The German parliament has extended the Bundeswehr's mission in Afghanistan for another fourteen months. A discussion is now needed on what goals the German army can realistically be expected to achieve and which strategy will offer the best hope for success.
Discussing military strategy in public seems somehow odd in Germany. Such dialogue in the US, where academics and journalists alike follow and sometimes drive the debate on counterinsurgency, proves that it is not always the generals who have the soundest understanding of new patterns of warfare. Smaller countries like the Netherlands or Denmark also show a remarkable willingness to adapt to new military realities. While still limited to the relatively stable northern region of Afghanistan, Germany needs to be prepared for when violence comes to German troops.
When German forces entered Afghanistan nearly seven years ago, they had little more than their recent peacekeeping experience from the Balkans to guide them. The idea was that reconstruction together with a democratically elected government would prevent the country from sliding back into violence. All the German soldiers had to do was man well-defended camps and conduct occasional patrols, thus deterring the well-known regional power brokers from taking up arms against the central government. Now confronted with a rising insurgency that - as suggested by anecdotal evidence - is to a large extent a grass-roots movement fueled by the mere presence of foreign forces, German strategy has not changed much. Worse, a debate on the aims and strategy for the Bundeswehr's mission, which could give valuable input to the political and military leadership, is painfully lacking.
Here are six suggestions for such a debate:
- Acknowledge the need to think about counterinsurgency. That does not necessarily mean adopting US doctrine, but something more sophisticated than building schools and hoping for the good will of the population is necessary. Experience shows that the dynamics of a counterinsurgency campaign are almost always underappreciated.
- Dramatically improve culture and language skills. These barriers hamper all operations. Dari is still seldom taught at the Bundeswehr's language institute. A new concept for linguists is urgently needed, from two-week courses for "combat linguists" to fully trained translators. Furthermore, in a culture that prefers politeness to honesty (most Afghans would find it rude to admit they don't know the directions you're asking for), Westerners are prone to grave cultural misunderstandings.
- Counterinsurgency is population-centric warfare, thus intelligence in a counterinsurgency campaign must be as well. Intelligence collection, and especially analysis, should focus on the local population. Most importantly, trained collectors and analysts are best utilized in one theater - don't send them to Bosnia once they have a grasp on the structures and dynamics in Badakhshan.
- Transform psychological operations. Insurgents are fairly efficient in framing the foreign military presence as an occupation. Counter their narratives day and night with a coherent and credible narrative for the campaign. Go where the population is (and the insurgents). Use teahouses, bazaars and mosques. Constantly monitor and improve the effects of this counter narrative.
- Be prepared to get out of the camps. It is not enough to tell the population that you are there for their security; you have to make sure the insurgents cannot threaten them into compliance. This can be achieved only by constant presence, not by occasional patrols. Thus an infantry increase is needed.
- Delegate authority to the most local level possible. Yes, Afghanistan is a very demanding and politically sensitive mission. However, the PRT-commander, RC North in Mazar, or the ministry in Berlin cannot decide everything. The Bundeswehr was once proud of its famous Auftragstaktik - adapting tactics to the local situation. It must live up to this flexible and efficient tradition.
Florian Broschk is a lecturer in Islamic studies at Bonn University and teaches Dari at the Federal Language Institute. As a reserve officer he served four tours with ISAF in Afghanistan.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Abbas Daiyar: Negotiating with Taliban is Admitting Defeat
- HOT ISSUE: How to Keep NATO Relevant?
- Morgan Sheeran: Afghan Surge: More Police Trainers Essential
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October 28, 2008
Morgan Sheeran, Armed Forces, Afghan Veteran, blogger, Gold Contributor (106)
While agreeing with Mr. Broschk's debate points as a whole, particularly the emphasis on counterinsurgency and Information Operations, if there is a national hesitance to use force, even when confronted, then other endeavors may be best. This is brings up years of policy, and particularly seven years of policy in Afghanistan.
Organizational mentoring is not a task viewed by soldiers as being overly military, but it is necessary. One of the key IO points that the Taliban score with is the corruption in the Afghan government. This corruption alienates the population from their government, and change in this area will not occur by itself. Germans are famous for efficient government and effective use of resources. This strength could well be utilized in Afghanistan to have much greater impact than sitting in large FOB's in the outlying provinces.
Perhaps the greatest impact that Germans can have is in Kabul and the provincial levels as organizational mentors.
Germany, not being alone, would have to renegotiate with its NATO partners to take up this type of role, for the troops in the north would need to be replaced. A secondary impact of these types of discussions would be legitimizing the concept that corruption and inefficiency at the higher levels of the Afghan government need to be addressed forcefully and soon.
The most effective Information Operations are based on truth. If a claim is to be made that life under the IRoA is better than life under some Taliban-led caliphate, then there must be truth in that claim. To the average Afghan, dealing with corruption and inefficiency in their government is no longer an acceptable option. Only effective leadership from the international community can bring such a focus, and Germany can take a very important role in making the necessary changes in Afghan ministries.
A collateral benefit would be a significant increase in the effectiveness of money spent by NATO countries in Afghanistan. Perhaps German mentors could break the "fuel mafia" at MoI, for instance.
Lacking the imagination to allow Germany to take a role that takes into consideration German sensitivities on use of force forces German troops into situations that their rules of engagement may not allow them to respond to appropriately. This unduly endangers German lives. Finding a role that makes use of German capabilities while minimizing their operational risks would be potentially very productive, especially if Mr. Broschk's suggestions on language and cultural training are implemented concurrently.