In a tumultuous world, America needs to retain maximum strategic flexibility. The request by General Stanley McChrystal to expand US ground forces in Afghanistan, while perhaps necessary to secure medium term stability there, may tie up more forces than the US interest can afford. An appropriate regional strategy must focus on preventing the reemergence of easy training grounds for terrorists while bringing in other players to prevent a collapse of regional stability.
Pakistan is the key nation where US interests are most challenged. While true that the former Taliban government in Afghanistan gave succor to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Taliban itself largely originated from Pakistan as part of complex local and geopolitical issues including its conflict with India.
Fundamentally, America's interest in Afghanistan, while significant, must be looked at within a global framework. Simply put, US resources must be built back up so that it can take on these kinds of projects. In the interim, they must be judiciously deployed while retaining the ability to confront other simultaneous challenges. Though a reconstituted al-Qaeda within Afghanistan must be dealt with immediately, this does not necessarily require Afghanistan to become a democracy in the traditional, western sense.
Both President Bush and President Obama seem allured by the notion that the only way to keep al-Qaeda off balance is to force Afghanistan to become something it has never been in its history- a unified state with a reasonably strong central government. However, even a federated government may not do justice to the various tribal loyalties in the nation. This raises serious questions about any long-term success for creating a stable state, even if Gen. McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy works as intended.
With all choices in the region deeply problematic, it seems the least bad one is to focus on preventing Afghanistan from being an easy base of operations for terrorists while shifting to regional diplomacy to dry up the wellspring from which al-Qaeda grows. This could be done by taking several steps:
- slowly disengage most current ground forces in Afghanistan without telegraphing specific time lines;
- retain an intelligence presence complete with financial incentives to maintain relations with various tribes;
- retain a rapid strike capability with naval and air assets that can act upon any intelligence;
- work to develop public/private partnerships with NGOs to continue an influx of capital into Afghanistan to construct schools and basic infrastructure
Though a far cry from "doubling down" in Afghanistan, this would also not be a repeat of the mistake made after the US left Afghanistan to its inner turmoil in the early 90s.
Meanwhile, the US must continue to push Pakistan to keep neo-Taliban elements contained within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and away from the most significant population centers. This must be done with or without the current rather weak civilian government.
The US also needs to reengage India more than it has since Obama took office. As India is a rising power in the region, it must be considered the key ingredient in keeping the pot from boiling over. It would clearly not be in India's best interest if Afghanistan devolves back into a jihadist playground. Given this, it may even be possible to entice India to play a limited role on the ground in Afghanistan as the US reduces its own footprint.
Obviously, there would need to be guarantees to Pakistan that this is not part of a conspiracy to surround it. However, this may add another incentive for Pakistan to fight more aggressively against those destabilizing Afghanistan to avoid a major expansion of Indian influence.
The US can not abandon Afghanistan to the vicissitudes of fortune. Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed to again find sanctuary there. Yet, with other problems looming, including the possibility of a military altercation with Iran or the need to recalibrate forces in Central/Eastern Europe due to revanchism in Russia, the US cannot allow its flexibility to be permanently constrained while fighting to establish something unlikely to be successful in the long-term. US interests are too broad for it to become strategically myopic.
Mr. Lawson is the Director of Communications for a US based political advocacy organization and is a life long observer of political and foreign affairs.
Related material from the Atlantic Community
- James Cricks on Iraq: Winston Churchill and Deja Vu
- Morgan Sheeran on Afghan Surge: More Police Trainers Essential
- Harlan Ullman on Stakes are Higher in Pakistan than Afghanistan
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November 24, 2009
Toby Joseph David Frost, Student, (2)
Conceding direct control of the civilian population in Afghanistan to the Taliban would effectively be conceding what theory has established as the main battleground in a counter-insurgency campaign. Allowing the Taliban unmolested access to the civilian population would catalyse the pace at which their current insurgency campaign could reach its concluding manoeuvre stage, especially given the relative infantile state of the Afghan government.
What the Taliban will advertise as a massive NATO capitulation of territory will be fed into the regional and global salafi jihadist strategic narrative, increasing the perception of strength that the Taliban could hope to enjoy. This will both galvanise any support that the organisation has already managed to foster, and also increase the rate at which the organisations growth and support expands regionally.
Both of these factors will exacerbate the already prevalent security problems along the Afghan-Pakistan border, reducing the utility that the United States can hope to gain from forging strategically beneficial relationships in these regions.
Moreover, given the limited access that the United States could hope to have to the civilian population and the impact this would have on their ability to collect actionable HUMINT, the key intelligence resource in such operations, it seems it would be extremely difficult for the United States to conduct an effective counter-terrorist campaign.
All of this is not to say that the United States does not need to seriously withdraw the level of strategic assets it has committed to the region. What this does suggest, however, is that this withdrawal should only occur once the situation in Afghanistan is stable enough to ensure, as far as possible, that the Afghan government is protected from the insurgent influences of the Taliban and, most importantly, has the support of the civilian population within the state, safeguarding itself against an insurgent strategy in the future. In short, the United States needs to accept a short term loss in strategic flexibility in order to reap maximum benefits from a scaled back counter-terrorist strategy in the future.