On October 10 this year, mass celebrations occurred in Pyongyang on the 65th anniversary of the establishment of the Workers Party of North Korea. This came in the week after the first public appearance of Kim Jong-un, the third son of the frail North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il. The younger Kim’s presence at an important conference of the Korean Workers Party confirmed experts’ opinions that he is now the chosen candidate to succeed the ‘Dear Leader’. The selection of Kim Jong-un as a four star general at this conference occurred following a two-year grooming process. In January 2009, South Korea’s Yonhap news agency suggested that Kim Jong-il had picked him as his heir five months after he had suffered a degenerative stroke in August 2008
While Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have been respectively referred to as the ‘Great Leader’ and ‘Dear Leader’, North Korean propagandists have already elevated Kim Jong-un to the position of the ‘Young General’.The Swiss-educated heir presumptive is believed to be 27 or 28 and bears a striking resemblance to his grandfather Kim Il-sung.
It is clear that during this succession period North Korea has undertaken a number of highly provocative acts. In late March 2010 the South Korean navy ship, the Cheonan, sank in mysterious circumstances close to the South Korean island of Baengnyeong in the Yellow Sea. In May 2010 a multinational investigation concluded that the ship had been torpedoed by a North Korean submarine. On the 23rd November 2010, the North also fired approximately two hundred artillery shells at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, located close to the disputed maritime border between the two countries. This came days after the international community discovered that North Korea had started enriching uranium. These belligerent actions have obviously been undertaken by Kim Jong-il to give his inexperienced son some credence, thereby furthering Kim Jong-un’s position within the North Korean military.
So how should the transatlantic community react to these current destabilising developments on the Korean peninsula? Firstly, the US and its allies need to begin to put real pressure on China regarding this issue. China has adopted a neutral approach to the North’s aggressive actions over the last number of months. While a long-time ally of the North, China has to force the DPRK to honour a 2005 agreement on the abandonment of its nuclear arsenal. If this occurs, the stalled Six-Party Talks could then resume in a less divisive environment.
Secondly, NATO has to continue to deepen its partnership with the Republic of Korea. Contacts between the Alliance and South Korea were established in 2005 when the then Foreign Minister and current UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, travelled to NATO headquarters in Brussels and addressed the North Atlantic Council. Since that time, the Republic of Korea has contributed to stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. During a visit to Seoul in July 2010, Dirk Brengelmann, NATO’s assistant secretary-general for political affairs and security policy, urged for a closer strategic partnership with South Korea on issues such as proliferation and piracy during an interview with the country’s Yonhap News Agency. A stronger relationship with the world’s largest military alliance is in the South’s interests, particularly in the context of the current instabilities on the Korean peninsula.
Niall Mulchinock is a Phd candidate in the Department of Govenment at University College Cork, Ireland.
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November 25, 2010
Paul-Robert Lookman, http://geopolitiek-in-perspectief.blogspot.com/, Platinum Contributor (295)
First, perhaps I should draw your attention to a related article on Atlantic Community, which the editorial team omitted to mention at the bottom of your piece:
“How Superpower America Tries to Safeguard its Dominant Position in Asia, see:
http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/How_Superpowe...
During the last few days I have seen quite a few theories from reputed international analysts to explain the events in the coastal waters of North Korea on November 23. I would welcome your news why in your opinion it is obvious that these “actions have… been undertaken by Kim Jong-il to give his inexperienced son some credence”, essentially excluding all other theories.
Early this morning, BBC World radio broadcast an interview with Michael Breed, who said the shelling was a response for firing in disputed waters by the South, for which the North had expressly warned. So who is provoking whom? Mr Breed added that the sending of an American aircraft carrier from its Japanese base was “silly” and added only to the tensions.
I wonder if we can expect China to act on “real pressure” by “the US and its allies”, given the changing balance of power in the area, and in the world at large. For the North, its nuclear capability serves as a deterrent, it knows very well that using it aggressively is a death warrant.
Finally, please refer to John Feffer’s article “China: Already on Top?” http://www.fpif.org/articles/china_already_on_top
from which I should like to quote:
“The nuclear revelations, by themselves, do not change the geopolitical dynamic. According to Siegfried Hecker, the former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory who toured the facilities, "I believe that although this peaceful program can be diverted to military ends, the current revelations do not fundamentally change the security calculus of the United States or its allies at this time. Pyongyang has gained significant political leverage already from the few plutonium bombs they have."
As two other members of the delegation Robert Carlin and John Lewis point out in The Washington Post, the United States should not dismiss negotiations with North Korea or simply let South Korea or Japan take the lead. "What is needed, right away, is a thorough review of the past 16 years of engagement with Pyongyang, analysis of the facts as we best know them and an honest assessment of the options," they write. Unfortunately, even before the artillery exchange, the United States rejected the idea of restarting negotiations and was cool to Pyongyang's proposal to transfer its nuclear rods to a third country in exchange for a U.S. recommitment to a declaration of no hostile intent.”
It is interesting to see Mr Feffer’s comment on the report on the Cheonan incident:
““Rather than dispelling any lingering doubts, however, the report generated more criticism. "There are several sources of public skepticism, particularly from the scientific community," write FPIF contributors Peter Certo, Greg Chaffin, and Hye-Eun Kim in The Cheonan Incident. "Furthermore, the secretive attitude adopted by the Lee government, its heavy-handed approach in dealing with the incident, and its reluctance to address or even allow for questions or concerns have served to fuel skepticism and allowed for conspiracy theories to abound."”