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August 19, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

As this is very close to the theme of my M.A. thesis, which I am currently working, I would like to add some more interesting articles.

- Frühling, Stephan; Schreer, Benjamin (2010): Creating the Next Generation of NATO Partnerships, IN: The RUSI Journal, 155 (2010) No. 1, 52-57.

- Hamilton, Daniel (ed.) (2009): Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century, IN: Center for Strategic and International Studies et al. (ed.), The Washington NATO Project, < http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090130_nato_draft_final.pdf >.

- Lindley-French, Julian; Boyer, Yves (2010): STRATCON 2010: An Alliance for a Global Century, IN: Atlantic Council of the United States (ed.), Report of the Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group, < http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/STRATCON%202010%20REPO... >.

- Razoux, Pierre (2010): What future for NATO´s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, IN: NATO Defense College (ed.), Research Paper No. 55, January 2010.

The Turkish Policy Quarterly issue above contains some more interesting articles about the topic.

August 19, 2010

Olaf Theiler, Political Scientist, German Armed Forces, Platinum Contributor (173)

@ Felix
Thanks for these useful additonal texts. For further reading you could also take a look at:

- Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process of strategic change. In: International Affairs 85:2 (2009), p.211-226.

- Christopher S. Chivvis, Recasting NATO's Strategic Concept: Possible Directions for the United States. RAND Occasional Paper, 2009
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP280.pdf

- Phillip R. Cuccia, Implications of a changing NATO. SSI, May 2010. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubI...

There are also some interesting articles in the AICGS Advisor, Issue 6, March 18, 2010
http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/gateslinks.aspx

August 19, 2010

Claudiu Dan Degeratu, EURISC Foundation, Silver Contributor (64)

This is a very good initiative.
I have a question related with the memo title NATO 2020: A New Strategic Policy for an Alliance in Transition.
What does it mean "Transition", is it your view that in 2020 the NATO will be in transition? Or shall we prepare ourselves for more 10 years of transition policy?
It is good to know your view before I start contributing with some humble ideas.

August 19, 2010

Olaf Theiler, Political Scientist, German Armed Forces, Platinum Contributor (173)

@ Claudiu Dan Degeratu,

In fact, NATO is in transition for more than 15 years now, constantly trying to adapt to a changed security environment. The term transition itself refers to a undefined period of change.

My personal understanding of the titel is that the Group of Experts expect NATO to tranform itself in order to become fit for the future, i.e. the time after 2020. It is impossible to predict how long the necessary changes will need since this depends at least partly on the development of the security environment and the respective changes in security interests/policies of its memberstates.

Hope this is helpful...

August 19, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

Transition happens in present and will continue in the future as well. I would define it as: " Adoption process to the evolving challenges of a rapidly globalizing world."

August 19, 2010

Hans Reuther-Fix

The new NATO seems not to be qualified for a " Mission Statement", because of potentially creating
a false dichotomy of " military and non-military" issues.
It is further complicated, as advising experts recommend for NATO to search for a partnership with the EU
So, EU actually could refuse NATO's offer of assistance and support....
Would NATO then go down the slippery road of tainted politics, as the EC still remains.

It almost seems that NATO now promotes itself to the management culture for independent nations.
Allow me, but sovranty (sovereignty) and autonomy should not be traded and accepted as the legions and the legionnaires of a new Rome.

The Lisbon Treaty must have priority over NATO. It is a reality, as much as the axis between France,
Germany, Poland and Russia, when Germany committed itself to help to rebuild the Russian economy.
Afterall, Russia has the raw-materials and the EU has the know-how.

It would be interesting to know the names of the experts, besides Madame Allbright.


HRF

August 20, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

@HRF: Have a look inside the report (p. 49): http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100...

August 20, 2010

Lauren Tucker, Atlantic Community, Gold Contributor (78)

As Felix pointed out, the complete list of experts can be found within the report, on page 49.

In regards to what is meant by "an Alliance in transition," Felix's definition hits it right on the mark. NATO must strive to adapt itself to an international security environment that is constantly undergoing change in often unexpected ways. As Dr. Theiler explains, it is an impossible task to create a precise timeline for transition - it is not a static process. This idea is also reflected in the title of the report of the Group of Experts: Nato 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. The challenge for NATO is to provide security in a dynamic environment that is shaped by a large and complex set of variables.

When speaking of the partnership between the EU and NATO, it is somewhat misleading to say that the EU should either accept or reject NATO's assistance. Both the EU and NATO are largely influenced by the policies of their members states, many of whom enjoy membership in both organizations. I don't believe the partnership must be defined in terms of a competitive relationship, and I also disagree that pooled sovereignty is a sign of servitude. In any case, sovereignty is more a question of EU institutions rather than NATO.

Please note that the Skype strategy session conference call will include remarks by Dr. Theiler as well as Dr. Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, who served on the Group of Experts.

August 20, 2010

Joerg Wolf, Atlantic Community, Editor

UPDATE: A US expert will participate in the Skype strategy session as well: Dr. Jorge Benitez, who works for the Atlantic Council and wrote his dissertation on the development of the 1991 NATO strategic concept.

All three experts have been long-time members of atlantic-community.org as well.

August 23, 2010

Jasur Sumerinli - Azerbaijan Doktrina military think-tank center

It's the good idea. I think that's importance to including in new strategic consept specialy parts about NATO's cooperation with active partnership states. Unfortunately I didn't find the huge opinions about cooperation with partners in the document “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement”. I think that NATO must pay attention to estabilishment different relationship with partrner countries. NATO must participate to keeping security of this states. NATO must participate in the solution process of frozen conflict in South Caucasus.

Today countries of South Caucasus under the pressing of Russia. Russia occupied Georgian territory and located there military bases. Russia support to Armenia to occuping process Azerbaijan territories. Today Armenia occupied about 20 percents of Azerbaijan terrirtory. And Russia is mainly player in this destructiv process.

Now days Russia prolongs rent agreement of military base number 102 in territory of Armenia for 49 year. One is statute of this protokol about that Russia gives guarantee to defend Armenian military security jointly.

In 2011 be expected prolong rent agreement about Qabala Radio Locaton Station in Azerbaijan.

Indeed Russia want to realise hegemonian policy in South Caucasus region.

It is interesting for me. How will NATO to answer him? Unfortunately I didn't se anythink about this matter.

I think that in new strategic consept of NATO must be imply closely cooperation with active partner country as South Caucasian states. And NATO must support to solve territorial problem and frozen conflict in this region.

NATO must help army buildings process in partner countries as strongest. NATO must safe this countries from other defence industry. That why NATO must realise weapons trade to this country for building new army.

And NATO must pay attention to democratision process in South Caucasus' countries. NATO must interest transparency of the reforms and military budjets in this region.

Thanks for attention!

August 23, 2010

Member deleted

"I don't think NATO has much of a future if it does not succeed in Afghanistan." - General Mullen.

August 25, 2010

Lauren Tucker, Atlantic Community, Gold Contributor (78)

Here is an excellent video on Article 5's position in the new Strategic Concept. It offers a range of viewpoints from different member states, as well as from Russia.

NATO Review: NATO's New Strategic Concept: A battle of minds?

August 27, 2010

Lawrence Efana

Let me begin my contribution as requested to this debate, by first of all, stating that NATO has turned an extraordinary chapter in its history. It is an institution standing between politics and military and yet uniquely so, it has the courage to understand and want to put democracy into practice. That is what this public 'out-reach' explicitly puts across. It is most appreciated far and beyond the Transatlantic Community Organization membership circles, that the enigmas of 'need to know' - even on the scale or level seen, has been put into practice this far. There are two likely reasons for the relatively new sense of improvement: (i) the presence of President Obama in the White House; and (ii) the regional spirit of new NATO Secretary General: a "Scandinavian", I prefer to emphasize than say outright a "European"! Good personalities in politics make it a pleasant game to play-even across technical combat and strategic lines like the military and its various units, organs and or infrastructures.

We have heard political scientists say that the challenge of embedded democracies - wherever, is to perfect and deepen the democratic spirit. NATO's effort is a journey in that direction - it is a "Western edifice"]. A strategically advisory message deducible from this is: steadfastness and the courage to enhance tolerance and understanding for transition democracies, and support for new democracies that they can withstand the test of time, political conflicts and crisis. All are important for and beyond European contexts that NATO finds or defines its organizational setting, roles and reform: the 2020] plans. Russia features here.

Contributors to this debate are not to overstep 500 or 700 words. If I freely overstep for the joy of key theme, I plead for tolerance, fully aware of the comment themes' outlines: (a) the strengthening of public diplomacy initiatives; (b) the further development of a modern, flexible response force and (c) the improvement of relation with Russia, with membership as future consideration. As I read through the comments above, and both summaries: (i) NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement - Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO; (ii) Strategic Concept; and also enjoyed listening to the You Tube videos, it became clear to rethink and connect the outlines, not easy to do using both summaries only. What strikes me is how do we look for and find balance in enormous differentiation, something I tried to ‘blog’ on sometime ago. 2020 transition plans are crucial in many senses and this is one of them. Some are suspicious of transition contextually. I do not, equally as I do not contest the term transformation, but the tasks [NATO realizes] are enormous. In contributing to the papers and debate the enormity may be seen and appreciated in different depths - with or not the possibility to venture beyond the 3 comment themes' outlines.

To continue, permit me comment on both paper summaries. They are good and highly ambitious. Nearly every word in each of them is "keyword": a hard reality of the challenging faces. One of the papers is more of an appeal. There is something softening and therefore good in that appeal. NATO makes its case historically and also relatively empirically. In "a political and economic world" of our day, NATO is an organization, and like every other organization, stands to fight for its existence and survival. Good! It is an era that "change and reform" gain more momentum and politics defined by party interests, senses undue threats to mindsets. NATO also senses its pond-like wave effect. A most frightening scenario contextually, is tendency of modern politics and parties to drives citizens as pawns: - imagined story of a divided family, where you see father and mother woo the child left and right, finding faults with each other and playing adversarial game to get power, divide and rule. There are such signs in alliance and partnership contexts, regionally and otherwise! That is where politics becomes a ‘dirty’ game, should NATO become blind and too dependent. Both papers are polite, not so outspoken thus, but they also clearly show awareness for the discrete trend dangers carefully adorned words and expressions like military and political dichotomy, jeopardy for alliance solidarity hence need to reinforce Alliance political role. It is a primary challenge.

The Scandinavian regional background of the Secretary General will thus be tested, but clearly useful from political angles like these. Appointment and constitution of the expert group for the job of the new perspective are well and good. They have shown that the 'Military' remains relatively constant and technical, but to be more insightful on direction wanted future challenges. Public diplomacy is mentioned less often in the paper. But, even in that context implicit consciousness for dangers of politics: democratic and non-democratic alike, is a sensed humbling and moderating factor: not to feel that the NATO of today does not understand or appreciate the value of soft contra hard powers, or when, where, and how to apply them. Of relevance and importance, is the fact that the international relations writer Nye is in the class promoting soft power logic, not as outcome of coercion but attractiveness resource.

That makes political dimension to however turn problematic for NATO as an Alliance: one not based on country-hood cultures, political ideals and policies but on their permutated commonality. Even so, something is novel and Nyeish in the 2020 paper from the way experts make and construct NATO future plan narratives explicitly and implicitly along imagined lines of: multiculturalism, notions of coalition - alliance and partnership building], thus letting loose sensitivities to separate hard: extremely secret] from public diplomacy, as a pointer encouraging cultural exchanges and political transplantation favorable to democracy ideals consonant with some 'founding' drive-items of the Alliance back in 1949. That increases the credibility for preparation of new grounds for internal and external policy measures most likely to win friends and strengthen trusts than further trek the paths of frustration, increasing conflict and alienation. Policy makers should give more time to think soft power not a threat, but good strategic tool in hard times of change. That is a good reason for NATO 2020 not to be unequivocal and politically ambivalent, while working as a military alliance organization.

NATO 2020......., also has many overlapping narratives, somewhat too repetitive, but that could also be due to the need to emphasize and reiterate: a product of the paper's policy- change appeal characteristic, rather political and psychological! It is sufficiently technical on its military history and objectives. For both papers, armament / disarmament alongside the paths of strategic studies are of help, so for many, especially those familiar with SALT and various Helsinki Agreement Rounds, not much is new in various sections [chapters] of the analysis. However, Cold War lessons are well deduced, especially with Russia in center. There are many recommendations from the expert group punctuating each of the sub or sub-sub sections. The viability of some of them will be relatively dependent on the "health" of world states and future politics thereon, which are as difficult to predict as the notion of: 'new perils or unconventional dangers'. One can see NATO more caught-up in the 'political' and so unduly vulnerable in the 'military' - its one-time raison-detre! The crux with 2020 is thus indeed too political to play down or adorn with military and strategic concept finesses.

It can turn out more dangerous a world, if adversarial views play informed calls of several publics for re-evaluation of methods, styles and strategies, critical risks estimates and more conscientious intelligence gathering, analysis and reporting. It is altogether, all about our institutions and us. That is, what we want, which for many, it does not seem we know or have been tutored so far by lessons to choose less pretentious consensus, among others on global environmental crises. As organization, NATO is feeling its pinch hence internal plans for administrative scale down, etc. You cannot do that and turn going hard in military front with a somewhat self-defeating military complex innovations of weapon systems, technology and warfare, believing that commitment to peace is dependent on lavish values about power, superiority and control. Soft power rationality and impetus gets a hearing: one truly worthwhile contextually and potent even in NATO's context.

Europe and Cold War were lessons of their time. NATO learned right and Europe has evolved with pains into a new but still unstable era. And yet we have to take more pains to raise pertinent non-evasive questions. Bi-polar politics is off, multi-polar politics is in, with new complex centers of technological, economic, military powers springing up here and there, in which the old status-quo values are no longer able to dislodge without deadly outcome in our nuclear proliferation and missiles age. An age in that those without them mess-up human dignity with suicidal deaths - whether or not a revival of Japanese World War II bomb' mission of no-return with life. Pearl Harbor aggression and World Trade Center attacks were both wrong but atomic bomb response and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan currently prove to push all against a moral wall at this stage of our appreciated enlightenment counter proliferating circles of pains and wastes arising from lessons of war as ill-winds blowing no one good! NATO might still sound good a 'savior', but wanting still to wear Caesar’s outfits might leave many in limbo unconvinced. It is a matter of public fear about what past strategies and indecisive politics of the day might do, using NATO's name.

They might be arguing that penetration of public diplomacy is vague as yet: not strong enough as a worthwhile experience-driven military combat hardware, itself a genuine argument about how to alley public fears and worries: a case to augment NATO's 2020 proposed strategic policy position. It is not negative but positive aimed to admonish NATO on a range of strategic challenges, derived from emergent arms of Afghanistan's ongoing lessons and experiences, partly induced by disturbing changes in warfare tactics, psychology and counter insurgency agendas. Recommendation admonishes 'sacrificial' morale from ISAF, but how realistic against the background of casualty and setback definitions? Where is the intensity of diplomacy there; in Iraq, five months after national elections with no understanding for meaning of a government of national unity; locked interrelated regional positions hence more lessons to draw? With all due understanding and respect for NATO's efforts against known odds so far, it has the right to comfort itself as an organization, but if that is overdone it also faces the risk of not seeing other hidden complex textures of problems "beclouded" as they are politically.

To make its 2020 plan one earn consensus, and offer a strong attraction to: (a) its own member countries' public, (b) other classes of partnership members: the UN, Non-NATO EU member states active in OSCE] and their public, and (c) other range of actor-publics, with whom it interacts directly and indirectly, a question about the type of world wanted for the future, should be clearly and less ambiguously stated. Here the political, economic and environmental are primary, military is secondary. Threat scenarios and protection of key points worldwide and fighting cyber attacks will need global solidarity, equally as fights against drug peddlers, criminal gangs and insurgent groups. Surveillance, cross-boarder policing, respect for international law and collaboration by law enforcement and security agencies will be needed. But because of past lessons, it has to be a world totally rearranged and that means the UN, like EU might be very central players.

It also means mindset war, structural and functional reforms, sensitivity to our fragile environment. In none of these has some of the combat strategies found in some sections of new NATO plan, a monopoly right. Missile systems here and there will only deepen suspicion and lead nowhere on disarmament and openness, what is most needed. It will take pains to build the trust but that is not directly as simple as we might be forced to think and arrogate to NATO. It can become a world organ partnering the UN, but will take much of reforms to do that, and without the long awaited New World Political and Economic Order, it might mean persisting in the same circle of conflicts and finding out that war, war, war, will lead nowhere, no matter the sophistication of weaponry systems, with which we, of-course, may succeed to destroy ourselves, demolish and render our own civilization laughable. There must be a peaceful way out and the sooner NATO sees and begins to work on that the better and more it will find the friends and supports needed, implicit in the paper and its characterization as an appeal for public support. I do hope that I have, in one general rather than specific manner, here and there interwoven the three comment themes outlines, to make convincing implicit and explicit arguments on their behalf.

August 28, 2010

Lauren Tucker, Atlantic Community, Gold Contributor (78)

Here is another video from NATO Review that focuses on how the financial crisis and a change in leadership in the US, France and Germany will influence the direction of the new Strategic Concept. Ambitions will have to remain realistic in the face of cuts to defense budgets, but there is a significant opportunity for consensus on key aims given the improvement in transatlantic relations:

NATO's new Strategic Concept: Timing is Everything?

August 28, 2010

Lawrence Efana

The videos are good and frank in their contents. Public relations in this context should not be a problem. There is no special gap between the set of efforts and what social or main stream medias should, could or can do. At the same time, at both national and international levels, it seems the scope and clarity of NATO intentions will need further scrutiny to earn it acceptable status for the transition and transformation strategy. On this, the variety of views and remarks in the videos is indeed no direct sign of consensus, but of-course, sign that realistic debates are going on and that there is the will to work on and arrive at what could be more pragmatic under the conditions: financial crisis and defense spending cuts.

Financial crisis is definitely not overplayed, when thinking of interests and challenges of many other sectors and the state of our world. Political will and alliance solidarity are massively very dependent. Degrees of fluctuations in both, looking across real NATO membership countries, not excluding ISAF-related countries may vary, but unwise to separate and not rate a function of named dependent factors. The argument that "allies do core businesses differently" should perhaps be better interpreted, among others in this context. Frankly also, the other argument that Afghanistan saps modernization resources is inevitably serious. It deals blows on many other interrelated strategic visions as of now anyway.

And it cannot be ruled out that ambition elements in ongoing plan are also impacted upon. Former Eastern block countries are still too drastic in their reading of Europe: perhaps with little interest for the outer worlds. NATO must find out where trust continues to go missing amidst the enormous progress in Europe at present under relatively constantly improving umbrella coverage of the European Union. It is a question of who stands to foot the bills: budget]. Surely if there is doubt about that, there is an option: improved national, EU and Transatlantic diplomacy. Contradictions will be enormous if NATO as an alliance organ at this time of our maturity and progress, fails to face hard questions in the face of estimated hard realities and choices. All sound paradoxical, but when democracy and politics push everything to the people [citizens] of individual countries and regions, accountability grows and demands for it hardens.

Not many of them will be deceived no matter how adversarial the politics. NATO has to be bold to ask many more questions, so also social media activists and national press. The point is not that NATO should not survive. No! Rather it is: survival in what form, with what degree of burdens, what definition of security at this time of experience and maturity and finally, in alliance with whom and which types of other institutions? These have so far been argued, but as yet the ambition level is still short of resources and perhaps interpretation of clearer mindsets and political moral.

August 28, 2010

Kazimierz Wiesak, Pennsylvania State University, Silver Contributor (75)

"NATO's new Strategic Concept"

Well, maybe we should start by using a simpler language of goals and methods. This will introduce some clarity of thought. What are the goals of NATO? After we agree on goals, we'll be in position to discuss methods.

I have an impression that some want to hide goals of NATO. Are those goals so unappealing that it's better to keep them unmentioned?

August 30, 2010

Jerzy S Deren, strategic analyst, DSW University of Lower Silesia Wroclaw visiting professor, Silver Contributor (43)

Kazimierz almost hit the target. Goals are not hidden but its burden exceeds European nations’ enduringness. Read: R Kagan: Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the new World Order. No simplicity in NATO policy. Since 1999, with introduction of the NATO Strategic Concept every next Summit generated number of new political ideas, and in the result planers developed a new Force Goals focused on delivery of a new capabilities. Finally, real picture is dimmed, what can be achieved by nations suffering lack of resources. Big inventory is required to identify NATO (Allies) capabilities in various defense disciplines.