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September 7, 2010 |  9 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

F.-P. van der Putten

Topic How Europe's Falling Behind Accelerates China's Rise

F.-P. van der Putten: China is in the process of displacing Europe as the second most influential actor in international affairs. As a result the international appeal of political and economic liberalism is diminishing. This process affects Europe and weakens the global standing of the United States.

China is in the process of displacing Europe as the second most influential actor (behind the United States) in international affairs. Whether China will continue to emerge as a leading actor depends on its ability to maintain its political stability in the domestic sphere. A decline in China's stability remains a distinct possibility. However, if the country does succeed in moving along its present course, the consequences for the international system can hardly by over-estimated. China displacing Europe in terms of global influence signifies the end of the brief era of Western leadership that began only twenty years ago, when the Cold War ended. The ability of the West to shape the world in its image will be significantly smaller than it has been in the past two decades. The degree to which political and economic liberalism currently exists throughout the world is set to diminish. This, in turn, will speed up the rise of China relative to the United States.

China is becoming influential at the global level because it is prominent in both economic and security affairs, and it is able to closely integrate economic and security themes into its foreign policy. Europe's security policy is for the greater part neither unified nor independent, and therefore it is not integrated with its external economic policy. So whereas China can fully exploit its economic size and growth to achieve leverage in international affairs, Europe can do this only to a limited extent. Given the relative size of the Chinese and European economies, China will at some point have overtaken Europe in terms of its impact on international affairs.

In the past few years, China has become - besides the US - the most influential actor in the North Korean nuclear issue, in Myanmar (Burma), and in many respects also in Africa and with regard to climate change. Significant progress in terms of international stability with regard to Iran, Afghanistan, and South Asia, as well as the global economy, cannot be made without the participation of China. Europe remains a major player in terms of global economic stability and climate change, but its role in maintaining stability in Africa and the Middle East cannot keep up with China's new prominence.

It has often been said that Europe's future role in the world will be based primarily on its ability to be an example for others, and to provide the norms that shape international relations. However, it is precisely in this context that China is in a stronger position than Europe. Although the EU is an impressive example of regional integration, most countries have priorities other than regional integration. For developing countries, the Chinese experience of the past half century seems more relevant to their own situation than the sophisticated process of European integration. If China is a greater source of inspiration on development than Europe is, then this means that the state-centred development model is more attractive than the liberal development model. The result is that developing countries will increasingly favour a stronger role for government in the economy and less political freedom than is customary in Europe. Through this process, it is likely that China will have a growing impact on international norms, and Europe a decreasing one.

Of course this applies not just to Europe, but to the West in general. The diminishing role of Europe results in the West being less able to promote economic and political liberalism. Beijing will play a prominent part in international organisations, thereby diminishing their capability to advance liberalism. A US-China leadership of the international system - contrary to a Western leadership - will be ideologically neutral. At the same time, China's statist model will become more popular in the developing world. This is to the disadvantage of Western - including US - companies. As they find it harder to compete internationally, the economic power of both Europe and the US will be affected. China's rise will be further accelerated, also relative to the United States.

Frans Paul van der Putten is a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague.

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Greg Randolph Lawson

September 7, 2010

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"The diminishing role of Europe results in the West being less able to promote economic and political liberalism."

That quote is key. I think, besides embracing the idea I have articulated elsewhere of a more regionally focused NATO, its time to bring up the notion of a US-Europe free trade agreement to bolster the relative punching weight of the "West" against that of the "East."

This idea has been explored at length by other writers here at the Atlantic Community and I think warrants additional serious discussion.

The "Western" way of business is no longer the only game in town as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. China, even factoring in its challenges, represents a legitimate alternative path to development and stability. This may seem distasteful to those brought up in assuming a liberal order is identifiable with the "End of History," but the reality is here and cannot be ignored.

While globalization is real and a renewed obsession on "Clashes of Civilizations" or "tribalism" would clearly be mistaken, ignoring the fact that there are some unbridgeable differences between nations and regions is also naive and dangerous.

The "West" is quite evidently not a monolith that works in lockstep with its constituent pieces falling into a perfect line. But, in a time of ever increasing competition, it makes sense to leverage the relative assets that those constituent pieces have.

Think about this vision for the future of U.S.-European relations:

A strong, laser focused security organization defending Europe from both external aggression and internal instability AND the largest free trade zone in the world. This can help keep Europe highly relevant despite the movement of relative power eastward. It could also allow the U.S. to continue promoting a relatively liberal economic order while freeing it up to develop appropriate relations with various regional security networks.

I think, given the potential ebbing of power, it can be the foundation a reinvigorated relationship that transcends past Cold War and even Iraq War arguments. Is that a bad vision?
 
Mike  McCormack

September 7, 2010

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I do agree with Frans' general points here. I do wonder, however, if there is a limit to how much China can "export" itself due to its current political makeup. Certainly it is gaining influence in more autocratic countries in Central Asia and Africa whose styles of government are more reflective of China than Western democracies. Even so, I think China will have trouble influencing the political nature of countries in Latin America and the Middle East unless they have some ability to do so purely through economic means. I think China is beginning to reach that point where a slow but steady rise is not going to sustain a level of influence that they desire, thus taking more political risks will be necessary.
 
Paul-Robert  Lookman

September 8, 2010

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Interesting article from an author who merely states the cold facts and seems to leave it up to “the politicians” to twist these. Where the author says that China is prominent not only economically, but also in terms of security, perhaps it is worth noting that China achieves the latter with a very modest defense budget. As a nuclear power to be reckoned with, however, it can afford not to let itself get intimidated by the US.

It is interesting to see that the author’s article prompts a reaction from Greg Randolph Lawson, who underscores the “unbridgeable differences between nations and regions”, a remedy for which in his vision is (and I interpret his words) a modernized and reinvigorated NATO in which Europe participates actively, plus a free trade zone US-Europe. In his vision, this would “keep Europe relevant” and allow the US to keep its world dominance.

To answer his rhetorical question “Is that a bad idea”, I feel it is a one-sided idea which in essence aims at keeping the current status quo. As Mr Van der Putten correctly explained, the days of a monopolar world are gone. Rather than a bilateral US-Europe trade deal, I feel there is a case for reinvigorated global trade talks in the framework of the WTO, in which the “third world” gets a fair deal. This will undoubtedly bridge "differences between nations and regions". In my view, the structure of all international organizations require urgent reorganization. Not only that of the WTO, but also UN, World Bank, OECD, ILO, WHO, G8/20, … These do no longer reflect the current balance of power of today’s world.

As I have brought forward elsewhere on Atlantic Community, I feel Europe is reluctant to see NATO increase its power and scope policing the world. And perhaps "the West" should take another hard look at the challenges and risks, which may be 'inflated' by the arms industry. As regards the challenge posed by "terrorism", some self reflection might be appropriate, including the question: "Why do they hate us".
 
Paul-Robert  Lookman

September 9, 2010

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In one of my previous comments I mentioned the speech of ambassador Chas W. Freeman to the Foreign Affairs Retirees of Northern Virginia under the title: “An Empire Decomposed: American Foreign Relations in the Early 21st Century”, see http://www.chasfreeman.net/farnova100324%5B1%5D.htm. I am repeating this reference, as it is relevant to the article of the author and may be interesting for Mr Lawson.

On 20 April 2010, I devoted an article on the message contained in the ambassador’s speech in my weblog, see http://geopolitiek-in-perspectief.blogspot.com/2010/04/god-bless-am... It is written in Dutch, so readable for Mr Van der Putten, and English speakers may like to run the article through translation software.

Key quotes from the ambassador’s speech, relevant for our discussion here and in the discussions on the future of NATO, are: “A resurgence in American leadership is needed. Such a resurgence is possible. It is, however, unlikely that our politicians or public will muster the determination to bring it off until catastrophe imposes it.“

and

“To preserve both our liberties and our prosperity, Americans need to rediscover our values, remake our government, and reinvent our current militaristic approach to international relations.“
 
Unregistered User

September 10, 2010

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Vigorous engagement of Russia on all levels – political, economical, cultural, military, etc - is becoming exceedingly critical. We are running out of time as this will take quite a few years and profound commitments on the sides of the EU and Americans.

It doesn't matter whether it's easy or not. It’s quite clear that all other measures will not work if Russia is pushed by cold war stereotypes and aging warriors to the other side.
 
Unregistered User

September 15, 2010

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An article with enormous loose ends. As a kid growing up on the borders of China and seeing its eventual rise with both awe and disdain, needless to say the author has missed these points:
-- China is a mercantilist economy but if the US pursues protectionist trade policies (which it has to if there is no currency floating by the Chinese), then what will be the Chinese economic model? The US can live with no debt from China but China live with no exports to US?
-- The Chinese have enormous border and regional problems and to say that they are a monolith is a misnomer. In fact they are a communist federation much like the Soviet Union but with present and quasi-stable political stability that is difficult to hold forever.
-- The main advantage the Chinese have is their impressive list of alliances with states deemed extremely illiberal and dictatorial by US/European standards which is what the article implies. How long will these relationships last? The Chinese have not started to influence regimes beyond their immediate borders except with money donations yet. Chinese do not influence Libya or Chile yet. So where is the super-power state assigned to them?

China is a great power and not a super-power while India is middle power like Germany and wanting to be a great power. Russia is also a great power while the US is slightly less than a super-power but the only one so far.

Calahas
 
Paul-Robert  Lookman

September 16, 2010

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Calahas: From whatever perspective, I don’t see any need for fear or contempt for rising China. Compared with other developing countries, its government is doing a tremendous job. Perhaps the difference is that many a developing country has been exploited by the West (and still is), which is not the case with China, which has an adequate deterrent defense.

What is wrong in being mercantile? Protectionism is a poor instrument and backfires. Even if the US closes its borders for Chinese goods, there are plenty of other markets where China has a foothold and will be able to develop, albeit with perhaps some initial disruptions. China’s industry will continue to flourish, but the US economy cannot do without cheap Chinese goods. All concerned are aware of that.

Like every other nation, China will have its border and regional problems, but I fail to see their “enormity”. I leave it up to the author to react to your observations on China’s form of government and foreign policy.

Calahas, your name reads like “alias”, it would help if you would become a member and complete your profile.
 
Dariusz  Lesniak

September 21, 2010

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I have to say that I agree with Calahas on a few of his points. China is indeed a mercantile system, which will not be able to hold up its current growth rates without U.S. imports. In addition, China has numerous issues which it must first address and in turn tackle with as much transparency as possible. First, its border regions, such as Xinjiang continue to trouble the central planners in Beijing. Next, China must deal with the problems of resources -specifically who has access to them- in the south China sea; a flagrant disregard of other nation's claims would do much to tarnish China's international image. Finally, China must be aware of the fact that Russia, specifically in Siberia, is gravely concerned, to the point where it is becoming policy, that China will one day invade Siberia. Needless to say, the coming decade for China will be one which is busy and rife with potential pitfalls.
 
Erica  Mukherjee

September 21, 2010

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I found Putten's point about how China is a much more relevant role model to developing countries than the EU very interesting. I think that this will continue to be the case, especially since Vietnam and now possibly Cuba are pulling themselves out of policy with a state-centric economic policy.

However, I don't believe that China's rapid growth can continue under relatively stable domestic conditions. History again shows us that when a country (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan) reaches a certain level affluence in the middle classes those classes will demand better civic representation. Both South Korea and Taiwan transitioned from autocracies to democracies in the '80s after they had risen to a certain GDP per capita. One might conjecture that China is on that same path.

Therefore, even though developing countries may be turning to the Chinese model for a short term jump start to their economies, it is the stability and overall prosperity of the EU that is the light at the end of the tunnel. The EU shouldn't despair if it is not the most popular player in the global game today; because its institutions are so strong it will continue to play a major moral role in the long term growth of foreign policy worldwide.
 

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