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In the final instalment of our survey of Russian experts, we asked them to analyse what policy processes could be introduced to establish a united European position towards Russia. Many experts felt that it was difficult for Europe to have a common position towards Russia as the Union's member states all prioritize different aspects of their relationships with Russia. For example, strong states, such as Germany and France, prioritize economic issues, while Poland has concerns about Russia's imperial attitude, while others, like the United Kingdom, want to see Moscow improve human rights and press freedom.

Some experts felt that only another conflict or an energy crisis could bring the European Union to a united position on Russia.  It was felt that a common energy policy was of vital importance as that more than anything else was used by Moscow to exacerbate the differences between European approaches to Russia.

It is clear that there are many policies that Europe could introduce in order to bring about a more united position on Russia, including discussions on the role of NATO and other international bodies, like the EU's Eastern Partnership,  but that this process needed to start with analysis of and goals for the relationship. Europe must decide whether it values a stable Russia or one that is transformed.

On a policy level, which processes need to be initiated to make EU countries act more cohesively vis-à-vis Russia?

Without open and ongoing dialogue on how Europe perceives Russia and what it wants from Moscow, the Center for European Reform's Katinka Barysch said "even seemingly unimportant EU policy decisions become a battle field for the contrasting views of the EU member states." That dialogue needed to result in a "new, broader, realist approach to Moscow," according to Luca Ratti from the American University of Rome.

This process would also involve, according to Ivo Samson, from the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, the European Union determining the limits of its "political tolerance" to Russia and work out the "red line Russia is not allowed to cross" whether that be its approach to Georgia or cutting off energy supplies. It would also help to stop thinking in Russophile and Russophobe labels as member states can vacillate between positions depending on the issue.

Similarly, Dr Hans J. Giessmann, from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, said the European Union needed to "agree on key interests among us." He said it was vital that Europe work out what role Russia would play in the European security order - "security because of, against or with Russia."

Controversially, some experts felt nothing encouraged European cohesion towards Russia more than Moscow's aggressive policies. Both the Polish Center for Foreign Affairs' Lukasz Kulesa and the Center for International Relations' Eugeniusz Smolar felt that allowing Russia to be "assertive" and "overreact" was the "greatest facilitator of unity." "The more aggressive it is in conducting its foreign and security policy, the easier it is to achieve cohesion," Kulesa said.

Another approach to encouraging policy cohesion was to encourage "real common policies on energy and security," according to Sami Faltas from the Center for European Security Studies in The Netherlands and many other experts. Energy policy was of huge importance to the European-Russian relationship because - Heiko Pääbo from the University of Tartu in Estonia said - "this is the main Russian tool in the EU to disintegrate its cohesive position towards Russia."

Marek Madej of the Polish Institute of International Affairs said Russia would need to accept the principles of an Energy Charter and the European Union would need to support "member states in their disputes over gas and oil prices/transit routes etc with Russia." While the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute's Andres Kasekamp said the European Union should consider liberalizing its internal energy market and applying its own competition rules.

With regards to what the European Union could do, Dr Michael Brzoska from the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik suggests that "the EU has to become a more credible actor for its own members [who feel] threatened by Russia or seeking to make separate deals with Russia. This can only be a slow process of confidence-building by the member states themselves."

While Merijn Hartog, of the Centre for European Security Studies, said NATO needed to rethink decisions like holding war games in Georgia "in times like these as it is evident that Russia sees it as clear provocation."

Part I: Russian Mindset is Greatest Barrier to Improved Relationship with the West

Part II: A Future with Russia as a Strategic Partner?

Part III: Economic Crisis not Severe Enough to Change Kremlin Policy

Part IV: Broad EU Debate Needed on Russia's Role

This poll was specifically conducted with experts from Europe and the US. In the near future, we intend to conduct another poll with experts from Russia to get their perspective on the same issues.

Experts who participated in the Atlantic-Community.org survey:

Katinka Barysch, Centre for European Reform, United Kingdom

Dr. Michael Brzoska, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Germany

Janusz Bugajski, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States of America

Leonidas Donskis, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania

Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg

Sami Faltas, Centre for European Security Studies, The Netherlands

Dr. Hans J. Giessmann, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Germany

Merijn Hartog, Centre for European Security Studies, The Netherlands

Andres Kasekamp, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Estonia

Lukasz Kulesa, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Poland

Teemu Naarajärvi, University of Helsinki, Finland

Marek Madej, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Poland

Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff, Yale University, United States of America

Maciej Mróz, University of Wroclaw, Poland

Heiko Pääbo, University of Tartu, Estonia

Luca Ratti, American University of Rome, Italy

Ivo Samson, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovak Republic

Eugeniusz Smolar, Center for International Relations, Poland

Elzbieta Stadtmuller, University of Wroclaw, Poland

Jan Závěšický, International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University, Czech Republic

Milan Znoj, Charles University, Czech Republic

June 22, 2009

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

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Much has been said about the need of co-operation with Russia, as Russia is thought to play an important role in key areas, including the so called Greater Middle East. A lot was written about how crucial it was for the West to get Russia on board in relation to Iran, as Moscow was thought to have enormous leverage power on Tehran. But when president Medvedev hosted president Ahmadinejad a week ago on the SCO summit, little was done to show that Kremlin is ready to offer a hand in resolving the current crisis. Actually, one could get the impression that the guys from KGB have advised the Iranians on how to crunch the demos. A week has passed and blood has been shed on the streets of Tehran and the only statement from Moscow remains as follows: what is happening is Iran's own business. Well, it may be, but from someone who's to be an honest partner for the West, one should expect a bit more than wahing the hands clean.

Tags: | Russia | Iran | West |

June 22, 2009

Member deleted

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There are a few things that are at stake here. Cognitive maps. Now what is the cognitive map of the European Union? What would be the cognitive map of Russia?
How are constructed and reinforced? It simply means imaginations and the reifications of such imaginations. Civilizational entities need to exhibit that: it comes as effortless expression.
The EU must determine whether its cognitive map (if any) represents its aspirations and realities correctly. A similar approach needs to be there from the Russian side though one is more sure of them having one and well articulated.

Tags: | imaginations | claims | realities |

June 23, 2009

Alesio Bassano

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Fortunately, not all Europeans think this way. Some Eastern European folks (especially those funded by US and British think tanks) must overcome their hate toward Russia. They are steering all of us in the wrong direction – direction of hate and bigotry.

As some readers already mentioned, this survey is one-sided and it failed miserably. I have no doubt that open-minded and unbiased Europe will prevail in its desire to build meaningful and lasting relations with people of Russia.

As a reader, I suggest the editorial team to be more evenhanded and stand for a variety of opinions, especially with subject matters as important as this.

June 23, 2009

Joerg Wolf, Atlantic Community, Editor

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@ Alesio

I would appreciate it if you could specify what statements suggest "hatred toward Russia."

This survey is one-sided in the sense that we wanted to ask "one side" first, and then ask the other side. This poll was specifically conducted with experts from Western Europe and the US. In the near future, we intend to conduct another poll with experts from Russia to get their perspective on the same issues.

Thank you for your comment.
We would appreciate it if you could register on Atlantic Community: http://atlantic-community.org/index/users/register

June 24, 2009

Alesio Bassano

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Joerq,

One doesn’t have to go too far to see that you segregated Russians right from the beginning by excluding them from the panel. This discussion can be successful only if both sides make a genuine and open effort. You idea about a separate Russian panel reminds me the old saying about people who live in glass houses.

Just look at the title of your first article - “Russian Mindset is Barrier to Improved Relations with the West.” You’ve already made up you mind without even talking to our Russian neighbors.

This kind of one-sided and unfriendly approach is the reasons we are unable to generate mass support for westernizing reforms in Russia. For example, the country has never received the genuine offer of membership in the EU and NATO. Simply speaking, we are too arrogant and today’s Russia is of our own making.

To make the transatlantic agenda global we must get rid of anti-Russian nationalism.

June 24, 2009

Malik Tanwir Amjad, The Helping Hands Pakistan, (4)

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World, Especially West shall think above racial thoughts in broad based interest and take Russia on board because otherwise, As things are developing, As U.S is pressing its stretegic interests in CIS, As Israel's hands are engaging in Georjia etc. Ther is very much liklihood of Russia again becoming USSR in next decade.

We should also think before criticising the Iran. World should look inside first before commenting on Iranian elections, The way Dollers have been poured in Iran to topple Anti West regimes is no democratic way, and It will result nothing but anti west sentiments.

June 24, 2009

Nikolina-Romana Milunovic, Zeppelin University, Silver Contributor (52)

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One of the core points established is that the EU is in need of a more cohesive strategy regarding its relations to Russia. While the European Union is not capable of agreeing on vital aspects for the consolidation of its own internal structure, it seems obvious that the agenda on external arrangements is even more complex. However, in order to obey its first and foremost ambition, the establishment of a zone of peace and security among former enemies, the European Union must approach Russia, more precisely, we should think about offering Moscow to join the EU.
It is beyond doubt that Russia’s recent political movements are objectionable.
Nonetheless, we must look at the facts: Russia belongs to Europe, not the whole state, but then again: neither does Turkey. Further, the EU has been willing to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement with radicalizing Serbia of 2008, where anti-Western leaders such as Tomislav Nikolic were gaining ground. However, the perspective of joining the European Union resulted in the victory the moderate pro-Western President Boris Tadic. While Russia today and Serbia of 2008 are still quite different, the act of approach instead of exclusion has proven to be successful more than this one time in history and would contribute to a more cohesive strategy of the European Union in general.
If the CFE Treaty should be certified any time soon or Russia comes around to other critical topics, the EU must attempt to move towards Moscow, as outlined in the above.

June 24, 2009

Gregor Schueler, University of St Andrews, Silver Contributor (35)

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Apart from all political and ideological considerations, Russia is simply too large to join the EU, to benefit from joining the EU, to want to join the EU and to be influenced positively by the EU.

If it joined it would instantly be the largest country in EU, it would have almost half the seats in the Parliament. Therefore rather than the EU changing Russia, Russia would change the EU.
Also I suspect they have little interest in joining the EU...

Geographically, asking Russia to join the EU isn't plausible. It would open the door for all of Eurasia to demand entry and would shit the centre of gravity of the EU too far eastwards.

June 24, 2009

Nikolina-Romana Milunovic, Zeppelin University, Silver Contributor (52)

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With the Lisbon Treaty the EU aimed to improve the manner of voting in regards to the balance of say in the commission (in order to solve the problem of the allocation of votes of large countries). This would give way to the entry of larger states, i.e. Turkey. Further, I argue, that Russia's joint would be just as plausible as Turkey's. If the EU goes through with the latter stating that cultural and geographical reasons support this decision, Russia should have the same prerequisites. Apart from the fact that I'm agreeing with you on Moscow's little interest in joining the EU, I still think that the symbolic gesture must not be underestimated. It could result in positive effects on the citizens' opinions, which is the trigger for all regime changes.

June 24, 2009

Gregor Schueler, University of St Andrews, Silver Contributor (35)

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I also don't agree with Turkey joining the EU in the near future if ever.

Additionally, I don't think the EU's pull is large enough to bring about or even catalyze a regime change in Russia and finally, I can see the eastern European states objecting to the approach you suggested above.

I agree that the EU needs a cohesive approach to its foreign policy (not just towards Russia). It has more powerful tools than the lure of its membership though. In the area of energy and trade the Russians are just as dependent on Europe as vice versa, if not more.
The EU has other options to satisfy its energy needs. (Solar power from African deserts, Wind energy - recent study shows that the need for energy could be covered solely (!) with wind generators in the future) and Russia will soon see the vulnerability of its economy without the income from fossil fuels.

The EU already has trouble making decisions and coordinating its member states. How much worse would this get should Russia join? And what will the US say?
Of course we could as them to join as well...

June 24, 2009

Nikolina-Romana Milunovic, Zeppelin University, Silver Contributor (52)

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You're right. However, I did not say that I agreed with Turkey joining too soon, but if the EU did decide to proceed that way, Russia could be considered. Nonetheless, I think that the talk about Turkey joining has provoked a European mentality perfectly captured by Bernard-Henri's quote: "Europe is not a geographic place, but an idea." Looking at your last statement about the US, I assume that you are also an advocate of this theory? :). Although I would like to believe in more powerful tools of the EU, the current crisis epitomizes the tendency toward less collaboration in my opinion, maybe even toward the idea of countries exclusively united for economic reasons. A more positive thought would be a profound reform of the entire structure of the EU. Either way, the approach to Russia has to be fundamentally reconsidered. The EU has to make the first step.

June 24, 2009

Gregor Schueler, University of St Andrews, Silver Contributor (35)

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I feel like we are finally converging towards a middle ground we can agree on.

June 27, 2009

John Hadjisky, Blogger, Platinum Contributor (328)

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Eastern Europe has always had no choice but to remain realistic about Russia. Western Europe, on the other hand, occasionally has the luxury to indulge in flights of fancy, imaging a Russia that is just like the peaceful, prosperous West, but with vodka. Having read all four parts of this report, I am delighted to think that this eastern realism might be catching on in the West.

Too often, when I congratulate pro EU Western Europeans on their prospective union, and mention in passing that I'm glad they're including (for example) Poland because haven't countries like that been through enough heartache in the past 100 years....they look at me like I've just asked them about their plans to defend the Moon from Martian invasion...

It is good to dream of a world without war, or take risks for a future that is quite different than the present. It is unfair to do so if the risks fall disproportionately on one region (the East). Perhaps the East would be more likely to take a risk in favor of a brighter future, if it knew that it had the unquestioned support, including military support, of the West (of Europe).

June 29, 2009

Matthew Kallechy

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Has much thought been given to the notion of Turkey's membership to the EU shares many distinction of segregationist thought parallel to that of the West involvement with the "East"?

Both have come under traditionalist scrutiny rooted in sharp suspicious and arm barren emotional obstructions which have stagnated the waters to common fluidity of developments and integration of purpose.

To make a point though, if more attention was paid to the analysis of resolutionary processes that occurred between Greece and Turkey in the slowly moving rounds of Turkish membership (membership being a word currently in transcribe) or to find familiarities with other European nations who have been divided by residual identities of distrusted past (Ukraine-Poland) perhaps it is likely that a new pattern of thought may emerge which sees logic in moving forward with common labor, energy, and transportation securities as though "new neighbors" and "new avenues" have moved into the "inattentive neighborhoods" .

August 5, 2009

Joshua Posaner, SOAS, Silver Contributor (73)

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Interesting ideas although my opinion is that Moscow values its independence and would be unwilling to join an EU moving steadily toward legal uniformity. Of course, an offer would provide an olive branch and if the member states could agree that Russia’s accession would be acceptable than that would provide the required alignment of policy toward Moscow that the experts identified as being required. Of course, this is speculation and extremely unlikely in the near future. In the meantime it seems that Germany is at the front of consensus building on Russia and may play the vital role in pulling Russia closer.

NATO, however, provides a whole different kettle of fish. An offer to join may ironically be perceived as a threat. Russia wishes to be left alone by the organisation and increasing advances not just into its near abroad but also to the state itself may prove to make things worse. This is to say nothing of the incompatibility of Russia’s military strategies with the NATO ethos as reinforced by events in Georgia.

On the initial point of Russia’s unwillingness to criticise Iran over the last few months, that is precisely one of the reasons why the Kremlin has influence there. If it were to criticize then it would find itself in a similar position to the West, perceived as enemies. Moscow has its own interests in the region including investment in nuclear infrastructure at the Bushehr plant and assistance in controlling separatist movements in republics such as Dagestan and Chechnya. In this respect it is in the Moscow’s interest to keep its criticism relatively muted. The SCO in itself has not, so far, been an organisation willing to criticize or pass judgement on members (or observers) affairs domestically. It is therefore no surprise to me that his issue wasn’t raised in Yekaterinburg.

I am eager to hear the opinions of Russian experts on how they see relations between the West and Russia. I suspect that the perspective will be somewhat different? Mr Bassano, do you have any suggestions for questions for the next expert survey? Perhaps it would be interesting to address the Iranian issue directly and to look at how unified Russia sees the West. Which is the right path for Russia and the EU?

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