Germany.

Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, Lake Constance Chapter - Germany: Marcel Raecker, Yves Steinebach, Yann-Lukas Schaefer, Juri Schnoeller, Matthias Garbin, Aylin Matle, Lukas Bresser, Florian Sies, Jonas Massing, Lina Drexler and Nikolina-Romana Milunovic.

Dr. Theiler and Dr. von Ploetz participated in a private capacity and were not speaking for NATO or the Group of Experts.

For more specifics on these recommendations as well as many other important recommendations, which could not be included here due to limited space, please click on the above names to read the op-eds from the atlantic-community.org's policy group.

September 28, 2010

Eliot Ames Rolen , Maastricht University , Bronze Contributor (13)

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While I agree that NATO should not overextend itself when it comes to involving itself in humanitarian and peacekeeping issues outside of Europe and the United States, this might also be dangerous for its future. NATO's peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and security maintenance within Afghanistan were instrumental in stabilizing both areas so that other military and civilian operations could be conducted. The danger is that imposing restrictions further hindering NATO's area of operations is that they might be made further redundant. I completely agree that an increase in transparency would only improve public perception of NATO, which ranges from cynicism towards their usefulness, to total ignorance of their post Cold War existence. What strikes me is that this redressing of purpose is directly correlated to a lack of interest in military engagement by the EU, and a realization that the NATO member which posesses the alliance's largest military force, the United States, does not require NATO support to conduct global 'policing' missions.

NATO has moved away from a multinational defense force to a multinational consultancy..with military instruments to protect themselves at home, which I have to admit, the expansion of the EU's borders does require the EU to threats originating outside of it regardless of their stated limitations on engagement.

Beyond everything else, this was a much needed readjustment, and I applaud the efforts made by the above mentioned experts to make NATO relevant again.

Tags: | Eliot Rolen | NATO |

October 1, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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There we go. Yesterday the SecGen`s draft was handed over to the allies. Today the important issues can be found online. Cyber Security and NATO´s nuclear deterrent are two issues our memo misses completly.

It is quite interesting to see, that cyber attacks can affect article 5. I am wondering about the criteria the SecGen defines in his attached operational paper, at what time a Cyber attack is an article 5 threat or not. Furthermore, how should NATO react on cyber attacks, if article 5 is invoked? I guess, NATO may develop a cyber strike back capability.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/world/europe/01iht-nato.html?page...

http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article9995356/Cyber-Attacke... (in German)

October 1, 2010

Claudiu Dan Degeratu, EURISC Foundation, Silver Contributor (64)

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Felix,
I also think that the political agreement over the NATO's nuclear deterrence could be one of the major test for Allied solidarity.
Concerning the cyber threats I think we are just at the beginning of a complex debate. It is clear to me that if NATO agreed on the protection of critical infrastructure against cyber attacks this is based on a allied threat assessment and crisis in Estonia.
Combating cyber threats means more than article 5, and will include a broad spectrum of policies: preparation, cooperation, prevention, deterrence, early warning, counter-measures, post-crisis recovery operations.

Tags: | NATO | cyberterrorism | nuclear deterrence |

October 1, 2010

Lukas Meyer

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Since NATO's biggest problems is its bad reputation (and mistrust about ist mission) -- at home and globally -- the Global Partnership Council and the public diplomacy initiatives are important. I applaud atlantic-community.org for reminding NATO about this.

Thank you, Felix Seidler, for the interesting NY Times articles. It seems that primarily (only?) Germany insisted on a commitment to nuclear disarmament.

What a fuss the German Foreign Minister makes about nukes!?! Westerwelle seems to thing that NATO's most important mission is to contribute to nuclear disarmement. No other threats for Germany and the alliance, apparently. Incredible.

The US nukes in Europe are here for symbolic reasons. They do not protect NATO at all against today's threat.
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=208

Thus they could be withdrawn, but apparently the East Europeans love them. So they could also stay.

There are more important issues.

October 1, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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According to NATO´s activities in Cyber Defence see:

Hughes, Rex B. (2009): NATO and Cyber Defence. Edited by: Atlantishe Commissie, < http://www.atlcom.nl/site/english/nieuws/wp-content/Hughes.pdf >.

Pretending a cyber attack could become an article 5 threat, is also a mean of deterrence. Especially when NATO tries to hide the criteria, which define what kind of cyber attack affects article 5. The aim may be to keep potential enemies unsure about NATO´s reactions.

Reactions of German press on the leaks are interesting. It seems, German media has slept since the cyber attacks on Estonia. Headlines like NATO prepares for cyber war ignore the whole developments in the last three years.

October 1, 2010

jacqueline gorham, NYU, Bronze Contributor (18)

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I would suggest that the third recommendation listed above is perhaps the most important. Without public support, organizations tend to create more conflict than they solve and/or become ineffective. Increased transparency leads to increased accountability, which is key to achieving the public trust and confidence. Additonally, bringing the Middle East into the dialogue would go a long way in addressing the global mistrust of the west that has perpetuated since the United States' invasion of Iraq.

I also wonder if the kind of expansion suggested above (number 2) would render NATO the effective UN military/peace keepers. I acknowledge the the first recommendation suggests that NATO does not aspire to become global policeman, but extending the partnership to the other countries and regions as suggested would necessarily cause more non-European and North American issues to be brought within NATO's purview. I do not necessarily think this is a bad idea. I wonder, however, how recommendations number one and two can be reconciled.

October 7, 2010

David Berridge

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First and foremost, NATO should be kept as a defence organization with a clear and specific mission to perform a combat role in defence of its members. It is and for sometime in the future, acting under Article 5 which formally began combat actions in the war on terror on terrorism. Assigning a multi-task role to the personel fighting this war, and overlapping duties due to multiple policy imperatives, is humanly demanding too much from both the organization and the personnel under its command. The military imperatives hold the first and highest priority, as an implementation of first to third world ideals of government and social structure will take a longer part of an historical process. This must come with a full and transperent defeat of the Taliban and related forces in the theatres of combat operations where NATO is engaged. In terms of larger framework in North America and Europe, NATO provides an organizational bond to issues that member governments have a common ground refernce point to, such as Artic security. NATO is and of itself is not a diplomatic organization, yet as in the case of the safeguarding of Polish sovereinty and territorial integity, it serves as the cutting edge of Western political will in Eastern Europe, as a guarrantor of last resort. NATO must be defined therefore in simple and straightforword terms in order to be more flexible and specialized in executing its fundamental tasks.

October 23, 2010

Bogdan George Radulescu

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As far as NATO is still badly conceived by Russia as primordial enemy in its national defense strategy, the issues is clear. NATO should remain a defence organization with a clear and specific mission to perform a combat role in defence of its members - Western Europen membres and Eastern European members. Any futile game of one of the Alliance's European memeber state outside of this security and defense framework, should also be regarded as act of betrayal, as a risky attempt to undermine the present security arrangement- Art. 5. Any other imaginary scenario of so called "Euroean security architecture" including Russia could be considered as a a part of Moscow's maskirovka strategy: the other Russia diversion to generate divisions and diplomatic conflicts among NATO state members. Full point.

Tags: | NATO | Russia | eastern europe |

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