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The concept of "global security" is indicative of a change in thinking on security - it is largely a recent realization that following the Cold War it is no longer possible for any major countries to remain oblivious to developments taking place around them as the world is now interconnected and interdependent. While countries will still have a "national perspective" on security influenced by their own geography and history, it is increasingly accepted that we are now dealing with global threats and global challenges which call for global responses. It is now acknowledged that India has a vital role to play in ensuring peace and stability in the global security arena.

In the global context, India is pursuing a traditional super power policy based on a combination of the "soft power" of economic strength and the "hard power" capabilities of conventional and nuclear deterrence. On many international issues, India shares threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the differences in foreign policy approaches become clear, for instance, in the area of multilateralism. While some global players, such as the European Union, associate the concept of effective multilateralism with a strengthening of the United Nations which aims to achieve a jurisdiction of international relations, whereas India tends to pursue a selective form of multilateralism in order to assert its national interest.

In the recent past, the nuclear deal between India and the US attracted the attention of the international community. With fears of nuclear isolation if the deal fails, it's a litmus test for Indian foreign policy which will have regional and global consequences. The international community condemned India's nuclear tests in May 1998. Then New Delhi was isolated, but the world is now ready to exempt India from the so called basic norms of the global non-proliferation regime. That this transformation occurred within a decade after the nuclear tests has a lot to do with changed perception of India in the international arena. This is but a dimension of the changing nature of the "new" Indian foreign policy. After decades of frustration, miscalculation, unrealized potential, India is now emerging as a factor in the global balance of power. In the coming years, it will have an opportunity to shape outcomes on the most critical issues of the 21st century like the construction of Asian stability, the management of globalization, the war on terror, non-proliferation, climate change, energy security, WTO negotiations and the future of the UN.

The changes can be viewed in terms of three concentric circles of India's global engagement:

1. The first circle relates to India's immediate neighborhood. India can't realize its dream to become a factor in world politics without settling relations with neighbours. As frustrating as it might be, there is no other alternative but to deal patiently with neighbours. In recent years, India has offered increased political and economic cooperation to its neighbours. This has included building and strengthening structures of functional cooperation, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim initiative.
   
   
2. The second circle of India's security policy is focused on what is called "extended neighborhood" - encompassing Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, Indian Ocean region and Southeast Asia. Sourcing India's energy needs, the presence of large number of Indians in Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, growing economic and security linkages with ASEAN, the threat of fundamentalism in Central Asia - are evident factors that necessitate greater Indian engagement with these regions.
   
   
3. The third circle includes Indian strategic engagement with major global heavyweights. The disappearance of Soviet Union "liberated" India to intensify bilateral relations with all major powers. India's stride in the military and economic realm is firing the imagination of major powers. The US, Russia, and Japan were early to recognize the rise of India, while the European Union has been late, though not too late to recognize this change.

While neighbours and some super powers see the "rise" both with appreciation and suspicion, the task of leading the region towards economic modernization, political moderation, and social development inevitably falls on India which will have a direct impact on global security.

Shakti Prasad Srichandan is a Senior PhD Scholar at the Center for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:

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• Urs Schrade: NATO Alone Cannot Tackle Global Instability
  

July 12, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

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Dr. Srichandan,

Thank you for your comments. In your analysis of global security, you highlight what I have often read about India's foreign policy, namely, that 'India tends to pursue a selective form of multilateralism in order to assert its national interest.'

In terms of the US-India nuclear agreement, I wonder how the fact that, as you explain, 'the world is now ready to exempt India from the so called basic norms of the global non-proliferation regime' helps India to achieve its goals in the three circles you identify as the future of India's global engagement.

I would suggest that, in each circle, issues of non-proliferation are likely to dominate the global security agenda in the years ahead. I do recognize that in terms of the assertion of national interest, India has come into its own with the bilateral nuclear agreement.

It may be precisely for that reason that tensions are likely to rise if India predicates its engagement in global security issues on that achievement. Can India step back and reassess the gains, if I understand the general perception of the nuclear deal well from the Indian perspective, in terms of potential global security tensions?

Or is the argument that the international recognition of India's new status makes the subcontinent a more responsible actor in global security?

In other words, as Russia and the US negotiate reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, what are India's national, regional and global responsibilities given its sheer influence, size, and increasing weight in the local neighborhood and the international community?

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette Mazzucelli

Tags: | India |

July 12, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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India has already emerged as a Great Power, along with the US, China, Russia, and possibly Brazil. Also the EU if it can ever manage to create a working security apparatus.

Many see China as the new superpower which will overtake the US - but don't count out India. India has many advantages, including her geographic position - bordering China but with ranges of mountains between.

The primary Indian advantage (to my mind) is that India is a well-established democracy, unlike China or Russia. Autocracies can work well for a long time but have more difficulty dealing with prolonged periods of adversity. Democracies have a built-in change mechanism; if one government fails (or appears to) the voters will vote in the opposition.

Autocracies find it harder to deal with prolonged adversity. Germany had a very long period of ascent and then ascendency, but when conditions turned against her fell a long way. Something similar could happen to China, which has few close allies.

July 12, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

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Greetings Donald,

I was rereading criticisms of the five-point world of Nixon and Kissinger and wonder if you think that the US, China, India, the EU (including Russia), and Brazil may constitute such a multipolar world in time.

Of course, this would be a very different system from that of the 19th century balance of power, which was exclusively European. I am thinking of the lessons in foreign policy the US and the world could learn from that earlier Nixon/Kissinger era with some parallels in that the US was emerging from Vietnam and the world was in the midst of the oil shocks and recession.

I agree with your point about India's democracy in terms of the domestic advantages vis-a-vis China, especially given the ethnic violence in China of late as well as the necessity of a government response. What is less clear is the overall direction China will take politically in the decades to come as economic changes proceed a pace and China's elites must keep up.

Bill Emmott in 20:21 Vision writes: "China's next few decades will consist of a constant contest between the creation of new jobs in modern industry and the destruction of old ones in state firms. The "gales of creative destruction" inherent in capitalism will be a dominant feature of China. The question, though, is whether China's political system is resilient enough to absorb these gales."

Emmott goes on to argue that Tiananmen had economic troubles at its root as rising inflation coincided with an economic pause. He writes: "Think what impact the existence of many millions of unemployed could have, if they came to expect their plight to last. Down south in Hong Kong, they would see a richer, freer sort of China, in which legal protections are more secure and in which there is even a tentative bit of democracy. Why not, the aggrieved might say, extend Hong Kong's ways and freedoms to the whole of China?"

What do you think of this analysis, namely, that economic uncertainty is the basic threat to China's political stability? What are the implications for global security if China should implode politically in decades to come given China and India's race to the top of the world?

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

Tags: | India China 21st century multipolarity |

July 12, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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Colltte, I think that there will be at least six great powers and possibly seven or eight. Russia will remain a great power in her own right and will have interests distinctly different than the EU, so I split them even tough I agree that the dialogue with Russia will bear fruit. I also thjink South Africa and perhaps Japan will emerge as 'great' powers.

The Emmott quotes come pretty close to my own beliefs about China's possible economic and social vulnerabilities. China has been on a roll economically for nigh unto 50 years now, and I think there is reason to believe that their export model has reached it's limits. To their credit the Chinese leadership seesm to have recognized that fact and seems to be shifting more to domestic consumption. But I submit that such a shift is fraught with possible consequences (good and bad) but suerly it will result in shifts in economic and social power, and historically no country has found this kind of shift easy to navigate.

Democracies have an easier time of it, because the leadership losed power in elections - but not their heads. The German experience seems to show that the less democratic the society the harder the shift is; not least because the German leadership sought ways of defusing the social crisis which were not efective or good. It's been argued that WWI came as a result of the dead end the Kaiser's government found itself in. I hope the Chinese experience is not similar.

I hesitate to predict what the consequences will be if China encounters such an inflection point, but they will be major. Think of the consequences of the situation Germany found itself in circa 1905.....

July 13, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

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Greetings Donald,

I agree with you about Japan and think the write off of that country is premature in terms of its potential role in a future multipolar system. Will the Japanese rely as extensively on the US security guarantee in Asia in the years ahead. I think not...

What could this mean for the situation in Korea and the balance in that region of the world?

South Africa is a country I would like to read about more closely, especially given the competition by great powers for resources, which is likely to continue on the African continent in the decades ahead. China's growing interests in Africa are striking.

I appreciated President Obama's recent trip to Ghana as well as his personal discussion of family experiences.

Russia I tend to see as closer to the European pole, in part because I think the interests will increasingly point in that direction as India and China continue to rise.

India has an advantage, as I understand, in the ability to weather this global downturn and potentially others in the future. China, on the other hand, I think is vulnerable in terms of its interdependence with the US economy.

The historical comparison you cite is one I did not consider. China is such a large polity to control from the center. Social tensions, popular grievances, must have constructive channels institutionally, which allow expression or the opt-out, the exit, from the system is likely to be brutal when it comes.

What kind of social democracy might evolve in China over decades? That's a question to weigh in the equation as the world moves in a multipolar direction...

All the best, Colette

Tags: | India and multipolarity |

July 13, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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Collette,

In thinking about Japan I think we encounter one of the great issues of our times - demographics. National power is not only a snapshot of today but also projected forward in time.

We're seeing a demographic problem today which is unprecedented since the Black Death, or perhaps the fall of the Roman Empire, depending. The problem of depopulation. The Black Death was swift depopulation obviously, so I would opine that the end years of Rome is the closer simile - complete with the 'barbarian' takeover. At least potentially.

Some nations are depopulating faster than others. Germany and Italy are depopulating faster than France or the US are. India is still increasing; but China is not, it is actually depopulating. The US is actually not depopulating, although 'blue' America is probably depopulating relative to 'red'. This doesn't imply the victory of blue over red necessarily as people move from red to blue. Dick Cheney (Wyoming and Texas) is 'red'; but Mary Cheney, his daughter, is blue - though perhaps not politically. But even in the US demographic balances are shifting; immigrants tend to reproduce at a higher rate than native-born.

Countries like Japan, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Russia are depopulating at a much higher rate than normal; China is depopulating while India is not.

To me that means that ceteris paribus, nations which are still increasing in population or holding their ground will be more powerful relative to those which are depopulating most rapidly in the future. That is assuming that these countries are in a position to develop their children, of course.

Japan is experiencing a demographic bomb right now; it is the precursor showing where much of the West may be going.

Demographics may actually be misleading us about relative shifts in national power, because children are actually a drag on national output because in a healthy economy they don't produce, being busy playing and learning. People who note the increase in European wealth as compared to the US may be drawing the wrong conclusio, because the US is investing in children while Europe invests in machines. Similar comments may apply to the comparison between India and China; India may be lagging China because it has more children, but children are a long-term asset in a healthy economy and the US and India may yet overtake....

This mass demographic shift seems to be unprecedented since the late Roman empire, and I am not wise enough to do more than guess. Except to note that Frances populace increased relative to the rest of Europe between 1550 and 1800 - and French power waxed with it. Similarly the French population failed to keep up with European norms after Napoleon - and France lost in relative power.

Arguably Napoleon had a disasterous long-term effect upon the French economy, one lasting a century or more. France could not beat Germany in 1870, 1914, or 1941 after having had few problems beating them before that. Demographics perhaps wasn't the only factor here - but I argue it was a big one.

July 20, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

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Greetings Donald,

In thinking about the demographics concern you cite, I read 'Rivals' by Bill Emmott who references the population decline and the rise in the average age in Japan.

One of his arguments is that the labour market is 'probably the single most important part of the economy to watch to find indications of whether the current recovery is likely to be sustained and even gather strength.'

By 2005, 30% of the workforce was comprised of non-regular workers. Companies were boosting profits by cutting labour costs.

In the period 2005-07, part-time jobs resumed their growth because more people were willing and available to do these jobs. Inequality rose to levels where it became a political issue. This sets up a contest in the fall elections between the LDP and the DJP challenger, which has begun to use the issue of inequality as a means of differentiating its profile from the LDP.

I wonder if the Japanese elite, particularly the bureaucrats, want to do what is necessary to stimulate fast enough growth to overcome the burden of an aging and shrinking population and to reverse trends in absolute and relative poverty that now characterize the Japanese context.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

Tags: | Japan |

July 20, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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Colette, both you and Mr. Emmott make some good points.

I think that when many people talk about inequality, they actually miss the
real issue. Many see inequality as an abstract issue of social justice and don't
realize the intimate link inequality has with demographics & depopulation.

One cause of depopulation (among others) are incomes and the cost of living. If
an ordinary couple making an average wage is unable to rent or buy a large enough
living space to share comfortably with a family, chances they will not have children when
they are young. If they have to wait until their 30's to afford these things many things may
prevent them having children - fertility problems, divorce, careerism, physical energy, etc.

My parents generation married young. My mother married when she was 22 - older than both of her sisters, who married at 18 and 19, respectively. Part of that was social mores, but a large part (I think) is that the future looked bright for them. They would be able to live well and afford children on the projected earnings of the man alone.

Contrast that with the situation today. How many high school graduates can afford to marry and have children while they are young enough to have the energy necessary? How many college grads have that?

To my mind that is the real crisis - a generational crisis. It is visibly gathering weight, even in my workplace. I am an IT consultant, a occupation which pays fairly well. Problem is it's unsteady, too unsteady. And I don't see ANY young Brits in my workplace paying their dues, learning the skills! Didn't on my last job either.

When I worked in Germany I didn't see a single German below the age of 29 or so in my workplace, so how are they going to have the money to have children? If it takes 5 years to establish yourself in your profession beginning age 30, that makes you 35 by the time you can think of a child. If it takes a decade, that's 40, and the biological clock is ticking loudly by 35 or 40.

Asian families manage to avoid the problem by two mechanisms - they support young families while they are too young to support themselves completely (within the family), and their customs make most young men marry by age 30, and the women marry between 22 and 25, frequently younger than that.

July 21, 2009

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One agrees with Srichandran's analysis over (should things be looked at from that perspective) the need for India to take care of her first "circle". That by itself summarizes India and its global aspirations rather well.

Secondly, while cutting a potato for dinner a couple of nights ago, I was surprised to discover many a potatoes (apparently healthy ones and I bought them from a vegetable mart in one of the villages of New Delhi - the capital city of India) with a rotten core that I had to slice away to find and ensure that I had something to eat for dinner from the healthy parts!

Those potatoes actually fare better than the Indian state. With these two conditions & indicators of development and political maturity: villages and their populace as true indicators of the Indian capital city of New Delhi - global engagement and ambition is a nice dream. Like most humans and life forms born - India continues to display its continued potential for global leadership.

Tags: | realities | potatoes | representations | global orders |

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