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Prior to the emergence of the Iranian nuclear crisis in 2002, Arab states had followed a common policy regarding the nuclear issue. This policy was designed to undermine Israel on the international stage by fostering the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the Middle-East. Consequently, the Arab league endorsed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for years has rejected nuclear proliferation.

This policy has been challenged by Iran. Its acquisition of nuclear weapons would strongly affect the regional balance of power to the detriment of the Arab states and would ensure Iranian strategic hegemony over the region. This shift in the Middle-Eastern balance of power has led several scholars and various experts to express their fears that Egypt and Arab Gulf states would react by breaking their commitment to the NPT. It appears that neither Egypt nor Gulf states intend to launch military nuclear programmes at present. Rather than changing their traditional stance, they have changed their approach to nuclear issues by developing specific policies designed to respond to the Iranian project without violating the international rules.

The possession of nuclear weapons could become a major asset in the regional rivalry between Arab states and Iran. For decades Arab-Iranian relations have been antagonistic for strategic and ideological reasons. Firstly, this rivalry is based upon the strategic interests shared by Arab Gulf states and Iran in the Persian Gulf, particularly the control and transit of hydrocarbons. Furthermore, while Egypt now has diplomatic relations Israel, Iran has replaced it as Israel’s major opponent, notably through its support to Hezbollah and Hamas. Finally, Iran and its Islamic revolution are competing with Wahhabism, the religious doctrine spread out of the Muslim world by Saudi Arabia as a tool of power. This is a vital issue for the internal affairs of Arab Gulf states because of the important Shiite minorities in their territories.

Arab states wish to avoid the destabilising effects of Iran confrontation with the international community as Iran is quite popular in many countries in the region. The has led these nations to only feebly criticised the Iranian nuclear programme. Even so, several policies have been implemented, but they are scattered. One of the main responses has been the enhancement of military conventional capacities by Gulf states. Their armament purchase has regularly increased over the decade. Moreover, Arab countries have invested in high standard armaments (e.g. aircraft Eurofighter, Air defence system THAAD) to answer the Iranian threat. These states have also sought to diversify their strategic partnership, trying to get closer to NATO and western powers, especially Turkey and France. If Egyptian military expenditure does not seem to be particularly linked with the Iranian threat, Egypt has implemented a "nuclear diplomacy" based on the right for every state to own nuclear capacities for peaceful purposes. By launching a domestic nuclear programme without breaking its commitment to the NPT, the Egyptian regime wished to strengthen its position in the Middle-East and its prestige in the face of Iran. Egypt probably hoped to be the leader of this policy on the Arab stage. Nevertheless, several Arab states, like Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, launched similar programmes, but they did it separately without real dialogue.

One of the main results of Arab attempts to address the Iranian threat has been the end of common policies on the nuclear issue in the League of Arab States framework. Egypt in particular has not succeeded in maintaining its leadership. Nevertheless, it prefigures a new field of rapprochement between the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Egypt. Egyptian should implement its policy of promoting domestic nuclear programmes in conjunction with the GCC to which Egyptian adhesion is currently discussed. This would allow Arab states not to appear timid in front of Iran. Influencing Iranian nuclear policy would entail the combination of unified action on nuclear domestic programmes and more outspoken criticism of and proposal for the settlement of the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Baudouin Long is currently a postgraduate student in Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College London. He holds a postgraduate degree in International relations and Politics from the Institute for Political Studies in Aix-en-Provence (Sciences-Po Aix).

This piece is a shorter version of the research piece The Impact of Iranian Nuclear Ambition on Nuclear Policies of its Arab Neighbours.

Related Material from Atlantic Community:

• Parag Khanna: A Future Without Borders
• Greg Randolph Lawson: The Golden Age of Proliferation is Here to Stay
• Shazad Ali: Carrots for Pakistan, Sticks for the Gulf States

May 3, 2010

Philippe Labrecque, King's College London, (3)

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Iran's alleged nuclear program may lead to confrontations before it is actually able to produce nuclear weapons. As mentioned in this article, Arab states have already begun a military build-up in order to improve their strategic position in the Middle-East vis-à-vis Iran. Such increases in conventional means is not to make Israel feel more secure, especially when combined with the possibility of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Israel has demonstrated in the past (Iraq and Syria) that it is willing and able to carry preventive strikes in order to prevent what it considers hostile regimes from acquiring nuclear weapons. A Iranian bomb would also force Israel to take a clear stance concerning its nuclear strategy concerning Iran. The present opaque stance Israel espouses would undermine deterrence between a nuclear Iran and Israel and combined with nuclear proliferation amongst Arab states the situation could quickly become impossible to resolve or stabilize.

The consequences of a preventive strike by Israel is not unlikely to lead to a wider conflict which would invariably involved the United States and the EU, even if only as mediators, although the latter would be unlikely if Iran is to retaliate with missile strikes against Israel. Therefore the United States could easily be involved militarily widening the conflict even more. The military exchange would not be the only problem as fundamentalist groups would gain greatly from the public outraged directed at Israel throughout the region following the strikes. The paradox is that Iran may be pursuing nuclear weapons in order to deter the very strikes Israel conducted against Iraq and Syria and that could be carried against Iran. By conducting such preventive strikes Israel legitimizes Iranian fears and increases the feeling that only nuclear deterrence will suffice versus Israel.

The Middle-East, including Iran and Israel, is better off as a nuclear-free zone enforced through verifications by an external agent (the IAEA for example) but the second best option is a Middle-East with only Israel remaining armed with nuclear weapons as it removes the incentives for other regimes to pursue nuclear programs. From a global perspective what matters is that the recently released Nuclear Posture Review aims at a world free of nuclear weapons. The latter won’t be achieved if Iran develops nuclear weapons since it will create the incentives needed for the Arab states to develop or revive their nuclear programs, possibly prompting certain states to default on their NPT obligations and sinking the latter and ‘Global Zero’ at the same time.

Philippe Labrecque
MA War Studies, King's College London

Tags: | proliferation nuclear NPT Global Zero |

May 5, 2010

Malika Pulatova, New York University, (4)

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Long’s article on the Arab reaction to the Iranian nuclear program seems to be primarily based upon the assumption of an inherent and uniform tension between Iran on the one hand and all Arab countries on the other. Although tension is not deniable, it is doubtful that it exists equally among all Arab countries and for the same reasons. While, as the author convincingly argued, the Gulf states have competing commercial and strategic interests with Iran, other centralized authoritarian governments, such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq under Saddam Hussain, were primarily concerned with the possible spread of the Islamic revolution that Khomeini advocated. This does not deny that fact that even though Iran under the Shah had a tendency to become a regional power, Arab rulers did not necessarily view it as a threat.

Concerning the question of the balance of powers, even though the development of a nuclear weapon in Iran will undeniably change it, the article does not address the question of Israel’s nuclear capacities. Given plenty of historical and ideological factors, it may seem that the Israeli nuclear program is an existing threat that far outweighs the possible Iranian one from an Arab political perspective. In addition, the Egyptian attempts to build a peaceful nuclear program do not necessarily have to be seen in light of the response to Iran. In fact, it seems that a lot of the programs adopted by Arab regimes in the past decades are more closely related to the internal challenges pertaining to maintaining grip over power and stifling internal democratic voices.

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