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January 9, 2009 |  22 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Marek  Swierczynski

Gas Dispute Puts Energy Security At Top of EU Agenda

Marek Swierczynski: The EU proved to be indispensable in taming the recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine. However, it still lacks the means to stabilize crucial energy supplies and oversee political cohesion to protect its most vulnerable members.

If anyone is still in doubt as to whether the EU is a stabilizing factor in the political and economical sphere on the continent, I would encourage them to try to imagine what could have happened if there was no EU in the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute. Many might have wished that the EU had acted more swiftly, used more powerful means and shown more unity in articulating the problem; nonetheless, there was a definite reaction and indeed all three political and executive bodies of the Union have spoken out on the issue. There is now a good chance that the involvement of the EU institutions and leaders will resolve the dispute that threatened dozens of millions of EU citizens.

But there are questions to be asked and issues to be discussed in the aftermath. Is the EU sufficiently focused on energy security? Does it have the means at its disposal to effectively take care of the issue? Does it need to create a coherent, common energy security policy? These are only the basic problems that need to be addressed and are coincidently among the key priorities of the current EU presidency.

The EU has apparently not yet come to terms with the Russian strategy - outlined a good year ago - of using energy supplies as a tool in foreign and security policy. Neither has it incorporated the energy security issue into the institutional and legal framework of the common foreign and security policy. It did not create effective means at the international level to secure stability of the crucial supplies, even though it has realized its own large dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. It did not create alternative supply routes that would circumvent potentially fragile bottlenecks, like the Ukraine. It did too little to make the Ukrainians and the Russians sufficiently aware that the energy security of much of Europe depends on how they resolve outstanding issues between themselves. The EU should also have made clearer the nature of the consequences should the Russians fail to co-operate.


As a result, Russia and Ukraine feel free to fight economic and political gas wars every new year, with many countries holding their breath and clutching their hot-water bottles in the freezing conditions. Quite a few of the member states have been left with cold feet, feeling that the EU is weak and incapable of sorting out a problem relating to its mighty neighbour and crucial partner. This does little to help increase confidence and trust in the EU.

In the short term, the current presidency, along with the Commission, has to act quickly and resolutely to restore gas supplies via Ukraine. It should also speed up work on an energy security framework for all the gas-dependent EU member states. A positive approach across the whole EU to a common energy security policy and the incorporation of the energy security issue into its general security policy is a long-term need. Putting these measures in place should start as soon as the newly elected European Parliament and the new Commission take power.

Marek Swierczynski is a journalist with a special interest in defense and security matters and a member of the Polish Euro-Atlantic Society.

 Related material from the Atlantic Community:

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Tags: | energy security | gas | Russia | Ukraine | EU |
 
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Eimear  O'Casey

January 9, 2009

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As you put it, "The EU has apparently not yet come to terms with the Russian strategy - outlined a good year ago - of using energy supplies as a tool in foreign and security policy". It remains unsubstantiated at this stage to presume that they have intentions to use gas as leverage against other EU countries in the same way they have done against the Baltics and Ukraine; they have enormous interest in maintaining their EU clients, naturally. However, the power that Russia wields over the EU in this regard consists in simply having the potential to withhold supplies. The dispute with Ukraine offers yet another reminder to other countries of their dependence on the elusive giant; this alone gives a hefty bolster to Russian foreign policy. As a result, the energy security framework which you advocate is indeed as imperative as you suggest.
 
Unregistered User

January 9, 2009

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«Let’s see NATO soldiers coming to rescue by cutting some wood for their allies. How else are they going to help, go to war over unpaid bills of a country which is not even a NATO member? In that case at least they won't face the questions about WMDs.»

from a reader of the Times :

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5477684.ece

well, may-be it's really the right time to also think about an EU defense policy, the EU energy policy depends on it
 
Marta  Osojnik

January 9, 2009

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On the one hand I believe Old Continent should stop pretending that it is not a part of the gas dispute. European Union should seriously think about how to react and take more serious measures but the question that arises here and bothers me more than why it is not really doing so is not whether EU politicians are being aware that European countries are in a way sacrificed for Russia's (and Ukraine’s as well) 'greater goal' (I am sure that is understood) but whether EU has a clear strategy already? However, it is almost obscene to claim that it might not have it once we understand that answers are, once again, pretty much orientated to what each individual European state will decide to do.

So, IS there a common Europe when we think of the present gas crisis? I most strongly agree with Mr. Swierczynski when he challenges those who think that EU hasn't reacted strong enough to try to imagine how the crisis would look like if there was no EU involved but in the same dare to emphasize the fact that EU still has a lot of work to do when it comes down to solving problems as the one we are discussing just now.

However, in the mean time, it would be useful if the European countries finally learn a lesson and start working on their own protection – with simply creating necessary gas reserves.

Marta
www.thinkyoung.eu />
Tags: | gas supplies |
 
Colette Grace Mazzucelli

January 10, 2009

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Dear Mr. Swierczynski,

Thank you for your article. When you explain that "the current presidency, along with the Commission, has to act quickly and resolutely to restore gas supplies via Ukraine," do you think this will be more difficult at present given relations in the Trio between France and the Czech Republic?

When you assert that "It should also speed up work on an energy security framework for all the gas-dependent EU member states," do you think that the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is necessary to create this framework or that a second "no" by the Irish in a referendum would complicate matters further?

I would appreciate hearing your views. Greetings from New York.

Sincerely, Colette Mazzucelli
 
Member deleted

January 11, 2009

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There are a few things that if the EU comes to grip (via such commentators) sooner the better for its much avowed reputation over a 'consensual governance@proportionality. The anti-Russian socialization one that comes across does little to EU and its reputation - infact the anti-thesis of the basis of the ESCE and then the EU and then the idea of the Europa!
Why should the EU imagine itself as a power-bloc in realist terms, if it is unable to accept individual states that are moving intelligently on the global arena. The anti-Russian sentiments merely makes the rationale behind Russia's re-assertion a reality for that state and serves as a reminder that Russia may need to hammer in the truth of a changed geo-political reality, while many seem to forget that Russia was a super-power in the very near-past.
This anti-Russian sentiment merely serves to strengthen Russia's realization of its existence that did not benefit from the US Marshall Plan to help it wobble to its feet. Even the United States, when faced with certain sentiments expressed at this journal may begin to wonder about the Marshall Plan scheme - for a democratic space that it sought to create and extend.
When the dependence of the EU dawns, yes, then it does need to find sustainable energy security policies without having grudges against neighbouring Russia at initiating the idea of partnership-of-equals that is standing it in good stead. Energy is going to occupy much of the geo-political upheavals and the private life of individuals in third world states fighting ethno-political terrorism on one hand and fighting the terrorist-international on the other - does not determine that. But yes, such "a bit too much" exercises usually makes the atlantic-community and its presences a "bit too much" of a sickness!

 
Marek  Swierczynski

January 12, 2009

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In response to Prof. Mazzucelli's note, yes I think the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty would have been helpful in this case, as it brings an extra unifying factor to the EU as a whole and more specifically it introduces the general rule of solidarity in face of energy supply crises.
It also demands ensuring energy security and interconnectivity of energy networks among the EU member states and therefore increases the level of protection - at least in the formal way - of those member states, who are most vulnerable.
The Treaty offers much more than that in the area of common security and foreign policy - by creating 'common defense' clause, which in future may also cover the energy security. Whether the spirit of the Treaty will be present without its application in the EU actions, is to be seen.
What we can see now is that both Russia's friends and foes within the EU are fed up with constant fiddling on gas taps and will eagerly seek more stable solutions than bilateral supply deals. And that could be a good starting point for a EU-wide energy security framework.
The Czech presidency in my view acted timely and in concert with the institutions they were obliged to consult with. In that respect they have done well. Now, when the crisis is coming to an end, the goal should be to prevent it from returning next year, but that will be much more complicated than the troubleshooting excercise they've just finished.
 
Francisco J. Ruiz

January 12, 2009

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As usual, I appreciate several contradictions on the critics against Russia related to the energy supplies to the European Union, and its occasional interruption due to political disputes with Ukraine, being a couple of them:

1. If everybody knows that energy resources and their rampant prices have been the key for recovering Russia from the 90’s turmoil, why would Russia be interested on endangered their sale to its main client, the EU?
2. If Russia is using the energy as a strategic weapon for dealing with Europe, why is collaborating with many countries (for instance, Germany, Serbia, Bulgaria…) in order to diversify the supply routes (with the North & South European lines)?

Related to contradiction number one, at the time of the Illustration, Montesquieu wrote that “where there is commerce, there are peaceful ways and morals”. Mr. Medveded can’t be compared with the outstanding French thinker, but his statement at the beginning of his term saying that “nothing approaches the countries more than business” reflects a similar concept. Don’t be wrong: when you are a seller, your first interest is that your goods arrive at the intended client, so he will be happy and willing to pay for the service, and will not look for alternative sources.

Related to contradiction number two, it is evident that Russia (once again, trying to sell its main resources to the intended clients) is by-passing some almost hostile EU’s members (in the case of the North European lines the Baltic’s and Poland) in direct collaboration with an interested Germany, and in the case of the South lines with its friendly Slavic partners as Bulgaria and Serbia to avoid the permanent blackout of Ukraine as transit country.

Ukraine has openly defied Russia since the”Orange Revolution”, it has removed any reference to one thousand years of common history (something that I could check visiting the country the last year), and it is playing the energy “wild car” as the last resource for causing troubles to Russia. It has been recognized even by the Ukrainians that a percentage of the gas supplies to the EU has been systematically stolen and, in addition to that, they have a huge debt and don’t accept an update of the prices: Russia suggest a 210$ figure, whit the EU countriesalready paying 450$, but even that increment is too much for a dysfunctional economy, so they ask for more transit fees.

In conclusion, the use of the Russian energy supplies as a strategic weapon it’s something that really exists, but the users are Ukraine and some former WP and current EU members that are always eager to solve old grievances against the Tsars and the Soviets, and not Russia. A strategic global agreement between Russia and the EU, including energy security, and the creation of alternatives routes by-passing these countries, are the only solutions to overcome that attempt.
Tags: | Russia EU relations |
 
Unregistered User

January 12, 2009

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Francisco J Ruiz said it, while I thought it too

Humm as far as Lisboa treaty is concerned, what about the Czecks ????
 
Donald  Stadler

January 13, 2009

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Francesco, you are correct about a lot of this, but I had to laugh when I read this:

"it has removed any reference to one thousand years of common history"

I would imagine that that 1000 years (or at least the past 500 years or so) may look MUCH different from the Ukrainian end of things than from the Russian end. Similarly to the way a Basque or a Catalonian will view Spanish History from a different perspective than someone from Leon, or Mexico may have a different perspective on US-Mexican history than we Yanks do....

No? ;)
 
Francisco J. Ruiz

January 13, 2009

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Donald, you can laugh as much as you want reading "it has removed any reference to one thousand years of common history", as a matter of fact laughing is a very healthy activity, but that is simply a fact, it is not an opinion or a critic.

What I mean is that if you had the chance to visit, for instance, the Ukrainian National Defense University (as I really did last year), you would discover a small museum devoted to the history of the Ukrainian military, where the history of the country is resumed like this: "We had some Cossack Tartar rulers that freed the country in 16th century from Polish domination, and then the Orange Revolution in 2006". That’s all. Just ludicrous.

I agree with you that the historical point of view can be very different from Russia and from Ukraine, which is something that happens everywhere (even in the US), as well as history is not maths, there are not unchallengeable facts.

So I would accept hearing different opinions about the same historical fact, but what I just can’t accept is to completely erase and occult, once again, one thousand years of common history, including:

- The golden age of the “Kievan Rus”, in 9th Century, origin of the Russian nationality and name. Ukraine was named latter the “Small Russia”.
- The fight against the Mongol domination, which destroyed Kiev in 1212, leaving the preservation of the Russian heritage in the hands of Moscow.
- The common struggle against the Polish-Lithuanian Union, from the 14th century to the 17th, and since then expanding the unified Russian Empire towards the west and the south.
- Three centuries under the Tsarist rule and 70 years of communist domination (equally tragic for Russia and Ukraine: some of the most relevant Soviet incumbents were Ukrainians, as Mr. Khrushchev who arbitrarily included the Russian territory of Crimea in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic).

In any case, it is a mistake to generalize (as you do) talking about the Ukrainians (or the Basque or Catalonians) as a whole, there are always very different points of view inside every community; you perfectly know that Ukraine is a divided country, with half of the population (mainly in the east) supporting a more friendly relation with Russia, and the other half (mainly in the west) refusing to speak Russian, ignoring its powerful neighbor (or simply trying to provoke it), and denying any historical bond with them (something that is a lie).

As a resume, history is a powerful tool for configuring the people’s basic feelings, so all the political factions have a tendency to manipulate it in order to reach their political objectives (sometimes based on noble ideas, many times based on seizing the power and sending money to Switzerland). I’m just a neutral observer, but in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship I have checked some clear manipulations in that sense, so it is something that must be explained getting away from interested topics.
 
Donald  Stadler

January 13, 2009

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"What I mean is that if you had the chance to visit, for instance, the Ukrainian National Defense University (as I really did last year), you would discover a small museum devoted to the history of the Ukrainian military, where the history of the country is resumed like this: "We had some Cossack Tartar rulers that freed the country in 16th century from Polish domination, and then the Orange Revolution in 2006". That’s all. Just ludicrous."

I acknowledge the humor, but I think it has a rational explanation. I think there are two opposing points af view within Ukraine (surely many more than that, but I will simplify). I might summarize these POV's as "Ukraine as a sovereign country" and "Ukraine as a part of Russia or a satellite of Russia".

This has political relevance to the choice of materials for a military history museum in Ukraine, because Ukraine does not have a seperate military history from Russia for at least 500 years except for the Orange Revolution and perhaps a year or two during the Russian Civil War. If you present the full story there is an inescapable lesson for those young Ukranian cadets you are trying to make into officers, namely "If Russia comes your only choice is to submit to your fate".

So the Ukrainians have chosen to omit that part of the history for now. Surely it is in the books in their library, but not advertised in the museum. I can see why they did it that way, apart from the fact that the museum is probably not even a minor priority for the military academy, probably more of a hobby for a few officers.

Let's say that Catalonia were ultimately to achieve true independence from Spain. I suspect they might build just such a museum with a rich legacy predating the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella and a large section detailing the Spanish Civil War, with not much else. I've been to Dublin and actually seen two such sections - at the Kilmanham Jail and at the Irish National Museum. Irish military history as depicted in Dublin is dominated by Wolf Tone, Padraic Pearse, Michael Collins, and the Easter Uprising. There was no discernable mention of the 'shared military heritage' with the UK - I wonder why?

There once was such a reminder in statuary form. At one time a statue of Nelson similar to the famous plinth in Trafagar Square stood in front of the General Post Office in Dublin, the main site of the Easter uprising in 1916. That statue stood until the 50th anniversary of the Easter Uprising in 1966. On that date the Provisional Ira 'removed' it by blowing it sky high "Up Went Nelson". It broke every window within several blocks. Curiously the Irish government chose not to replace it.....
 
Donald  Stadler

January 13, 2009

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Thinking back to my Dublin visit another lacunae in the Irish museums stands out in retrospect - the museums completely failed to mention the greatest military figre of Irich history.

This is a fellow you may be well acquainted with as he made his most notable achievements in Spain. One Arthur Wesley aka Wellesley aka The Duke of Wellington.

Wesley was born into the Anglo-Irish nobility and was mostly raised in Ireland. His only Irish military action was as a junior officer helping to put down the rebellion led by Lord Edward Fitzgerald. The museums don't supress all of the Anglo-Irish, Fitzgerald and Wolf Tone are covered at some length despite being Protestants. But they don't regard Wellington as Irish - and I think he would have agreed!
 
Colette Grace Mazzucelli

January 13, 2009

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Mr. Ruiz (or Francisco, if I may), Donald,

Thank you for this exchange, which brings to light one of my interests in "narratives," or the recounting of stories that have particular relevance in the collective consciousness of a particular group, and the ways in which history is interpreted or, as you rightly assert, manipulated for the ends of those who seek power within a particular community or state.

My own interests are in the ways this manipulation often does lead to ethnic conflict and/or civil war, i.e., Rwanda, Bosnia. In other words, the ways in which recent history is constructed or rewritten, to serve political ends. I recommend Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo How Myths and Truths Started a War, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, for an insightful account.

I am also thinking of the ways in which history textbooks are written for the primary grades, for example, in Serbia. Traditionally, there has only been a single textbook in use for a particular grade. In one case, all references to the Milosevic era are omitted from the recent historical accounts. How can one teach history using a text that does not reference the Milosevic era? For educators, this is a particularly sensitive matter because it demonstrates how learning can be biased to support one version of history over others.

In the early 1990s, the seduction of "ancient hatreds," or the primordialist explanation, was evident in policy thinking about the Balkans, which has been referred to as the "Rebecca West Factor" or "bad history" in To End A War by Holbrooke. In order to understand ethnic conflict, it is helpful to reflect on the significance of rewriting history in the more recent past by political leaders who have an entrepreneurial approach to seeking and maintaining their hold on power. Naimark's Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, is an excellent contribution to the literature.

I appreciate your insights into these different cases, which make for a rich discussion.

Sincerely, Colette
 
Donald  Stadler

January 13, 2009

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That is interesting, Collette. Francisco piqued an intererest of mine (Irish history) when he mentioned the Ukranian museum. I realised that there must be certain parallels between some threads of Irish history and what some are trying to do in Ukraine - i.e. to make an extinguished state and people live again. There are far from the only examples of course, other examples spring readily to mind. Catalonia, Scotland, the Sud Tirol, Poland all spring to mind, not to mention Wales, Bretagne, Provence, and the Laguedoc in France. In most of these areas a more or less serious effort was made to estinguish a national identity. With perhaps the most notable success in France, of course.

So assuming that such a repressed nation wins it's independence what can they do to revive themselves as a nation and not an appendage upon another nationality? Ireland and the Ukraine are two examples of formerly dead nations returned Lazarus-like from the grave.

I think nations like these have to express an identity, and that identity must in some ways surpress the artificial identity which was strongly pressed upon them by their former rulers. Ireland strikes me as a country with many self-imposed mental blocks. Not only in the supression of Wellington's Irish identity but in other areas as well. Michael Collins is perhaps the most notable example. Collins was an (mostly) undenied Irish national and patriot and one of the greatest military and political innovators of the 20th century, yet I have read that no statue of Collins exists in County Cork (which is where he was born I believe). Collins is (in a very real sense) the Father of the Irish nation as it exists - in sundered condition.

Omitting Wellesley is understandable, I think, but omitting Collins?!!!!

The reason for that is the Irish Civil War, which raised passions which have still not completely died 80 years later. Had Collins died heriocally but ineffectively as did Lord Edward Fitzgerals, Wolf Tone, Robert Emmett, and Padraic Pearse there would be no shortage of statues and sentimental ballads for him.

But he didn't. He won an ambigous victory against the British, and then sealed that victory by fighting a war against his own. He died heroically, but even so it will take many more years for Ireland to come to terms with the ambigous legacy of Collins.
 
Francisco J. Ruiz

January 13, 2009

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Great and interesting points about Ireland, but just one comment: even recognizing that there could be some similarities between that country and Ukraine, regarding their recovered independece, there is a huge and basic difference: I think that the old Ukraine (the "Rus" of Kiev) is not only the origin but also the real soul of the Russian nationality, something that can't be said, of course, about Ireland and England.

Best regards.
 
Unregistered User

January 13, 2009

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"Bretagne, Provence, and the Laguedoc in France. In most of these areas a more or less serious effort was made to estinguish a national identity. With perhaps the most notable success in France, of course." :lol:

As born in Brittany, I am more french than a french, also some of our immigrants, Ms Dati could share the same qualities (or unqualities) ;

yet, it's true that our centralised educational system made it, as well as "communautarism" hadn't really a chance to grow ;

also I don't see how our basques would rejoin a unic Basque entity with the spanish ones, just cross the border, you'll see 2 different "cultures", architecture, services, infrastructures... all are very formated by their leading central powers, and I am sure that the people there wouldn't like to renounce to any one of the advantages that they get from their "colonial" power :lol:

the following links describe Mr Kepel's analyse, about our integration system related to the muslim immigrants

http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NWIwM2RmYjM2YzNiYjY4M2EyNj...

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/product-description/0674031385/ref...
 
Goran  Radakovic

January 14, 2009

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"In the early 1990s, the seduction of "ancient hatreds," or the primordialist explanation, was evident in policy thinking about the Balkans, which has been referred to as the "Rebecca West Factor" or "bad history" in To End A War by Holbrooke. In order to understand ethnic conflict, it is helpful to reflect on the significance of rewriting history in the more recent past by political leaders who have an entrepreneurial approach to seeking and maintaining their hold on power"

I respectfully disagree with the opinions in the context of 'the Balkans' (read former Yugoslavia) that there was rewriting of history in an attempt to hold onto power or to encourage ethnic hatered. Not only was the well known but extremely arrogant "they fought each other for centuries" explanation coming from certain political circles in the West a blatant propaganda, but it was also used to develop narratives where certain explanations of 'the other' influence public opinion and reassert the current power centres in the countries involved in the propaganda.


In my opinion, Kosovo War was not fought because of some sort of myth; it was fought in the context of falling ideologies (socialism in Yugoslavia), rising extremism (which transformed into terrorism) in Kosovo which endangered the security of the country (at the time Federal Republic of Yugosalvia) and to which the police and the army reacted, obliged by the Constitution.

I would ask a question why did Richard Holbrooke so openly give support to Kosovo Albanian terrorists (KLA)?

 
Marek  Swierczynski

January 14, 2009

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This debate proves once again how perceptions of history have been distorted by politics and propaganda. Many cliches that we've been fed with for centuries or decades - be it under communist rule or "indoctrinated" by politically correct "democracy" - still echo in what we say and think today, as if history wasn't subject to intellectual scrutiny that we glady apply to all aspects of life, thought and matter. Our Anglo-Saxon friends know generally little - but they will surely forgive me this assumption - about Eastern Europe, that knows little about Irish-British relations or, primarily due to communist style education, about religious wars in Europe that effectively shaped the modern societies and state structures in the West. The less knowledge there is, the more tempting it is to accept cliches and slogans. What the EU should do in my view is to put a lot of resources to open, free, online education sources that would enable nations and regions understand each other, without prejudicies. Much have been said about European history handbooks, I am personally in favour of that, even if each country would add its own appendix. And I hope one day such a book or - better - European history website emerges. Your views?
Tags: | European history. |
 
Colette Grace Mazzucelli

January 14, 2009

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Dear Marek, if I may,

Thank you for your comments. As an Italian-American who spent years living in several European countries, Switzerland, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, I agree that perceptions of history are influenced by politics and propaganda in each different national context.

Once in Bonn, when I was assigned to the Foreign Office, I found a European history textbook, which had been written by a team of historians from numerous countries and was translated into the languages of the European Union. I purchased the German edition.

I am in favor of such transnational projects in education because of the exchanges of ideas that are encouraged, which ask us to reconsider what we have been taught as true. I support the idea of a European history website, perhaps along the lines of the one that exists to present the Cyprus conflict: http://www.cyprus-conflict.net, which is an independent and comprehensive website dedicated to the Cyprus conflict, and contains a detailed narrative as well as documents, reports and eye-witness accounts.

The European history site could be interactive and may encourage dialogues that animate learning and make young and older citizens alike question the assumptions they sometimes take for granted in formal education.

I appreciate your views. Greetings from New York.

Sincerely, Colette
 
Donald  Stadler

January 15, 2009

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Marek, I wasn't trying to show eridution in Eastern Eropean history. I program computers for a living, for gosh'sakes! It leaves little time for reading obscure tomes in the corners of libraries or attending academic congresses.

I do have a grasp one might expec of a well-read layman, perhaps somewhat stronger than my grasp of India or chinese history because Russia and the Warsaw Pact were an area of considerable interest to Americans of my generation.

Reading what Francisco wrote about the Ukranian museum got me thinking, and I realized that I'd seen carefully-edited history in one other place, which is why I wrote about the Irish.

I think that when a nationality has been completely dominated both physically and culturally for a long time the problem is not merely one of writing accurate history but of building a national identity as well. The more that the national elites have been supressed or replaced by the conquering power, the greater the potential trauma when the nation is reborn. The very libraries in places like Ukraine and Ireland must speak in a way 'You are British, British' or 'You are Russina, Russian', and until new history is written that is the story which is told.

Try to look at things from the POV of those Ukranian army officers. When the repeated lesson of 'history' is that you are Russian, not Ukranian, it must be very difficult to present another story. Particularly after domination by two generations of communists and several generations of Czars before them, who were scarcely easier on Ukrainian nationalists.

As for Ukraine being the mystic 'soul' of Russia, that may be true in a sense, from a long time ago. Francisco, were you aware of whom the 'Rus' were? They were Swedish Vikings in fact. The Swedish contemporaries of the Normans who conquered Normandy, England, and Sicily went east instead and conquerd Novgorod and Ukraine. Is that a slavic identity? Probably not.
 
Unregistered User

January 16, 2009

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Thank you, Francisco J. Ruiz. You have an excellent understanding of Russian and Ukrainian history. And we have a very long history together. In fact, many believe that Russians and Ukrainians are in essence the same people.

Therefore, efforts of the current Ukrainian leadership to destroy this closeness of two nations are appalling. Europe will do well by helping us to keep these ties strong, for the good of the Big Europe.
 
Francisco J. Ruiz

January 16, 2009

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Yes, Donald, I know that.

Still being a little kid I listened about the Scandinavian warlord Rurik, who sailed from the Gulf of Finland to the south following the Volga and Dnieper rivers, and the way they established in the area of Kiev, mixing with the local Slavic tribes.

Afterwards, they made several attempts to conquer Constantinople, and resisted the expansion of the Islam and rebelled against the domination of the Khazars under the leadership of Prince Oleg of Novgorod, in 884, the beginning of the political history of Russia. Even being Vikings’ descendents, it was the mix with the Slavic tribes of the East what represented the birth of a new nationality.

Of course, the fall of Kiev under Mongol domination in 1240 endangered that new nationality, but that same year the Russian hero Alexander Nevsky defeated the Swedish, invading the country through the Neva River, and some years later he also defeated the Catholic Livonian Knights in the Lake Peipus, as you probably has seen the impressive 1938 Eisenstein’s movie.

Those victories preserved the spirit of the “Rus” of Kiev, which was consolidated when the Great Dutch of Moscow, Ivan III, refused the Augsburg throne in 1488 saying that he was the heir of the Emperor of Constantinople (occupied by the Ottomans in 1453), and his legitimacy came from God and not from the West (the imperial symbols, as the two-heads eagle, were then adopted).

Excuse me for this excess of history, but the one of Russia is so interesting that I couldn’t help writing a little bit more about it.
Tags: | Russia |
 

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