Ever since Gerhard Schröder's tenure as Chancellor, Germany has moved to improve its economic ties with Russia beyond all regard for the interests and fears of its allies, especially Poland and its partners across the Atlantic Ocean. A striking example of this policy is Berlin's support for the Nord Stream project, a proposed pipeline which would directly connect Russian gas fields with Germany under circumvention of the states adjacent to the Baltic Sea. However, the German belief in being able to go alone on the critical issue of energy supply is only the most visible manifestation of a general attitude. Germany is showing a tendency to lose focus on geostrategic matters while moving its own economic considerations to the center of attention. As the almost religiously followed collective aspiration to remain Exportweltmeister (a leading world power in exports) shows, this trend is not limited to the German government alone.
The country has always been the economic powerhouse of Europe, which has also directly translated into great political leverage within the European Union. Until the policy turn of the past few years, this strength had been used to foster the integration of the continent and promote common goals shared by the Union members. Now, however, Berlin prefers pursuing its individual economic interests and in doing so, is largely supported by the German people. This became especially apparent during the recent escalation of the Euro crisis in May, when Germany's hesitant attitude - due to mostly domestic concerns - brought the Monetary Union to the brink of collapse. It is arguable that the Merkel government only finally acted because of the Euro's extraordinary advantages for Germany. A clear signal that in Berlin, it is "Germany first, Europe second (or possibly third?)" was sent out not only to Greece and the other stricken European economies, but to the whole world.
This type of policy does not only hurt the European idea, but also damages transatlantic relations. America - challenged by domestic issues itself - needs a strong partner across the ocean in order to keep realizing its foreign agenda - which, for the most part, is congruent with European interests. Germany alone cannot be that partner, and a Germany prioritizing its own goals will actually jeopardize achievements already attained. US influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus region is waning, with Russia and China at the same time extending theirs. A united Europe would have enough weight to counterbalance this development. Germany, instead of being the driving force behind a comprehensive European policy towards these strategic regions, is content to trade them for the security of its own energy supply. In order not to endanger this security, Berlin follows a soft and appeasing approach towards Moscow and is careful not to aggravate the Putin-Medvedev tandem. The often mentioned "critical dialog" is little more than a hollow phrase.
Russia and its people are not helped by this either. They are historically very much connected to the West on a multitude of levels. While this relationship has often been rocky and seldom without challenges, it is clear that Russia has always been a European, not an Asian power. For instance, while it does seek to diversify, the vast majority of trade - both imports and exports (especially oil and gas) - was and still is conducted with European states. Pressing for alternatives to a seemingly intrusive Europe, Moscow has found a highly convenient alternative within Europe: Germany.
The current leadership is facilitated by Berlin's policies in its attempt to reduce connections to the economic (and to a lesser and more debatable degree, security) level and to unlink issues. The geostrategic shortsightedness of Berlin risks dispelling a historic chain, on top of estranging its allies. A continued deterioration of human rights in Russia will move it farther away from Europe, and instill Poland and the Baltic states with even more distrust towards their big neighbor. A further lack of EU engagement with Russia in the Caucasus will consolidate the frozen conflicts there and lead to an even bigger division between Moscow and Washington. A German policy minding economic issues alone will thus hurt relations between Russia and the West.
What Berlin now needs to do is to revive its vision of a united Europe. Despite recent hiccups, the Union is just as important to Germany as vice versa. This would also mark a return to the geostrategic thinking that has suited and benefitted the country for so many decades. Germany's economic policy once again would be harmonized with its neighbors and global partners, as well as linked to other issues, which due to its heterogeneity, the European Union is naturally inclined to do. Moscow would be forced to deal with all of Europe and perhaps more importantly, the broader range of issues which the EU would bring to the table.
While this re-linking might be painful to the current Moscow leaders, it also carries a high potential for success exactly because Russia is (inter)dependent on its partners to the West. Berlin is in a position to initiate the transformation of existing ties into a multitude of connections. Thematizing human and minority rights could be made a condition for tangible discussions on new or extended European security architecture. This would be comparable perhaps to the linkage of these topics in the Helsinki Accords, which later provided fertile ground for the work of civil right movements in the Eastern Bloc.
Both Russia and the West have to gain from a less confrontational attitude towards each other. Washington, for instance, has repeatedly sought cooperation with Moscow over questions of non-proliferation and the conflict in Afghanistan. The latter issue is directly related to the struggle for influence in Central Asia, where a European Union and Russia in agreement could better respect each other's concerns and thus both gain a better position against the interests of China and perhaps India.
A solution to the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus without Russian approval and assistance is at the moment unthinkable, but would become conceivable under the proposed new security arrangements. Russia and its people, likewise, would benefit from an even deeper connection with Europe, not only on the economy or in security, but also on a social and cultural level. A more open, democratic, less assertive and cooperative Moscow would make all of these visions a lot easier to follow for the majority of Western capitals. It is up to Berlin now to try to make it happen.
Benjamin Hanke is a student of International Relations at the University of Leipzig.
This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student
competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the
U.S. Mission to Germany.
Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Russia and the West" here.
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November 15, 2010
Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)
Thank you for your sharp analysis of Germany's recent foreign and trade policy. You rightly criticize the worship of export-strength in Germany. As any other cult it's beyond the grasp of reason. It's bizarre to aspire to be world export-champion without wanting to share responsibility for accompanying imbalances. Too be sure, some members of the Union have been following irresponsible budgets and their citizens took on too much debt. But Germans were all too happy to finance those spending sprees. The debate over Greece's bail-out never quite concentrated on the fact Germany's banks (and their corporate and private clients) were rescued from the fall-out of their investment strategy.
A similar lack of reason is evident in energy-policy. Politicians of all colors feed Germans' imagination that electricity essentially comes from the power-plug. The debate is driven by emotion, not scientific argument. We can argue about the financial and moral costs of nuclear waste, no doubt about that and with the likely consensus that this technology should be abandoned in the near future. Unfortunately, phasing out Germany's nuclear-power plants while at the same time linking the power-grid to our neighbors, who maintain existing and build new nuclear- power plants, brings no benefit whatsoever. To the contrary, it drives up costs and smacks of moral hypocrisy: After all we will import nuclear generated power from other countries and leave them to deal with the generated waste. I think most of our neighbors have a different understanding of European integration and cooperation.
At the same time capacities in renewable energies are installed at guaranteed prices for often minimal output. Storage-facilities will have to be constructed to meet peak-demand (hopefully Norwegians don't mind some more hydro-electric facilities for storage of excess power in their country, because try to build such an installation in Germany). To keep the lights on when the elements take a break, gas-powered electricity generation is expanded, making independence from fossil fuels less likely.
Bringing back reason to energy-policy has to be the first step of creating a common European energy-policy. The recently published energy concept of the German government was important as to have any concept at all. Further discussion will show whether it merits its implementation. Reasonable energy-policy is less about feelings and more about the insight that every technology has certain drawbacks that can't be ignored. We probably can't have clean, cheap and reliable energy all at the same time. Once we acknowledge this, we can discuss the important questions of where and how to generate power and how to save power in an efficient way (and how to cooperate with Russia within the concept).