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After the Russia-Georgia crisis, one thing is clear: besides the devastating consequences for the civilian population, the Georgian leadership has failed to represent a clear change in the legacy of post-Soviet elites.

There are two main reasons that President Saakashvili has failed to represent this change. First, he has done little to alleviate the abuse of executive power. Second, he has insisted on adopting a nationalist strategy to establish Tbilisi’s power over the breakaway regions. Subsequently, the consequences of a malfunctioning leadership have played a major part in the eruption of the current crisis.

Although the August crisis is not entirely the fault of any one person or administration, the aftermath may prove that Saakashvili has made it more difficult to cling to his fading legitimacy – especially in question following the November 2007 crackdown.

It has weakened his ability to generate further progress in Georgia’s democratic transition; the prospects of which are still so promising in the wake of the color revolution, or part of what Vazguen Manoukian (former Armenian prime minister) calls the “second revolutionary wave.”

The first wave of change (disavowing communism as a form of governance) is less complicated than the second: overcoming the entrenched institutional and personal traits of political actors in the post-Soviet space. Without modifying these characteristics, democratization is locked in a “hybrid status,” whereby reform remains caught between different forms of government.

This type of post-Soviet, Georgian leadership existed under Saakashvili’s predecessor Eduard Shevardnadze, who was invited back in 1992 to assume the presidency after the coup d’état by the “Military Council” that ousted chauvinist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Shevardnadze was seen as a statesman (like Saakashvili in 2003) who would initiate change and stabilize the country. Shevardnadze’s relations were also strained with Moscow, as he initiated the strategic relations with the west that Saakashvili continues. However, Shevardnadze failed because of endemic corruption and the abuse of executive power that led to the Rose Revolution and his resignation.

Five years later the abuse of power remains, particularly seen in the measures taken to quell the November 2007 demonstrations. The brutal crackdown authorized by Saakashvili and his clamp down on independent media – including the Imedi and Kavkasia stations – were antithesis to the Rose Revolution’s values. Even Shevardnadze did not go so far on the eve of his downfall.

Next, while Saakashvili’s measures were successful in establishing Tbilisi’s authority over Ajara, his decision to undertake maneuvers in South Ossetia should not have been made based on this achievement, where the Kremlin did not support de facto leader Aslan Abashidze. Instead, the Georgian offensive on Tskhinvali is reminiscent of Gamsakhurdia’s 1991 incursions into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and leaves minimal opportunity for future reconciliation.

Thus, a combination of Shevardnadze’s surfeit of executive power and Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist fervor are still brought to bear on the Georgian population by the incumbent president. These lingering trends are unfortunate when contrasted with the successful reforms Saakashvili has made and his cooperation with western institutions.

The west can hardly be blamed for the mixed signals sent to Saakashvili, whose quasi-democracy has made it difficult for its leaders to assume a unified stance. With western leaders divided in their view of Saakashvili’s commitment to democracy, membership in these international institutions will be more difficult for Georgia to gain. However, without western integration, the choice of democracy becomes more confusing.

Even NATO’s establishment of a Georgia Council for damage assessment, humanitarian aid brought by US troops, and a large sum of IMF re-construction money are not clear signs of endorsement by the west. While they show some solidarity, they are not progressive in nature; instead, they are bandages on what could be called self-inflicted wounds.

It is insufficient for Saakashvili to give press conferences in perfect English or French while EU flags hang behind him. He should redouble his efforts by engaging in dialogue with the opposition, alleviating Georgia’s widespread poverty, and allowing the breakaway regions to choose their own destiny (provided the safety of ethnic Georgians in the areas is guaranteed). A destiny where Tbilisi can play an important role – if not as leader, then as a strong economic/political partner.

Saakashvili has made it clear that Moscow will not dictate the form of government in Tbilisi. He should now make clear his intentions to break with his predecessors’ style of governance. It is not a question of communism versus democracy, or even Moscow versus Tbilisi. Instead, it is one of Saakashvili and his administration, albeit in the face of great challenges, choosing to uphold the rights of Georgia’s citizens despite past mistakes.

Jesse Tatum is a recent MSc graduate from Heriot-Watt University and is currently finishing an internship with the GSPE at Robert Schuman University in Strasbourg

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Jeffrey Mankoff: Georgia and Ukraine: Circumnavigating the MAP
• Anna Nadgrodkiewicz: Stop the Wishful Thinking about Russia
• Mark Brzezinksi: Shared Interests

January 13, 2009

Marie Grunert, intern at SWP, Silver Contributor (59)

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Abuse of executive power and nationalist strategy accountable for the failure of the Saakashvili regime to bring up democratic changes in Georgia, the author makes a very interesting point. What –if anything- can the international community do to invert these tendencies?

Apart from the notoriously known November 2007 demonstartions supressed with violence, the subsequent January Presidential and May Parliamentary elections have cast doubt on their level of “freedom” and “fairness”. This has led to the boycotting of the Parliament by most of the opposition parties (whether this is the right response, especially in the aftermath of the Summer War goes beyond the aim of this comment).

Against this background, what is striking is that after having plunged his country in a catastrophic situation when starting the offensive against Tskhinvali over the Summer (still debated but there is wide range of evidence) leading to the Russian overreaction etc…, Mr Saakashvili is still attempting to reinforce his power while unwilling to bring up changes (in spite of the rhetoric and commitments made to the international community to this regard). In fact, the current general climate in Georgia is characterized by a complete lack of the rule of law; the freedom of speech is close to absent as a corollary of the quasi inexistence of the media freedom (no independent news programs on any Georgian TV).

However, the post war precarious climate, as well as patriotic rhetoric launched by Mr Saakashvili as an attempt to keep his leadership uncontested have united a great part of the Georgians who focus on their external enemy (Russia) rather than internal fragile democracy and autocratic leader. This has been highlighted by the relatively low turn out during the November 2008 demonstration, anniversary of the one of the previous year.

What shall the West do?
The ultimate solution doubtlessly lies internally; democracy is al long, path dependent process which cannot be externally imposed. In addition Mr Saakashvili’s support may have been shaken by the war but not destroyed and as such it would be inappropriate to take drastic actions (plus there is still an important part of the international community, i.e. the New friends of Georgia, that actually supports Mr Saakashvili). The international community should however: (I) put conditions on aid package granted by the international community for post-war reconstruction to ensure a transparent use of money and avoid its spending in regime strengthening. (II) Privilege other sort of maneuvers to promote democratic processes rather than granting access to NATO in the present conditions. The country is democratically not ready and it could lead to a dangerous precedent.

Georgia is a further sad example of a population who pays for the actions and errors of its leadership.

January 13, 2009

Levan Ramishvili, Liberty Institute, (3)

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This publication is one more example failure of certain western "experts" to understand what's going on in transitional countries like Georgia. Unfortunately author is entrapped in certain theoretical clichés. Basic implicit assumption is that under-developed countries are destined to pursue "nationalist strategies". There are certain facts, that falsify this implicit assumption and can explain policy to reestablish "Tbilisi's power over the breakaway regions" not as element of nationalistic strategy but as concern for elementary human rights, including right of refugees to return to their places of residence. Around 3/4 of pre-war population of Abkhazia and 1/2 of South Ossetia, mostly Georgians were expelled as a result of ethnic cleansing. In this context any talk about "allowing the breakaway regions to choose their own destiny" is another way of rewarding ethnic cleansing and legitimation of grave violations of human rights on mass scale. As for it's blaming Saakashvili's polices that they "leave minimal opportunity for future reconciliation" is failure to understand that no democratic leadership of any country can "reconcile" with fact that around 10% of it's citizens are victims of ethnic cleansing and can not return to their homes in security and dignity.

January 17, 2009

Member deleted

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It is not the kind of political genre that happens to be popular in this particular moment in history that makes any kind of difference what-so-ever. It is a matter of what are the goals of the country or collective of countries. If your current economic or social situation needs improving then it is a conscious shift in how to solve problems within the country this is required.

Poland sets an example for overcoming cultural differences and evolving into a paradigm shift for improving a country and its friendships.
Over the years Poland has tried traditional methods for improving its country. Traditional economics, research and education. These methods were not creating the kind of forward thinking or impressive results they were designed to create. Poland like many countries were stuck in a stalemate trying the impressive sounding “Look toward the future, imagine how you want it, then create that future”. After all Japan had used this very strategy successfully. Why not other countries?

Past Methods:
Poland decided to try a reverse strategy. If looking toward the future did not work, then how about looking back toward the past for ideas. First they took a look at how had once tried all kinds of government co-ordination, planning and resource management to improve its economy, all to no avail. Then Germany designed a new strategy to move from highly authoritarian economic interventionist style to very quickly withdraw price controls and government support resulting in the Wirtschaftswunder. This method is called Shock Therapy economics. Poland researched the idea, developed their own version and successfully implemented the idea.

Next they had to address the information age with multi-tasking jobs creating the need for multiple skill sets. How would they prepare the people for these jobs? Again they looked to the past. A German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus in the 1800s did an experiment on learning and forgetting, resulting in the development of a new concept of the forgetting curve. Poland scientist Piotr Wozniak furthers this research into a concept called Active recall, and then starts working to develop a computer program to study and remember. This program is called SuperMemo and is available to everyone.

Poland has shown creative problem solving in adapting to the modern world. They have overlooked their cultural differences with Germany. Also their ability to take supposedly out dated concepts and modify them for modern use is extraordinary. Maybe Georgia can learn a few things from Poland.

Tags: | Poland | Economic | Problem solving |

January 23, 2009

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Given Georgia's turbulent history and neighborhood, it is a wishful thinking to produce a perfect democracy overnight.

January 23, 2009

Angelina

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Following the November 2007 crackdown, when Mr. Saakashvili declared the state of emergency, he also called for early presidential elections in January 2008 (thus reducing his first presidential term by his own free will), therefore ensuring that the opposition would have a chance to make its case.

It is more easy to see things in a stereotypical way, for example: he didn’t like the demonstration, he cracked down, closed the television stations he didn’t like. That's the end of democracy. This is the comfortable position, but it's not the whole story.

I think it's unfair to hurl criticism from the West, where journalists and politicians of all stripes generally understand the importance of acting within certain boundaries to preserve democracy. In that rough part of the world, political dirty tricks and intrigue are the norm.

From a distance, with all of the various propaganda machines with their own specific agendas, the situation doesn't look or sound good. But I think it takes faith and time to understand the events, the dynamics.

February 3, 2009

Jesse David Tatum, GSPE, Silver Contributor (70)

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Thank you everyone for your comments and feedback. A couple of things, in particular:

To Angelina:

In fact, during the November protests, the opposition was calling for the parliamentary elections to be held in accordance with the constitution (Saakashvili was looking to delay them until the next fall, knowing that holding them in the spring might jeopardise his constitutional majority). Hence, Saakashvili—in order to appear like he was making amends—called presidential elections to make it seem like he was indeed reducing his term and letting the people choose.

Here’s the problem with this: the opposition then had merely a month and a half to choose presidential candidates and run campaigns—clearly not enough time. Saakashvili made a shrewd bet on being re-elected, knowing that the main opposition party was already suffering from in-fighting and was liable to crack. Thus he cleverly avoided having to step down and won a second presidential term within the span of three devious months.

Game, set, match: Misha.

You can read Tchantouridze’s (2008) (the link is in my article) and Fuller’s (here: http://www.rferl.org/content/One_Year_After_Crackdown_Georgian_Oppo...) for more on the ‘dynamics’ of this.

To Levan:

I’m not an ‘expert’, Big Man, far from it...

You do bring up a great point though: there are few ‘western’ countries who would tolerate even a miniscule percentage of the kind of abuse that Russia is inflicting on Georgia’s citizens. A 700-word article’s not going to do justice to that.

That said, if Saakashvili wishes to be in the clubs (i.e. the EU, Nato), and he does, then he’s going to be judged by the ‘clichés’ that I’ve laid out here. There are plenty of real experts who would argue this point—both inside Georgia (i.e. Burjanadze, Alasania, Zourabichvili; see above link) and outside.

Moreover, despite the abominable human-rights violations carried out by South Ossetian forces (backed by Moscow) against ethnic Georgians in the area, Saakashvili’s attack was miscalculated if only because (1) he should have known that the West was not going to follow him into Tskhinvali, and (2) Grad rockets have never solved anything in this world...

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