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China's agreement last month to join the US and other powers in a diplomatic initiative to contain the Iranian nuclear program was an important and positive step. If Iran were to accept the offer - including international support for its civil nuclear energy program and other incentives in exchange for the suspension of uranium enrichment - both sides would get what they say they want: civil nuclear energy for Iran, reassurance on nuclear proliferation for the others.

The problem, as made clear to me in discussions with Chinese officials and analysts in Beijing and Shanghai last month, is that China has no intention of backing this proposal with teeth. Whereas the European Union and US are committed to increasing sanctions on Iran if it rejects the offer, China has made clear that it would continue to oppose significant sanctions and seek only further dialogue.

Beijing's reluctance to forego juicy economic and energy deals with Tehran is based on simple, almost syllogistic, logic: the Communist party's main priority is to stay in power. To stay in power, it must maintain social stability. To maintain social stability it needs economic development. And for economic development, China needs massive amounts of affordable energy to fuel its booming economy. Thus, China's reluctance to do anything that would interfere with its energy relationship with Iran.

This spring, even after signing on to three United Nations Security Council resolutions designed to punish Iran for non-co-operation, Beijing announced that it was moving forward with part of a $70bn (£35bn, €47bn) plan to develop Iran's massive Yadavaran oil field in exchange for a stake in that field's development and the supply of liquefied natural gas.

China's economic logic seems impeccable but it overlooks several realities. Indeed, for a country with the reputation for long-term strategic thinking, China's pursuit of close ties with Iran is short-sighted. In a global oil market, deals with one country do not ensure the security of supply that China seems to be seeking. There's always oil available from somewhere in the world, so by developing Iran's oil fields, China is at best marginally bringing down the global cost of oil and at worst just buying it from one place rather than another. While Iran is a big producer, even its entire oil production of around 4m barrels per day represents less than 5 per cent of total world output.

Beijing also understates the risks to China itself of failing to contain the Iranian nuclear program. A US or Israeli pre-emptive military strike on Iran would send the oil price up a lot more than would cutting Chinese investment in Iranian oil production. Moreover, Iranian development of a bomb could lead to further nuclear proliferation, not only in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey) but eventually in east Asia (Japan, South Korea) as the global nuclear taboo was lifted. This would require China to spend more on national defence, its own nuclear forces and missile defences. Finally, the spread of nuclear weapons technology in the Middle East would increase the prospect of Islamist terrorists getting their hands on nuclear materials; this could hurt China directly, given China's own Muslim separatist problem, or indirectly if a nuclear attack devastated the US or European economies, both of which are more important to China than is Iran.

If China really started to think strategically about Iran, it would not only support international dialogue with Tehran but back that diplomacy with penalties for non-compliance. Even modest Chinese steps such as a freeze on investment in Iranian oil fields and support for tighter financial sanctions at the Security Council would send a powerful signal to Iran, which at present thinks only the West cares about its nuclear ambitions and that China and Russia will always protect it to spite the US. Such measures would also improve China's image in the US, which is dominated by negatives such as trade imbalances, currency tensions, unsafe food and toys and conflicts over Taiwan and Tibet.

China's gradual assumption of its responsibilities as an "international stakeholder" is a potentially momentous development in world affairs. Serious Chinese action on the Iranian nuclear program would bolster that development while serving China's own long-term interests.

The writer is senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. His book ‘Winning the Right War: The Path to Security for America and the World' will be published this summer by Times Books.

The article was previously released by the The Financial Times on July 8, and is republished here with the permission of the author.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Fabian Martin Lieschke: Germany Not Able to be Tough on Iran
• Fouad Naji Maarouf: Iran and the West: A Difficult Relationship
• Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh: Iran Just Won't Stay Isolated

July 31, 2008

Heinrich Bonnenberg, Energiewerke Nord
DGAP, Platinum Contributor (358)

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I like this comment! What's this?

The politics to Iran of the very important strategically thinking (!!) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with its main partners China and Russia should be mentioned: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/hd18ad02.html
Want do you think about that?

October 23, 2012

Eriko

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Let's not forget that Turkey has a necaulr arsenal of its own (sort-of). Despite the fact that the Cold War ended about 20 years ago, the United States has forward deployed 200 tactical necaulr weapons throughout Europe. In fact, 90 of these gravity bombs (designed to be delivered by aircraft) are located at the Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey.Other than France and Great Britain (which have their own strategic and tactical necaulr arsenals), more necaulr weapons are present on Turkish territory than any other nation in Europe. By way of comparison, the U.S. has forward deployed only 20 of these weapons in Belgium (at Kleine Brogel Air Base), 20 in Germany (at Bfcchel Air Base), 20 in the Netherlands (at Volkel Air Base) and 50 in Italy (at Aviano Air Base). These weapons were originally intended to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe and were long considered a political plum for those nations that had them; this was especially true of Turkey (which used to brag that the U.S. stationed more necaulr weapons in Turkey than it did in Greece). Of course, these weapons are ostensibly controlled exclusively by the Americans and could never be launched without a direct order of the President of the United States.There is some debate about whether Turkey would object to the removal of these 90 warheads. The current government has issued somewhat muddled and tentative statements that they would be willing to see these weapons removed but it is unclear that the Turkish military would support this. In fact, some have suggested that acquiescing to the removal of these weapons is a red line that Turkey's civilian government had better not cross unless it wants real trouble with the military.It has even been suggested that if Iran acquires necaulr weapons, Turkey will feel obliged to develop its own independent arsenal despite the protestations of the current government that it would not do so.Those interested in this subject can begin their research at the website of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The BAS has an extensive archive of material on Turkey, NATO and American tactical necaulr weapons.

Tags: | the United States has forward deployed 200 tactical necaulr weapons throughout Europe. In fact | Let's not forget that Turkey has a necaulr arsenal of its own (sort-of). Despite the fact that the Cold War ended about 20 years ago | 90 of these gravity bombs (designed to be delivered by aircraft) are located at the Incirlik Air Base near Adana | Turkey.Other than France and Great Britain (which have their own strategic and tactical necaulr arsenals) | the U.S. has forward deployed only 20 of these weapons in Belgium (at Kleine Brogel Air Base) | more necaulr weapons are present on Turkish territory than any other nation in Europe. By way of comparison | 20 in Germany (at Bfcchel Air Base) | 20 in the Netherlands (at Volkel Air Base) and 50 in Italy (at Aviano Air Base). These weapons were originally intended to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe and were long considered a political plum for those nations that had them; this was especially true of Turkey (which used to brag that the U.S. stationed more necaulr weapons in Turkey than it did in Greece). Of course | these weapons are ostensibly controlled exclusively by the Americans and could never be launched without a direct order of the President of the United States.There is some debate about whether Turkey would object to the removal of these 90 warheads. The current government has issued somewhat muddled and tentative statements that they would be willing to see these weapons removed but it is unclear that the Turkish military would support this. In fact | some have suggested that acquiescing to the removal of these weapons is a red line that Turkey's civilian government had better not cross unless it wants real trouble with the military.It has even been suggested that if Iran acquires necaulr weapons | Turkey will feel obliged to develop its own independent arsenal despite the protestations of the current government that it would not do so.Those interested in this subject can begin their research at the website of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The BAS has an extensive archive of material on Turkey | NATO and American tactical necaulr weapons. |

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