RSS

I apologise for bluntly jumping straight to the point of this article, but I want to ask what is being done to take the ‘media' battle to the Taliban?

By this, I mean proactive campaigns that confront and expose the Taliban's statements, their vulnerabilities and their contradictions - and not just the stream of ‘good news' stories broadcast to the Afghans and the international community.

I believe there is too little time, effort and analytical resource directed at understanding what the Taliban are saying, how they are saying it and why they might be saying it. And too few reports of the calibre of the one by the International Crisis Group, which looked into Taliban propaganda. As a result there is little understanding or even any apparent interest in looking at measures that might counter Taliban media activities.

While NATO is investing effort in strategic communications, spreading ‘good news stories' and information across Afghanistan is only one part of the media battle front. My contention is that the Taliban are actually quite vulnerable in this arena and a proactive effort against them could prove fruitful.

Communicating is not a question so much of sophistication but effectiveness

In the physical, or ‘kinetic' battle against the Taliban, analysts like to point out that it is not that the Taliban are strong, but that they usually the only ones actually occupying the ground at the district level. I suggest that this view holds true when thinking about the media arena.

The Taliban are good, or ‘effective', at the local level, when they are communicating in simplistic ways to their Pashtun community - on both sides of the border. Here, it is the commonly held tribal values and language which gives them a great advantage over what I feel is a fairly ‘clunky' Western approach. The Taliban are good at reflecting local concerns - whether it is fear of poppy eradication and loss of livelihood, violation of honour by infidels or collateral damage to people and property.

While the Taliban's media activities are not particularly sophisticated (I feel NATO/ISAF has tended to use Taliban media ‘sophistication' as an excuse for their own ineffectiveness), in many ways we need to be careful about this part of the debate. Firstly, because it is not a question so much of sophistication - but effectiveness. And there doesn't seem to be much evidence of analysis of Taliban media effectiveness. Secondly, for the main audiences to whom the Taliban are communicating, they really do not have to be that sophisticated.

Who is winning the media battle: NATO or the Taliban?

In the media arena, NATO should have the advantage - it has the money, resources, brainpower. But it is handicapped because:

• Its deliberations, dilemmas and concerns are very painfully public
• A lot of its media effort seems to be spent just keeping its own team ‘on message'
• It has a wider, more sophisticated, demanding and sceptical audience in its domestic capitals

On top of these difficulties, the international media frequently and unintentionally make propaganda ‘gifts' to the Taliban. For example, the persistent use of the term ‘Spring Offensive' has gone so long unchallenged that the Taliban now use the term themselves. And if you ask a Taliban spokesman ‘did you launch an attack on Bagram airbase because you knew the US Secretary of State for Defence was there?' the answer is hardly going to be ‘No'.

Continue reading the full article in NATO Review.

Tim Foxley studies Afghanistan for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

January 6, 2009

Markus Drake, atlantic-community.org, Gold Contributor (80)

• 2
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

Some of the reasons for why the Taliban are managing repeatedly take the "high ground" in the media war, both local and global, can be found in these videos: http://atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Taliban...

Certainly one of the biggest problems is that there is no popular and independent media in Afghanistan, especially not in the provinces. This can not only be due to the actions of the Taliban, even though keeping such local media from growing certainly is one of their priorities. The current government in Afghanistan does not seem to have a large interest in supporting the growth of critical and independent reporting. Also, it is worth looking at this list: http://www.abyznewslinks.com/afgha.htm Out of 11 local newspapers listed, 10 are serving Kabul...

January 8, 2009

Adrian Edwards, Director of Communications, UNAMA

• 3
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

Tim - thanks for the article. The Taliban and other anti-Government groups are continuing to prove effective in delivering on their core commodity of insecurity. It's this that underpins their communications credibility, more than factual accuracy or technical sophistication. A military turnaround, were it to happen, would almost certainly have a rapid and dramatic effect on Taliban communications effectiveness. In the meantime their major vulnerability - as with other military players - is alienation of the host populations in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Keeping close to the people is key.
Adrian

January 8, 2009

Morgan Sheeran, Armed Forces, Afghan Veteran, blogger, Gold Contributor (106)

• 1
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

The point regarding sophistication vs effectiveness is excellent. Often the term should be "surprisingly sophisticated for an otherwise backward enemy." The Taliban make good use of the tools that they have access to and show a disturbing tendency to have their message carried by truly sophisticated media. Taliban claims are often reported as facts while some of the more outrageous claims, while reported as disputed, are still reported in the international media; which is still carrying their message whether or not a disclaimer is attached.

There should be a distinction made between tactical and strategic communications, and media is merely one area of information operations. The level at which the international community begins to come to awareness, and is often surprised, is at the strategic communications level, where the message meets media. The strategic level is merely shaped by, and congruent with, their tactical information operations. As COL John Agoglia and LTC Trent Scott point out in their paper, "Getting the Basics Right: A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan," (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/134-scott-agoglia.pdf) the insurgents in Afghanistan shape their operations to suit the information objective. This is, for information operations (of which media is only a subset,) very effective. Their actions are tailored to support the perception that they would like to have set in the minds of the observers.

Contrast this with our behaviors. NATO operations are often out of all congruence with the desired perception of both the local populace and the international audience and are often not shaped by the information objectives at all, occasionally being shaped in spite of them. The insurgents sometimes goad NATO partners into violating their informational objectives, which is actually an information goal of the insurgents.

Bear in mind that Afghanistan has an average literacy rate of around 18%. Afghanistan's history, to the Afghan, is an oral history. Newspapers do not carry the weight of the news in Afghanistan; word of mouth, requiring personal contact, does. Afghans, and by extension Afghan insurgents, are comsumate storytellers. It is a cornerstone of their culture. One of our great failures is at this level, the oral storytelling and the shaping of operations to support the story that we are telling.

It is at the tactical level that our failures in the information fight begin. It is at the individual level. That loss of initiative carries into the media realm and on into the international perception fight; and make no mistake, it is a fight. The insurgents realize this and orient their operations to support the shaping of perceptions and opinions not only in their own countries but in the rest of the world, particularly in countries that are actively supporting the GIRoA. It goes along with the statement made by a Taliban spokesman to the effect that the Western people have all the watches, but the insurgents have all the time.

Tags: | Afghanistan | media | information operations | insurgency | COL John Agoglia | LTC Trent Scott |

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org