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An important lesson from the Caucasus conflict is that NATO has to be able to surmount Russian naval power anywhere in the mandate area in order to defend its post-soviet newcomers against Russian aggression. The most vulnerable NATO members are the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - strategically locked between their mighty neighbor’s mainland and its military stronghold of the Kaliningrad zone.

In any conflict involving Russian aggression toward the Baltic states, the Baltic Sea provides a crucial operation theater and access corridor. And - as was the case in the Caucasus and the Black Sea - Russia has an advantage over NATO forces and can prevent a contingency operation.

The bulk of NATO forces protecting the Alliance's eastern flank are located in Western Europe. The US Army V-Corps is stationed in Germany and the NATO Response Forces are rotation-based. In times of conflict some units may be located as far away as Spain or southern France. The Baltic Sea is the default route of relocation. But Russia has an enormous strategic asset: the Baltic Fleet and relatively large land and air forces in the Kaliningrad zone.

A Rand Corporation study of 2002 concluded that “for the United States and its allies, the greatest anti-access in-theater vulnerability is concentrated in the area of the Baltic Sea. If Russia could find a successful combination of mines, submarines, and air-launched anti-ship missiles, it could potentially deny NATO forces access to the eastern Baltic Sea.” In the analyzed scenario a limited Russian operation against the Baltic states was launched on the grounds of protecting a Russian ethnic minority.

Russia may not be as strong in the Baltic as it is in the Black Sea - with the mighty missile cruiser Moskva - but it has enough fire-power and capabilities to prevent NATO from quick deployment in the Baltic states. With Sweden and Finland being neutral, Germany and Denmark concentrating in the North Sea and western Baltic, the only NATO navy close to the theater of operations is the Polish navy. And it is no match for the Russian Baltic Fleet.

Poland's naval capabilities have been on the decline since the early 1990's. Its firepower dropped dramatically from 16 missile attack ships in service to only 3 small missile vessels. The only larger ships in service are two obsolete US-granted OHP-class frigates, equipped with Harpoon missiles. Poland had plans to strengthen its navy with 6 new corvettes, but failed to build even one.

NATO has to make a full and credible commitment to defending its outer-circle member states. Reinforcing the Baltic states with defensive measures will only have limited effect, as they are not able to sustain under Russian attack for more than a day or two. In order for any NATO contingency to succeed, the Baltic Sea must be controlled by strong NATO navies and air forces. Otherwise, the collective defense clause may be impossible to implement.

Marek Swierczynski is a journalist with a special interest in defence and security matters and and a member of the Polish Euro-Atlantic Society.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Marek Swierczynski: Visegrad Four: A Friendship Turned Sour
• Marek Swierczynski:Dead End in Sight for Poland's Missile Defense Site
• Alexandros Petersen & Ryan R. Miller: The Polish-Lithuanian Tandem

October 22, 2008

Member deleted

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I like this comment! What's this?

As before I also now support other solutions than collecting weapons on the borders. One of the positive events took place yesterday 21st Oct. in Helsinki, Finland, when army commanders (chief of staff) of US (Mullen) and Russia (Makarov) met first time after Georgia conflict. This secret or low profile could be a sign of attempt to find peaceful practice for todays' and tomorrows' crisis. I also think that Baltic pipe line is better action line than Navy because economical cooperation normally decreases tensions and increases mutual understanding.

October 22, 2008

Jeffery Allen Richard, lawyer/contributor, Silver Contributor (43)

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I agree with Herr Swierczynski. Military readiness is often the cornerstone for diplomatic success. By making it clear that NATO is prepared and willing to take even disproportionate military action to defend its member states, it raises the costs for furture Russian military adventures in eastern Europe, and thereby making a diplomatic solution more likely.

I for one am a little dubious of claims that economic cooperation decreases tensions and increases mutual understanding, for it reminds me too much of Norman Angell's famous tract "The Great Illusion" (1910) which argued that economic interdependence was the real guarantee of the good behavior of one state to another. Although I find it very unlikely that Russia would risk a military intervention in the Baltics, I think that likelihood would go down to nearly nothing if NATO was adequately prepared.

November 5, 2008

John Hadjisky, Blogger, Platinum Contributor (328)

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Historically, the fate of the Baltics have been decided by land battles, not by naval engagements. Only by creating political conditions that prevent aid to the Baltics by land via Germany and Poland, could the Russians hope to make effective use of their Baltic navy in support of a Georgia scenario in the Baltics.

Still, a strong NATO Baltic fleet would be extremely helpful in in defending the Baltic states from a Russian attack. Such a fleet would require considerable expense, and would raise the usual complaints about guns vs. butter and fears of a regional arms race.

Those who favor butter should consider that the best way to avoid the need to build a NATO Baltic Fleet would be to demonstrate that Germany and Poland have an unconditional commitment to the territorial integrity of the Balkan states, including a pre-approved and well-rehearsed plan to transport reinforcements, supplies, and humanitarian aid via land if the Baltic "access corridor" is denied by the Russian Baltic fleet.

Similarly, those who favor an entente cordial between Germany and Russia could consider how this could trigger a Baltic arms race.

Sadly, those who favor butter, or who favor a strong German-Russian partnership, appear to imagine that the Russians have no ambitions that are more important than trade. Because of this failure of imagination, there may be no alternative but to try and build a NATO Baltic fleet.

November 12, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

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To John: indeed the land corridor proved crucial to many european campaigns throughout the centuries. But today's armies do not just cross the country straight, they use roads and railways. In light of your comment it is striking that Poland never managed to link the remote north-eastern areas of the country with the main East-West rail and road corridor. 20 years after Poland broke free from the communism, there is no highways and bridges that could provide quick force relocation, there is no large airstrip in the whole nort-eastern quarter of the country and the protection of the seaways is like described above. Moreover, there is significant power-deficit in the north of the country and already independent Poland took a strange decission in the early 1990's to abandon construction of a nuclear power-plant. If Russians played a role in that, congratulations to them.

June 21, 2009

Libertatis

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Actually now Russian Baltic Fleet does not exist in practical terms. US/NATO air and sea power could easily smash several remaining Russian naval basses, airfields, surface combatants from stand-off distances launching several hundred cruise missiles under AWACS planes control. Aircraft strikes would follow. Outdated Russian air force and depleted SAM network could not prevent this. Only two or three Russian conventional submarines now operate on the Baltic but it is not enough for any naval blockade. They would be hunted and sunk by any NATO's major naval task force entering Baltic trough Danish straits. Finally Russian forces would quickly cease to exist in the air and on the sea. However another question is to draw Russian Army back from Baltic States. This task would require carry out NATO's ground offensive from Poland and maybe conquering Kaliningrad enclave as a bargaining chip.

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