Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

August 20, 2010 |  3 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Topic Five Lessons to be Learned From Afghanistan

Felix F. Seidler: NATO’s expected withdrawal from Afghanistan is the result of a loss in focus. The country will hardly be stable in 2014 and beyond. The aims proclaimed by the international community were not realistic in the first place. Decision makers have to take the long view, if they wish to succeed.

Western forces went into Afghanistan to fight Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Thereafter, the Americans and Europeans announced that Afghanistan should become a Western-style democracy. But Bin Laden was never caught, and al-Qaeda escaped into other countries. Karzai continues as "Mayor of Kabulistan." Afghanistan's constitution will not replace Pashtunwali.

What went wrong? The aims initially proclaimed were soon forgotten or proved to be too ambitious. Bin Laden's case in particular demonstrates Western politicians' inability to keep focused. Al-Qaida remains a threat, but today it is considered a minor topic. The situation in Afghanistan has not improved. The equality of men and women is laid down in Article 22 of the Afghan Constitution; however, gender equality and other 'Western' values cannot work in a country where 90 percent of adults are illiterate. That amounts to putting the cart in front of the horse. Western countries have five lessons to learn from Afghanistan.

The first lesson: pursue long-term agendas. Stabilizing Afghanistan and defeating global terrorism takes more than a few years. Democracy has to grow slowly. Only when the first generation, which has grown up in freedom, takes over will democracy have been established successfully.

Secondly, persistency is needed in the fight against terrorism. Al-Qaeda is an ideology. Hence, it cannot be defeated by bombs, but needs to be discredited by its own actions for all time.

Lesson number three: get informed! One reason for the failure in Afghanistan is a lack of knowledge. Intelligence services failed, as very few specialists showed an interest in the country after 1989. In the twenty-first century, countries low on today's agenda can be of paramount importance tomorrow.

Fourth on the list, don't do what's politically correct! Do what's necessary. Tribal societies with cultural ideas that have grown over hundreds of years will not change overnight into the Swedish model. Decision making should not follow fads, but instead be based on the insights of professionals. Afghanistan will not become a stable country by Western standards any time soon. Solutions for Afghanistan have to be found by Afghans.

These questions will become particularly virulent after 2014. Once Afghans are on their own, we will see to what extent they have adapted to our system. Nobody can guarantee that the Afghan Constitution will survive until 2020. From a short-term perspective, the democratization of Afghanistan looks like a delightful idea. However, a system imposed by foreigners is not a stabilizing factor in the long run. Nation building has to focus strictly on pushing local elements. This cannot succeed if Afghan citizens perceive their own country as 'Westernistan.'

Politicians tend to espouse the short-term view. Informed elites have to continue pressuring them to maintain focus. This advice continues to be necessary because it is becoming increasingly difficult to set an intelligent agenda in a rapidly globalizing world. In contrast to non-state actors, the critical disadvantage of Western politicians is that they continue to be in a 'reactive' mode. Westerners reacted to 9/11 and the insurgency in Afghanistan. Developing an active decision making capability requires flat hierarchies with fast intelligence and analysis units. NATO's new 'Emerging Security Challenges Division' is a step in the right direction.

Finally, the last lesson: keep your aims realistic. Policy cannot be achieved by writing wish lists, rather by executing 'to do' lists. The motivation behind NATO's withdrawal is political expediency. After all these years, Western societies are simply exhausted. However, long-term success demands that NATO stays longer. None of its original goals will be achieved by 2014. Furthermore, the geopolitical competition in Afghanistan's neighborhood is a long-term factor that favors destabilization. What should be at the top of this Western 'to do' list? Stay and get the job done!

The crucial job for NATO in Aghanistan is to create conditions for Afghan citizens to build up their country in their own way. If this mission fails, old issues will reemerge that the West will no longer be able to solve. Western politicians need to stay focused and committed, or else they risk losing their influence over the region to Afghanistan's neighbors.

Felix Seidler is a student of political science, law and history at Wuerzburg University.

Related Material:

  • 6
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
Tags: | al-Qaeda | NATO-ISAF | terrorism | US | Afghanistan |
 
Comments
Darrell Calvin Brown

August 21, 2010

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
One point I agree with in the above article is that the war will not be won by mere bullets and guns. Also, President Karzai is no different from King David when he was under siege within his own country. All is not lost as the "private security" forces are removed along with their private interests. The NATO-ISAF forces , who are the International Public Force ,can carry forth the plans for peace keeping , building, and making as they are focused on the overall good of the citizens of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It is Afghanistan not Sweden or any other country. So, some folk do not think the Giants in the land may be conquered. There are those who are a little higher than us who disagree. "Let there be peace on earth and let it begin with me."
 
Bernhard  Lucke

August 26, 2010

  • 5
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Excellent article. I disagree only with one point: Do you think it makes sense to continue a strategy that has obviously not worked for 9 years? Do you think things will improve thanks to more troops, more killing, and more fighting? They only got worse since 9 years, with the additional risk of destabilizing Pakistan.

It's also a matter of honesty to admit that NATO has failed. But I guess that would be too much of a prestige loss, which is why we are now seeing a so far unsuccesful "surge" and "transition of power to Afghans", which is essentially mimicking the Soviet attempt of getting out without losing too much face and influence.

But reality is, every day NATO stays longer, every lie more, every soldier more, every dead "Taliban" more, puts more locals against us, diminishes western influence on the long run, dumps tons of money, destabilizes the region, breeds terrorism, and reflects the lack of vision, honesty and leadership of western politicians.

All of us who travel to developing countries, especially islamic ones, can feel this every day of their journey. It would have been better to start different from the first day onwards, keeping your first 4 points above in mind. But now that the "child fell into the well", there's no way to success continuing the same business.
 
Jerzy S Deren

August 29, 2010

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Fully agree, see extract from broader text: Ages of Afghan’s turbulent history, since Alexander the Great, has been researched and characterized in number of monographs, dissertations and books which have been written by scientists, writers, journalists, warriors, and diplomats, often with different approach and knowledge about this region and country. Often “impartiality” of such works is not clear, and readers may read about myths on invincibility of Afghan warriors However, as was stated lastly the key for operational planning is to identify Afghan nation as a Centre of gravity of such battlefield environment. Who visited country knows that it is mission almost impossible because of multiethnic, tribal structured nation, where majority Pashtu tribes are divided by artificial boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Long period of war against Soviet invaders, pushed Pashtu shepherds to become Mujahedin fighters who during civil war turn into Islamic Sunni fundamentalists Taliban and opened safe haven for - international terrorist organization al- Qaida...In addition to identification roots of the threat imposed by Taliban insurgency a current strength of al-Qaida in Afghanistan must be exposed to public opinion, in the light of nine years of war, after failed Taliban regime. This action is necessary to change declining support of both US and NATO forces deployed to OEF and ISAF mission...NATO must conduct world wide information campaign convincing public that contemporary civilization deals with multidimensional networked nature of today’s transnational terror threat. As General James Mattis at Joint Forces Command recently said, the challenges of operating in a counterinsurgency can be greater than in large scale conventional combat, “since the adversary has more flexibility to determine how, when, where, and whether to fight. In addition, defence priorities for such mission should be achievable and feasible for forming “system of systems” aimed on fulfillment of NATO political will, in order to avoid further generation of capabilities shortfalls as well as growing number of casualties on the battlefield.
Tags: | Afghanistan | NATO |
 

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org


Community

You are in the archive of all articles published on atlantic-community.org from 2007 to 2012. To read the latest articles from our open think tank and network with community members, please go to our new website