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March 19, 2012

Philip James Duffy, The University of Edinburgh, (6)

I agree with you in that post-revolutionary regimes must have in place an effective domestic security/ police force and that the excessive corruption of past regimes should be stamped out by creating a new bureaucratic system. My only concern with these policy recommendations is how they will be perceived in these Arab countries. There is a fine line between assisting this younger generation of Arabs and instructing them. I fear that a Western led re-structuring of Arab nations will fuel Fundamentalist Islamic propaganda, which will condemn well intentioned NATO efforts as neo-colonialist interference in democracy. I especially see this being a problem when you describe,

"Endowing young Arabs with the skills necessary to govern effectively, both in a technical and philosophical sense"

I do not quite understand what you mean by a "philosophical sense", does this mean fostering a Western conception of liberal democracy in this Arab nations? If so, I feel this will backfire. NATO should be prepared to offer technical guidance in running a bureaucracy and in providing short-term stability through training domestic security forces; however, I feel that the philosophical element of these new democracy should evolve from the unique historical/cultural contexts of these Arab nations. Otherwise, we risk fuelling anti-Western propaganda, which is particularly fervent following the War Crimes committed in Afghanistan, and witnessing the emergence of a much more dangerous breed of political dictators.

March 19, 2012

Yasmin Jeanice Mattox, St. John Fisher College Graduate International Studies Program Alumna and Government Contract Analyst, Silver Contributor (29)

Geoffrey, I agree with the overall goals of your recommendations, but I also strongly agree with the criticisms and questions brought up Philip, above. While I was reading your article I could understand your intentions perfectly well, but the execution seems like it could backfire as Philip states. Technical education is one thing and that at first look seems innocent enough, but pushing or strongly advocating Western Liberal ideals is another, and that latter objective can be incredibly dangerous. We have seen what doing so in the region in the early 20th century, for instance, has gotten us -- a lot of the mess, if not most, that we deal with there, today.

Aside from that, I have a question for you. In terms of technical bureaucratic education, how would you divide educational resources amongst not only Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries, but also with respect for the precarious dynamics of sectarian politics? What happens when by design or happenstance more Sunnis are educated in certain areas than Shiites because of the division of resources? Or, more Shiites than Sunnis? What effects does this have on sectarian dynamics and relations, and what implications could that have for which sects are able to achieve the most power as a result of Western educational assistance? What would the implications of this be within Arab states and amongst them? In the United States, for instance, the issue of access to education and educational opportunity as well as the results of that education, i.e. better access to better paying jobs, higher socio-economic status, class and race issues resulting from educational and economic disparities, have far reaching cultural and policy implications that are difficult to manage and at times even anticipate. How could that be prevented in the case that technical education is distributed unevenly or without being mindful or sectarian issues? Thanks, and congratulations on being in the top 5.

March 19, 2012

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

Dear Geoffrey,

let me support your argument by adressing the critique of the former comments:

while it is true that a strategy aiming to impose the concept of liberal democracy could backfire, we should not see this as anything that prevents us from doing so. We have seen that the liberal, secular and democratic forces are relatively minor, but they served as a strong intellectual engine behind the protests. They know fairly well how to adress the public with their vision and should be encouraged in doing so. Just because these values would probably face a majority opposition does not mean we can abide those forces who commit to them. That would indeed mean we do not take ourselfes serious and would be seen by the minor liberal forces as traitory. Who would they have left if those whom they identify with abandon them?

To conclude, we should be aware that our actions can be seen as imposition and could potentially backfire - but the counterargument is that in any way, all the involved actors will face enourmous difficulties and struggles. Therefore, why not support those who share our values?

March 19, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

This is certainly an interesting contribution to the debate, but I wonder whether NATO is at all adequate for those two initiatives.

First of all, I fear that there is a misunderstanding between internal and external security forces. NATO has a long expertise in education and training for the armed forces, but none for the domestic police forces (or very limited). It is key to distinguish both, because you should not offer the same partnership program to both and NATO should not enter the field of the security sector reform, because it cannot claim any expertise (being a political military alliance) and the Allies will not allow it.

Second, the second initiative is not appropriate for NATO. Once again, NATO should stick to its niche, which is military education and training. Bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy contacts, partnerships, or exchange programs should be facilitated by other institutions or on a bilateral basis. The Allies will never allow NATO to dive into that field. That NATO offers immersion courses within the NATO Command Structure is one thing (which is already being done and important as we saw during the Libyan mission with partners' officers working along Allies' officers), but we should not mix everything. NATO is not equipped for this.

In a nutshell, if NATO tries to emphasize civilian education and training, this is not going to be approved. Carrying on with its military education and training and developing cooperation with other institutions may bring about more positive outcomes.

March 19, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

I would like to add another comment but it touches on a different subject as the previous one.

We have to understand the relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Dialogue is yet another example of the difficult relations a Western institution (as well as the Allies) and authoritarian regimes have been nurturing. NATO, like other institutions, have been putting democracy, human rights etc. at the center of their programs. Let's say that it is difficult not to see the irony when pushing for partnerships in regimes that had no interest to implement reforms... Today, Western counterparts have lost credibility in the region.

Even if we wanted to leave our values out of our partnership programs, we could not. However, we have to realize that the way we have been conducting ourselves in the region has not worked. The interest to cooperate with multilateral organizations is limited, and these days foreign interest is seen as foreign interference, in some countries more than others. We should not push against all odds. It does not serve our interests. Two components have been missing in our partnerships: incentives and interests. Especially with the MD, we have been so anxious to develop dialog with partners that we have favored an a la carte cooperation. The idea was that first we let them choose, then we implement conditions to cooperation. This is a double-edge sword: it might have worked in a very few countries, but not in most (and what says that a more conditional approach from the outset would have failed?). Second, we have not been able to define our interests enough and align the adequate resources to go along. What do we want from partnerships? Dialog? Reforms? An in-between? Partnerships are a two-way street, but in most cases, we have listened too little while wanting to be heard too much.

March 19, 2012

Giulia Clericetti, Roma Tre University, Bronze Contributor (15)

I agree with Philip's and Yasmin's comments: while the education of the new generations is surely necessary, the kind of assistance that you propose could easily be seen as an interference and, as so, used against the "well intentioned NATO efforts", as Philip said.
Maybe a different approach would be possible, without prejudice to your idea of an education: in fact I believe that there are already many Arabs who have the knowledge to teach others how to govern effectively, in a democratic manner. The role of NATO could be to help them, providing appropriate facilities, funding and the necessary support, to develop that function you've attributed directly to NATO and member States, so that there won't be any interference but just the help that every State may need after a troubled period.
Moreover, I also agree with Vivien's comment: bureaucracy has little to do with NATO and other organizations, for instance OSCE, can better develop a cooperation in this field.
Anyway congratulations and thank you for this interesting article!

March 19, 2012

Gillian Kennedy, King's College London, Gold Contributor (107)

Geoffrey, I would like to thank you for your very interesting article. Firstly, I was particularly drawn to your policy idea regarding the Security Sector Guidance Initiative (SSGI). I think there are definitely lessons to be learnt from the analogous example you cited in Iraq circa 2003. With the dangerous rise of armed sectarian groups in post Saddam Iraq, this should definitely be used an example of how not to carry out policy in post conflict societies. Yet, there is an element of caution to be taken with such an initiative. NATO must be very careful in the method by which it would implement such a programme because this is exactly the sort of programme that could be utilized by the literalist Salafists in Upper Egypt as a propaganda tool to incite hatred against foreign imperialists. Considering the previous decade of tense relations between Western countries and the Arab world, there is no doubt that such foreign assistance regarding police reform could only be achieved through working with our MENA partners as a silent partner, providing advice rather than actual training programmes.

A second point that I would draw your attention to is NATO and its possible role of providing mentoring programmes for Arab students. I think both Philip and Vivien have both already commented on this also. You stated that, 'NATO should facilitate a mentorship program that brings Arab students and emerging public servants to NATO countries to learn how government ministries function there.' Though there is no denying that the sentiment behind it, to endow the youth participants of the Arab Spring with the skills to govern is very noble. I must make a crucial point here: This could easy come across to the proponents of Tahrir square and beyond as firstly a patronizing Western attitude, and secondly as a possible insidious form of neo-colonialism.
Many of the participants in Arab Spring, especially in Egypt are over 30 years of age, have considerable experience in civil society groups and in constructing programmes for democratization. Coalitions such as Kifaya (2005) in Egypt demonstrate that a cross party collaboration, with a predominantly youth centered leadership is capable of cooperating to build a new democratic national project.

NATO can help in security and military assistance programmes; or as part of a greater partnership with the OSCE to provide in the fields of electoral development and civil society engagement; but besides this I believe giving it a further role as a educator could be construed as a form of foreign intervention, which considering the tense atmosphere in the region may be seen as infringing upon a nation's sovereignty.

March 19, 2012

Josiah Jason Surface, University of Washington, Silver Contributor (33)

You make some excellent points in your article. For example, your recommendation that NATO train the police and security forces in the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Certainly Libya could benefit from any successful governmental structures that actually bring immediate security and stability to their nation. Fortunately, Turkey, a NATO member state has already offered to train Libya's new police and security forces. Therefore it seems you are right to suggest that NATO could train the police forces in these nations.

However, Tunisia and Egypt may not be so willing to allow NATO or one of its member states to train their security forces. It must be remembered that NATO had direct relations with the militaries of Mubarak and Ben-Ali via the Mediterranean Dialogue. Therefore, it may be that the newly elected leaders in Tunisia may not look too kindly at NATO. While in Egypt the military currently rules the government and therefore presumably they are still friendly towards NATO, this attitude may change drastically if the military is forced to relinquish its grip on power in June of this year. That is why NATO might find it more profitable to work with another alliance, like the League of Arab States. The League could easily be trained by NATO to train the police forces throughout the Arab world.

Therefore, it seems that NATO could approach the issue of training Arab police and security forces through direct and indirect engagement. While NATO should offer its services to the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, it should also have a secondary plan if its offers to help are met with rejection. This would look like using the League of Arab States as a surrogate to train the security forces of the Arab world.

March 19, 2012

Josiah Jason Surface, University of Washington, Silver Contributor (33)

Geoffrey, in regards to your Bureaucratic Development Program (BDP) I agree with Phillip that when at all possible NATO should avoid implementing any structure or program that could in the slightest be seen as being neo-colonialist.

Beyond this objection to your proposal I also feel that it is necessary for me to point out that such a program would not entirely be in line with what NATO usually does as an organization. This is because NATO is a security organization. However, if NATO were to add an element of the Partnership for Peace program to the Mediterranean dialogue, I believe they could accomplish some of the goals that you lay out in your Bureaucratic Development Program (BDP). That specific element would be education. In spite of or as a result of the Partnership for Peace program NATO already has a number of academies throughout its member states at its disposal. Perhaps members of the new governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya could be invited to take part in courses offered at these academies. While at these academies they could takes courses on how militaries operate in democracies and generally how democracies are designed to govern.

If this is not a workable solution then I suggest that an organization besides NATO work to accomplish the goals that you laid out in your vision of the BDP. I make this suggestion simply because NATO is first and foremost a security organization and is viewed as such by numerous nations throughout the world. Thus it seems that the responsibility for creating mentorship programs that would foster competent and trustworthy bureaucracy should be delegated to an organization such as the European Union. Because the European Union (EU) is well versed in creating an establishing bureaucracies.

Also, at it stands there is an IGO called the Union for the Mediterranean, which could be used as a platform to encourage an education or bureaucratic relationship between North African and European states. While the Union for the Mediterranean has certainly faltered and has had difficult time getting off the ground, perhaps the EU and Mediterranean Dialogue could breath new life into it. Having reinvigorated the fledgling Union for the Mediterranean, NATO might pass off any political and bureaucratic responsibilities it has encountered in the Mediterranean Dialogue to the Union for the Mediterranean and to the EU. All the while EU states, some of which are members of the Union for the Mediterranean, could invite diplomats and members of the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan governments to observe and study how bureaucracies like the EU and the various governments of EU states operate and function.

This would allow NATO to shift the educational and bureaucratic burden of engaging with the governments of North Africa to institutions that are more suited to handle such tasks. At the same time this could free up NATO to more directly engage the militaries of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, through the Mediterranean dialogue. Also, NATO could still incorporate the educational aspects of the Partnership for Peace program into the Mediterranean dialogue so as to offer more educational and engagement opportunities for those individuals from Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan governments that desired to experience how other democratic institutions function and govern.

Lastly, all of these programs should be used to encourage the experiencing of many cultures. i.e. these programs should work both ways, to allow citizens of North Africa to experience democracies in Europe and for the citizens of NATO member states to experience the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Gregory, I noticed that your recommendation for the creation of the BDP did not include any cross-cultural interactions. If NATO is going to train individuals from North Africa and not encourage any of the citizens from its member states to visit North Africa it gives off the appearance that NATO member states have nothing to learn from the nations of North Africa. Thus, to build an effective program where competent and trustworthy bureaucracy can be created should involve the exchange of individuals across the Mediterranean and not simply the educating of North Africans by predominately European and Western individuals.

March 19, 2012

Gillian Kennedy, King's College London, Gold Contributor (107)

I would like to add that I entirely agree with Josiah's point regarding the recommendation for the creation of the BDP, alongside a cross-cultural programme. It is true that cultural exchanges could not only assist partner states in the MENA region; but can also facilitate vital networks between young people within the NATO member states and the Arab world.

Already there is a Youth in Action Programme within the European Union which has been set up for young people. Its aims include striving to inspire a sense of active European citizenship, solidarity and tolerance among young Europeans and to involve them in shaping the Union's future. What is most notable about such an organization is that has in recent years expanded its youth programmes to other Partner Countries, extending far beyond Europe to include numerous Sub Saharan African states and countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Turkey.
As someone who has actually taken part in the Youth in Action Programme in the past, there are lessons to be learnt from such an initiative. One of its key objectives has been to foster capacity-building for youth organizations and structures in order to contribute to civil society development. In the case of the MENA region, countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya would benefit greatly from this because it would create a more accountable and able civil society, which could work as a counter to check the power of the State. An effective civil society is one that is both independent and also accountable.

Additionally, seeing as one of the main grievances for the 'Arab Spring' was youth unemployment it is worth taking into account that the Youth in Action Programme has invited young people from developing nations in the past, to discuss youth unemployment, poverty and marginalization as a means for understanding how to combat these socio-political problems.

As witnessed at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, there is greater determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership. Incorporating the Youth in Action Programme with NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, could facilitate partner countries in fostering greater collaboration between regional agencies, as well as to encourage stronger networks between the youth within the NATO states and its MENA partners.

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

Thank you to all those who offered constructive criticism about the article. Before addressing individual criticism, I would like to point out three main points which, implicitly or explicitly, are key to my article and important for understanding NATO's path forward:

1. The biggest threat to regional security to emerge from the Arab Spring is the prospect of state failure/ institutional collapse in the medium term (1-10 years). The collapse of state institutions in Syria or North Africa would pose a major threat to the security of many NATO member states, posing challenges that would be difficult even for NATO to solve. NATO should thus make every effort to prevent such an outcome.
2. It is thus vital to NATO's security interests that non-partisan government institutional responsible for security and basic necessities are strengthened in states affected by the Arab Spring. As the trans-national entity most responsibly for member states' collective security, it follows that NATO should take the active role in augmenting Arab state institutions. NATO can facilitate certain functions with other actors, such as member states and partner organizations, if it finds that these actors can do such functions more effectively. That said, the lack of concerted action thus for, combined with NATO's strong links to all relevant organizations and states, makes it necessary that NATO initiate and coordinate this process going forward.
3. On a different, though related note, direct engagement with Arabs under 30 is of the utmost importance if NATO expects to form any sort of long-term and meaningful relationship with the states. NATO must listen to their concerns and show they care about their problems. Some of these problems include: lack of jobs, corruption, strained relationship with the security sector, an eroding/inefficient public sector, and lack of access to an education that can give them with skills they need to achieve the financial security they desire.

These are the biggest challenges, and most pressing unanswered questions, that we must deal with today in regard to NATO-Arab relations after the Arab Spring. In my brief article, I put forth what I see as a pragmatic solution to address as many of these issues as possible. It is not perfect, and as many of you have pointed out, there are obstacles to implementation and effectiveness, as there are for any plan. The most frequently mentioned critique related to concerns that such a program would be perceived as too intrusive in light of the unpleasant history of European/American involvement in the region. I understand these concerns; they need to be address, but I feel like the underlying problems I listed above are too pressing to go unanswered.

Fortunately, we can think of creative and flexible solutions to get around these obstacles and make a program like this more of a real, equal partnership. Some of you have already suggested very interesting and creative adjustments/additions, as Josiah did above. I think that a cross-cultural component is exactly the type of thing that the BDP - and our memo - requires in order for a real partnership to be achieved. I also would like to hear more about Gillian's Youth in Action Programme experience, as I think that would be useful as well. Several, if not all, of the other finalists (whose articles will be posted later this week) discuss the importance of NATO working with other actors to achieve it aims. I would agree that this is absolutely necessary, and the programs listed in my article require coordination for implementation.

Thank you all for the comments thus far and I look forward to discussing/working with you further. I will continue to address other individual critiques tomorrow, as they have certainly given me ideas on how we can strengthen our policy recommendations as we move forward.

March 20, 2012

Costinel Anuta, George Marshall - Romania Association, Silver Contributor (37)

Thank you for an interesting point of view. My critics however are intended to help you to design a clearer framework for your endeavor (at least I hope so).
First of all I have to reiterate Philip’s concern regarding the “philosophical sense” of the programs, which could bring into the debate the contentious issue regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy. That’s the reason I would strictly stick to the technical dimension of such a program.
Second, training police forces would be an issue for the EU more than for NATO (see EULEX, EUPOL). NATO could act more in a DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) – SSR (Security Sector Reform) framework, but taking into account Vivien’s and Jason’s observations regarding Alliance’s limited experience with this type of activities and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries willingness to take part in such programs (except maybe Libya, even though it is not yet a MD member). I see also the feasibility of a partnership between NATO and the regional organizations (League of Arab States, African Union) in delivering this type of support. However, I was wondering which would be the differences between SSGI and a SSR framework? What added value could bring SSGI beyond SSR?
The second initiative you proposed seems similar to the Governance and Institution Building endeavor (http://www.un.org/en/development/progareas/governance.shtml), already taking place around the world under UN aegis, and I also think NATO is not the proper venue for it. We cannot rule out however a partnership NATO-UN in this respect.

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

Thank you very much Costinel for the constructive feedback. I agree that the word "philosophical" can be misconstrued; technical reform is the basis of my recommendation, which is why I did not elaborate further on the "philosophical" point, besides offering general support for greater access to education in the last paragraph and supporting good governance in general. I think the word should be left out of further policy discussions on the issue.
I see cooperation between NATO and other organizations such as the UN and the EU as being vital for success in any project such as this one; several of the other articles to be published this week also stress this dimension. I do that that NATO may be able to play a larger role in the mobilization of support than perhaps it will in some aspects of implementation, due in part to its role as security provider to so many relevant state actors (Turkey, the US, the EU states). While SSR is a vital component as you point out, a particular stress of the program is engaging with the youth, focusing more on long-term, broader goals (as elaborated by the Arab States) than on short term ones alone. I also don't foresee the programs I propose being nearly as intrusive as many modern SSR and DDRR projects have been; I see it more as a volunteer option for individual empowerment more than a foreign led rebuilding of institutions. In that way, my emphasis is more on presenting opportunities for self-guided improvement in human capital more than on an externally-guided mission of institution-building, a project which I do not think this is warranted in states that have not failed.

March 20, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

I am coming back to some of the comments, hopefully not too late. Despite the possible potential of cooperating with regional organizations, either the League of Arab States or the UfM, I think it is illusory at this stage. The Arab League remains very, very divided and despite some positive activity recently, the power dynamics are still very detrimental to any empowerment of the organization. The UfM is not the right organization. Notwithstanding its potential, its design is flawed. There has been little appetite from the Southern countries to partake in the organization (and not much more from the Northern countries if there is no political agenda - France - or economic interests - Germany). Moreover, the UfM is mostly a project-oriented organization. That is the reason it has been completely absent from the post-Arab uprisings. Any vaguely political component to the UfM is carefully avoided, because of the enduring difficulties the Barcelona Process experienced.

But as mentioned by Geoffrey, we all agree that NATO can't do it alone. The question is then: with whom to cooperate effectively?

March 20, 2012

Alexander Corbeil, Atlantic Council of Canada, Gold Contributor (101)

Thank you for this wonderful article Geoffrey, I must say that it was a pleasure to read and admittedly I agree with some of your policy recommendations. That being said, I believe that you have missed out on crucial elements in the fostering of democratic governance. I will first analysis the two points of your paper, namely the Security Sector Guidance Initiative (SSGI) and the Bureaucratic Development Program (BDP).

The SSGI at its surface is both a well intentioned and much needed initiative, especially given recent developments in both Libya and Egypt. In the former case, militia members have become the de-facto law enforcement agencies, particularly in Tripoli were both the Zintan and Misrata militias (the two strongest fighting forces in post-Gaddafi Libya) overlap their jurisdictions, undertake summary executions and participate in the worst forms of torture, condemned by both Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, among others. In Egypt, the Port Said football massacre and the infamous beating of the blue bra women have stained the reputation of the security services, not to mention repeated abuses against Coptic Christians and pro-democracy protesters.

Thus, in terms of the Libyan situation, a responsible, tribally and regionally integrated security force is a robust step to fostering national unity against the divisive backdrop of Gaddafi era cleavages, and historical East-West rivalries. But this is merely only part of the solution, NATO, as recognized in comments by the contributors is best suited to provide Security Sector Reform (SSR) to national militaries, institutions which have a better record of fostering national unity. Police reform is only a small part of the puzzle in creating a sustainable and responsible security sector, the reformation of this state institution must first be buttressed by a disarmament and reconciliation initiative, that includes other employment and education opportunities for the 125,000 armed Libyans that could not be fully incorporated into either the SSGI or BDP campaigns. This is not to mention that an important percentage of these fighters are either middle aged or hail from minority groups (most notably Berbers) both who would surely be sidestepped or discriminated against by both initiatives.

In regards to Egypt, the police are largely a holdover from the Mubarak regime, corrupt and underpaid, known more for their above mentioned abuses than professionalism. Youths do not view the police as viable partners in the transition to democracy, and we as policy contributors in NATO countries should not trick ourselves into thinking that an SSR campaign would either result in true professionalism nor distancing this institution from the true sources of power within the country. It is true that their security apparatuses have disappeared in Egypt, after the so-called Day of the Camel, but this development in combination with the disenfranchisement of Mubarak business cronies and members of the National Democratic Party, has ensured that only one pillar of the state has remained.

The Egyptian military, long hailed as the “protector of the revolution” is now, through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), playing a robust and arguably dictatorial role in post-Mubarak Egypt. Its overarching role in both the political and economic spheres ensures that various other actors, whether within the institutional framework of the Egyptian governance system (a holdover from the Mubarak-era) or emboldened by the results of participatory politics, must either submit or enter into a mutually beneficial relationship with the generals. Your policy recommendations miss two crucial elements in the consolidation of democratic governance, this first of which I have alluded to above, dealing with political kingmakers, whether the Islamists in Tunisia, militias in Libya, or SCAF in Egypt.

A crucial stratum of the future young Arab leaders is within these organizations and must be put in contact with counterparts in the Western world, as noted by Gillian and Josiah, whom I agree with, whether through the Youth in Action Program, Union for the Mediterranean, or an equivalent initiative. This is in addition to the fact that these institutions and organizations must be negotiated with as a whole, for they are key actors in providing the political climate and structural changes required to bring about the eventual full scale development of a truly democratic bureaucracy and a civil society that embraces liberal values. NATO is well placed to do so, having backed the Libyan rebels and given the historical linkages between the Egyptian military and their Western counterparts. In roads with Tunisian government officials, holdovers from the military and security apparatuses and rising political players are also crucial in this regard.

Focusing now on the Bureaucratic Development Program (BDP) initiative, I applaud your recommendation that we must “endow youth that fought against corruption with skills to serve democratic governments.” Your program to foster a “competent and trustworthy bureaucracy” is a strong component to ensuring a transfer to democracy, and must not be overlooked. NATO should go forward with this initiative, having member states host Arab youth and up and coming politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers, in order to provide these actors with the knowledge of such issues as: the separation of powers in democratic regimes; good governance initiatives; and building robust state services. That being said, we must acknowledge the fact that educating the bureaucratic class alone does not bring about meaningful changes. It is first and foremost a concrete act of political engineering, strengthening specific actors in an attempt to have a democratic effect on the entire polity. These actions could have the adverse effect of coalescing populations around non-democratic representatives who point to these initiatives as “foreign interference”, an issue which all the finalists should be wary about in our policy prescriptions. In addition disenfranchising local representatives for Western back ones is sure to cause a great blow back from the domestic sources of power in each country, most notably the so-called “kingmakers” I discussed above.

In addition to this concern, it must be noted that previous rulers-in-waiting, such as Bashir al-Assad and Saif Gaddafi, having been educated in the West, were presented as liberal reformers. As we now know, this is not the case and that Western education did not embolden leaders to create freer and participatory societies. The BDP and SSGI initiatives are just small parts of the roadmap towards the adoption of democracy and democratic-liberal principles in post-Arab Spring regimes. The adoption of democracy and the principles that underpin it are part of a multi-pronged process and do not hinge solely on reforming the security sector nor educating a new “Westernized” bourgeoisie. Previous attempts at this top-down engineering have led to disastrous results for liberal democracy in the region, whether one looks at the Islamic Revolution in 1979 or the failure of liberal parties in the first free Egyptian election. Corrupt leaders have utilized democratic rhetoric to forward their agendas, receive rentier funding, and quell opposition, creating societies that view the liberal interpretation of democracy with disdain.

The question has become, how do we create the preconditions for democratic governance? There is no quick fix, democracy in itself is the part of the historical, cultural, and societal evolution of the West, encompassing thousands of years of multi-faceted interactions. A long term process is needed, one which can embolden society to back liberal-democratic norms, vote based on concrete policy options rather than shallow labeling, and keep leaders accountable.

To achieve this goal, a top down and grassroots dual pronged process is needed, one that as Geoffrey rightly assumes provides future leaders with the skills and knowledge to govern in a democratic system, but that also creates a participatory society that keeps these leaders in check, as to not repeat the mistakes of the past. The Arab youth need to be brought into this process, but they are only one stratum of society, who arguably have already been convinced of the merits of democratic governance.

Full societal adoption of democratic principles is needed, in addition to the incentivized cooperation of political kingmakers, for the institutional and constitutional openings required to pave the way towards freer civil participation hinge on political openings created during the current transitional period. I will expand upon these points in my further critiques and defense on Friday, again it was a pleasure to read your article Geoffrey.

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

Thank you again for all of the good feedback; interestingly, there are some contradictory recommendations on one important issue – the role of value-spreading in the abovementioned programs. Several of the early comments (from Philip, Yasmin, Vivien, Giulia, and Gillian) suggest straying away from any perceived liberal value-spreading as much as possible, while Alexander posted an eloquent critique of my article recommending that spreading democratic principles should be at the core of any such program. When delving deeper into my policy recommendation, I perhaps fall somewhere in the middle, but in general tend to share the “backlash” concerns of the earlier group.

Virtually any Western-led program that intends to have any real effect on the Middle Eastern states is inherently vulnerable to accusations of cultural intrusiveness. This is a reality of Middle East policymaking that we need to be aware of, and something I think Europeans tend to emphasize more than Americans (in general). But I disagree with those who feel that a program such as this cannot be advanced in a way that is sufficiently culturally sensitive. Many voiced similar concerns in opposition to NATO’s intervention in Libya, but through attentiveness to the (voiced) desire and interests of the people, NATO was able to succeed in aiding Libyans without causing a major backlash. With proper cultural sensitivity, NATO and its partners should be able to create programs that offer technical training to young Arabs and their countries without causing a backlash. Objectives and intentions need to be states clearly, and certain terminology should not be used, but the essence of these recommendations is both viable and necessary. Moreover, as mentioned in an earlier comment, emphasizing the program as a two-way partnership with a cross-cultural component can serve mitigate these concerns (as Josiah recommended).

To Alexander: Thank you very much for your well-articulated comments. On a personal level, I am a bit split on the issue of fostering democratic governance. While I considered mentioning it explicitly in my article, I ultimately decided against it, in part due to my own concerns about perception as articulated above. To me, the issue of local ownership is of the utmost importance. The Arab Spring has shown us that the most effective proponents of Arab democracy are Arabs themselves; we also need to be careful to ensure that Arab democrats are the loudest voices in advocating further democratic advancement. At the time being, it might be best to focus on technical aspects of reform in order to make it clear to potentially troublesome actors that that local forces are leading the way towards democratization. Appreciation for democracy and self-government can and already has come from within, and though we should be available to offer support to Arab democrats, we must tread carefully in our rhetoric.

I think you are correct in terms of the important of engaging “political kingmakers”, although navigating such engagement is easier said that done due to the uncertainty and fragility that remains. I did not mention it explicitly, as my article focused more on long-term recommendations for the whole region rather than initial steps forward in regard to specific political actors; however, I think you present a generally accurate analysis of the complex political environment in these countries. We will discuss your specific recommendations further on Friday, and I certainly look forward to engaging these ideas more at that time.

March 22, 2012

Alexander Corbeil, Atlantic Council of Canada, Gold Contributor (101)

I agree that by attempting to foster democratic governance, NATO and its member states will face acquisitions of intrusiveness—this is unavoidable.

That being said, the West is dealing with a new political atmosphere in the Arab world. Neo-colonialism and various accusations of Western imperialism have pervaded in the past. This rhetoric was disseminated by autocratic regimes as a bulwark against the adoption of real democratic reforms. The people of the regime have now shown that they indeed want democratic governance, under elected rulers and not corrupt despots. It is true that the strata which led the uprisings in these North African countries views perceived neo-colonialism and Western imperialism with dismay, but it does not see the West through the same prism as pervious autocratic rulers. As the populace of these countries is now empowered to a certain extent, I believe that they would welcome additional help to balance their political resources with that of the political kingmakers in their countries.

Local ownership is the most important aspect; one cannot “plant” democracy and attempt to see it grow, the re-entrenchment of authoritarian governance is sure to follow in this case, as the example of Iraq shows. Arab democrats can, and must be the loudest voices, I am not arguing against this. For them to be loudly heard they must be provided with the tools to do so and an open forum in which to participate. This is where NATO and the West can step in to buttress the actions and local ownership of the Arab democratic transition---for any attempt to lead the way or morph the playing field by an outside power would surely fall under the definition of neo-colonialism.

Technical reforms are a good and much needed focus, but they should be part of an overarching process, including institutional and constitutional reforms that endow Arab democrats with an open political space. The framework for democracy must be enacted now, constitutional enshrinement of fundamental rights is necessary, so extremists cannot trump what so many lives have been lost over. SCAF in Egypt is already manipulating the process of constitutional creation, ensuring that the vast majority of those on the constitutional committee are appointed by the generals, thus usurping representatives elected in a free and fair process. We must tread carefully in our rhetoric, but this does not mean that the expertise of NATO countries should be wasted under the guise of a “hands off” approach.

You are right to focus on the long-term aspects of democratic entrenchment, and your policy recommendations highlight this note. It must be noted though that these long term processes rely on the creation of open political space and bargaining with political kingmakers, facets of a transformative course that must be instilled in the immediate term. Engaging with political kingmakers won’t be an easy task, but their linkages with the West; whether economic, security, or political can be utilized in a fashion that may open up the political realm in each state.

March 27, 2012

Patrick Edwin Moran, Wake Forest University, Platinum Contributor (207)

I think Mr. Levin and I see the same problems. Two areas are crucial for avoiding a fast slide into corruption and partisan antagonisms in any state that has lost its integrity, its status as a well consolidated nation. One area is the defense of the citizenry against power groups that seek to dominate them by force of arms and/or by deception. Externally those functions are performed by a military that is subordinate to a central authority, and internally those functions are performed by peace officers (local policemen, provincial police, and nation organizations similar to Scotland Yard in GB, the FBI in the US, etc.). Another area is constituted by the organs of government that handle regulations, building codes, standards of weights and measurement, infrastructure, legislation, a court system, and many other functions that would all fit under the term "public sector." Neither the original presence nor the preservation of originally adequate institutions is guaranteed or even likely in the aftermath of severe internal conflicts after a long period of extreme repression.

Local leadership can take hold at any level of social organization providing that it is not suppressed by larger and stronger power centers. A single community can decide that it will have a clean water supply and provide that utility for itself, provided that local leadership emerges and supplies itself with adequate technical expertise.

The main problems I see in many emerging countries, from the early years of the 20th century (China, for instance) to the present, is that indigenous leadership does not easily emerge. First, because people of the highest levels of talent are rare, and, second, because emerging leaders with superior talent are vulnerable to established power groups. Without adequate leadership at the top, the security and infrastructure services are difficult to acquire, maintain, and be kept free of parasitization by entrenched power groups.

As soon as minimally adequate national leadership is in place, it will need to take stock of the opportunities available in the world and get its police forces trained so that the police will act as responsible servants of the legitimate government and of the people. No outsiders should have to push this choice on a country's leadership if that leadership is minimally competent. What interested outside parties can do, however, is to facilitate procurement of the cooperation of governments with suitable educational systems. For instance, interested and beneficent nations might help pay for police training in Hong Kong.

There is no direct way to foster the emergence of superior national leaders. Talent must be matched by motivation. Talent must be enhanced through education in the broadest sense, and that will mean that the emergent leaders must be in charge of guiding their own education—for the protection of their own autonomy if for no other reason. This emergent leadership will have to see to its own tempering in the crucible of action.

Even someone like Churchill, who is born into a situation that itself nurtures many of the strengths needed for leadership. will surely not see his/her path entirely clearly in the beginning. Someone who is born into an environment that is much more corrosive may beholc with acute agony all the forces arrayed against his or her family members and community, but may in the beginning have to blindly grope out a path.

The outside world can perhaps do two things for such a potential world spirit and world leader: One is to lift high the best exemplars, i.e., the leaders of the past who have best served their own communities. Another is to make available, to any such talented young people who may want it, their own educational resources.

There are two problems with my idea that are immediately obvious. It is easy to name leaders like Alexander of Macedon who have conquered vast regions for their own glory. It is difficult to list very many leaders who have performed extraordinarily well in bringing benefit to their own people. Everybody knows Napoleon, but very few know of Dag Hammarskjöld. On the flip side, there is no way that any educational institution in the world can pick out the next world leader from a cohort of intelligent and ambitious young men. So provision will need to be made to offer educational opportunities to all who seem to offer promise.

I think my ideas support those of Mr. Levin but move all the potential donor nations to the status of passive providers and require that the impulse for salvation come from within those nations most in need.

April 3, 2012

Marwa

Egyptians would not that easy to allow any foreign influence or intervention on it's internal or external affairs ... Therefore , whatever NATO even tried to train the army or police or whatever ( i doubt that they even need any trainings ) that surely won't be an easy step .

Majority of you wrote basically about the government rather than taking care of the nations and people themselves , while in the Middle East there are more problems which unsolved yet and here where we suppose to start suggestions for how to get closer to those nations from this point , not through their governments ... this way won't work anymore for the Middle East specially with Egypt ...

April 10, 2012

Georgi Ivanov, Carleton University, Silver Contributor (28)

We must understand that the programs proposed in the article are with a generational perspective. Creating a bureaucracy and institutions will take decades. Imagine starting from zero - the precedent is offered in Eastern Europe, where institutions of state do exist, but 23 years on, they are still working badly - effectively, it is a multi-generational prospect in the post-Arab Spring environment.

Additionally, a security apparatus is also difficult to create. Training professionals, loyal to the state rather than one tribe or another is going to be a significant challenge - as evidenced by Afghanistan or Libya.

Fundamentally, the prescriptions of the article are good, but they mean an engagement by NATO with an outlook of at least half a century.