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Western reactions to the current upheavals in Middle Eastern countries appear to some degree perplexed. On the one hand, compassion demands action against the suppression by intolerant regimes. On the other hand, Islam is seen with caution, and any political change feared as it might allow extremists to take power or de-stabilize the region.

Western politicians enjoyed talking about human rights, but the context of cooperation with regimes left the impression that they were just an excuse to secure western interests. Until the revolution in Egypt succeeded, freedom and human rights were prices willingly paid in exchange for stability. This undermined Western credibility and led to the formula that "it all was only about the oil".

As much as this would be simplifying Western interactions with Middle Eastern countries, it would be dangerously simple to ingnore the benefits which stability brought. Stabilty was mostly enforced by regimes with little democratic legitimation, but from the Middle Eastern point of view, democracy is a luxury which can only be afforded if basic stability is available. Take Syria, for example: when Hafiz al-Assad took power in 1970, he ended a 20 years-period of instability and chaos. I believe many Syrians would agree that his iron rule was still better than the previous anarchy, even though it only permitted very slow development.

The historic context also explains the readiness of the "regimes" to use force, and the many conspiracy theories that view Western agents as reasons behind the revolutionary movements. One could say that we are now harvesting the toxic fruits of seeds planted in the colonial era that created fragile states which did not represent its people, but the imperial interests of foreign powers.

Consequently, there is very litte Western powers can now do. The examples of Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate how difficult, if not impossible, it is to enforce development and democracy. The history of regime change in the Middle East was usually characterized by one repressive group taking power from another one after violent confrontations. I think it is likely that a military victory of rebel groups in Libya, and perhaps Syria, will have the same outcome. There will be losing groups who will form a new core of opposition that will be suppressed with force. In fact, this might be the best possible outcome of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and it remains to be seen how the fragile cohesion between the different ethnic groups in Iraq will develop when the last US forces have left.

However, I am hopeful that Egypt and Tunisia might in contrast enter developments towards more democracy, since their revolutions were peaceful and might benefit the largest parts of the populations. Apart from the clans of the former presidents, there might be no real losers, and the newly acquired freedom of speech might allow the countries' problems to be tackled better than before. Crucial factors for these promising perspectives were the good education of relatively large parts of the population, and the professional and stabilising role played by the military.

These are not the results of short-term interventions, but of long-term development. If we want to see positive regime changes in Libya, Syria, or other countries like Iran, we must start to build the foundations now in order to harvest results in 20 or 30 years. Such policies should aim at reducing tensions and fears, replacing them with cooperation for development. Comparing developments in the Middle East with the example of the Soviet Union, I am convinced that it was Willy Brandt's "Entspannungspolitik" that had the strongest impact on the communist dictatorships. Missing a foreign enemy, the regimes had no further excuses for their home-made failures.

It is likely that we will see short-term failures of the democracy movements in Libya and Syria, and this with no regard to who will win the military confrontations. In the short run, Western policies should be focused on maintaining credibility and stability. That is: forcing the regimes to play by at least some international rules, e.g. no air strikes against civilians, but no engagement in a civil war. The mission creep in Libya must soon be ended by negotiations with the Gaddafi clan, and not develop into a forced regime change that all to easily might create a new Afghanistan. And in Syria, all should be done to prevent further violence.

Western colonial politics created the countries of the Near East as we see them today, and only double-standards of aid and cooperation treaties allowed many of the regimes to survive until today. And while the stability provided by dictators should not be disregarded, it might also have been all too comfortable in the past to ignore corruption or stay entrenched in old concepts of enemies.

Future policies should aim to firstly create real credibility, that is the West must play according to its own rules and not turn a blind eye to corrupt regimes because they serve its interests. And secondly, many small incentives should be given that lead to more cooperation and understanding with the countries of the Middle East. Such measures, e.g. student exchanges, well-managed development aid, and general cooperation will create trust. In that context, all too often small groups close to the governments stole e.g. development aid, which is known to the donors but ignored as a deal in order to gain more influence.

Big changes can only be the result of many small changes that benefit all. And these will only happen if the rule of the law is respected. The current situations in Libya and Syria are unclear and complex and it is hard to say which action Western countries could or should take. I think credibility and respect of the rules are key elements for future positive developments, and the West needs to lead by example. I think it was correct to enforce the no-fly zone in Libya, but it is time to design a clear exit strategy now. In the end, it is the Libyans who must decide about their future.

Western engagement should not aim to have one or another group win the confrontations, but to bring people back to negotiations and a political process. Only then real democratic development can take place.

Dr. Bernhard Lucke is a researcher at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nurenburg and has spent many years working in the Middle East.

May 18, 2011

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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Dear Mr. Lucke,

I don´t quite get the argument, e.g. the difference to the former traditional despot-complying realpolitik approach of most of the Western powers. You seem to argue to comply and cooperate, but somewhat in a better way. Who exactly are better forces and parties to support? Can we keep out of partisan commitments? Isn´t that the whole question, after the (adequate) delegitimization of the Mideastern, North African despots, who is there to support? Where are the Libyans who can decide about their future and how can they become in power to do that? In that way, without potential partners, and also naming of the opponents of political progress and respective framework for counteractivities, what is the difference to the old strategy.

These considerations will in fact lead to difficult choices, and from my perspective we have to make up a clear perception to show willigness and courage to make these choices. Being compliant, nice and cooperative doesn´t make it, we have to know with whom and who to reject.

May 23, 2011

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

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Dear Mr. Anzinger,

thanks very much for your comment, which in my opinion reveals basic mistakes of western policy-making that is responsible for many failures of Mideastern foreign policies.

The first mistake is a dangerous simple raster of black and white. You ask "whom we should support and whom confront". We ordered countries in the Near East as "friends" and "foes", and supported friends while we opposed friends. Therefore, we are afraid of revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, since these countries are "friends", while we hope for regime change in Libya and Syria, as these are "foes" and the revolution might bring people who comply better with our ideas. But from a point of view of a Middle Eastern citizen, there was little if any difference between e.g. the Egyptian and Syrian regimes. Both were far from democracy and relied on repression.

The second mistake is thinking that we should support one or another group. You ask "who are the better forces to support": I argue that there is NO group you can support to enable these countries to achieve more democracy. In Europe the structure of societies is much simpler, because loyalities are primarily to societal groups, such as communists or anti-communists, for example. But in the Middle East, loyalities are primarily to tribes and clans. They might adopt an ideology in order to be supported by foreign powers, for example in Egypt in order to receive western aid, or in Syria to receive Soviet or Russian aid. Realities in the Middle East are simply not in agreement with our western patterns of thinking, and most importantly, they are never black and white (see point 1).

That's why missions like the one in Afghanistan must fail and why supporting Libyan rebels military will lead nowhere if not flanked by a real political progress.

May 23, 2011

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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Dear Mr. Lucke,

Do we look at "one for himself", the "Egypt people for themselves" (e.g.) or who do we address? Normally, at political reprensentation, leadership or the politically embedded economic branch. One or another, we make that decision. We normally chose compliance with these who appear as principals (and they are due to enforcement and the respective social and political structure). This means, legitimizing and taking this order for granted. One out of many reasons for the burden of cemented despotic and backwarded structures, such as massive political oppression, persecution of minorities and so on, and so on. Wasn´t all the recent criticism (rightfully) about the compliance with the despotic leaders (Quaddafhi, Ben Ali, Mubarak, Assad etc.)?

On the contrary, I would argue that an amorphous movement of young people designated not by ideological partisanship, rather by individual perception of a better life, is occuring. My criticism challenged your point that I would see you do not question the malevolent structures against individual self-determination and in fact argue therefore, that we should maintain our traditional approach. I think your criticism of my perception of "black and white"-thinking tackles empty space - or you may maintain it if you buy my criticism that your perception is all blurred by greyness. Determining what is wishful and what is not wishful is a very basic thinking category; the "black and white"-reflex merely tackles a straw man - it refers to a perception of religious thinking. What you do is also deciding "No partisan comittment" instead of "partisan comittment" - in what sense exactly is this not "black and white"-thinking in the way you brought it up against me?

May 23, 2011

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

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Dear Mr. Anzinger,

the amorphous movement of young people seeking opportunities is firstly the result of stability and nation-buliding that has to be credited to the regimes, and secondly to the failure of very inefficient government, which as well has to be credited to the regimes: and double-standards of cooperation of Western powers. Some seem to think that by supporting "regime change", everything will be well. But I think there is a great danger that if you remove the regimes, you will remove the countries as we know them today. That could be beneficial on the long run, but involves the risk of a Great War in the short run.

We should never forget that the origins of the regimes has to be credited to the Western colonial powers, who created the countries of the Middle East as we see them today. These were mostly artificial entities located in a geopolitically important zone, and it is therefore no surprise that the rule of despoty prevails. Sometimes, Western powers cooperated well with the new regimes, and sometimes, the regimes were opposed to the west and seeked partners in the Soviet Union or China. Regardless of their political orientation, these policies have their origin in the colonial heritage, and the countries have highly fragmented societies and a repressive and undemocratic rule in common.

As far as I know the Middle East today, the basic economic and environmental problems have reached a degree that some regimes can only survive because of foreign aid. And even the oil-rich states witness a demographic growth that limits their ability to simply "buy" short-term solutions allowing to continue with the old, inefficient way of government that concentrates power in the hands of a small elite.

If the states of the Near East want to survive the 21st centuries as the entities as we know them today, they have to continue the process of nation-building by allowing more democratic and efficient forms of government and participation. However, it is an error to believe that this will be the outcome of western political action. In my experience, the opposite is the case: the West either contributed to preventing change by stabilising corrupt and inefficient structures, or destroyed basic stability during wars as for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Lebanon, which thwarted all efforts of nation-buliding. In Afghanistan and Iraq we now witness how futile an endeavour like nation-building from outside is and I hope it will be a lesson that will teach us some more post-colonial humility. And while it is worth to support the people's desire for political change, we are on the brink of creating new Afghanistans in Libya and Syria due to an unwise use of force.

I say: the actions of the west can only be symbolic (which is already quite important, and with the case of a no-fly zone appropriate), but you cannot enforce the nation building (and starting to bomb Libya is crossing the red line of active war participation). If this shall be effective, the only thing you might be able to do is to re-colonise the area in order to establish states according to western standards, but for such a long-term endeavour we lack both the necessary demographic background and the required acceptance with the local population. In fact, I think it is quite arrogant to think that we have the right or obligation to make other people happy according to our standards of happiness.

But one thing we can do, and we must do: that is stick to our own rules. That is, you cannot just invade a country because you don't like its government, and you should not give money to guys who will likely transfer it to their own bank account. I have seen myself how development aid was robbed and the donors tolerated it with the argument "we want to retain our influence". Westerners talk about fighting corruption but western money is probably the biggest corruptor in these countries. This is the point where we need to start: with the Berlusconis and Mubaraks and the whole felt of mutuality of those in power.

Revise the control mechanisms of economic interactions and cooperation, and blacklist and persecute all those regimes that steal money from their people and their cooperators in our countries, regardless whether they comply with your goals or not, and you will have the strongest impact leading to more opportunities for the young people in the Near East. But if you involve in partisan comittments leading to civil war, you essentially re-play an old game long played by the historic Colonial powers, re-shuffling wealth to a new elite but maintaining old structures that guarantee backwardness and impede development. Overplaying this game could lead to a point where the whole order of the modern Near East will be revised, and impeding democratic development for too long will have the same effect.

It might be hard to accept, but there is only one thing we can really do apart from making sure that we ourselves play the international rules as we like them: nothing. I have said it before, the art of doing nothing is sometimes perhaps the most difficult one in politics where dramatic action is required to put a politician into scene in the media. But sometimes less is more, and the very small things that create trust and understanding have a bigger and tremendously more positive impact than the big things such as war campaigns.

May 30, 2011

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Dear Mr. Lucke,

you approach is the old conservative-isolationist culture criticism perspective, which was also very apparrent in history. Logically, that is very consistent, I can´t do much about it. But try to see it that way:

In our globalized world, there is no such thing as non-interference. Every country (which country is not artificial?) somehow relates to international institutions and the world market and their political and economic performance much depends on that. Allowing the Mideastern despots full access to the international capital market is indeed a decision, and a very powerful one, which allows them to gain material and money to enforce their rulership. From my perspective, that has been the very problem in the last decades. Like it or not, there is no such thing as neutrality. At this point, no one is talking about intervention or that kind of stuff, but indeed I think furthermore, intervention can be morally applicable, if not practically extremely difficult. If there had been more consensus about world powers about the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there would have been a better outcome, even though I don´t think the people in these countries are worst off. That very much things were wrong doesn´t mean that the whole things were wrong. We have to get used to the idea that we cannot make masterplans for these things.

May 30, 2011

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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I´m sorry, I forgot to login. The previous was my comment.

June 1, 2011

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

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Dear Mr. Anzinger,

I agree with you that there is no such thing as neutrality, and that all too often western leaders were all too comfortable reaching agreements with Middle Eastern regimes.

It is, however, extremely difficult to influence developments in those countries. Therefore I strongly caution against any simple solution. Military force is the most dangerous and costly way of enforcing developments, and I would conclude that the military involvement of western powers mostly backfired. In the light of the U.S. debt crisis, one perhaps has to speak even about defeat, and it seems not impossible that the world order as we know it today will soon and rapidly disintegrate - firstly because of the monetary problems, but secondly because the endeavour of western-guided nation-building has largely failed. Assuming that rising bread prices are a sign of inflation triggered by the recent mass-printing of the world currency U.S. dollar ("world inflation"), one could even interpret the current uprisings in the Middle East as the first signs of the above mentioned disintegration of the world system as we know it.

I cannot communicate in a few words how things might be done better, but I am convinced that the current strategy was wrong, if not disastrous. Unfortunately, speaking from a general scientific point of view, we have large problems understanding complex systems. Many failures of the western way of thinking and acting can in my opinion be attributed to our linear approach in order to deal with our environment, but which nearly always is structured as very complex system where everything is connected with everything in feedbacks.

Only if we achieve progress in this very basic philosophic view of the world we will be able to tackle the problems of the 21st century well. Re-considering the complexity of the Middle East before making decisions would certainly help.

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