RSS

As the Arctic ice cap is melting, the region is growing in importance for both the five countries on its coasts and the rest of the world. Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US are staking out their claims in ways both peaceful and aggressive to secure access to the Arctic’s assets, while Iceland, Finland, and Sweden are participating in multilateral discussions through the Arctic Council. The success of collective governance of the Arctic’s resources depends on the commercial value of the resource and who it primarily interests: states, indigenous groups, or NGOs. Although countries seek to exercise sovereignty in the Arctic, the international nature of the region’s resources will inevitably require multilateral governance. The question remains whether the Arctic Five or the Arctic Council will dominate.

Resources that have little commercial value will be easiest to manage. As early as 1965, the Arctic Five declared polar bears an “international circumpolar resource,” which led to a multilateral agreement on their conservation. Whereas polar bears compel international cooperation, precious commodities like oil and gas provoke sovereignty claims. Greenland has recently gained greater autonomy from Denmark thanks to abundant hydrocarbon reserves. Yet the entire circumpolar region’s oil and gas cannot be drilled until border disputes are resolved. For this reason, conflicts benefit conservationists while hindering corporations. For thirty years, the US, Canada, and the state of Alaska have disputed sovereignty in the Beaufort Sea. Alaska may try to sell leases to oil companies, which could force the two countries to resolve their dispute. Thus, even regional-level governments could play key roles in the Arctic, but the Arctic Council is really their only potential forum, and it could be overshadowed by the Arctic Five.

The melting ice is also opening up dramatically shortened shipping routes. Russia is modernizing ports along its Northern Sea Route, while the newly-renamed Canadian Northwest Passage is under development. Countries dispute whether these straits are sovereign or international, which could create problems as shipping increases. To make the routes safe and efficient, the Arctic Five should allow an international regulatory body to intervene. UNCLOS could be a good starting point, as the littoral statse have already demonstrated that they respect its authority, going through it to settle overlapping territorial claims.

The strategic unimportance of the Arctic’s polar opposite, Antarctica, allowed the continent to be demilitarized and devoted to science. The same cannot be said for the Arctic. Russia is creating an Arctic Group of Forces and Canada is looking to purchase three icebreakers, while the US has declared the Arctic a national security interest. Even Denmark is planning to create a military contingent solely dedicated to the Arctic. Sovereignty will predominate in military affairs, yet to counteract these tensions, states should focus on areas of cooperation. The Canadian Coast Guard and Danish navy, for instance, worked together as part of Northern Deployment 2009 to practice search and rescue, which is far more productive than Canadian and Russian squabbles over fighter jets near each other’s airspaces.

Underscoring the Arctic’s global importance, countries which have no geographical links to the region like China, South Korea, and the EU have attempted to become permanent observers of the Arctic Council, only to be turned down. If Iceland joins the EU, though, the latter will acquire a foothold in the Arctic and gain permanent membership in the Council, and Brussels could become a new pole of Arctic power. The EU could bring a different perspective to the table as well since its overarching priority is protecting the Arctic environment while allowing for some sustainable resource exploitation.

With all of these disputes, multilateral cooperation in the Arctic has rough waters ahead. The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, which declared there was “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean,” marked the start of a potential power struggle between the Arctic Five and the Arctic Council, which also includes indigenous groups and NGOs. On March 29, Canada will host a summit for the Arctic Five, which could exacerbate tensions between the two groups. Yet in the end, the Arctic Council should be used as a model for international cooperation, as it is more inclusive than any organization based solely on the littoral states. Excluding actors from discussions only increases conflict and leaves vital opinions out in the cold. Since Russian icebreaker captains, Alaskan oil prospectors, and Inuit whale hunters all interact in the Arctic, cooperation that is multilateral, multilevel, and inclusive is essential to making the region sustainable.

Mia Bennett is a fourth-year undergraduate student in Political Science and European Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. She focuses on the politics of Arctic resource management and is interested in the application of GIS technology to Arctic dilemmas.

Related Material from the Atlantic Community:

• Paal Sigurd Hilde: Norway and the Arctic: The End of Dreams?
• K. S. Yalowitz & R. A. Virginia: The Arctic Region: Great Game or International Cooperation?
• Klaus Dodds: Sea and State Change
  

March 15, 2010

Levoyer Estelle, University College London, (5)

• 2
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

As you very well underscored in this article, the future of Arctic Governance relies much on the value of the Arctic region resources. Polar bears are less worthy than oil, nickel or gold. But do you think that the economic crisis could ease up this ongoing tension over the negotiation? You suggested that the Arctic Council would solve the Arctic challenges best, can we see that economic downturn as an opportunity? Tensions do not seem to ease up, according to the other articles posted on the website (increased militarisation, etc).

March 16, 2010

Caitlyn Antrim

• 2
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

I disagree that the Ilulissat Declaration marked a potential power struggle with the Arctic Council.It certainly doesn't need to. The five coastal states have responsibilities, notably maritime security, that are outside the purview of the Arctic Council and they have the right and duty to address these issues among themselves. Similarly, the IMO has responsibilities governing shipping, safety of life at sea, suppression of unlawful acts, the IOC has a role in international science and other bodies have their own roles and interests that do not fade away in the Arctic.

The Arctic Council has an essential role as the forum for the discussion of matters related to sustainable development. It's impact comes in part because it is not a governance body. Attempts to turn it into a formal governance body that has increased control over the activities of the arctic coastal states will fail, just as trying to create a supra-governmental body for the North Atlantic, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea would fail.

The Law of the Sea Convention, the conventions and guidelines of the IMO, the policy studies of the Arctic Council, the provisions of the high seas and straddling stocks agreement, along with more general agreements such as the London Dumping Convention and agreements of other intergovernmental organizations all constitute real Arctic governance, not less real because it is disseminated among different organizations and authorities. What is requires is an understanding about how all these rules and regimes work together in the Arctic. As to an over arching function, what is needed is a process to knit together all these different functions and authorities - more a coordination function than a governance one - and to identify areas in which additional action is needed by functional organizations or regional states. And in this, the Arctic Council has a critical role in defining issues of environment and development that need to be addressed in the appropriate geographic or functional body.

What we don't need is to spend time arguing for a central governing body when most of the tools of arctic governance already are in place in existing bodies, particularly when the Arctic states are no more likely to give up their sovereign rights in the oceans and coasts of the Arctic than would any nation in more tropical climates.

March 17, 2010

Juliette Dixon, Science Po Lille, Gold Contributor (118)

• 0
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

We thank you, Ms. Levoyer and Ms. Antrim for your thoughtful comments!

@ Ms. Levoyer you are asking a very important question. I invite you to read the other Polar Politics Theme Week article by Mr. Yalowitz and Mr. Virginia about this one question, which can read by copy-pasting this link: http://atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/The_Arctic_Region...

@ Ms. Antrim

Your view on how to address the Arctic challenges is very interesting. Most of our guest contributors have advocated either the reinforcement of the Arctic Council or a "fair" and genuine leadership of the leading coastal nations ( mostly "Arctic Five: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US.) But how do you make sure this cooperation between the IMO. ILO and other international institutions is comprehensive enough to encompass all the aspects of the Arctic governance: environment, indigenous development and empowerment, private stakeholders as well as new nations getting interested in the region and which may not all be signatories of the above mentioned international organizations?
These international institutions and conventions may be more efficient (London Dumping Convention, UNCLOS,etc) but are they inclusive in the end? The US still have not ratified the UNCLOS for instance.

March 23, 2010

Mia M. Bennett, Foreign Policy Association; UCLA, Bronze Contributor (12)

• 1
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

Ms. Levoyer and Ms. Antrim, thank you both for reading my article and offering insightful comments. Below are my responses.

@ Ms. Levoyer: I think you raise an interesting question. Economic crises can indeed decrease tensions, particularly when the crisis in question can only be solved by international cooperation. For instance, the G-20 London Summit in 2009 proved that countries as diverse in views as France, Germany, China, the US, and the UK could all come to an agreement on how to counteract the recession. The situation, however, is a bit more delicate in the Arctic, where natural resources with definite territoriality are at issue (rather than, say, CMOs or CBOs, which can avoid being boxed in to national boundaries). In the end, I don't think it's the economic downturn per se which will lead to cooperation in the Arctic through forums like the Arctic Council. In fact, the recession, could actually lead countries to seek to secure their resources at a time when oil, for instance, is expensive. Instead, either a mutual concern for the environment among the Arctic Council members, or alternatively a realization that profits can only come through international collaboration (such as Norwegian oil companies helping Russia establish needed infrastructure), will have the best possibility of generating cooperation in the Arctic regarding natural resources.

@ Ms. Antrim: I agree that the littoral states have a right to address issues of maritime security, which are indeed outside the realm of the Arctic Council. You mention that the Arctic Council’s essential role is to discuss sustainable development. Yet I think that the Arctic Council could build on this role, in which it brings multiple countries and actors together, to discuss other circumpolar issues. Indeed, as you observe, there are already international regimes in place to discuss certain matters in the Arctic, such as the IMO for shipping safety and UNCLOS for resolving territorial disputes boundaries. Yet what is needed in the end, as Ms. Dixon suggests, is some type of organization to harmonize the actions and policies of all these various bodies. I see the Arctic Council as potentially possessing that ability, whereas the Ilulissat group of the Arctic Five could become a body that willfully excludes other states from discussions on the Arctic even if they pertain to issues relevant to more than just the littoral states.

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org