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This commentary is the second in a two-part series on energy infrastructure security. Part one described energy infrastructure security as a key challenge for the transatlantic community.

Key Military Capabilities
Armed forces have a serious role to play in energy infrastructure security. A senior NATO official confirmed on May 14, 2007 that the organization is now taking steps to secure energy infrastructure through talks with oil companies and energy-exporting countries.

Many of the military options available are multi-purpose, which means that they can be used to provide energy infrastructure security, improve the security of the transatlantic homeland and meet international crisis management demands. The following military capabilities are most important:

• Intelligence is indispensable to identify domestic and international risks. Energy infrastructure security would benefit from situational awareness along the energy supply chain. This requires more advanced intelligence sharing between civil and military agencies and between public and private actors.

• Surveillance of energy infrastructure could improve through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, networked sensors or radar systems. Many of these tools are unavailable to civil emergency responders.

• Protection of critical infrastructure could include controlling perimeters, establishing checkpoints, using advanced electronic warfare capabilities to protect information and communications technology and conducting operations to secure uninterrupted energy flows. Given the increasing importance of liquefied natural gas, for example, maritime transportation security will become a key task in the future. That’s why NATO is considering using its maritime resources in cooperation with energy companies.

How the EU and NATO Could Join Forces
We suggest three areas where Europe and the United States could use NATO and the EU in tandem to advance their common interests in energy infrastructure:

• Security and defense science and technology (S&T) programs, such as the NATO Science for Peace and Security Committee or the EU 7th Framework Research Program, should be brought together. Joint S&T approaches could be useful for information and communication technology security, situational awareness, command and control, human factors, detection and protection technologies, material sciences or modeling and simulation. The EU and NATO should also study how energy-relevant countries could be integrated into existing S&T programs. One of the most obvious candidates is Europe’s Galileo program, which could provide satellite-based energy infrastructure surveillance in Algeria, Russia or Central Asia.

• Military cooperation on energy infrastructure security with key energy partners should be established according to the Mediterranean dialogue initiatives from the EU and NATO. For example, the EU and NATO should review how to bolster Africa’s local security and military capabilities to address the security of the continent’s energy infrastructure. The EU has promised to help develop infrastructure as part of the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure and should not let China do the job.

• Using lessons learned and conducting combined exercises in energy infrastructure security could stimulate mutual education. European experience shows a significant lack of adequate cross-border infrastructure-related emergency management capabilities. These capabilities are exactly what the global energy supply chain requires. As an example, existing shortfalls could be overcome by pooling the efforts of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center, which helps coordinate disaster relief for instance in vital energy supply regions such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, and civil protection agencies of the EU. Outreach programs of the EU and NATO could also be used to advance joint exercises with Mediterranean dialogue partners.

Dr Heiko Borchert is a member of the advisory board of IPA Network International Public Affairs, Berlin, managed by Karina Forster. This commentary was extracted from their study on energy infrastructure security commissioned the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Swiss government. Both parts of this article have also been published in the Middle East Survey, VOL. XLIX, No 21 on May 21, 2007. The authors can be reached at contact@ipa-international.org.

Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Ron Asmus on the Importance of the Black Sea Zone
• Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe
  
  

June 3, 2007

Peter Schumacher, Siemens, (3)

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Good suggestions, but talking about hard power is not politically correct in Europe.
Teaming up with African dictators to protect energy supply routes from rebels sounds too much like 19th century colonialism.

Before we can seriously talk about all this, the European public has to realize how vital energy is. They have to learn that more ruthlessness is necessary to secure our energy supply. They have to accept that sending our troops abroad to protect energy infrastructure is not imperialism, but defense of our way of life.

This will take a few years.
Right now, most Europeans still believe that Russia is nice and will always supply energy to acceptable prices. Most Europeans consider the US a bigger threat than Africa.
In other words: Most Europeans are not yet ready to discuss your suggestions seriously.

June 4, 2007

Peter Männer, University of Regensburg, Silver Contributor (47)

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I have to disagree with Peter´s evaluation. While the public in many european nations might not be willing to approve such an active stance to protect our energy security today, the governments increasingly do. As a good example I can point out to the latest german "Weißbuch" (a document of the federal government published approximately once every decade about the current strategical alignment of the german army).

It contains chapters about energy and trade security and the masterminding defense minister also for a rebuilding of a fleet capable of protecting german economical interests throughout all seas. Without the support of both major governing parties, such points would never have been considered. This change can be regarded as a turning point for the traditions of the federal republic which up until that point had a very reserved approach on military solutions of conflicts.

These steps received little resistance in the german society and went on smoothly like most of the military reforms do today. One may assume that the uninterested public will approve this active stance of the leadership once it got used to it again.

June 4, 2007

Peter Männer, University of Regensburg, Silver Contributor (47)

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*It contains chapters about energy and trade security and the masterminding defense minister also calls for a rebuilding of a fleet capable of protecting german economical interests throughout all seas.

June 4, 2007

Philipp Rock, Holger Haibach, MdB, Silver Contributor (34)

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I strongly disagree with the opinion that military reform in Germany goes "smoothly" with the majority of the German people. The fact is that the discussion of the Weissbuch was unfortunately confined to the circle of the usual suspects of the German defense and foreign affairs community, who are of course well aware of the necessity of reforming the doctrine of the German armed forces. But the general public does not really care for such issues, there is in the words of President Köhler a sense of "benevolent neglect" towards the Bundeswehr. So there will be no general opposition to a change in doctrine up to the point when German troops will actually be sent into action to protect into energy supplies. Only will there be a general debate and I am afraid that the outcome of this debate will not be supportive of the use of military means to secure energy supplies.

Tags: | Bundeswehr | energy security | military operations |

June 4, 2007

Peter Männer, University of Regensburg, Silver Contributor (47)

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I agree that the point at which new doctrines will actually come into effect in a crisis will be a very decisive one. One cannot expect for sure that the public will then approve an active stance of the government. But isn´t it also the job of the government to explain and promote its actions among the people? Such a crisis woud provide the perfect opportunity to point out why it is necessary to stand for our economical interests. As soon as the number of threatened jobs and expected costs of a more accomodating non-military approach are thrown into the discussion, the amount of ardent protesters can be expected to decline rapidly.

Additionally, political organizations close to the governing parties could start to intensively advertise this new approach in the media to gather further support among the formerly uninterested population. The money needed for this effort would be well worth the expense.

June 5, 2007

Philipp Rock, Holger Haibach, MdB, Silver Contributor (34)

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Yes, obviously it should be the government's job to explain such issues to the public. But such an explanation of military strategy and doctrine should come before the action and there should also be a general debate about in the media and in parliament. But at the moment there are very little people, especially within the government, who are interested in such a large scale debate.

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