A regularly
employed analyst runs a certain risk when publicly speaking about the
possibility of humanity being destroyed in the foreseeable future. "Professional
myopia" or "immaturity in judgment" may be among
the less denigrating - "unprofessional hysteria" or "irresponsible conduct" the
more damning - reactions by colleagues. However, a plain extrapolation of
recent political developments in Russia into the future should lead
one to regard outright war with NATO as a still
improbable, yet nonetheless possible scenario. It is not unlikely that Russian public discourse will, during the coming years,
continue to move in the same direction in which
it has been evolving since 2000. In such a scenario, what is in store for the world
is not only a new "cold" but also possibly a "hot" and perhaps
even nuclear war.
This assessment
sounds not only apocalyptic but also "unmodern," if not anachronistic. Aren't
the real challenges of the 21st century global warming,
financial regulation, the North-South divide,
international migration etc.? Isn't that enough to worry about, and should we
really be distracting ourselves from solving these real problems? Hasn't the age of
East-West confrontation been over for several years now? Do we really want to
go back to the nightmarish visions of the horrible 20th century? A sober look at Russia suggests that we
better do just that: prudence may decrease the probability that a worst-case scenario
ever materializes.
Such a scenario
has become feasible again as Russian public opinion and elite discourse have -
until August 2008, largely unnoticed in the West - made a fundamental shift,
during the last years. The 1990s began with Russia's enthusiastic
embrace of the Western value system and partnership; they ended with Russian scepticism
and bitterness towards the West. This was less the result of NATO's expansion
or bombing of Yugoslavia per se than an
outcome of Moscow's peculiar
interpretation of these actions.
In the early
1990s, Yeltsin failed to remove many of the Soviet Union's elites from their
positions of power and influence. This gave the ancien régime's representatives
an opportunity to impregnate post-Soviet political discourse with a
reformulated, yet again fundamentally dualistic, world-view in which Russia and the US remain
arch enemies fighting not only for control of the former Russian
empire, but also deciding the future fate of humanity.
Initially marginal
interpretations such as these were already making inroads into Russian mainstream
discourse in the 1990s. With the beginning of Vladimir
Putin's rise in 1999, however, they started to slowly but steadily move
into the political center. Whereas Europe's recent
scepticism towards the US has been, in many
cases, an anti-Bushism, the Russian aversion towards America and NATO goes
deeper. Today, the idea that the Western (or at least Anglo-Saxon) political
leaders are virulently Russo-phobic is commonplace on TV talks show
and in academic conferences. That events like the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine or Georgian
attack on South Ossetia were
fundamentally inspired, if not directly organized by the CIA is, in Russia today, a truism.
That the CIA or another Western secret
service is behind 9/11 or the Beslan tragedy are respected assessments
frequently discussed in mainstream Moscow mass media. That
the current behaviour of the West and its puppets in Eastern Europe has much in common with Nazi Germany's policies is an opinion with which many Russians would readily agree.
Such collective
paranoia is not only regrettable, but also dangerous. The nation that is
beholden to these bizarre views still has a weapons arsenal large enough to
eradicate humanity several times. Until August 2008, it appeared that Dmitry Medvedev's rise might usher in a new stage in
Russian-Western relations -- a prospect that, after the Russian-Georgian war and
the disciplining effect it had on the new President, has become unlikely again. Today,
there is little ground for hope that the deep contamination of Russian public
discourse could be reversed, or at least its further evolution be stopped, in
the nearer future. Unless something fundamentally changes in Russian-Western
relations, we will -- as the Russian-Georgian war illustrated -- continue to live
on the brink of an armed confrontation between two nuclear super-powers.
Dr. Andreas Umland teaches at the Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Upper Bavaria and is a member of the Atlantic Community. He edits the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society" and compiles the biweekly Russian Nationalism Bulletin.
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February 19, 2009
Andrey Chubyk, Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”, Silver Contributor (64)
Russia doesn't need to confrontate with nuclear weapons and armed forces. It receives step by step victories of another kind - economical. It is a war providing with Energy weapon – complex system of use energy and infrastructure potentials of one country (corporation) with the aim to deliver economical destruction to a potential enemy and/or to get these or other preferences from him and/or cessions political, economical and another character.
It should be remembered, that Energy Strategy of Russia officially proclaimed the goal «to strengthen its presense on internal energy markets of foreign states, joint ownership over distribution network of energy sources and objects of energy infrastructure in these countries».
So Russia will not destroy economics of other countries directly, but for sure take control over their development, what include also possibilities for political pressure and influence.
The best possibilities are provided by so-called Infrastructural weapon – systematic use of energy infrastructure by one country (corporation) with the aim of energy flows’ reorientation to bypass another country for economical or political pressure and receipt of some preferences and cessions. Examples - Nord Stream and South Stream, where everything will depends of Russia because of lack storage facilities.
Those kinds of weaon are already in use and will be used by Russia in the future as prime tools to achieve desired goals.