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February 26, 2012 |  6 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Ian Clarke Hansen

Establishing a Unified NATO: The Case for Georgia

Ian Clarke Hansen: The best way to promote a communal NATO is to provide a meaningful purpose that draws upon transnational concerns and interests. The clearest and most deserving case for this is establishing a timeline of admittance for the Republic of Georgia.

NATO currently lacks communal ownership because there is no interest or threat which transcends national borders. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has not faced a singular enemy. Its most unifying actions were the peaceful expansions into former communist states. To rediscover a strong shared identity, it is necessary for NATO to cast aside timidity and current division in promotion of valued norms like liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The best way to do this is to give the Republic of Georgia an exact timeline for admittance into NATO, regardless of Russian concerns.

Georgia offers both unique challenges and the greatest potential reward for uniting the NATO community. True, NATO is already seeking expansion in different global and regional partnerships. However, no other country revives the sense of purpose NATO assimilation generated in the 1990s as it constructively reformed governmental institutions. Moreover, with Georgia, NATO can demonstrate it still possesses both credible military power and the cohesion to not be influenced by possible Russian truculence. Three specific issues bolster the argument for Georgian accession into NATO.

The first is the 2008 promise NATO made to Georgia and Ukraine of eventual membership. To maintain credibility as an upstanding organization, NATO ought to provide a public timeline offering this admittance within the next five years. Unlike Ukraine, Georgia's government and its populace have continually supported membership. In fact, Georgia has unquestionably been one of the most significant contributors to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. This makes ambiguous promises from NATO insulting and undermines Georgian public confidence in achieving membership. If the Alliance cannot maintain support among prospective members, it will also fail to create a communal identification among its current disparate publics.

Second, NATO can once more positively reform a country's institutions if Georgian accession hinges on free and fair elections. If legitimate, these elections would see President Saakashvili step down from power. This, consequently, would remove much of the existing personal animosity in the Georgian-Russian relationship. Additionally, a new democratically elected leader facing a legitimate opposition would highlight Georgia as a vibrant democracy deserving acceptance.

Reforms focusing on the judiciary should also be mandatory. These will further reduce concerns over current government opaqueness. Moreover, as Georgia progresses in its evolution towards the values NATO upholds, one must believe that will unify the Alliance's diverse publics in support of the small democratic country in Russia's shadow.

Finally, Russian feelings on Georgia currently divide the NATO community. Yet, by overcoming this division and announcing a timeline, NATO could signal to the Kremlin that Georgian entry is not intended to cause any undue Russia concern. It could argue how the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 resulted in international opprobrium and financial calamity for Russia. As a supranational actor, NATO would provide a valued additional conduit for which the countries could mediate disputes and avoid conflict.

Moreover, NATO could ease Russian fears in a collective voice that this is neither political brinksmanship nor martial encirclement. Rather, it is the Alliance uniting to voice approval for reform in a region that has generally struggled to progress. To not reward that would discourage future progress, diminish NATO's stature as a values-based union, and give credence to attacks of Western hypocrisy in promoting ideals.

Even if a diplomatic approach failed to sway Russian bellicosity, Georgian admittance would prove the Alliance represents a bond between members. That is because if NATO perpetually postponed intensely desired membership to a major contributing country willing to undergo reforms, only out of fears of antagonizing Russia, the cornerstone of shared defense is already absent. Though some might retort Tbilisi is too distant to incorporate, that both reneges on earlier promises and deepens an existing divide citizens in NATO cites like Tallinn or Warsaw already believe in.

Providing Georgia with an exact timeline for admittance will reestablish NATO as a unified military union and institution that helps positively reform countries. Georgian acceptance would reinvigorate the entire NATO community by asserting the organization's willingness to commit to universal beliefs such as the rule of law and democracy. Just as these ideals and history of military agreement has solidified a common identity in the past, betraying both now out of the fear of provoking Russia would debilitate any hope for a sense of communal ownership.

Ian Hansen is an International Affairs graduate student at George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

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Gökhan  Tekir

March 8, 2012

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After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the republics, which emerged out of the ashes of Soviet Union, continued to be regarded as the sphere of influence of Russian Federation. Russia formulated the term of near abroad to define the positions of these countries.
Georgia has been the most problematic case for Russia since the 1990s. Georgia did not want to join to CIS at initial stage of its establishment. Russian pressure were able to force Georgia to join to the organization. After Georgia became the member of CIS, it sought new organizations to bypass Russian influence in the region like GUUAM. However, the Eurasian partners of Georgia did not provide adequate support to survive this organization efficiently.
Saakashvili sticked to pro-Western attitude unprecedently. Being a member of NATO has a vital importance for Georgia to provide security to free itself from Russian influence. But NATO and European Union did not return Georgia's affection towards them in the same way. In 2008 war, Georgia lacked Western support and experienced a humiliating defeat.
I think NATO's expansion to Georgia would bring the organization brink of conflict with Russia. Russia's cooperation is needed on Syrian issue and other conflict areas such as Afghanistan for NATO. Flirt with Georgia would antagonize Russia needlessly.
I do not mean NATO should not support rule of law and democracy in the world. However, while experiencing Syrian crisis, Afghanistan war, a possible Iran conflict, the organization should priroritize its options carefully.
 
Tornike  Metreveli

March 29, 2012

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I strongly agree with substantial messages which the author delivers in this coherent, logical and analytical piece. Suffice it to say that the author is also right in suggesting that at some point the risk persists that public attitude in Georgia towards NATO will shift and trust will perish together with Georgia's ambitions to join this organization. This might be a logical sequence of NATO's balancing policy with Russia and Georgia. The fact that Georgian soldiers are regularly dieing together with NATO officers in Afghanistan, while the country does not get any specific timeline when it will join NATO might become a source of gradual change in attitude (if not trust) in NATO.

Tags: | NATO's expansion. |
 
Tornike  Metreveli

March 29, 2012

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NATO’s compromise regarding an uncertain postponement of Georgia’s membership (in 2008) was possibly aimed at both rewarding US-backed Georgia (encouraging its contributions to NATO’s peacekeeping missions) and to please the frustrated Kremlin (by not giving a MAP to Georgia). However, as well all remember, it had a counterproductive effect in 2008. Russia perceived the refusal of a MAP to Georgia as a signal to act to finish Georgia’s NATO ‘dream’, as president Medvedev later himself confirmed (see this link http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111121/168901195.html).

Having said all this, I deem Gökhan is not quite right in suggesting that not-to-angry-Russians-first policy is anyhow in the interests of NATO. Quite the contrary. The more NATO compromises with Russia about Georgia, the bigger will be the chance of Kremlin's growing regional hegemonism. Russia perceived the refusal of a MAP to Georgia as a signal to act in order to stop Georgia’s NATO assertions and give reply to the West for Kosovo. Georgian war was a message to both international players involved in the region (NATO and the US in particular) and the former Soviet states. In the case of the Western institutions, the Kremlin was warning about intervention in its spheres of influence and giving a reminder that it had recovered its place as hegemonic player on the international stage. For the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Georgian example served as a reminder to rethink the costs and benefits of possible cooperation with the West. I am quite skeptical to believe that becoming a puppet of Russia is what NATO should aim at.

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Tornike  Metreveli

March 29, 2012

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Also, if one considers the strategic importance of Georgia as a transit route for Central Asian gas-oil resources, bearing in mind the over-dependence of some NATO member states on Russia's energy-terrorism, getting Georgia in will allow creating energy security alternative which in my view would make region safer place.

With the August war on their mind, Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders did not resist Kremlin’s political and economic pressures seeing the political prices as being higher than the costs. As a result the political vector of those countries did not shift in the Western direction. In other cases, mainly Azerbaijan and to some extent Moldova, formerly active NATO and EU aspirations accordingly were rethought in Baku and Chisinau. The country where the Kremlin’s agenda did not quite have the desired effect was Georgia, which despite losing both sovereignty (20% of the country is currently occupied) and perhaps the chances for Western institutional integration (at least in the nearer future), has neither lost the belief in its Western aspirations, nor shifted its political vector.

Who, who but a citizen of Turkey can possibly guess Gökhan how much socio-political stamina is needed to stick to your belief of Western integration when your application to the international institution is postponed for uncertain period of time.
 
Gökhan  Tekir

April 5, 2012

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I appreciate Tornike's sensitiveness concerning Georgia but I just tried to express crude facts. Russian Federation is not a weak state anymore. It asserted its big brother status in its 'Near Abroad' and no Western power seems to challenge Russia's hegemonic position in this region. Even Western countries avoid themselves from questioning Russia's status.
Fİnding alternative energy routes which would reduce Russia's leverage over Europe was a big dream of European Union. Georgia could have played a vital role in this issuebut it was understood that no Central Asian countries would supply this route. Germany and Italy get themselves into bilateral agreements with Russian Federation in energy issue.
Tornike is right in claiming that Russia sent messages both to the West and to the former Soviet states in 2008 war. And Western countries and former states received the message. The EU and NATO failed to deliver both military and diplomatic aid. to Georgia.
Finally, I am not against Georgia's adherence to Western aspirations. On the contrary, I find Georgia successful in dealing with corruption and in solving Adjara issue in peaceful means. The impact of the EU aspiration cannot be denied on both issues. Same idea can be applied to Turkey. Although I do not think Turkey will enter to the EU in the foreseeable future, the reform process experienced thanks to the EU helped Turkey to emerge as a regional power.
 
Gökhan  Tekir

April 5, 2012

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I appreciate Tornike's sensitiveness concerning Georgia but I just tried to express crude facts. Russian Federation is not a weak state anymore. It asserted its big brother status in its 'Near Abroad' and no Western power seems to challenge Russia's hegemonic position in this region. Even Western countries avoid themselves from questioning Russia's status.
Fİnding alternative energy routes which would reduce Russia's leverage over Europe was a big dream of European Union. Georgia could have played a vital role in this issuebut it was understood that no Central Asian countries would supply this route. Germany and Italy get themselves into bilateral agreements with Russian Federation in energy issue.
Tornike is right in claiming that Russia sent messages both to the West and to the former Soviet states in 2008 war. And Western countries and former states received the message. The EU and NATO failed to deliver both military and diplomatic aid. to Georgia.
Finally, I am not against Georgia's adherence to Western aspirations. On the contrary, I find Georgia successful in dealing with corruption and in solving Adjara issue in peaceful means. The impact of the EU aspiration cannot be denied on both issues. Same idea can be applied to Turkey. Although I do not think Turkey will enter to the EU in the foreseeable future, the reform process experienced thanks to the EU helped Turkey to emerge as a regional power.
 

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