At the
Lisbon Summit, German Federal Chancellor, Angela Merkel, hailed NATO's opening
to Russia
as proof that the Cold War had finally ended (Deutsche Welle).
One key outcome of the meeting was the decision to establish a joint missile
shield to protect Alliance members and the
invitation to Russia
to cooperate in the effort (New
York Times). Russian assistance might be helpful to prevent possible
attacks from nuclear-armed states, especially Iran. However, NATO member Turkey insisted that Tehran
not be named specifically as an adversary in order not to hinder talks with Iran (Zeit).
Among NATO
member countries, Germany
has traditionally distinguished itself in its advocacy for closer relations
with Moscow.
However, the precise mechanisms of that envisioned collaboration have yet to be
determined. NATO prefers an add-on strategy of complementing its missile
defense with the Russian one, with a U.S. general firmly in command. Moscow meanwhile insists
upon an integrated system and a true partnership. There are fears that the
Kremlin could consider a NATO missile shield without Russian participation as
evidence that the nuclear balance in Europe
would be altered to its disadvantage. Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev argues
that this could potentially incite a new arms race in Europe (FAZ).
Nuclear
disarmament also weighed heavily on the minds of the Americans at Lisbon. The Obama
Administration faces Republican foot-dragging in the U.S. Congress on the
ratification of the START agreement. The treaty's failure to pass the House
could well "anger Russia,"
as journalists at one German public TV seem to fear (MDR).
In
Germany meanwhile, a debate
in the German Bundestag several days prior the Lisbon Summit brought to light
diverging attitudes toward the Alliance.
Rainer Stinner of the coalition FDP emphasized that NATO had a successful
record in guaranteeing peace in Europe for
over half a century. NATO would need to place added emphasis on Article 4 and
become a hub for information exchange and cooperation on security issues for
the same to hold true for another 60 years.
Gernot
Erler, the deputy head of the SPD parliamentary faction in charge of foreign
policy, meanwhile was the first of many parliamentarians to criticize the lack
of transparency in discussing NATO's new strategic concept. Even though the
Bundestag session had been scheduled for this express purpose of discussing the
concept draft, German legislators had been given only restricted access to the
classified paper. The lack of transparency stood in contradiction to the Alliance's declared
values. Erler's fellow party member Uta Zapf declared that the SPD would
continue to demand the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from German soil. With an
eye to the missile shield, she criticized what she called using nuclear weapons
as glue for the fabric of the transatlantic community.
The
head of the opposition Green Party, Juergen Trittin, pointed out that NATO as a
military alliance was ill-suited for dealing with threats such as cyber war. As
Trittin put it, NATO could not well bomb Google. Many of the issues faced by
the Atlantic Alliance today could only be properly addressed in the framework
of police efforts. NATO should concentrate on its core mission - the military
defense of Europe - instead of losing its
focus by taking on too many tasks.
Gesine
Loetzsch of the Left Party meanwhile insisted that NATO had simply outlived its
purpose. The Alliance
provided no answers to the more pressing problems of the day, such as trade
wars or climate change. In her view, the military alliance merely perpetuated
conflicts by intervening in countries like Afghanistan.
The
chairman of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ruprecht Polenz of the
CDU, summed up the debate by saying that, in his opinion, three different
attitudes toward NATO prevailed among German politicians: While the coalition
parties and the SPD were generally in favor of NATO, the left Party was opposed
to the Alliance, and the Green Party seemed partial to a step-by-step abolition
of the defense structure by insisting on NATO's unilateral disarmament (Deutscher
Bundestag).
The
criticism of NATO voiced during the Bundestag debate foreshadowed the manner in
which the Lisbon Summit was subsequently discussed in the German media. The
moderately left-leaning Sueddeutsche
Zeitung revealingly entitled one op-ed: "Between delusions of grandeur and
a hangover." NATO's troublesome involvement in wars like Iraq and Afghanistan,
it argued, was contributing greatly to sobering up the Alliance that so recently had celebrated
victory over its Cold War foe.
In the
absence of a tangible enemy, the Munich-based newspaper sees too little
political will binding the Alliance
together today. For the Europeans, the EU would provide a far more convenient
venue for realizing their aspirations, while the U.S. would traditionally be weary
of multinational organizations. NATO would only be able to solve this dilemma
if it worked closer with other international bodies such as the EU, the UN, the
Gulf states, and other regional bodies in Asia. Most importantly, it would have to speedily clarify
its relations with Moscow.
Without the Kremlin's close cooperation, the various crises from across the
Caucasus into Central Asia simply could not be
resolved (Sueddeutsche).
The more
center-right elite daily Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung meanwhile cautions NATO to take its new relations with Moscow with a grain of
salt. While President Obama gladly acknowledged the support of NATO's East
European members for the missile shield project, the Russian President would
need U.S.
ratification of the START agreement before he could go home and advocate closer
ties to NATO. Much of the old rivalries and realities remained in place,
despite declarations of the "historic" nature of the summit. Attempts to
rewrite history would not suit the Alliance,
which after all was not "a club of intellectuals" (FAZ).
The left
wing alternative Tageszeitung (taz) meanwhile argues that the "dream of Lisbon" -
i.e. full and close cooperation between the "paper tiger" NATO and Russia
on security issues - was unlikely to be realized. Moscow would rather attempt to dictate the
terms under which it would tolerate the shield's construction. Moreover, the
assessment of the threat scenarios was vastly different in Washington
and in Moscow, where rogue states such as Iran
did not figure prominently. NATO by contrast provided a much needed enemy image
for Russia's
elite, considering its intelligence service background and the fact that its socialization
took place during the Soviet era. In the final count, the Russians needed NATO
just as much as NATO needs the Russians (taz).
Photo Licence: CC-BY NATO
- 0
December 8, 2010
Talia Hagerty, NYU, (6)
This is a really interesting point. While I have a hard time understanding the perspective of some lawmakers who believe we still need to take a Cold-war-esque attitude toward cooperation with Russia, I realize that that perspective exists and must be addressed, especially after the US midterm elections. Perhaps this angle- an emphasis on consultation (Artile 4), information, and cooperation- could be the necessary compromise in easing NATO-Russian relations. NATO states have to realize that it does us no good to be seen as Russia's enemy. ("NATO by contrast provided a much needed enemy image for Russia's elite") Unifying the world powers, even if that requires compromises from the West, is a significantly more constructive strategy for dealing with Iran than trying to strong arm without full cooperation. The later will be seen as weakness. This movement toward cooperation and information exchange could be the best next step for NATO, as it will promote cooperation with Russia and ultimately, positive global strategy.