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"The Security Council passes more and more resolutions; Iran installs more and more centrifuges." Though this early assessment of the West's current approach to the Iranian nuclear program was spoken by no less a figure than Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, Gholamali Khoshrou, many, also in the West, would agree today. In fact, Iran is advancing well on its way to "master the enrichment circle", that would allow Tehran to build a nuclear weapon. The transatlantic partners should draw three lessons from their engagements so far in order to have a bigger impact on Iran's nuclear policy.

Lesson One: Decide on a Strategy!

The West's current approach runs the risk of failure. While Iran enriches uranium, a nuclear weapon in Tehran's hands becomes more likely. That poses dangers to the region's stability, might provoke a nuclear arms race around the Gulf or even provoke an Israeli military strike. Basically, the West has three broad alternatives to challenge this situation:

First, the West itself could try to stop the Iranian nuclear program with a military strike, as it has more effective means than Israel and therefore an allied strike is more likely to be successful. But a military strike bears extremely high costs, probably too high to be paid. Israel would be counterattacked, terrorists would target western embassies and tourists worldwide, and the economy would have to cope with a new oil shock, as Iran probably will block the Strait of Hormuz.

A second, but not more convincing, alternative would be to accept a nuclear armed Iran. This policy approach would have to deal with well-known instruments, such as containment, deterrence, and, also, détente. It would include guaranteeing a nuclear shield to countries around the region, above all, Israel. Massive anti-ballistic missile defense systems would have to be installed. This approach would also include arming countries such as Saudi-Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to strengthen their military power. But no one knows if Israel would accept such a situation or if it would try to prevent it by attacking Iran alone.

The third option, a new diplomatic offensive that leaves behind deadlocked talks, seems to be the best option available. Only in case of failure, the other options should be reconsidered seriously (while preparations should start today).

Lesson Two: What Does the West Want?

The ultimate objective of negotiations is to convince Iran not to build a nuclear weapon. Negotiations should concentrate on this issue and leave behind talking about uranium enrichment activities, which are legal to all signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty, one of whom Iran is. Enrichment ultimately has to be accepted (but controlled, as envisaged under the treaty). The Tehran regime is criticized not only for its nuclear program, but also for its poor human rights record, it's crushing of last year's protests against flawed elections, support of terrorism and repeated threats against Israel, especially by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While all these issues raise concerns worldwide, it is unlikely that they can all be resolved simultaneously. President George W. Bush introduced the concept of "regime change" to solve all these major problems, but that resulted in failure. In effect it meant, as Richard Haas, former Director of Policy Planning in the State Department put it: "We are telling Iran ‘We want regime change, but while you're still here, we'd like to negotiate with you to stop your nuclear program.'" The West should concentrate on the nuclear program first and discuss other issues later.

Lesson Three: Analyze Iran's Objectives!

Negotiations with Iran, if meant to be successful, have to offer Iran and the regime some incentives. To be able to offer, Iranian goals have to be identified more clearly. Tehran's objectives benefit not only the country, but, of course, also the regime. The West should figure out how to favor the population without helping the regime too much. Iranian objectives can be grouped in three categories: economy, prestige, and security.

Economy

Iran has the second biggest natural gasoline and the third biggest crude oil reserves worldwide. But Iran does not have sufficient capacities to refine its crude oil. Thus, alternative energy sources, as nuclear power, are reasonable. Oil also can be exported and may yield a higher price. The nuclear energy program thus could enhance export revenues for Iran's economy. Also, developing a nuclear program gives the regime the chance to channel funds needed for this program to loyal parts of society, like the religious foundations and the revolutionary guards that in effect own large industrial complexes.
The West currently threats Iran with more and more sanctions. A more successful way might be to offer strong incentives. The transatlantic partners should accept Iran's desire to develop a nuclear energy program in principle and support it. Help should be offered, as envisaged by the Nonproliferation Treaty, if Iran accepts controls. Further incentives would evolve around Iran's accession to the World Trade Organization and the modernization of the country's petrol industry. By doing so, Iran's independent economy would be strengthened. However, sanctions should continue to be part of the strategy. But, it should be indicated which sanction will be lifted as a result of certain concessions Iran makes. The reaction on any of Iran's concessions should follow as quickly as possible. All of these measures should be adopted collectively by the U.S., the EU and its member states. By concentrating on incentives, resistance by UN-Security Council members China and Russia could be overcome. Also, incentives cannot be presented to the Iranian public by the regime as threats, causing a "rally-around-the-flag"-effect.

Prestige
Iran has an extremely rich and long history, dating back to the ancient Persian Empire that used to be the major rival of the Greek city states. Today, many Iranians feel not being taken seriously by the world. Mastering the nuclear fuel circle - and maybe ultimately constructing nuclear weapons - could boost Iran's image as a strong and advanced nation. The nuclear program itself is supported by an overwhelming part of the population. Forcing Iran to give up some of the rights others states have (such as uranium enrichment) might be rejected by the population. For the regime itself, advancements in this program enhance its internal prestige and thus create support. This effect would be most welcome, particularly after last year's anti-regime protests in Tehran.

The west should react to these desires. It should start with the recognition that Iran's leaders are acting rationally (though currently hostile), instead of mad or stupid. It should also recognize Iran's history and culture. Areas should be identified, in which mutual trust could be created, for example by organizing joint cultural events, or even in the Afghanistan policy, where Iran has strong interests. Being taken seriously abroad and consulted more regularly could enhance the country's (but also the regime's) prestige. Europeans and the U.S. together should also reinforce their efforts in the Middle East peace process, as this would have a (negative) impact on the regime's propaganda possibilities.

Security

If Iran does in fact construct nuclear weapons (an objective it is likely to pursue), the security situation in the Greater Middle East would change dramatically. Iran would have at its command the ultimate weapon as it could react to all attacks with a nuclear strike. More importantly, Iran's regime would protect itself effectively against any attempts to regime change, as was proposed by the Bush administration and voices in Congress. Watching the death of its rival Saddam Hussein after his capture in Iraq might have reinforced the wish to avoid that destiny.
As long as Iran and especially the regime fear an attack by the U.S. or Israel, they will seek a nuclear protective shield and agreement will be impossible. The U.S., the predominant actor in the security field, would have to guarantee Iran no more than it did to North Korea or Libya: No violence and no regime change, as long as Iran does not build a nuclear weapon. This guarantee should be reinforced by declarations by Congress (which, of course, will be hard to obtain), because Iran's leaders are fearful that a new president might change this policy again.

Given the alternatives, diplomatic efforts should be boosted now, while there is still a chance to reach agreement. Whereas the U.S. might have to change its policy in a more radical way, the EU would finally have to overcome its inactivity, both vis-à-vis Iran and in persuading the U.S. of this new approach. Germany should set the Iran policy at the top of its foreign policy agenda and advocate the altered strategy both in the EU and abroad.

Tobias Sauer is a student of political science, history, and cultural anthropology at the University of Trier.

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.

Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Iran's Nuclear Program" here.

October 26, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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I absolutely agree about the current approach´s failure. Moreover, the security guarantee option seems to be a quite useful mean. Not because of the regime, rather to prevent Iranians from the fear of an outside attack. The regime wants its people to be scared, though it can gain support for its policy. Honestly, nobody wants emerging support for Ahmadinejad´s regime.

The counterattacks point underlines, furthermore, that the Iranian nuclear program is part of far greater challenger. Western governments, henceforth, have to cut Iran´s ability for terrorist attacks as far as possible. Current documents released by Wikileaks highlight, what kind of role Iranian state sponsored terrorism played in Iraq. Similar rumors exist in case of Afghanistan.

However, accepting a nuclear armed is, as written in the article, not convincing solution. All international efforts for non-proliferation would be bankrupt, if Iran affiliates itself in the nuclear weapons owner´s club. All other nuclear ambitioned states would gladly see the signal shining. Hence, if Teheran did it, Cairo, Brasilia, Caracas, Rangoon, Riyadh and others just needed to follow the example.

During his UN speeches or the recent Lebanon visit, Ahmadinejad showed that he is, in Western understanding not a rational leader. His rationality is a different one, because he has been socialized within Iran´s revolutionary guards. One may have to think about, he could honestly mean, what he says (for example according to Israel). Fundamentalist religious ideology is a point, we should not forget about. Additionally, Teheran´s governing elite is not a single actor. Religious authorities and civilian leaders as the revolutionary guards and military´s commanders surely have a lot of different interests. Especially the religious branches´ activities are behind any kind of control.

Thus, I would not trust the Iranian government to react honestly on any incentives. Sanctions, as ineffective as they have been, at least, make it harder for Iran to purchase certain components and dual-use goods. Iran is taken seriously in all negotiations, otherwise those talks were not about to happen. However, it is Iran, which bursts each new round of negotiations. Later Iranians and Europeans start negotiating again about how to negotiate.

Yes, Western governments should accept the energy program, but not support it. How would people in Saudi-Arabia, the UAEs and Israel feel about European, especially German, support for any Iranian nuclear activities? Hence, transatlantic partners should show appropriate attention for those state´s security perceptions.

October 26, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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Three reasons why dialogue with the Iranian regime is about to fail:

1. The regime at its weakest in Iran. It would have to turn off even the reformist Islamic ("moderate") wing of the Islamic Republic in order to maintain power. Yet they only thing they have is violence. This weakness was impressive in the uprising last summer. The first may be at its limits for the moment, but the regime faces a dead end in domestic policy.

2. His power sources are mainly abroad: Islamists and left-wing populists, but also anti-Israel sentiments of the Middle Class in Western countries, and of course in dealing with the West. The West provides the know-how for its intensive armament.

3. The regime knows no secular power politics calculus, such as the Soviet Union. It is driven by anti-Semitic destructive dynamics. The totalitarian dynamics can be described by terms of Hannah Arendt: not only the persecution of the opposition for what they “do”, in addition the regime pursued people for what they are (such as Baha´i, women, homosexuals ...). It is this totalitarian dynamic that makes compromise impossible.

Precisely because of its internal political weakness, the regime will never make substantial concessions in foreign policy. The chances of Western countries that are serious about preventing a nuclear-armed regime are to promote the weaknesses of the regime - that is, the democratic opposition to support for regime change.

You may not be compromising with that option. But I argue that only a "regime change" can provide a stable Middle East (whatever that means historically).

The failure approach is the inconsistent and half-hearted strategy by the Western powers.

And one more additional point why I think you missed to characterize the regime:

You mentioned an “extremely rich and long history”. This is indeed true. But we are talking about the I s l a m i c Republic of Iran.

The state-building process of this theocracy-model at least one implementation: the complete destruction of Persian culture (or the adaptation of what was considered useful). This is reflected in the prohibition of Persian festivals (like the fire festival) and the banishment of this "un-Islamic" culture in the education system.

In conclusion, this culture is not recognized by those in power, but seen as destructive. Although some of the representatives of the regime know that you have to speak about culture in dealing with the Europeans in order to get understanding and concessions.

October 26, 2010

Alexander Pyka, Bucerius Law School, Gold Contributor (105)

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First of all, thanks for your interesting article with which I agree on many points: regime change is truly not an option for a sound foreign policy strategy. By the way, who can assure us the next regime would not be likely to continue the nuclear program? I believe the current US-administration already acknowledges that, although I agree that it could be communicated yet in a better way. Also, I agree that a better understanding and acceptance of Iran’s cultural and political history would improve diplomatic efforts of all kinds. Regarding the latter, we do not have to go back to the Persian Empire but rather take a look at the Iran-Iraq war in the 80ies. The complete inaction of the international community in this regard - and the UNSC in particular - are not forgotten in Iran and foster a deep suspicion against the UNSC/NPT-system until today. Interestingly, Pakistan’s motivation behind its nuclear ambitions (by the way, also A. Q. Khans personal motivation) stemmed from a similar humiliation in the Indian-Pakistani conflict right before acquiring the bomb.

But I have to disagree or at least comment on some other points as well: although the US- and Israeli-rhetoric sound like it – indeed it much reminds me of pre-Iraq-war times - a military strike against Iran is not an option. It is neither militarily possible to effectively destroy the nuclear facilities in Iran (see e.g. UK House of Commons – Foreign Affairs Committee, 5th Report of Session, Global Security: Iran, 2007-2008, p. 22; even R. Gates said last week it would do nothing but “buy time”) nor, first and foremost, would it be legal under current international law. A preemptive strike on Iran, resembling the legal rationale of the Bush-doctrine, would endanger our system of international law and its most important principle – the prohibition of the use of force in Art. 2 Nr. 4 UNCh – which would be an intolerable setback on a much broader scale than just Iran.

Further, while I like the idea of working with incentives instead of sanctions, I have to disagree on some of the specific content, especially regarding the “security” section. It is not surprising that the beginnings of the Iranian nuclear program in the early 80ies coincide with Israel – a non-NPT state until today – becoming a nuclear power in the late 70ies. An US-assurance regarding regime change would simply not be enough, first of all we have to deal with the strategic imbalance created by Israel becoming a nuclear weapon state. A nuclear free zone in the middle east is a right step in this direction. Further, we should not underestimate how much Iran’s nuclear program is directed towards its inner politics, rather than international. “All politics are local” and the effect of the nuclear program in stabilizing the current regime might not be sufficiently compensated by an US-assurance of “no regime change”. Bearing this focus on inner politics in mind, it even becomes questionable if Iran will seek to acquire a nuclear bomb at all or much rather will decide that a “virtual capability” (the option to build a nuclear weapon in little time, if necessary) is enough. I just read, Israel postponed its projections as to when Iran will have the bomb again to 2014 – but enough at this point, I hope to take up that line of argument in a later post.


Eventually, I have to disagree on some of Felix’ comments. While nuclear capacity would certainly strengthen its position in the region, Iran would be very unlikely to support a terrorist movement like Hizbollah with nuclear weapons. It would be too obvious where the nuclear material was coming from, thus resulting in the harshest possible reaction from the international community against Iran. Further, why would the Iranian leadership give away control over a means of strategic pressure and power such as a nuclear bomb to – even for them – in all relevant cases unpredictable terrorist-groups? Would Iran really benefit from such course of action? Further, not trying to argue for or against such course of action from a political perspective, I would like to note that Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are legally obliged (!) to exchange nuclear technology under Art. IV para 1 NPT.

October 26, 2010

Felix Haass, University of Tuebingen, Silver Contributor (55)

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On the rationality assumption, I’m with Tobias. If we want to pursue a meaningful dialogue and negotiations with Iran, we have to accept Iran’s rationality; with rationality understood as cost-benefit calculations, which can even be opposed to the ideology of the Islamic Revolution as long as they benefit Iran as nation. Because if Iran’s leaders weren’t rational neither negotiations/incentives, nor sanctions nor security guarantees nor deterrence would work. Yes, there are fundamentalist factions in Iran’s government and yes, religion plays a great role in Iran’s decisions and yes, they employ policies that we don’t approve of. But that doesn’t mean they are irrational. They just operate under different logics than we are used to.

Although Iran is an authoritarian system it is not monolithic let alone totalitarian. The numerous factions that participate in Iran’s decision-making all have different interests. In order to bring together those interests these factions have to find a lowest common denominator. Such a pluralistic (though not a democratic!) decision-making process that consists of factions like the IRGC, that have huge economic and political interests, is likely to work according to cost-benefit calculations since not every party to this process is fundamentalist (though some surely are!). As Felix pointed out, the Iranian elite is complex but this actually highlights the rationality of the regime. I would be far more concerned if the power would solely rest in the hand of Ahmadinejad alone, but it doesn’t.

Based on that rationality assumption, a combined strategy of engagement and sanctions would likely to achieve the most results. Thus, I would apply a two-track approach, with one track outlining a detailed incentive package while upholding and course-correcting/intensifying sanctions (“The Package”) and another track trying to ease up the context of the negotiations (“The Context”). Tobias’s points fall neatly into this two-track approach what makes them – at least in my view – very valuable.

The Package

(1) Incentives. Tobias has a couple of good proposals here, such as the prospect for Iran’s accession to the WTO and, of course, putting the lifting of the sanctions on the table. Offer support for Iran’s energy sector is something that must be considered and, yes, at some point even support for Iran’s nuclear program is in order. However, the UN Security Council must clearly state which benchmarks Iran has to achieve in order to get these benefits.

(2) Sanctions. Sanctions should not be abandoned completely but rather better adjusted. Although I don’t agree with Niklas’ overall position of isolating Iran in his essay, he put forward a couple of worthwhile thoughts on how sanctions could be toughened, above all Germany’s role in the support of Iran’s nuclear program. But the UNSC has to make clear that the sanctions are about Iran’s behavior in the role of its nuclear program and NOT about Iran being Iran.

The Context

I’m focusing on the context of Iranian and the P5+1 negotiations in my essay, so I won’t go into much detail here. It’s going to be online Thursday, I guess (and I don’t want to make you read the whole thing twice…*g*). But there are a couple of Tobias’s proposals that I see as a part of the “Context”-track. These include:

- Security guarantees. The U.S. should make clear that they won’t attack Iran unless it crosses a clearly defined red line (that has yet to be defined, but this surely would include building a NW)

- Showing respect for your negotiation partner. Tobias’ quote of Richard Haas is very telling about how Iranians perceive themselves being treated by their negotiation partners. Yes, Iran has time and again walked away from talks but so has the West. But you don’t take your negotiation partner seriously if you call for his destruction while talking to him. Ah, and, yes, Iran has to change its behavior in that respect, too.

- Reinforcing efforts in the Middle-East process is part of relaxing the context as well.

- Increase (high-level) diplomatic, academic, tourist, journalist etc. exchange

To be clear. The proposals under the “context” track should not be part of a possible deal but should be implemented by both parties or even unilaterally by the West to set an example.

In conclusion, I don’t think either strategy (incentives, sanctions and easing up the context) is going to work by itself but only a combination of the three.

October 26, 2010

Sascha Lohmann, Goethe University Frankfurt, Platinum Contributor (203)

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I generally agree with Tobias’ argument of focussing on positive means such as incentives rather than tightening the sanction noose on Iran. But here the devil is in the details.

As a start, I want to concentrate on the strategic realm. Yes, there is indeed a strategy which was conceptualized by Dennis Ross well before Obama came into office (see the chapter authored by Dennis Ross in a 2008 report published by the Center for a New American Security; ; see also Felix’ comment above where he picks up this approach). Moreover, whether or not the current strategy of the US and its European allies has had failed already cannot be decided at this point as no objective measures for success or failure have ever been defined by neither of the transatlantic partners.

What could be defined as success? Would it be bringing Iran back to the negotiation table, put a considerable strain on the Iranian gasoline and energy sector, or cut back the regime’s ability to acquire nuclear technology? There is no agreement at all about what has already been achieved or what concrete actions need to be undertaken by the Iranian government which would be seen as sufficient to mitigate the fear its nuclear program. For President Bush only the complete suspension of any enrichment activity would have met this criterion. Obama would already settle with a multilaterally enforced inspection regime that would oversee the nuclear fuel cycle (according to information Jonathan Alter cites in his book on Obama's first year).

But to make one thing clear, the regime in Tehran is first and foremost suspected to develop a nuclear breakout capability because of its disregard of the safeguard agreements which it is obliged to respect under the NPT. This needs to be emphasized as Tobias also assumes that the decision to develop a nuclear breakout capability has already been made in Iran. Formally, the Supreme Leader has the last word on the nuclear program but as Iran is slowly but surely turning into a military dictatorship entirely controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, tracking back such a decision is becoming more and more difficult. This also highlights the fact that the regime is by no means “at its weakest” as Niklas has argued in his comment.

It is true that officially and publicly recognizing the impressive achievements of Persian culture is an indispensable step because any sustainable solution of the conflict has to take into account the Iranian desire to be regarded as a legitimate and accepted member of international society. But the most important actor from which Iran would accept such a reverence is the US as the country is fixated on what its leader have repeatedly called “the Great Satan”. Given the tremendous domestic restraint that any US president would face for reaching out to Iran (this holds true for the Iranian side as well), this is not likely to happen in the near future without first focussing on other more limited confidence-building measures. Solely concentrating on the nuclear issue at first is therefore the direct route toward failure.

I am afraid that advocating a strategy that is based on common interests and incentives is too naïve and short-sighted given the history of negotiating with Iran. Hence, incentives bear the potential to be presented by the regime as the result of its persistent intransigence. Rather, incentives have to be embedded in an approach of reciprocal engagement in which both sides take similar steps at the same time. Apart from that, I very much support the idea that Germany needs to engage more actively on the issue and capitalize on its ties with both the US and Iran.

October 27, 2010

Alexander Pyka, Bucerius Law School, Gold Contributor (105)

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Just a short follow up regarding Sascha's comment: you write "Tehran is first and foremost suspected to develop a nuclear breakout capability because of its disregard of the safeguard agreements which it is obliged to respect under the NPT."

True, Iran violated its safeguard agreement (Model INFCIRC/153), inter alia because it did not declare its nuclear facilities prior to 2002. Nevertheless I want to emphasize that a country has the option to heal such breaches, which is exactely what Iran did between 2002 and 2005 by voluntarily applying the INFCIRC/540-safeguard Model and cooperating with the IAEA far beyond its legal obligations. A violation of Art. III NPT - which requires Iran to conclude a safeguard agreement with the IAEA - is highly disputed in international law and from my point of view not ascertainable in the case of Iran. Under any circumstances the possible violation would not have forfeited its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Art. IV para 1 NPT) and merely serve as an indication of military intentions, not proof.

Eventually, the IAEA board of governer's decision to formally declare a "non-compliance" of Iran with its safeguard-agreements in 2005 was an unprecedentedly narrow decision (22 yes, 12 no, 1 abstention). Compared to the board's reaction to other incidents like the - almost concurrent to the Iran-decision - discovery of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium in South Korea and the subsequent decision of the board in 2004 to not further pursue this issue, Iran's accusation of a "politisized" process appear less far-fetched.

October 28, 2010

Pamela Michele Gray, none, Bronze Contributor (13)

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I'm going to focus on Tobias' analysis of Iran's objectives vis a vis the 'Security' heading.

Tobias writes:
As long as Iran and especially the regime fear an attack by the U.S. or Israel, they will seek a nuclear protective shield and agreement will be impossible

This begs the question of why Iran pursued nuclear arms in the first place. Iran could have avoided any threat of attack simply by avoiding nuclear arms, yes?

Why, then, a nuclear policy? An argument can be made that Saddam's hints that his regime was pursuing development was an influence. But after their war with Iraq, development of nuclear weapons was a VERY expensive undertaking given their ravaged economy.

Is Iran really going to wipe Israel off the map? Possibly, but that's a dead-end game for Iran, a "Is Paris burning?" option when all is lost. Iran is more than happy to fight Israel - right down to the last Shi'ite in Lebanon. The resulting 'street cred' is tremendous for the very small price of a few rockets and lining the pockets of their proxy, Hezbollah.

How do nuclear arms benefit Iran in a way that nothing else can?

Regional hegemony.

If, Tobias, you accept that premise, I'd like to see your policy recommendations tweaked a bit. For example, what if everyone agreed to just let them HAVE complete hegemony over the Persian Gulf? What then?

October 28, 2010

Tobias Heinrich Siegfried Sauer, Universität Trier, Gold Contributor (84)

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Pamela,

thank you very much for your comment.

You are right, in my opinion security is one of three basic goals, Iran does pursue with its nuclear programm. But contrary to you argument, in my view, the Regime in Tehran did already feel threatened for a very long time and its nuclear programm is a reaction to this (perceived) threat. In 1953, the CIA was playing part in the ousting of Mohammad Mossadegh, the U.S. were then supporting the brutal dictatorship of the Shah until 1979, and the West remained very silent, when Saddam Hussein was attacking Iran in the 1980s with Weapons of Mass Destruction (Chemical Weapons).

Also, the nuclear programm did not start with the Islamic Revolution in 1979, but earlier. 1979, the programm was stopped, for two main reasons: The programm depended on western technologies, and nuclear weaons were perceived as incompatible with Islamic beliefs. This decision, then, was revised probably after Iraq's WMD-attacks against Iran.

You are absolutely right: Nuclear weapons are extremely expensive to develop. But other cases show this is not necessarily a counter-argument. Have a look at North Korea or Pakistan (Pakistani officials announced, they would "eat grass" if necessary to develop such arms if India develops them as well).

Furthermore, I am not sure if nuclear weapons will allow Iran to act as a regional hegemon. Instead, there is a risk of nuclear arms race around the Gulf. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE already announced plans to construct nuclear reactors.

So in my opinion, it is necessary to prevent Iran from aqcuiring such weapons. As I am not sure that sanctions will prove terribly helpfull, we (the West) could offer something the population wants (in all three fields: security, economy, and prestige). In that case the Iranians might exert pressure on the leadership, especially as it became clear last year how shaky its fundaments of power are.

I understood your comment as quite pessimistic, and, indeed, I am not sure as well that this proposal would work quickly enough to change Tehran's cost-benefit-analysis until the final decision to build - or not to build - a "bomb" has fallen. So we - Europe and the U.S. - should start now. At the same time, however, it will be necessary to keep the other options in mind (though not necessarily on the table, to quote one famous metapher).

Tobias

October 28, 2010

Tobias Heinrich Siegfried Sauer, Universität Trier, Gold Contributor (84)

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Felix, Niklas, Alexander, Felix H. and Sascha,

thank you very much for comments as well. I would like to apologise for not reacting until now.

As your comments fill seven pages printed out, I will just react to some points you mentioned.

Felix, in my view, Ahmadinejad is acting rationally. The important point is: Who is his audience? And in my view, this is not the West but some parts of the Iranian public and maybe Hamas, Hisbollah and some other radical groups. Our (the West's) focus on what Ahmadinejad says and wants is maybe part of the problem. Instead, we should focus on the Supreme Leader, who will have more influence than Ahmdinejad, and, first of all, we should not forget the population or at least influential groups of society. Incentives (and sanctions as well) might work better, if they are not (only) focused on Ahmadinejad. Iran ist not a totalitarian state and incentives could create pressure in society to leave the path Ahmadinejad and others have followed so far.

Niklas, I agree that the regime is not settled firmly. But I disagree with the consequences you draw out of that assessment. Instead, I think the regime will react, if its grip on power is threatened. And criticisms may rise if a more begnin approach by the international community offers economic growth, security and prestige while everything that stands between the population and these possible developments is the regime's policy.

Niklas, I would welcome a nuclear free weapons zone in the middle east. But unfortunately, I don't think this is a realistic option. Israel declared, a pre-condition for such a zone would be a comprehensive peace agreement in the middle east. And we are talking about something like that already for many decades already. In consequence, we don't have time to wait for such a zone, as Iran will probably have the bomb earlier. I agree with you on your assessment, the program has a strong internal dimension. That's why I think we will have to focus with our measures on this internal dimension.

Felix Haass: I agree very much with your comment.

Sascha: Yes, the devil is in fact in the details, as always. You are right, we have a "Moral Hazard"-problem here. North Korea exercised a strategy which consisted of creating (nuclear) crisis and then being paid by the international community for resolving it. Then it started all again. An incentives-approach would have to be planned very carefully to avoid such problems. In your essay you proposed a "concrete reciprocity" and I think this is a very good wording for what I had in mind. At the same, however, concentrating only on Ahmedinejad and the regime is not enough: We should not forget the population, which can exert some pressures. I agree that such a strategy should be embedded in confidence-building measures.

Alexander: After the "Tehran-Statement" and the "Paris-Agreement" in 2003 and 2004 respectively, Iran in fact worked together with the IAEA. But if you read the reports carefully, Iran did not cooperate fully and was admiting important details late, often after they have been discovered by the IAEA. I understood your comment as saying there exist no problems with Tehran's program. With that, I have to disagree as many decisions Iran has made only make sense if Tehran is pursuing a military nuclear program.

Thank you very much again for your comments,
Tobias

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