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With a new round of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program approaching and UN, US and European sanctions underway, the media is once again buzzing with talk about “fuel swaps”, “HEU”, “LEU” and centrifuges, centering around the question: “How can we make sure Iran’s nuclear program isn’t going to be used for military purposes?” Just like the times before, technical details of verification are being discussed and carefully detailed plans are being worked out. And, once again, the talks will fail. This is not because plans on verification and technical details are not important, quite the opposite. But they alone won’t do the trick.

These plans and offers do not fully get to the core of the problem between Iran and America (and Europe, too), which is trust. No verification plan will ultimately be acceptable for the US and Europe as long as they don’t trust that Iran does not have any intention to build a nuclear bomb. And Iran is never going to believe that Washington and its European allies are serious about their offers as long as America (and Israel, too) is still talking about military actions against Tehran. Thus, any policy aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis has to address these trust issues in one way or the other.

Political scientist Leonard Schoppa labels the problem of mistrust between negotiating partners “the social context in coercive bargaining.” In a nutshell, he suggests that you tend to yield more concessions in a coercive bargaining situation (i.e. a situation where you employ “carrots-and-sticks” tactics as the West is currently doing with Iran) when the negotiations take place in a social context. This occurs when “tactics fall within the range that are accepted as legitimate” by both parties and when “the coercion takes place within an institutionalized process that establishes mutually accepted rules of the game”. None of these conditions are fulfilled in the case of the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program.

Both the US and Iran accuse each other of not playing by the “rules” of international politics – and both have a point. Tehran is enraged by Washington’s meddling in Iran’s domestic affairs, especially by US financial support for Iran’s opposition movement. Also, Iran condemns US rhetoric about “Iranian regime change” (which has eased up a bit since Obama’s inauguration). Tehran views the formula “all options remain on the table” as a threat of the use military force, which it considers a clear violation of international law. The US is particularly angry about Iran’s support for terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, which seek to destroy Israel. What is more, Iran’s repeated violations of the IAEA’s safeguard regulations prove to the US, Europe, China, and Russia that Iran is not in compliance with its obligations under international law and might be secretly building up nuclear weapons capability.

Furthermore, the various rounds of negotiations and the UN Security Council are hardly places well suited to establishing mutually accepted “rules of the game” for Iran and the US. One reason for this is that negotiations are not being held on a regular basis. And when the parties do gather at one table, they have to deal with changing short-term interests from the other side of the table. On the other hand, Iran perceives the sanctions of the UN Security Council as illegitimate because, in Iran’s view, it is stripping Tehran off its inalienable right NPT to enrich uranium under the NPT.

Finally, a considerable trust deficit exists on all sides. This is partly due the reasons mentioned above, but mostly stems from the conflict-ridden history between Iran and the United States. The US-British led overthrow of Iran’s Shah in 1953, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S. Navy in 1988 and Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad's repeated calls for the destruction of Israel are only a few examples of what created such mistrust between the US and Iran.

Within this poisonous context it is going to be almost impossible to find a solution that sufficiently accommodates both sides. It is this mutual mistrust that has been one of the main causes of the failure of talks so far. Consequently, any serious effort to negotiate has to be accompanied, or better, preceded by efforts on both sides to improve the general context of the talks in order to create a minimum amount of trust between the United States, Iran and Europe. In light of this analysis, here is what is to be done:

Stick to the Rules:

Iran has to accept a two-state solution in the Israeli-Arab conflict and has to cease support for Hamas and Hezbollah. In exchange, the US has to offer a mutually agreeable statement recognizing Iran’s legitimate security concerns in the region. The US has to stop direct financial support for the Iranian opposition movement in Iran. At the same time, both Brussels and Washington should point out that they are not going to stop publicly criticizing human rights violations in Iran just as Iran can keep criticizing America and Israel. However, a red line has to be drawn between criticizing each other and demanding the destruction of each others country or the others allies. In doing so, Washington could hopefully dissuade Tel Aviv from launching an attack on Iran.

Restore the Authority of the UN Security Council and Create a Regular Negotiation Forum:

The Security Council needs to show that it doesn’t intend to deny Iran the right of the peaceful use of nuclear energy as long as it proves to be a responsible member of the international community. Thus, the UNSC has to make clear that its demands to stop uranium enrichment does not mean it intends to proscribe enrichment forever, but only until Tehran proves it is not building atomic weapons.

Also, the permanent members of the Security Council (possibly accompanied by other states such as Brazil or Turkey) have to establish a permanent negotiation forum with Iran, open to any topic. There are many issues where Tehran’s, Washington’s and Europe’s interests touch, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. Establishing a lasting and working relationship on these and other issues could prove that both sides can work together and this, in turn, has the potential to create positive effects on talks on the nuclear issue as well.

Build Trust:

In addition to the measures above, the following policies should also be pursued:

1. The US and Iran have to normalize their diplomatic relationship. The United States should open an embassy in Tehran and should relax flight restrictions between the two countries for everyday Iranian citizens. This does not include lifting travel bans currently set up by the UN Security Council. Also, the U.S. should complement these measures with an apology for the downing of Iran Air Flight 655. At the same time, Iran has to declare that the hostage-taking of U.S. embassy employees in Tehran in 1979 was wrong.

2. Encourage NGOs and civil society groups to engage with their counterparts on the other side and help existing ones with their work.

3. Foster academic exchange programs between Iran and the West, e.g. offer scholarships for Iranian students and scholars and organize academic conferences.

4. Each side should ask representatives of their main religious groups (i.e. Christians, Jews and Muslims, preferably both Shia and Sunni Muslims) to engage in religious dialogue. Building trust means showing respect for other religions.

5. Iran, the US and Europe have to give attention to how the other side is being depicted in their respective media. Although Western countries cannot (and should not) keep their media from expressing their opinion, administrations on all sides should always stress that extremist views expressed in the media are just that: Opinions and not an official policy.

Taken together these measures should open new communication channels and create a minimum amount of respect and trust between Washington and Tehran.

To be sure, a policy of creating trust is not going to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis by itself. Rather, it has to be complemented by tough sanctions and a carefully detailed incentive package for Iran – this is where technical solutions come into play. But they are not sufficient. Only by combining them with measures to relax the context of bargaining is the world going to be able to prove to Tehran that its opponents are not aiming to keep Iran a small and weak country, but only seeking to stop it from getting a nuclear weapon.

Ideally, steps to build up trust should have been taken before the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program were started. But the clock is ticking on finding a peaceful outcome to this crisis, so both strategies have to be pursued at the same time. Yes, it is going to be a ride on the razor’s edge. But it’s the only way to untangle the Gordian knot of the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Felix Haass is a student of Peace Research and International Politics at the University of Tübingen.

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.

Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Iran's Nuclear Program" here.

October 28, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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Dear Felix,

I added the first star to your article.

Your five proposals to build trust are absolutly right. However, I have issues with some points you make.

An acceptance of the two state solution by the Iranian government will not be realistic. Same is with the stop of support for Hamas and Hezbollah. There is so much hate, ideology and fundamentalism, by the way on both sides, which make any acceptance impossible. If you try to emphatise in those actors minds, you may get the insight that they are following a different kind of rationality.

Thus, I want to finish with a quote of Ahmadinejad: "You can pass as many resolutions as you like but you cannot stop the progress of the Iranian people. We thank God that our enemies are idiots."
Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1509804/I...

October 28, 2010

Felix Haass, University of Tuebingen, Silver Contributor (55)

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Felix, thank you very much for your valuable comment! You're absolutely right, Iran won't stop the support for Hamas and Hezbollah tomorrow if we demanded it today. The same is true for Iran's acceptance of a two state solution.

However, I put it in there because, ultimately, it has to be part of a long term solution. Notice that I haven't said anything about the timing of the specific proposals and the sequencing of the different steps I put forward in my essay - there's only so much you can say in 1500 words. Because timing is key here.

However, step by step, a progress toward that goal may be possible. Not tomorrow, not next week, probably not even next year, but maybe some time in the future. Iran has already offered accepting a two-state solution in its proposals of 2003 that were turned down by the Bush government (granted, there were a lot of ifs and buts, and it was under a more reformist oriented government. It is going to be MUCH harder with the current regime. But nobody has said it was going to be easy...).

We have to start small, with a multi-track approach, one step at a time, tough sanctions combined with a concrete reciprocity approach, embedded in a detente of the overall context in which the negotiations are taking place. I'm pretty confident we'll find a consensus on that, given numerous great proposal that have been put on the table by you and the other participants of this policy workshop.

October 28, 2010

Tobias Heinrich Siegfried Sauer, Universität Trier, Gold Contributor (84)

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Dear Felix,

it's nice to read another proposal calling for incentives.

I also appreciate your idea of creating an international forum in which all disputed topics could be discussed.

But to me, one problem remains (maybe I need some trust-building as well). Most of your proposals are directed at the regime itself or give the regime the role of a goal-keeper (e.g. academic exchanges; not supporting Hamas; contacts between NGOs for which visa are needed of couse). Personally, I don't think we should focus so much on the regime, but more on important groups within the Iranian society. An approach concentrating on the regime might overestimate the West's barganing power vis-a-vis Iran. More useful would be pressure exerted not by outside players, but by the population or important groups of the population in Iran itself. That's why, in my opinion, incentives should be focused on these groups and concerning security, the economy and prestige. Of couse, in your comment you wrote that, such an approach would be most useful if applied on the basis of concrete reciprocity.

Tobias

October 28, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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"The US has to stop direct financial support for the Iranian opposition movement in Iran."

Felix, in my view, you ultimately call for the betrayal of the peaceful opposition movement. Please clarify your statement in order to prevent misunderstandings, so that I can give an accurate answer.

Dou you think, the regime is the legitimate agent for negotiations? Do you think the human rights violations should be negotiated appealing to the regime?

Please also note my characterization of the Iranian regime and the analysis of the political balances.

October 28, 2010

Felix Haass, University of Tuebingen, Silver Contributor (55)

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Tobias, Niklas: Thanks for your comments!

Tobias:
You’re absolutely right to point out the gate-keeper problem with the current regime and you are right to highlight the role Iran’s population. But I’m afraid the gate-keeper problem also applies (at least partially) to incentives directed at Iran’s population or groups within Iran. There is no easy, straightforward solution to that. One possible solution might be to offer these incentives publicly and in a way that ensures the Iranian people know about them. Offering academic stipends, travel stipends, inviting religious scholars to a dialogue might be done publicly and directly to the Iranian people, be it via Internet or other media. But the media is being controlled in Iran, so this might prove to be only partially successful. Other approaches are conceivable and I would very much like to hear your thoughts about that.

Niklas:
With the statement you quoted, I was referring to the problems that direct financial support of opposition groups in Iran might create. As I said in a comment to Felix S.’ essay: Not only do most opposition groups in Iran reject foreign money anyway but offering financial support might also harm opposition groups that don’t actually take foreign money. See, for example:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2...

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/magazine/24ngo-t.html?_r=1&pagewa...

Consequently, any policy directed at supporting opposition groups in Iran has to be crafted very carefully. I’m all in favor for supporting Iranian opposition groups since I don’t like the current regime in Tehran either. But we have to be careful that our policies don’t backfire.

And no, I don’t think the regime is a legitimate partner for negotiations. But it’s the only one we have. Yes, the regime is doing terrible things that I don’t approve of at all. But completely isolating the Iranian regime is only going to confirm their perception of the BAD Western governments that try to bring Iran down. Economic sanctions might slow the nuclear program but they may (I'm emphasizing the "may" here) only crush the Iranian regime if they are supported by Russia and China as well.

If we don’t complement sanctions with clear-cut incentives, a careful outreach to the Iranian opposition movement, steps of concrete reciprocity and relaxing the context of the negotiations (measures that have been put forward by most of the participants of this policy workshop), war or an Iranian nuclear weapon is the most likely outcome.

October 28, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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Tobias, I think my position is very clear at all. Please look up for my argumentation in the other commentaries.

My criticism is the same: your approach is wishful-thinking because it lacks an adequate analysis of the situation.

Instead, I will refer to some of your points:

The two articles are from 2007. I think the situation has considerably changed ever since. Previously, the opposition did not talk of regime change, now the people on the streets are risking their lives.

"If we do not complement sanctions with clear-cut incentives, a careful outreach to the Iranian opposition movement, concrete steps of reciprocity and relaxing the context of the negotiations (measures that have been put forward by most of the participants of this policy workshop ), or was at Iranian nuclear weapon is the most likely outcome. "

And what do you think would happen if Iran has the bomb? What would happen if my analysis is correct? Even if my analysis is not adequate - why the experiments? Why shouldn´t we clearly say that nuclear armament is not an option? If my assessment is not adequate, so be it. We have a world without a nuclear armed Iran. What´s so bad about it? Consider, if my assessment is right, the people in Iran and in the whole region will face a horrific nightmare.

"But down completely isolating the Iranian regime is only going to confirm their perception of the BAD Western governments that try to bring Iran."

I do not think you trust the smartness of the people in Iran. Didn´t they chant the slogan "Obama, Obama, with them [the regime], or with us." They hate the regime. They want a free and democratic Iran. In my opinion, they have shouted out loud enough that actually everyone should have noted who has not completely closed his eyes.

Your approach is a decision made in response to the slogan of the Iranians: You say "With them" so that you also say "without you". The people in Iran have asked you, you answered them clearly.

There is nothing to negotiate with the regime - it has to disappear into the underworld of history. Please note my argument that the regime will not make foreign policy concessions. All points are already addressed by me.

October 28, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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I want to stress another point: (perhaps the admin can connect my two posts)

I quote: “Iran has already offered accepting a two-state solution in its proposals of 2003 that were turned down by the Bush government (granted, there were a lot of ifs and buts, and it was under a more reformist oriented government. It is going to be MUCH harder with the current regime. But nobody has said it was going to be easy...).”

Here I demand a source.

Was it the revolutionary leader who has made such a proposal? How exactly is the alleged proposal for a two-state solution formulated? It is on you to quote this proposal to specify with a verifiable source and evidence that Khamenei was behind it. Everything else is posturing.

You probably refer to a very vague paper from an Iranian ambassador (I think from France), which was supposed to be placed in union with the Swiss ambassador in Tehran. However, it was never authorized by the leadership in Tehran. This is a rumor, which belongs to the same category as this "translation mistake".

For that I can tell you here by now. You will not find such a source.

October 28, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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Dear Niklas

Here, as well as below my article, you citizen direct financial support for the Iranian opposition. Your argument may be correct, because such support would discredit any opposition group inside the country. But my argument was not about financial support, rather about political support and technical advice or material support, if asked for.

Foremost, public and political support for Iranian opposition groups is must. The effects of such support on the mental strength of people cannot be underestimated. Only a few people will start acting, when they feel left alone. Moreover, it should be clearly communicated that those groups reject foreign money. Thus, their authenticy would be underlined. Of course, it may not be possible to address the groups by their names.

However, people who look for help to run a website or a magazine should receive it. Superiorly, not by any governments, rather by NGOs or endowments. I stressed the need for support for the Iranian people ("each team needs fans for its support") by other civil societies. In my view, this would be a project tremendously worth working for.

October 28, 2010

Felix Haass, University of Tuebingen, Silver Contributor (55)

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Niklas, thanks for your comments! Unfortunately, I don't have the time to answer them in detail right now, so just a couple of quick thoughts.

Oh, you're absolutely right, I'm referring to the "very vague paper" drafted by the Iranian ambassador to France Khamal Karrazi and delivered to the U.S. by Swiss ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann. Of course, it's never going to be 100% sure how serious this offer has been and yes it's not 100% if the proposal has had the approvement of the Supreme Leader. All I have to offer is the assessment of several journalists, and analysts who interviewed officials in Iran and the U.S., see for example:

Trita Parsi (2007), Treacherous Alliance, Yale University Press, p. 243ff.
Barbara Slavin (2007), Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies, St. Martin's Press, 204ff.

But I'm sure you know these already and if they haven't convinced you before they probably won't change your mind now.

October 28, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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Well, no disagreement on that.

But have you been on the streets to support the opposition´s cause? I have been and I know the people, who were in the streets - I got to know many, many Iranian people and had endless discussions. They told me their stories how they had to flee from the Mullahs´ grip. How they were in torture prisons, how they lost their beloved ones. They are all disappointed of the ignorance of the people in the West, who are still talking about negotiating with the theocratic regime. There are reasons why there are so little supporters on the streets. For one reason, this is the European attitude for dialogue-policy with the regime. They don´t want to see the true face of the regime.

It is always the same arguments.

(But don´t count that as an argument, this is just my personal background.)

October 28, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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This post was addressed to Felix S.

Felix H., indeed there may be some rumours in that direction. Have you heard of the case of Mussawis son? He was tackled for his sentence "Israel is not our enemy".

These rumours are serious if they are expressed officially. And even in that case you have to proof their credibility.

October 28, 2010

Alexander Pyka, Bucerius Law School, Gold Contributor (105)

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Felix, first of all thank you for the nice article, which I support not only because it takes into account the legal circumstances and seems to be widely in accordance with international law. I really like your five steps in pursuit of mutual trust-building - as others and you already pointed out, naturally accompanied with other measures.

Tobias wrote that it is nice to read another article calling for incentives. I would like to support that and contribute another argument from a legal point of view. Although seemingly nobody in my field seems to write about that: unilateral sanctions that go beyond those authorized by the UNSC under Art. 41 UNCh, like the US and EU-sanctions at the moment, are very likely to be a violation of international law. Sanctions against another sovereign state are generally a violation but can be justified if the sanction's target has also violated its obligations in a relevant and proportionate manner (as a so called "reprisal"). The problem here is, that Iran has violated some obligations stemming from its INFCIRC/153-treaties (safeguards) with the IAEA, but these violations are (1) mostly from a time before 2002 (2) in most cases already healed by the over-obligatory cooperation with the IAEA in the period between 2002 and 2005 and (3) were not grave enough to be a sufficient justification for the "crippling sanctions" that some call for. The lacking abidance by the UNSC-measures cannot be used either for they do not constitute a violation of rights possessed by the US/EU. To sum it up, this would be another argument to support any approach that works with positive measures and incentives like the many well thought-out proposals we already read here.

In some other posts it was - by and large - argued that the legal situation does not matter (much) in the face of strategic power-driven decisions. While there is a lot of truth in that - in international law we interestingly call this "the normative power of factual circumstances" - I believe that the legal situation does matter. Being in accordance with international legal obligations is a strong argument in the international sphere and helps gaining support and trust from others. It is remarkable to see how much effort both Iran and the US put in arguing why their actions are legitimized by law and in accordance with the UNCh on various occasions.


By the way, while reading Niklas last comments I just recalled that I read Ahmadinejad was criticized internally for his rhetoric towards Israel on numerous accounts as well (unfortunately I do not remember the source from the top of my head).

October 28, 2010

Sascha Lohmann, Goethe University Frankfurt, Platinum Contributor (203)

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Dear Felix,

We are both on the same page that the upcoming talks will not do the trick, least of all get us closer to any substantial progress on the matter because, and you have extensively written on that, mutual trust is lacking. In fact, we share this analysis with the respective governments, the current negotiators involved as well as with former hostage of the US embassy in Tehran Amb. John W. Limbert, who has written a seminal analysis on this particular feature of the conflict (he is truly one of the most renowned Iran experts in the US, see him talking to Khamenei at that time here: http://niacinsight.com/2009/11/04/hostage-john-limbert-speaking-wit...). Moreover, I also think that the mutual interests in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq could create a positive impulse for building up trust.

Anyhow, while I generally support your proposals, I think that we should also consider the domestic constraints in the US and Iran. Therefore, small-scale projects in the realm of academic exchange, which is an extremely important but oftentimes neglected tool to induce change, should be employed at first. Especially Germany with its strong academic and cultural ties could take a leading role in that regard. The current UN philosophy conference is not a good example for that but I am sure that smaller projects yield more potential to promote cultural exchange. It also might be worth to think about the possibility to integrate the Iranian diaspora, dispersed throughout the West, into such a strategy.

At best, any strategic approach should force both sides into an institutionalized form of cooperation in which lacking trust is compensated by institutional provisions against cheating and security dilemmas. I think of an OSZE-like organization for the Middle East in which cooperational patterns could be established and institutionalized. It could be initialized out of the coercive framework that exists right now and which could be gradually lifted by reciprocal steps including such that you proposed in your paper. I am afraid that your approach is too much focussed on the long-run, so I think we should actually start and think about an institutional design that could lock in all of the relevant actors in the short-term (instead of merely proposing a forum which that would lack the adhesiveness that is so much need here).

October 29, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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On this issue:

"Therefore, small-scale projects in the realm of academic exchange, which is an extremely important but oftentimes neglected tool to induce change, should be employed at first. Especially Germany with its strong academic and cultural ties could take a leading role in that regard."

I miss the argument why this should help. Such exchange works only in consent with the regime. The regime mostly sends intelligence officers with such exchanges. In fact, there are numerous examples of events which have become propaganda for the regime (Rainer Stinner, Ruprecht Polenz, most recently the Cultural Committee of German Bundestag Claudia Roth and Peter Gauweiler). As an addition, I could list endless, but most significantly one from 2000:

"On the eighth of April, the foundation forcibly cleared the packed room following tumultuous events. One week later, participants from Iran were hauled before Tehran's Revolutionary Court and horrendous punishments were meted out. Unfortunately, the Böll Foundation chose to pass over the anniversary of these incidents and what missed a chance for critical self-reflection, as the turbulent events from these days are certainly linked in many ways with the current challenges facing relations between Germany and Iran. "

http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/descending-from-green-pastu...

You see, the regime is not a partner for these trips.

From numerous trips by German politicians in Iran, I criticize the following:

1. The injustice system is legitimized and thus strengthened.

The chief of Iran's human rights comission, Laijani (brother of the Speaker of Parliament) justifies stoning because it is in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

2. Which of the opposition outside parliament wants to talk? The regime will not let them if it does not correspond with the regime's interests.

3. How can one talk with representatives of the Baha'i, Whose leaders were put in prison only because their religion for 20 years. The Baha'i religion in Iranian view is no, but heresy and apostasy which is sanctioned by death penalty.

4. cultural cooperation solves conflicts?

Iran does not allow independent artists, they do not allow free film production, they forbid music, they lock film makers and journalists. Even the UNESCO has canceled its philosophy congress in Iran.

I conclude, such an exchange as you wish is not possible with the regime. The numerous cases demonstrate that this exchange can take place only under the rules of the regime. These experiments were naive and counterproductive. They were propaganda events for the regime.

I therefore reaffirm the need for a regime-change, in order to make such an exchange possible.

Therefore I propose a different concept: the invitation of captured dissidents, such as Majid Tavakouli. International campaigns to free these people, and invitations for political talks. In addition, precautions for these people when they are out of the country.
Anything else would be "business as usual".

October 30, 2010

Tobias Heinrich Siegfried Sauer, Universität Trier, Gold Contributor (84)

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Dear Felix,

in fact the regime also has got a gate-reekping role regarding the media, but here maybe Felix' proposals could help, as he highlighted the role of the internet as a less-easy to control medium.

Concerning economic incentives, they should have a clear impact on certain groups or the population as a whole. That means, they should be formulated credible (clear benchmarks!), offer clear advantages (no talk about "possible removal of trade barriers" or "possible promotion of trade"). The EU already offered a new trade-agreement and an energy-partnership, both of whom have not been formulated the way demanded here. Instead, they should indicate very clearly, how much the incentives are actually worth to the population, which goods will be affected, and how and when they will be implemented. Clear statements about Iran becoming a member of the WTO would help as well. In sum, these measures need some detailed information about the internal dynamics of the Iranian society (especially which groups have or could have an impact on the regime), but I think this should not be impossibile for Foreign Offices. But it is important to note that incentives should concentrate less on the regime itself, so offering nuclear co-operation (as has been done) will have to be only one, and not the major, point of a incentives-package.

As incentives formulated this way could work the same way sanctions work (by using a "social transmission belt", as Clara Portela has put it), they could complement the picture of sanctions, security guarantees (as long as Iran does not build a nuclear weapon) and measures accredeting Irans cultural heritage.

Tobias

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