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February 28, 2012

Donn Baca, DePaul University, Bronze Contributor (25)

Daryl,

I enjoyed your viewpoint. In some ways it immediately stirred me, as I was only just earlier considering my submission for the next topic in the series. A serious need to consider what we are doing, how we are doing it, why and when we should act. I think my position will probably be quite different from most of those that will be probably be submitted...but who knows?

I was especially interested in reading your submission because as coincidence would have it, I met and had a conversation with NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Kolinda Grabar, just yesterday. In contrast to some of your points regarding the Secretariats and Public Diplomacy division, I was encouraged by the very frank and realistic viewpoints she expressed in her presentation. I was even more impressed by her candor and viewpoints afterwards speaking with her directly.

She was I would say, far more in tune with some of your positions than perhaps what we are given to consume through official media and formal pronouncements. Amongst other things and I don't believe she was officially on the record, she showed a genuine appreciation for the difficulties and pitfalls of some of what you discussed - both in regards to places like Afghanistan, the Arab Spring countries, as well as within Europe itself.

Ambassador Grabar who it turns out is just a few weeks younger than myself, shared some of her thoughts regarding Europe and NATO following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact (after I had mentioned my expectation of being killed on a Central European battlefield before it collapsed) - as well as thoughts regarding what her native Croatia went through when Yugoslavia disintegrated. I expressed my concerns about how difficult it is to be a soldier or small unit leader in the current conflict/paradigm...when I trained to be an officer I was taught that "the job of a soldier is to kill people and break things"...a far simpler and straight-forward mission in comparison to what we now expect of NATO troops and leadership.

I don't envy the difficult task that she and the Alliance face in a world dominated by assymetrical warfare and the lack of an enemy which all 28 NATO members perceive as a common threat. Every alliance faces such challenges in peacetime, and since not all NATO members see themselves as part of an alliance currently at war, they have their work cut out for them.

I was very impressed by her and since she has only recently assumed the post (4 July 2011), it will be interesting to see if there are shifts in policy and practice which you would like to see in relation to your piece.

Regards,

DB Baca
DePaul University
Chicago

February 28, 2012

Stephanie Theresa Baulig, University of the German Federal Armed Forces, Silver Contributor (61)

Good morning, Daryl,

thank you very much for your well-structured and amazing paper, it is written in a clear, informative and understandable way. Reading your article, I still found some aspects I would like to ask you to give me some more information about or to clarify your statements.
Firstly, I refer to your assumption that „citizens cannot be expected to simply click their heels and identify positively“. This is quite true since even though Public Diplomacy tries to influence, direct or even manipulate the majority view, it will never reach all citizens and never defeat their ability to develop their own minds and ideas. However, the citizens of a very country elected their government whose prerogative in deciding on NATO contributions (military ones, mainly) is not being touched simply by being a member of NATO. If the majority of a country refuses to take part in a military conflict, this country is most probably not to so do. There are merely political decisions or influences.

I strongly agree with your opinion of NATO being “the most successful military alliance in modern history, and one committed to supporting its liberal-democratic values beyond its borders”. It is these values that tie us together and helps us to act (in most cases) unanimously.

Referring to the citizens once more, I would like to add that any kind of disagreement can be considered as a moral and/or ethic reaction to a NATO decision. Given the extensive and widespread dimensions of information, combined with the speediness, the multiple sources and ways of distribution, people get to receive an impression a lot easier and faster than ever before. Add here the various ways of showing their anger and resentment (internet, strikes, protest marches etc.). Compared to the situation a decade or more ago, it is not the people who have changed, it is their options.

Furthermore, I would like to ask you what you meant by saying “killing to spread [our values] to others”. Are you referring to Libya? To Afghanistan? This may depend on the point of view, I consider NATO’s intervention as an assistance to the rebels who were fighting for equal, call it: more Western, more progressive and new rights. We did not kill those who shared a different opinion but helped and protected those who asked us for help and – as it comes to values again – started to share the same basic values.
I really liked your division into three paragraphs then which made it easy to follow your following arguments.

I do not see a threatening dualism, however. There has always been some kind of Janus-faced public diplomacy, as you named it; depending on the target audience. In the first place, NATO PD consolidates relations among member states, it fosters mutual identification and minimizes potential risks. Moreover, it can easily be put into practice and is absolutely an interactive process on a NATO level. Although, it is not only about winning minds any more today, but about trying hard to avoid losing minds!

What do you mean by claiming to replace “more substantive and effective policies”?
Apart, I think that the influence of media is ever-growing! It surely should not be underestimated nor trivialized. Using the right information at the right time in the right place, crises and other issues can be controlled!

In your explanation of the second point, I noticed that you suggest less “value talk”. But is it not our mutual values that should be stressed and emphasized over and over again? Since – besides a mutual need: safety and defense – it is our values that connect us.
If NATO’s Public Diplomacy tends to use politico-military vocabulary in an extensive manner, this might not lead to more understanding, I am afraid. If you want “people” to understand what NATO’s decisions lead to and/or how they are justified, the target audience analysis proposes adequate vocabulary that is easy to understand by non-professionals as well. Otherwise one might risk to really lose somebody’s mind.
Nonetheless I totally agree with you is your last point: the introduction of regular live sessions. Thus, urgent decisions can be taken promptly, without special announcements. It also fosters the frequent and continuous exchange of opinions within the group of policy enabler. National media get to know when, how and why things happen the way they do.
Moreover, I support your call for more openness and transparency – there have to be established new and especially more channels of distribution to involve “the people”, the citizens of NATO member states, too!

Thank you very much again for your thoughtful and great article! It was a pleasure reading it.

Kind regards,
Stephanie

February 28, 2012

Andrew Barr, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Silver Contributor (72)

Daryl,

Thanks for your very insightful piece. I thoroughly enjoyed it! I wanted to address several parts of your argument that I had several questions on, and comment on several points that we both agree upon. First, regarding your contention that “Resorting to force to defend your values is one thing; killing to spread them to others is another altogether”, I would assert that although your statement is logical, the scope of many NATO military operations is so complex and multifaceted that to determine what is “defending” values and what is “spreading” values is a highly subjective undertaking.

Your discussion of an “over-reliance” on public diplomacy brings up an interesting perspective. You say that “public diplomacy can replace the need for more substantive and effective policies, by encouraging the illusion that nations which shape the media message can control the outcome of an issue or crisis.” I would argue that public diplomacy inevitably takes on a larger role when substantive and effective policies become harder and harder to achieve, policies that could come easier through the establishment of more quantifiable norms.

Furthermore, but I would hesitate to downplay the importance of creating and maintaining a “winning narrative, agreeing on coherent media lines, and communicating the right message to domestic and foreign audiences.” To me, NATO public relations activities are a crucial part of fostering a greater sense of community and shared values. Certainly, as you discuss, the public diplomacy should not overshadow the reality of NATO policy, but to try to detach one from the other does the entire community a great disservice.

Your second point addresses the need for a “blunter” use of language, and raises an important question: how does NATO deal with its duality as a values-based community while it employs military means in pursuit of those values? To me, the rhetorical balance that you say should be reevaluated is at the heart of the Organization’s dichotomous nature. Appeals to liberal-democratic principles are not contradictory when military action is undertaking in the name of preserving or perpetuating said principles. To “strip the values talk to a bare minimum” would be highly deleterious to the effort of forging strong bonds of community across NATO.

Indeed, the Organization is a truly “unique community of values” and to limit the emphasis on its commitment to these ideals is to render it little more than an international military force. Your observation that “publics to whom NATO is accountable should not be patronized by sanitized mission statements for their more pleasant consumption” is very astute, but values-centered dialogue doesn’t necessarily mean coddling publics. In fact, allowing citizens to make their own decisions based on empirical measurements of state participation rather than subjective statements (as sole criteria) may be a prudent step. The values-based language should be a part of the discussion, but not the only factor by which NATO is judged by the world.

Your third suggestion is very much in line with the increased transparency that I propose, and although considerations must be made for security concerns, I wholeheartedly agree that the spirit of transparency in council proceedings is a necessary step in the “they”-“we” transformation. Promoting this transparency in other avenues of NATO action is also a steps towards community building. The more governments and citizens know about the benefits of NATO participation and their status in that involvement spectrum, the more invested member states (and importantly, the citizenry of member states) will become in the Organization.

Thanks again for such an engaging piece!

February 28, 2012

Stephanie Theresa Baulig, University of the German Federal Armed Forces, Silver Contributor (61)

Dear Daryl, dear Andrew,

I have to admit that you pointed out and phrased the issue of strripping "the values talk to a bare minimum” more precisely, Andrew. It is these values that link our individual actions with each other and that effectively and inevitably hold the organization together.
Moreover I share your opinion that people are being coddled as a result of values-centered dialogue. Once a "hard" language is being used perpetually it looses its effect, but the same result becomes visible if the language is smoothened too much as well! NATO has be find a happy medium to bridge the gap between its existence as a military allience as well as a values-based community.
It is these values that have to be consolidated, stabilized, partly readjusted and spread among the people in all NATO member states. In my opinion, our politicians already share in a large part this feeling of "we" since they are responsible above all. The main problem is that the countries as a whole, specifically the population, does not really have incorporated this esprit de corps which is essentially needed to render NATO strong and really unified. They cannot be forced nor persuaded to support NATO despite sharing mutual values. It is their hearts and their minds (very declamatorily said) that have to be won and this cannot happen within a few days or months. With NATO first and foremost still being a military organization and soldiers being an essential and accepted part of society, it can be this group of people who can "transfer" the feeling of togetherness to their friends and neighbors. It is not necessary that this happens in a direct and offensive way, but it may proceed quite subtly, e.g. by meeting for a talk, getting to know foreign guests (soldiers from other NATO member states) etc.
Just the same might happen if, as you proposed, Daryl, meetings on a regular basis thus creating some kind of new institution whose decisions can be perceived frequently and thus can be reported on promptly. I really agree that this kind of transparency does not exist yet. Since I am personally interested in NATO and military decisions (due to my job) I am usually "up to date", whereas people who do not have a lot to do with this business lack of information and I quite often hear them talk about "they" - since there is no indentification, despite mutually shared values!

Kind regards,

Stephanie

February 29, 2012

Megan Ann Reiss, University of Texas-Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs, Silver Contributor (34)

Dear Daryl,

I enjoyed reading your piece, and think that you raise some valid criticisms which should be taken seriously by all those decision-makers contemplating a use of force. However, I would argue that your piece works better as a critique of NATO than as a policy prescription for the creation of unity within NATO States. I'll respectfully disagree with your first two points, but end with support of your measure to enhance democratic legitimacy.

As Clausewitz famously said, war is the continuation of policy by other means. As you stated, ‘resorting to force to defend your values is one thing; killing to spread them to others is another.’ Any action we pursue through NATO needs to align with our officially stated policies. Only through an alignment of values and official policies with action will we obtain the basis of legitimacy. Only through legitimacy will we maintain the support of the peoples of NATO. However, I fundamentally disagree that our actions have been misaligned with our policies or our values, and thus there is no need to strip values (even if it's simply stripping the vocalization of values) from our actions.

Will you be able to state your definition of public diplomacy used for this article? From my understanding, public diplomacy is a way of communicating with the public, framing a narrative or story or mission. However, importantly, from framing a mission, public diplomacy becomes a tool of completing the mission. Since problems do not speak for themselves and are often only understood in context, only by framing an issue then getting people to rally behind a mission will we gain support for the mission. This support will be both through economic assistance and support internationally---diplomatic support, media support, etc. When missions gain legitimacy, NATO increases its legitimacy. Only through legitimacy will NATO continue to thrive as an alliance.

I think we need to be careful about throwing around the idea that NATO is ‘killing to spread our values.’ The intervention in Bosnia happened after the massacre at Srebrenica, with Security Council support. The Libya intervention was prompted by the murder of civilian protesters, with Security Council support. Our actions were not prompted by a desire to ‘spread our values’. They were prompted by a strong need and will to prevent further massacres. Former US president Bill Clinton has stated that one of his biggest mistakes in office was not stopping the Rwanda genocide, and I wouldn’t be surprised if NATO officials have held this failure in the back of their minds. These actions may involve killing, but they weren't actions to spread our values, they were internationally authorized missions to attempt to bring resolutions to conflicts which included massive human rights violations.

Would we care about genocide in another place unless we first held a value, shaped and repeatedly affirmed by ourselves, our States, and our actions? As you said, we can’t be ‘appealing to the higher moral ground and untarnished liberal democratic values at the same time as its fighter jets are incinerating enemy troops on the ground.’ When, exactly, did we lose the right to use a military organization to fight, especially if the action started in order to stop a massive human rights violation? And why would we ever want to suppress the opportunity to say that the action (even if it includes base and fallible and human mistakes, as the use of force is bound to have), is for a higher purpose, especially if the action does, in fact, align with a value we all share?

I think it’s also worth taking a look at how NATO interventions take place. A great source of this is the review of NATO action through the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia for the Office of the Prosecutor. While the report admits mistakes and some bad choices in the campaign, in reflects a NATO conscientious of humanitarian law and reflective of NATO values. Targets are very specific and designed to end the threat, in line with humanitarian law.

I personally do not want to be represented by an organization that does not espouse democratic values and is not a vocal stalwart of humanitarian law. Vocalizing ideas to the public, like a commitment to humanitarian law, should be self-reinforcing. Our organization vocalizes to us, the public, their agreement to abide by certain standards. We agree to the standards, internalize the values of the standards. Then we hold the organization accountable to those values. I believe this is what has been happening in respect to the law on the use of force for NATO.

I believe the public should question why we intervened in Libya by not in Syria. But we need to note that the Security Council has not (yet) authorized action in Syria. In Libya, we had a Security Council Resolution. The use of force which aligned with our higher value system and prevented a further massacre was authorized from a council that has the authority to authorize the use of force. We abide by international law, and do not act beyond our borders without authorization. We are following our own policies. I would actually argue that NATO has not stressed either our value in abiding by international law or the actual fundamentals of the situation enough.

NATO will not act in every possible humanitarian disaster. We can’t. We don’t have the resources, the will, the ability. In our free societies, there will always be people who say we should not act, or those who say we should do more. But when we do act, I think we need to rally public support around action. One of the best ways to do this will be through the interaction of NATO officials and the public, through public diplomacy. Public diplomacy should both clearly explain actions but also remind the public of the very normative values that make NATO, NATO. We need to make sure people know why they are willing to hand over their precious resources and their brothers and sisters to an action, and we need values for this appeal.

Values are normative, but when backed by action, they are legitimizing. How else will anyone take NATO seriously unless they know what we believe and that we are willing to act on those beliefs?

As you yourself said, you would fight to the death to defend their democratic way of life. But what does that mean exactly? Freedom of speech exists not just as an absence of a man trying to jail you for noncompliance with speech regulation. It is also a value, a freedom which we can not be complacent enough to lose. To make sure we don’t lose this freedom, we need to talk about it. We need to know what we’re willing to fight for. And to prevent other countries from infringing on those values in a way that will compel us to action, we need to maintain legitimacy through actions backed by values.

Your critique is welcome, though I don't agree with its conclusions. Would it be possible to take your criticism of public diplomacy as being overly ‘fuzzy’ or values based talk and instead prescribe the public diplomacy department to make a more concerted, expansive effort to portray NATO decisions and the decision-making process to the public? Not to take an about-face on the rhetoric, but to add more substance to the rhetoric, such as in the Syria example I gave earlier?

I agree that your proposal to televise some of the meetings, beyond press conferences, will add to the democratic legitimacy of NATO. Natochannel.tv is already a forum for this, and a great resource to the public to understand what is happening in NATO actions. I’m a bit concerned though that any off-the record, frank discussion will be censored when a telecast occurs. However, this fear will always exist in any effort to make an action transparent, and thus I support the initiative. This could also be one of the the primary means of adding substance to the rhetoric for the public diplomacy team, especially if there is also a subsequent weekly press release of the transcript of the telecast, to reach a broader audience than natochannel.tv. However, I think we’ll need more than this to bolster NATO as an alliance of ‘we’.

Sincerely,

Megan

February 29, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

Dear all,

Thank you kindly for all your very constructive comments; I really appreciate all of your input. To avoid writing a monolithic, telegraph-length reply, I think it is most practical to break down my responses into digestible comments grouped around specific comments or questions.

Firstly, in reply to Donn Paul Baca – thank you kindly for your feedback and your thoughts. I was interested in your comments about Ambassador Grabar. I have also seen one of her presentations, and let me be clear that my critique is only aimed at some of the ideas underpinning NATO’s public diplomacy, not the people designing or implementing them; this is not an ad hominem critique. I am confident that Ambassador Grabar is a very capable Assistant Secretary General, and I also know that the folks at the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) are similarly very talented, influential and successful at what they do. (PDD is also one of the key supporters and organisers of the ‘Your Ideas, Your NATO’ initiative, so it would be the height of disrespect to insult our generous hosts).

However, my argument starts from the assumption that NATO’s public diplomacy could be a victim of its own success. In essence, I might be betting against a winning horse, but I feel very strongly that PDD’s efforts have generally been even more successful at NATO Headquarters than perhaps among NATO’s publics, where its intellectual authority is generally unchallenged. In the spirit of constructive debate, however, reviewing PDD’s approach, raison d’être and strategies can only benefit the Alliance if it contributes to better public diplomacy. My critique of NATO’s public diplomacy is intended to be constructive, not gratuitous, as I hope is clear.

I will not expand further in this comment box, as I see that I already have a lot of good questions from Andrew and Stephanie to respond to, and I hope that these will clarify where I stand on concrete public diplomacy issues raised in my piece. However, I wanted to stress that I very much agree with your assessment: “I don't envy the difficult task that she and the Alliance face in a world dominated by asymmetrical warfare and the lack of an enemy which all 28 NATO members perceive as a common threat.”

Thanks again for your feedback!

Daryl

February 29, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

Dear Stephanie,

Thank you for your kind and positive feedback about this piece. I am glad we agree on quite a few points. I also really liked your comment that, “Compared to the situation a decade or more ago, it is not the people who have changed, it is their options.” On the substance of the questions on which you would like further clarification of my position, I have reproduced and numbered your questions to make for a more structured discussion:

1. 'I would like to ask you what you meant by saying “killing to spread [our values] to others”. Are you referring to Libya? To Afghanistan?'

I principally had Libya in mind. I have generally been supportive of the NATO-ISAF intervention, for a variety of reasons which we do not need to go into right now. In Libya, however, although the cause (R2P), the mandate (UNSC 1970 and 1973), and regional support (Arab League and, originally, African Union) may have been legally, politically and morally defensible, I think that both NATO’s ends and means were questionable. In short, I agree with those who argue that Western powers (not simply NATO) over-stepped the UNSC mandate – and then some. Special forces intervention, cover support and military training to the rebels, weapons air drops and targeted assassination attempts on the Gaddafi leadership and Gaddafi himself were not part of the UNSC resolutions; of course, many of these mandate-breaching measures were by individual nations, thereby providing plausible deniability for NATO. But I do not think that makes it any more justifiable.

You “consider NATO’s intervention as an assistance to the rebels who were fighting for equal, call it: more Western, more progressive and new rights. We did not kill those who shared a different opinion but helped and protected those who asked us for help and – as it comes to values again – started to share the same basic values.”

I am afraid we genuinely do not see eye-to-eye here. In fact, the UNSC mandates did not allow NATO to actively assist the rebels, who were combatants – i.e. by bombing all Gaddafi military assets – but instead to protect civilians, who are generally understood as non-combatants. Of course, we could have an endless legalistic argument about the term 'all measures necessary', but that would be missing the point. NATO was not mandated to act as a rebel air force, but it did; it was not mandated to use force to accomplish de facto regime change, but it did; it was mandated to enforce an arms embargo, but unilateral Western arms drops and hardly secret special forces operations were still tolerated by NATO. This leads me to another conclusion to yours altogether: namely that NATO forces, and individual member-states, actually did kill Gaddafi regime forces to achieve “more Western, more progressive and new rights”, as you put it. This was regime change by another name, and the “protect the population” rhetoric, in official statements, was arguably badly-managed and even Orwellian (“war is peace”) in my opinion. I am not a Gaddafi apologist, and if I were Libyan I would probably be rejoicing today; but I am not a Libyan, and therefore cannot claim a droit de regard over Libyan politics; my main concern here is with the present and future policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO clearly over-stepped what it was mandated to do in Libya, which was to protect the population, and to enforce an arms embargo and no-fly zone. Furthermore, this is not a fringe argument. I was surprised to encounter this feeling very frequently during research interviews at NATO Headquarters, among national diplomats, civilian International Staff and, I am told, this was also a broadly-shared sentiment in NATO’s military planning staff before and after the intervention. The no-fly zone, as planned and implemented, was in all honesty a large-scale military offensive on regime forces; and I also understand that NATO military planners were much more cautious and less enthusiastic about the intervention in Libya than a small group of national leaders who principally drove the intervention. Several NATO officials voiced variations of the same concern: “it is simply beyond me how you protect a population with air strikes and bomber sorties.” In any case, I do not expect to convince you if our opinions diverge so fundamentally, but perhaps my answer can simply act as context for my further points on NATO’s arguably mishandled public diplomacy efforts during and after Libya.

2. 'What do you mean by claiming to replace “more substantive and effective policies”?'

What I mean here is simply that, due to its popularity and success at NATO HQ, as I argued in my piece, the public diplomacy tool can become a crutch if it gives NATO Ambassadors the illusion of control which, in reality, is not determined alone, or even chiefly, by public diplomacy strategies. Let me give you a concrete example of what I mean. You argue that “Using the right information at the right time in the right place, crises and other issues can be controlled!” I would tentatively agree in principle, but with a lot of caveats. I will stick to the case of Libya for the sake of simplicity. I fail to see what added value NATO’s PD strategy brought to the intervention, beyond the Secretary General’s carefully-rehearsed and –repeated media points. I do not deny that coherent messaging is vital for a 28-member Alliance – and the importance of this was driven home when some Allied leaders made unilateral declarations out of synch with NATO.

However, I clearly remember a PD expert saying that the mantra of this tool is basically to “do good and say it.” It is about telling the story of good policies; not justifying bad ones. And if the policy is misled or somehow flawed, as I and a sizeable slice of expert opinion at NATO believe it was in Libya, then the PD tool does not in fact add anything of value, except post-hoc rationalisation and justification. This aforementioned expert was adamant in underlining that PD cannot replace or make up for inefficient policies; for example, no amount of public messaging can undo the mistake of civilians killed in NATO airstrikes intended to protect them, or a Koran accidentally burned in Afghanistan. But this expert also pointed out that “nothing breeds success like success” with specific reference to Libya: the sheer fact that the operation succeeded undercut all of the critiques which could legitimately be levelled against specific Allied policies, such as the PD campaign in this case. In Libya, I would further add that some Allied messaging – for example that Gaddafi must step down as a precondition for negotiations between the rebels and the Gaddafi regime – arguably contributed to shoring up the rebels’ determination to fight, rather than negotiating under African Union auspices. There are other examples, but this will suffice to demonstrate that PD is a double-edged sword, which can backfire or achieve unintended consequences if wielded indiscriminately.

As a final thought on this topic, even PD experts acknowledge the lack of clear conceptual borders between the concepts of public diplomacy, strategic communications, and information/ psychological warfare. In practice, this means that there is no way for citizens of NATO, and potential adversaries of the Alliance alike, to differentiate between what is legitimate political messaging and what is blatant propaganda. I will let you consider the implications of this point.

3. 'In your explanation of the second point, I noticed that you suggest less “value talk”. But is it not our mutual values that should be stressed and emphasized over and over again?'

I self-consciously went out on a limb by suggesting that NATO turn the volume down on its “values talk”. For now, I would only reply that I am not suggesting we abandon NATO’s founding values altogether; this is not the sense of my proposal. Instead, I am striving to improve the way they are packaged and expressed. But I simply think that this aspect of NATO rhetoric has been badly over-done, and that it can back-fire or even drive citizens away from NATO, especially the influential opinion-makers (journalists, academics, think tankers, commentators, etc.), because of a psychological process called cognitive dissonance. It can be extremely difficult for domestic audiences to reconcile the idea of defending NATO’s core values, human rights, etc. when seeing images of plumes of smoke from a NATO bombardment rising above Tripoli, or Belgrade if we go further back. Can we really blame them? Try to put yourself in their shoes – NATO spokespeople are talking about the defence of freedom, liberty, the rule of law, while its military forces are taking human lives for a cause that can seem abstract, or far removed from citizens’ day-to-day lives. I will come back to this in a future comment.

I also believe that NATO would gain in international credibility by aligning its words with its actions. Words matter in international relations. For example, one of the many reasons that Russia dislikes and distrusts NATO – some of them legitimate, many less so – is precisely this use of soft, human rights language in conjunction with the projection of hard military power. The Russians are very skilled at pointing out logical inconsistencies in NATO rhetoric, and what they call "Western double standards". (Read the former Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin’s book ‘Hawk of Peace’ for a whole section criticising NATO’s sanitised language). Some experts say that NATO would command more respect by talking toughly to Russia; I see some truth in this. By speaking frankly and more bluntly about its strategic interests and intentions – rather than promoting its values which the Russian government does not share or appreciate – this would remove a minor but enduring bone of contention in their relations. This would not only be true of Russia, which is admittedly an extreme case of NATO antipathy, but also other NATO-sceptical powers and organisations, like South Africa, China and the African Union.

Finally, justifying NATO's existence mainly with regards to the shared values of the Allies, which I fully understand are central to this Alliance, can nevertheless seem suspicious to publics. It can encourage the perception that NATO is constantly on the back foot, justifying its existence by repeating the importance of the ideal values it upholds over and over, like a broken record. So, in sum, I think that PD can be over-done, which is why I argue that NATO suffers from a PD overload. It may be counter-intuitive, but I genuinely believe that, with PD, less can be more.

I intend to elaborate on this point further, but because I have probably abused the right-of-response privilege by writing such a long reply, I will return to this question in the next comment box, because Andrew has asked exactly the same question. As such, please read below.

Thank you kindly once more for your engaging questions and comments,

Daryl

February 29, 2012

Donn Baca, DePaul University, Bronze Contributor (25)

Daryl,

I very much agree with your latest comments regarding Libyan intervention in particular.

I'm glad that he is gone, but nobody should pretend that considerable overstepping didn't occur (you provide excellent examples). Once again western powers have also made the classic mistake of acting to a certain extent far beyond the level that they should have, making the usual ill-advised bets on certain parties. I'm very much a believer that R2P in particular is going to long be an unevenly applied justification for highly subjective and selective interventions around the world. One that will far more likely and often be more about vested interests than actually protecting the people in nations which responsible international intervention could provide protection to in proper and unbiased humanitarian instances.

In some ways, the Chinese and Russian blockage of measures related to Syria within the Security Council are probably a blessing. At this time they are keeping the world and entities such as NATO from jumping into a situation which may well be incredibly ill-considered. While I do support seeing Assad go as well, we aren't likely to be thanked in the end for acting in Syria's internal conflict.

DB

February 29, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

Dear Andrew,

Thank you for your very constructive feedback. Firstly, I definitely support your observation that “the scope of many NATO military operations is so complex and multifaceted that to determine what is “defending” values and what is “spreading” values is a highly subjective undertaking.” Although I did not make it explicit, what I had in mind was the mostly clear-cut division between Article V (collective defence) and out-of-area operations with no Article V justification.

You are also right to hesitate in downplaying the importance of NATO’s public diplomacy (PD); that was not my objective, as I mentioned above, but it is rather to contribute to refining and improving that instrument. It is certainly an important tool of NATO’s work, but its very popularity can also encourage a vicious circle in which PD is seen as a cheap, band-aid solution to deeper problems, plastering over potentially problematic policies, and thereby deterring critically-minded policy scholars and policy-makers from questioning those policies in the first place.

On the issue of a blunter use of language, you ask: how does NATO deal with its duality as a values-based community while it employs military means in pursuit of those values?

It is an excellent question, and one which I certainly had in mind. You argue that “Appeals to liberal-democratic principles are not contradictory when military action is undertaking in the name of preserving or perpetuating said principles.” I would argue that there actually is an intellectual tension there – see my above comment about cognitive dissonance, and the potentially repelling effect of this say-do gap on the perceptions of Allied publics. If the appeal to liberal-democratic principles is in defence of NATO countries’ very way of life from an existential threat – let us in a collective defence scenario – then I agree that there is no tension there. In fact, although quantitative studies suggest that democracies do not fight wars against each other (the democratic peace theory), other scholars have actually found that, when democracies believe the cause is just (the Second World War) they are often capable of fighting more fiercely and making even more costly sacrifices to win wars, justified by credible threats to their way of life.

The war in Afghanistan is arguably much closer to this category than any other NATO operation, because of the direct link to 9/11 and terrorist attacks against the European and American heartlands. However, it is more difficult to justify Libya as a case of defending NATO’s territorial integrity and very way of life – except under the Responsibility to Protect norm, justifying intervention in another state’s affairs. (Incidentally, although it was widely hailed by a portion of the R2P community, some other key thinkers and supporters of the norm, such as Gareth Evans, were quite cautious in their appraisal of the Libyan operation, fearing the negative precedent which could be set by NATO’s potential over-stepping of its mandate).

You express concern, Andrew, that without constant appeal to its values NATO could be rendered to “little more than an international military force.” Immediately after Operation Unified Protector began, however, international audiences and journalists, in like-minded Partner country Australia for example, hailed (rightly or wrongly) NATO as the world’s foremost security sub-contractor. Of course, NATO is more than that, as you say; its espoused values play a key part in binding Allies together. But there is a good reason that critical thinkers, and even other Allies and like-minded partners look beyond NATO’s rhetoric in trying to understand why the intervention in Libya occurred – because there were important strategic interests at stake in Libya, including the stability of a large, resource-rich Mediterranean neighbour, the potential for thousands of refugees fleeing to Europe which was stemmed, and the departure of a previously-partner dictator (let’s not forget that fact) in favour of a hopefully more tolerable and palatable democratic leadership in Tripoli (that also remains to be seen). I am certainly not propagating an intellectually-hollow ‘blood for oil’ thesis. Instead, I am merely pointing out that very important strategic interests no doubt informed the action of France and the United Kingdom in spearheading the operation in Libya. Does anyone contest these facts?

What disturbs me, however, is that instead of communicating those important (and I would argue very legitimate) Allied interests to publics in a straightforward, honest and probably more convincing manner, NATO media statements focussed on carefully-rehearsed media lines and platitudes about the liberal-democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Sure those were important, from a legitimising ideological point of view, but it is misleading and intellectually irresponsible to mention the Realpolitik behind this or other NATO missions. I believe that important segments of Allied publics would readily understand those interests if they were communicated in such a straightforward manner; they would probably be more convinced, rather than reflexively searching for a hidden agenda in NATO's actions. The net result of such a realist approach to public diplomacy, I am suggesting, would be a stronger and more relevant NATO.

I certainly still see the appeal for your quantitative points idea in this context, Andrew, which could perhaps help to remove some of the subjectiveness out of these values-centric discussions. Very often the success of public diplomacy is benchmarked by standards and criteria which lack analytical rigour, such as directly inferring public perceptions of NATO’s missions from the positive or negative tone of newspaper articles’ headlines; there are surely more reliable and objective ways to measure these perceptions, such as through annual or bi-annual public opinion polling of NATO policies in all Allied nations, which could be synthesised and presented as an open-source report. This type of polling would reveal a lot about publics’ perceptions, and would contribute to turning the “they” into “we”, by narrowing NATO’s democratic deficit. I can also suggest, if I may be a little bolder, that similar opinion polling of NATO international staff, national diplomats and military officials could be immensely revealing – but perhaps that is a bridge too far in directly opening NATO up to the democratic pressures and accountability mechanisms inherent to each functioning liberal-democracy.

Finally, I am thankful for your positive feedback on the live Council idea. I am very mindful of the security concerns at stake, hence why not every Council meeting could be reproduced live. Initially, the Public Diplomacy Division could run a pilot project by proposing a fortnightly, or weekly, 30-minute video of Allied ambassadors discussing and summarising the main points on the NATO agenda for that week. This could feasibly be tested over a three-month trial period; perhaps this initiative could even be announced at NATO’s 2013 summit, as it is probably too close to the Chicago Summit to allow for the necessary internal deliberations among nations. I could even envision NATO citizens submitting video questions to the Council (building on NATO’s iReps competition: http://promoshq.wildfireapp.com/website/6/contests/189404), which Allied ambassadors could reply to on a selective and competitive bias. The possibilities are literally endless. Obviously, NATO member-states would reserve the right to cancel live sessions, if pressing matters required it, and crisis management and other highly-sensitive security issues would naturally be omitted from this initiative, for understandable reasons.

Thanks again for this very enriching discussion!

Daryl

February 29, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

Sorry to write yet another comment, I just saw an important typing error, in the third paragraph from the bottom of the last post:

"Sure those were important, from a legitimising ideological point of view, but it is misleading and intellectually irresponsible *NOT to mention the Realpolitik behind this or other NATO missions."

February 29, 2012

Stephanie Theresa Baulig, University of the German Federal Armed Forces, Silver Contributor (61)

Good morning,

thank you very much for your detailed and constructive answers, Daryl. You made clear some of your ideas which I did not see like that before.

Firstly, I would like to say that I agree with Megan who said that she would not want to be represented "by an organization that does not espouse democratic values and is not a vocal stalwart of humanitarian law." Compared to many groups of people in the world, those of NATO member states are more or less spoiled, really spoiled when it comes to securing and guaranteeing values such as democracy, freedom, equality and further ones NATO has incorporated. To "us", enjoying these values is a matter of course (like a duck takes to water, to put it figurally). Still there is no feeling of togetherness which we are discussing about how to create it. That is why I do not see the repetition of these values "like a broken record", as you said, but as a constand reminder, an essential part of its messages and its basis.
Moreover, you mentioned that the reasons why people may be killed, defending our values, was abstract. Sure it is, this is one of the main attributes of values, their trait of character: They are not tangible not manually moveable.

Furthermore, as you said that you had had Libya in mind when talking about "killing for values", I would like to point out that this is an example how wars become more and more complex, harder to differenciate these days. The public takes part via news coverage, internet and opens their minds since they are mosty not directly affected, thus in a comfortable situation where it is easy to criticze. Whereas those who have to decide end up becoming the easiest target possible for criticism! This makes it so hard to find an all-satisfying solution for conflicts today - everybody thinks to be informed about things going on the best and to be right. By quantifying NATO PD measures instead of limiting them, one-sided news coverage and extensive elucidation might support creating a feeling of togetherness instead of building of "walls of minds" between people.

Referring to your further points, I agree with you in most parts now that you made your position clear.

Thank you once again for your article and your answers!

Kind regards,

Stephanie

February 29, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

Dear Megan,

Thanks for your lengthy comments. You begin by characterising my piece as “a critique of NATO [rather] than as a policy prescription for the creation of unity within NATO states.” I will repeat what I wrote above – namely that this critique is intended to be constructive, not gratuitous, and if the alternatives I offer are not yet clear enough, I will use this opportunity to make them crystal clear.

Moreover, I feel very strongly that the greatest service we can do to ourselves, and to an improved NATO, is to be frank about what it is doing right and where it may need improvement; we would be doing the Alliance a major disservice if we simply told it what it wanted to hear, or refrained from open critiques if they are intended to be constructive, as mine certainly is. Consensus-building among Allies requires frank and often difficult debates; and so it should be with us. These are, after all, the benefits and rights to citizens of democratic societies.

You fundamentally disagree with my argument that NATO’s policies and values have been misaligned in previous operations; we may have to settle for agreeing to disagree on this. I have already expanded, in the comments above, on my views of why I think the say-do gap was particularly wide and self-defeating during the Libyan operation.

For an academic definition, I like Hans Tuch’s definition of public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” (Cited in J. Melissen, ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations’, 2005: 11-12). I would generally hesitate to throw in the spreading of values and exercising of influence into a definition of PD, as some do, as I see this goal as much more closely aligned with information/psychological operations which actively seek to influence and manipulate domestic and foreign perceptions and actions. NATO might disagree, because its umbrella strategic communications strategy places PD alongside the more offensive capabilities. NATO defines strategic communications as "the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims" (SG(2009)0794).

Hence, I can see that we generally agree on loosely defining PD as an activity intended to inform and, perhaps, to influence, rather than as a tool of deception and propaganda. (I recommend the aforementioned book by Melissen, which discusses debates about PD being an outgrowth of modern propaganda). But you go a step further, stating that PD should be about gaining support for NATO’s missions; yes, understandably so, but not at the cost of the truth and objectivity, seeing as though we agree that it is not an offensive, deceptive tool (see my previous critique of NATO over-stepping its mandate in Libya). If citizens cannot differentiate between NATO’s genuine efforts to persuade them of its case, and between offensive psychological operations – because of a lack of conceptual clarity on the matter – then the most sophisticated PD efforts will be self-defeating, because citizens are not simple consumers of problems and solutions as NATO decides to frame them. PD should be about opening up dialogue with Allied publics; not about sloganeering.

Next, I certainly agree that the Rwandan genocide played an important role as a ‘never again’ analogy for Libya – there is direct evidence that Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and Samantha Power all learned the lessons of Rwanda with regards to Libya. But as Paul Miller pointed out, analogies make for sloppy thinking, and Libya was no Rwanda; it was a civil war in which NATO took sides, rather than a pre-planned genocide intended to exterminate a clearly-defined ethnic group (this is built into the accepted definition of genocide). “If R2P justifies Libya,” as Miller argues, “then it certainly obligates us to overthrow the governments of Sudan and North Korea...” (http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/30/libya_is_not_rwanda)

You ask: “When, exactly, did we lose the right to use a military organization to fight, especially if the action started in order to stop a massive human rights violation?”

Actually, NATO and other international organizations were never granted that right under international law - and due to the norm of non-intervention in the affairs of other states - except in self-defence, as defined by the UN Charter, or when clearly mandated by a UN Security Council resolution – and this is the controversial part of our discussion, as we have already discussed.
“And why would we ever want to suppress the opportunity to say that the action (even if it includes base and fallible and human mistakes, as the use of force is bound to have), is for a higher purpose, especially if the action does, in fact, align with a value we all share?”

I do not mind NATO claiming that certain actions, including military intervention, are justified by norms that the Western Alliance may cherish, such as human rights, etc. But in such cases as these are provided as the only justification (i.e. “We saved countless lives”), without actually acknowledging the strategic interests which made it worth the while of the interveners to act, then I see that as highly misleading towards Allied publics, if not intentionally so. Some would call it hypocrisy, but I think it was just bad public diplomacy. This is something we can fix.

Please do not misunderstand my position as rejecting NATO’s values wholesale, I simply think we need to be careful during a military operation about wielding values, which we of course claim are universal, but which large proportions of the world do not share. This discusson reminds me of a statement French politician Michel Rocard once made: "It is very difficult to compromise over values; people fight and kill over values." Hence, using values as the currency of NATO's international posture is a recipe for intractability, international animosity, and further interventions which may in fact be entirely unnecessary (by undermining potential non-violent solutions, for example), politically-costly (among the electorate) and financially unsustainable. This is why I stress that NATO should use the vocabulary of Realpolitik - national and collective interest - which other international actors understand and accept much more readily. In fact, NATO does use this language behind close doors; it now needs to apply it to its public pronouncements.

All I am saying is that Allied publics can converse, and understand, collective interests framed as such, rather than sugar-coated platitudes and ideals which citizens may share, but which are only half-truths when used to justify wars. I very much like what Jean Fournet, former Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, had to say on what PD is about: “touching target audiences meaning having a possibility to engage in dialogue, and dialogue with trust and confidence. We are about substance and...not about sugar coating.” Public diplomacy initiatives that are out of step with reality, or which overlook or omit substance and truth in favour of political spin will erode publics’ trust and confidence in the Organization, which will in turn undermine NATO’s legitimacy, coherence and raison d’être. This is what I mean about a duel-edged sword.

You say that you “personally do not want to be represented by an organization that does not espouse democratic values and is not a vocal stalwart of humanitarian law.” That is fair enough; neither do I. But I do not want to be represented by an Organization which misuses the norm of R2P, or manipulates the ideals in which I believe, to justify overseas military interventions which may, in reality, have nothing to do with either. Perhaps our views simply boil down to different visions of an ideal NATO. But I believe we share the bottom-line of wanting a NATO that respects and upholds our values, but that does not use those said values as pretexts for illegitimate military operations.

You asked what I meant about fighting to defend one’s democratic way of life. Here, I am principally referring to an Article V scenario – a direct attack or threat to NATO’s security and/or way of life – in which we could expect more than adequate public support for a war of survival, with or without public diplomacy efforts. I used this example to contrast it with the difficult task of explaining to Allied publics how Libya, and other out-of-area missions, align with defending their own values at home. This is an important practical distinction. Unfortunately, I did not understand the link you made between freedom of speech and “knowing what we’re willing to fight for”. This is self-evident in an Article V scenario, but are you suggesting that freedom of speech or other domestic political liberties are convincing justifications for out-of-area military interventions, for example fighting to defend Libyans’ or Afghans’ right to free speech?

Somehow, I do not foresee that Allied publics would be too impressed by this rationale, which is basically armed democracy-promotion minus the clear and coherent neoconservative ideology. The case I am making is, instead, that NATO privilege systematically explaining how the direct security interests of Allied citizens are implicated in certain missions, rather than repeating mantras about values which, to most people, must sound decidedly hollow when politicians are unable to explain with a straight face why citizens should invest their “brothers and sisters” for a cause they cannot be expected to intuitively assimilate and accept (women’s rights overseas, defending foreigners’ right to free speech, etc.). This is more than a rhetorical nuance; it is a call to pragmatism instead of ideology. Values are fundamental, but they are also implied and understood. The Transatlantic Community can be proud of having established and maintained a values-conscious and -centric alliance. But pragmatic decision-makers need to be frank to their publics about which interests compel their actions, rather than draping any actions in patriotism and the flag to silence any constructive questioning of their decisions.

Finally, as you correctly point out, the sense of my piece was to recommend that the Public Diplomacy Division act to systematise this proposal into a policy for greater openness and accountability between NATO, especially the North Atlantic Council, and its citizens.

Thank you for the exchange, and I look forward to any more thoughts. Thanks also to Stephanie for the further thoughts, and to Donn Paul Baca for those constructive and encouraging remarks.

Daryl

February 29, 2012

Andrew Barr, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Silver Contributor (72)

Hello Daryl,

I echo Stephanie’s sentiments in my appreciation for your clarifications. Indeed, it seems as though the commitment to greater transparency is something we all agree on, and with good reason. However, I still have several questions regarding the points you raise in your response-- I wanted to specifically address what you refer to as “carefully-rehearsed media lines and platitudes about the liberal-democratic aspirations” specifically in the case of Libya. Indeed, as with any large organization, public relations efforts contextualize a given situation for a variety of reasons; in the case of Libya, the goal of these efforts was to bolster international support for the action.

The media lines and platitudes you allude to were not falsehoods, but simply more subjective in nature, as you acknowledge. Thus, I contend that rather than being, as you say, “misleading and intellectually irresponsible”, conveying broader values-based messages to the public is vital to the Organization’s esprit de corps. Doing away with the more subjective (while still factual) rhetoric meant to inspire confidence in the Organization is counterproductive—certainly a middle ground can be reached. An increased emphasis on the Realpolitik behind a NATO action may be called for, but not at the expense of abandoning the idealism that has long characterized the Organization. Indeed, such communications may best be augmented by cold, hard facts (like empirical point values); perhaps that would be the necessary injection of realism in public diplomacy that you call for.

Your polling idea is intriguing, and I welcome discussion of the quantifying question. However, while the polling would be a positive first step in identifying where NATO stands in the eyes of its members and its own staff, in the long term, I struggle to see the impact it would have on building community and solidifying the bonds of shared security across the Organization. A poll is a starting point, but how does a poll inspire a state to increase its NATO involvement, to forge stronger sentiments of “we”? Low polling numbers of support for NATO may even widen the chasm between the “active” and “inactive” members and threaten the cogency of the community.

Surveying could be useful in making determinations about the way in which NATO actions are communicated to specific publics-- states with governments and citizenries disenfranchised by NATO will undoubtedly respond differently to increased or diminished levels in Realpolitik in reporting, and perhaps such surveys can assist in making such determinations.

In closing, your points regarding the need for increased realist dialogue are well-reasoned; the necessity is there, but is highly contextual. My above suggestions regarding the selective use of increased realist rhetoric, based off of determinations reached through empirical means are an attempt at a gradual and experiential process, one that could lead to a stronger sense of commonality and shared purpose.

February 29, 2012

Megan Ann Reiss, University of Texas-Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs, Silver Contributor (34)

Hi,

Thank you for taking the time to respond so thoughtfully to my comments. I'm glad we can agree that a removal of discussion of values would not be necessary for the furtherance of your PD changes. As I said earlier, and Andrew agreed, frank discussion of an action should be alongside of greater values, and my critique is very comparable to his (and Stephanie's).

I will only respond to a few of your comments, because I think for the most part we will have to, as you said, agree to disagree, because my responding to all your comments will hardly be worth or time or constructive. I agree with Andrew that the pro-democratic and responsibility to protect concepts were not in fact falsehoods. I know you are quite critical of NATO actions, and that is a right and responsibility of every NATO citizen to think critically of their opinions on NATO actions. Thus, your PD call is supposed to allow citizens to make more critical assessments of NATO actions. The way I can see this best enhancing the ability of citizens to best benefit from this by seeing that there is more legitimacy in an organization that is 'more honest' with them, then come to identify more with the alliance. Thus, figuring out a way to do this with balance is the best move forward. However, will this truly create an ability of States to associate themselves as a 'we'? I see this bringing out an ability of citizens to better support NATO individually (although there's already majority support of NATO) but not a 'we'. This doesn't address the concerns of a divergence in values, or a fear that this is an organization dominated by the US or dominated by Europe. I'm skeptical that this ideal will answer the goals of this project.

Despite my skepticism of this plan for meeting the goals of the policy, I still appreciate your policy recommendation. The implementable policy recommendation in your article related to the idea of closing the democratic gap by televising meetings has been gnawing at me, and I think it's primarily because those meetings may lose substance and frankness of discussion as a result. I'm not disagreeing with the idea or the implementation, I just don't think it will end with an ability to create true transparency in NATO. The heavier decisions will simply take place behind the scenes.

What if we also propose to have a change in the process of the release of NATO records? Part of the NATO archive is online, but the rules on when archived information will be released is unclear. In fact, it says that it is the responsibility of the owners of the information to define the period of retention, or the period before the information is to be released to the public (or destroyed if deemed unimportant). By having clear guidelines for the release of information or even a process by which the public could call for release of information, this could provide a better historic context for the likely decision-making process.

I recognize a public request element could be overwhelming, as the process of release of information in the United States for the system is perpetually behind the rate of information requests due to volume, which is why it would probably be more efficient to simply have clear, time specific procedures for the release of documents.

Sincerely,

Megan


On one note, I have to defend NATO. You stated that NATO has never had the right to military actions. I want to defend NATO here. This is correct, but obvious context is needed, context which I'm sure you know and understand. With the Security Council authorization virtually non-existent in the Cold War for military action due to the veto (with the exception of the Korean War, which was only authorized because the USSR was boycotting the SC), military action was untenable. For the most part, it still is. China generally does not authorize the use of force. Because of the inability of the Security Council to act as it was intended, NATO chooses to act when necessary. It attempts to act within international law as much as possible, and emphasizes first obtaining at least some support from the Security Council first. Thus, many legal writers also point to the concept of international legitimacy to be used as a tool to measure actions alongside the law.

March 1, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

Thank you once more for this engaging discussion, Andrew, I very much appreciate it.

I will try to be more concise with my response, as I have already written lengthy responses.
If you refer to my comments above, I actually did not refer to NATO’s media/PD campaign during Operation Unified Protector as “falsehoods”. For the sake of accuracy, I used the word “half-truth”, by virtue of justifying the intervention through emotional appeal to ideals and values, without explaining the equally-important self-interested rationale of Allied members. There is an important difference in my use of language, half-truth being less categorical and more nuanced. Precision is important in policy recommendations, hence why I am insisting on the above.

On polling, I actually believe that it could lead to greater community cogency, by at least equipping NATO with the quantitative knowledge – which you also call for – to make more precise judgements about how its public diplomacy statements affect (if at all) its target audiences, and how these could be improved. It is only a first step, as you say, but it could be an important one by allowing the Organization to factor in public opinions and perceptions in its decision-making process; this is as close as you could get to the pressures of democratic decision-making, as I said earlier, without directly electing NATO leaders – which of course is an unrealistic goal in any case for a multilateral institution consisting of democratically-elected nation-states. A more moderate goal is for NATO to deepen its collaboration with credible, third-party pollsters, such as the Transatlantic Trends survey, and suggest that they incorporate concrete questions about the public's policy preferences for NATO's actions, rather than general questions of Allied publics' overall support for NATO, which are not entirely revealing. (For example, the quantitative methodology of this poll could be problematic in grouping all European countries into an "EU" category, brushing over important differences among European NATO publics).

For example, the poll could ask such concrete questions as: a) Do you approve of NATO's intervention in Libya, based on liberal-democratic principles and the Responsibility to Protect?; b) Do you believe that your security interests were directly served by this intervention?; c) Would you support a presence of Allied ground troops and/or special forces on Libyan soil?; d) Did NATO act within its United Nations Security Council mandates (UNSC 1970 and 1973)?; e) Would you support a comparable intervention, based on the same criteria, in the future?

You expressed concern that this could in fact not accomplish a closer Allied community, by framing the question as follows: “how does a poll inspire a state to increase its NATO involvement, to forge stronger sentiments of “we”?” This is a legitimate question, but perhaps not the most relevant one. Creating a “we”-feeling out of 28 nation-states will not, in fact, be accomplished by a public diplomacy campaign, or by any practical policy recommendations we can brainstorm short of fundamentally altering the structure of the currrent international system. The 28 members of NATO are already a community of values and interests, and they do not seek closer integration into a single federal-type unit, as the European Union could be understood to have attempted. Instead, public diplomacy appropriately targets the national audiences of NATO member-states; hence, it is about their perceptions of belonging to the Alliance, to its cause, to its interests and its values. Cultivating this feeling of "we" between Allied constituencies and NATO as a whole is a much more realistic and achievable goal; whereas the 28 member-states arguably already identify more with one another, through NATO, than they ever did, and the ceiling to further integration is simply the centrality of nation-states to the present international system.

There is nothing to fear from being exposed to the sentiments and opinions of Allied publics, for that is the chief accountability mechanism of all democracies worthy of the name. In the short-term, it may certainly be an irritant to some nations to work in the spotlight of public opinion. But if we take a more strategic, long-term view, the Alliance cannot endure as a community of values as well as interest in any meaningful shape or form without the full interaction and engagement of its Allied publics. This does not mean that Allies should expect or hope for sheepish and flattering feedback on all of its policies; constructive criticism is exactly what NATO will learn to live with and improve from. If NATO genuinely seeks to implement its liberal-democratic values from rhetoric into reality, this is the most realistic way to achieve this goal. Moreover, by being exposed to the difficulties and subtleties of Alliance decision-making, especially in crisis scenarios, Allied constituencies will develop a more nuanced and accurate view of what NATO does - and appreciate just how necessary it is. This will also give NATO's Public Diplomacy Division more tangible feedback to work with, allowing it to rethink its strategies to fill certain needs in public understanding. Implementing this policy of openness would be a victory for democratic values and for NATO's coherence and feeling of community as a whole.

March 1, 2012

Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)

To Megan – I have already answered Andrew's comment, which you echoed, about R2P and other democratic concepts behind intervening in Libya being “falsehoods”; I did not in fact make that claim, but only pointed out that it was a very partial, and subjectively-framed justification. Andrew seemed to agree that the other side of the story – the legitimate strategic interests of the Allies – was not covered by NATO’s PD effort. If I ask difficult and searching questions of (some) NATO actions, as you point out, it is in the tradition of detached and scholarly debate, and for the constructive purpose of improving the Alliance.

You say that you are still sceptical about what my policy recommendations for NATO’s PD efforts will achieve: “This doesn't address the concerns of a divergence in values, or a fear that this is an organization dominated by the US or dominated by Europe. I'm skeptical that this ideal will answer the goals of this project.” Personally, I do not see a divergence in values as an issue. As for the perception of NATO being dominated by the U.S., I think that this is more relevant to uninformed public opinion than to policy-makers working at NATO, who know that the reality is much more nuanced. Hence, this misperception would arguably be cleared up by public viewing of certain North Atlantic Council meetings, because they would then see for themselves that decisions are well and truly taken by 28, not by any one power alone.

Thank you for your support for implementing the policy recommendation of televising certain NAC meetings. You are concerned, however, that this may hollow out Council sessions, and that “heavier decisions will simply take place behind the scenes.” To the best of my knowledge, this has always partly reflected the nature of many multilateral fora, not just NATO, in which coalitions of states lobby and agree on the terms of some future agreements, and then present it to the full assembly for debate and a final, formal agreement. In any case, I provided caveats in my above comments to this idea, by suggesting that important decisions and security-sensitive discussions would obviously be exempted from this project. Moreover, I am only suggesting that the Public Diplomacy Division be tasked to create a pilot project of special sessions in which highly-classified subjects are not covered; nations would retain some right to cancel the screening of certain sessions, based on explicit opt-out arrangements, in case they felt that their security was directly imperiled by information exchanged during a meeting. The multilateral negotiating frameworks in place at NATO would provide the opportunity for committee-level discussions at 28 of the implications, limitations and opportunities of this idea, before it could be agreed to at the 2013 summit, as I suggested. This gives NATO states at least 12 months to engage in substantive negotiations.

Your idea for the more systematic declassification of NATO archives is an interesting one, but I am not convinced that it will be easily achieved, or that the benefits will be worth the effort. For historians, the basic time-line is usually 30 years, whereupon government archives usually begin to declassify material (sometimes longer, depending on the institution’s rules). It might be worth trying, but in the end I am not sure that this will benefit the public beyond specialised scholars and historians – of course, as an historian I would welcome this – as NATO documents would need to be contextualised by such qualified historical scholarship before they could make direct sense to the general public, or else there would be a risk of misinterpretation, particularly by sensational journalism. On balance, I think that the idea for a public information disclosure mechanism (like the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S.) could be the most achievable policy goal to strive for, and would be a clear signal of NATO’s openness and democratic accountability to its publics and to the international community. Perhaps this will require another working-group level discussion, however, before nations find consensus on this policy, which will have many security and practical implications.

Finally, I acknowledge your distinction between international law and international legitimacy. It is an important one. But our discussion, as I understood it, revolved around international law, and its contrast with normative frameworks for action (i.e. R2P). I certainly did not make a blanket argument that NATO’s actions were illegal or illegitimate – far from it, if you look at my views on Afghanistan, and my more qualified views on Libya. I was simply pointing out that this was not a given legal “right”, as I understand it. A capacity to act, undoubtedly; a necessity to act, perhaps, depending on the context and circumstances. But a right, understood as a legal entitlement, is a more controversial claim. A capacity to act does not itself constitute a duty or right to act. But perhaps we can both agree to the consensual position that humanitarian necessity, proportionality, international support and accountability are central to the perceived legitimacy of NATO’s actions?

March 1, 2012

Sascha Lohmann, Goethe University Frankfurt, Platinum Contributor (203)

Daryl, I fully agree with your analysis of the overreliance on public diplomacy and the tendency to employ communication as policy substitute. After visiting NATO headquarters as one of the AC participants of a UK/German bloggers delegation last year, I ended up with a similar conclusion (http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Mee...).

In the end, an intergovernmental organization politically accountable only to its member states cannot shoulder the responsibilities of their national governments, i.e. engaging their publics over defense and security issues.

March 2, 2012

Steven Alan Swingler, Indiana University , Bronze Contributor (19)

To Mr. Morini,

I found your analysis of NATO's use of Public Diplomacy and "White-washed, Fuzzy" public image rather spot on.

Though I do have one critque and I will keep it short. I do not think that NATO is using Public Diplomacy so much out of choice. Rather it seems that there is a lack of concenus among member nations on there national and collective intrests in NATO, the goals they wish to attain, and the level of commitment they wish to maintain.

Because there is no agreement and real will to act, you have a big PR public diplomacy campagin that is great PR and looks good, but really does nothing and risks nothing. Its almost as if NATO now can be compared to the League of Nations in the 1920s, with the dominant PR image of collective security and international justice, but a lack of poltical will and disagreement among the big players, and a two tier system of membership. The British mantra of the 1920's that no Englishmen will "die for Danzig" seems to be repeating today but instead, in places
like Georgia and Ukraine.

So thats just my bit, and take it easy on my spelling and writing, I just turned 18 and have not graduated high school yet.

Thank you for your time,

Steven Swingler

March 2, 2012

Johannes Steger, Università di Bologna, Bronze Contributor (18)

Are you really convinced that NATOs community suffers from a "value deficit"? Its members are remarkably homogeneous, and all of them would subscribe to promote “individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law”.
By contrary, the real problem of NATO seem to be the sometimes highly diverging interests of its member states. All initiatives to build up a "community feeling" on the basis of mere values won't lead to anywhere.
The missing "demons" have been already invoked throughout your discussion, and some of you seem convinced that so called "new security threats" may replace them. However, the threat of terrorism is nothing against Cold War menaces! Most of member states can cope with terrorism by internal police action - and most of them have got some experience in dealing with terrorist action already starting from the '60s. Surely, NATO cooperation and intelligence sharing may be a big help to root out transnational operating terrorist groups - but do you need a military alliance for that?
NATO is still alive because of its usefulness for the USA, a great tool of managing their allies. And by the same token, it is the only tool for the Europeans in order to have a “voice” in US-Foreign Policy issues, a way to tame the tigers unilateralism – guaranteeing or not political and logistical support. Furthermore, it is the only serious framework where Europeans agree to work together on military matters – as the Italian refusal to accept French leadership on Libya has shown once again.
And again emerges our problem of diverging interests. Italy would have preferred to not intervene in Libya, but it had to in order to be not excluded from future cooperation with the “new” regime.

March 3, 2012

Milda Leonaviciute, Graduate from Vilnius Univesity, (8)

Dear Daryl,

I enjoyed reading your article. It in some ways reflects my own beliefs. The public diplomacy as you say is arguably a problem inside NATO.

I strongly agree that NATO cannot please everyone around it. But I wish respectfully to hold an argument that "NATO should strip the values talk to a bare minimum, and adopt a leaner and meaner vocabulary of Realpolitik and self-interest". I believe that our alliance has to focus on its own values and defend them decisively. None alliance, to my belief, can exist without having values which it inevitably tries to safeguard against any kind of threats.

I would agree with you that public diplomacy is making NATO softer. There is, however, a difference between a language the alliance speaks with governments or partners and the language it speaks with member nations. Yes, public diplomacy tries to influence minds of people. But it can be used to influence a stronger sense of community among the nations. I do not see an incompatibility between being firm and having "a leaner and meaner vocabulary of Realpolitik and self-interest" to be used with governments outside the alliance and simultaneously foster the idea of community in the intercommunication level between the member states. Frankly, I support your statement that "NATO is a politico-military organization and the custodian of a collective defence treaty, not a book club".

Congratulations with a catchy headline. Would you agree that there is a need of less talking and more actions instead?

Kind regards,
Milda Leonaviciute

March 6, 2012

Ira Straus

Absolutely right that NATO overdoes the Public Diplomacy as a solution for the democratic deficit -- and for the deficit of support from media and academia, where the most frequently expressed view is that NATO is an obsolete cold war relic and will/should soon disappear.
Two points on the solutions:

1. To overcome the deficit of media and academic support, one of the things that is needed is, paradoxically, a very different form of public diplomatic: a different -- and more accurate, because more complete -- historical narrative on the origins and development of the Atlantic Alliance. One that fully remembers the Alliance's roots in the growth of a northern Atlantic mode of society and polity since the 1600s, and the Alliance's development from the Anglo-American rapprochement of the 1890s to the world wars of the early 1900s, rather than just starting in truncated form with the outcome of this development -- the Atlantic treaty in 1949.

2. To overcome the democratic deficit is a difficult matter in NATO, as in every international institution, but a feasible one. The crux of it is always,

a. to increase the flexibility of the decision-making process away from unanimity toward voting -- that is, to make increased use of the methods for decision in the NAC without consensus, and to increase the range of such methods considered available there. And

b. to increase the parliamentary role in the decision process -- that is, to increase the role of NPA, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

The NPA was created in the 1950s and '60s on the initiative of the Atlantic Unionists, for the express purpose of overcoming NATO’s democratic deficit. Geoffrey de Freitas MP, one of its founders, expressed regret, in a pamphlet published by Hansard on its origins, that it was not given much to do beyond the role of a Tudor parliament -- where the notables of the realm gather and hear about the good things the King is doing for them, so they can go home and give the people (in this case, the national parliaments) the good word on how excellent the government is.
In other words, Freitas was saying, NPA was given a Public Diplomacy function in lieu of the incipient democratic function it was intended for.
Democracy is the muscular replacement for public diplomacy, or rather, the thing needed so that there will not be a temptation to overemphasize public diplomacy in the first place. NATO's Public Diplomacy emphasis is a sublimation of the problem of the lack of a Public Democracy aspect in NATO's core policy-making processes. Like all sublimations, it exudes weakness, diversion, inability to move directly toward the object, somewhat like people who talk out of the side of the mouth and are unable to look others in the eye.
The solution -- the way to escape the otherwise quite inevitable Freudian impulses of sublimation and projection -- is not more publicity; nor more transparency of NAC diplomatic consultations (this would harden national positions for public show and for practicing public rhetoric, as seen in UNSC broadcasts -- making harder the diplomatic give and take, which fortunately works rather well in NATO, much better than in the UN; we don't want to screw up the one thing that works!). The solution is the difficult but entirely feasible matter of introducing elements of voting and parliamentarism into the decision-making processes of NATO. There are several sequential evolving forms this should take, some of them similar to a few of the numerous methods used in the EC-EU since its consensus-start in the 1950s to its more efficient, if complex, mixed system today. The EU has shown that voting makes easier the diplomatic give and take, by changing the game, where concessions used to be available most easily through obstructionism, and creating a new dynamic where the advantages come far more from cooperation. It is the opposite of the harm that comes when publicity is given, prematurely, to a process, such as that of the UNSC, which remains almost purely diplomatic and veto-ridden.
NATO has always wanted to increase the efficiency of the NAC -- the NATO military is especially strong on this, with a near consensus among NATO ex-military leaders that the reliance on consensus in the NAC needs to be reduced; some of NATO’s most dedicated Secretaries General, such as Spaak and Stikker, have also sought this -- but has been unable or unwilling to establish clear rules for decision short of consensus. NATO has also always wanted to strengthen the role of the NPA, but has usually thought in terms merely of enhancing its public diplomacy functions, and has failed to agree on a significant strengthening of its role in real decision processes.
These are the things that can change, and need to change.

Sincerely yours,
Ira Straus
Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO