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A straight line is the shortest way to connect two dots. It is the most direct route to move from start to finish and in many cases the best choice among alternatives. However, as the controversy around a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia and the Ukraine shows, it may not always be the best path to follow.

The MAP discussion should be evaluated in the context of NATO's evolution since its inception, a time that was characterized by cold war rhetoric and a very different world security equation than the one that we are facing today. It was one of a much more bi-polar balance of power and military focus. Since then, boundaries between the two former "blocks" have lost much of their previous clarity and both sides of former cold war alliances have moved closer towards each other. Today, we have achieved a respectful, active, peaceful and constructive dialogue between the two sides of the former world security equation. Focus has shifted towards questions of global security which are an equation with multiple variables in their own right (in many cases multiple unknowns).

This evolution over the last decades has fundamentally transformed the understanding of NATO as an organization, its position today, and its direction going forward. From its creation as a military defense alliance for the "Western World" NATO has extended its focus more broadly to take a global perspective on security matters. Such matters will continue to pose challenges for NATO as it further develops its understanding of, position towards and role in addressing modern security themes such as world terrorism, nuclear proliferation, totalitarian regimes, isolated civil unrest or relationships of member and partner countries with China and other Asian countries.

These subjects are as much a concern for governments of former Soviet Union countries as they are for current NATO membership states. NATO's changing perspective on this new paradigm was manifested in its 1999 and 2004 expansions and in the establishment of the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic-Partnership Council.

The natural extension of this process, of course, is to offer membership action plans to other countries, consistent with NATO's first steps of including selected Eastern European countries with similar perspectives on world security. Transitioning like-minded allies from a loose forum of common dialogue into a closer military alliance is sensible. However, given (i) NATO's historical context and (ii) the significant benefits that have resulted from constructive East-West relations since the end of the cold war, an eastward expansion involving countries that are close neighbors of the Russian Federation should involve consultations with the Russian government.

A "go-it-alone" expansion policy would be disrespectful to Russia's security interest, could cause a change in its domestic public debate, and potentially become detrimental to its internal political stability. A result that would be counterproductive and could hurt long-term security interests.

Of course, one can take a view that a near-term inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine would be unlikely to cause such unrest among Russia's current political and economic leadership for it to cause them to act contrary to the country's vested economic interests. However, over the medium term a forced move without an adequate process could provide a fertile ground for political forces within Russia that may seek to undermine the current stability of what is still a fragile democracy and market economy - in a country that does not have significant experience with either one.

NATO should work together with Russia towards a shared vision about its role in the 21st century and, on this basis, communicate a process for selected Partnership-for-Peace countries to join the alliance as full members together with and at the same time as Russia. To the extent that this may prove not to be a viable option in the short- to medium-term, it would still be more beneficial for NATO to seek to carve out a special role of some other sort for Russia. This role could go beyond its current partnership status, but not as far as a full integration into military command structures. The announcement of such a more prominent status for Russia should be announced together with the accession of its neighboring countries. It would create a basis for Russia's leadership to communicate the expansion of NATO in a way that is in line with both sides' common long-term interests. On a side note, such a path is also likely to cause less friction with the Chinese government than a full membership of Russia.

A statement of clear and strong support for a membership of Ukraine and Georgia is desirable. However, a straight line between where we stand today and the aim of achieving this goal in the future may not be the best way to get there. NATO must be mindful of its role vis-à-vis the Russian Federation and the impact that its actions may have on the political landscape. An offer of membership to Georgia and Ukraine against strong political and public opposition in Russia cannot be advisable. NATO membership states should consult with Russia to determine a common understanding of NATO's role in world security matters and way for Russia's security interests to be either respected or represented through the alliance.

Dr. Andre Kelleners is a member of the Atlantic Community

April 8, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"A "go-it-alone" expansion policy would be disrespectful to Russia's security interest, could cause a change in its domestic public debate, and potentially become detrimental to its internal political stability. A result that would be counterproductive and could hurt long-term security interests. "

You make some decent points here. The problem is that NATO was formed to further two purposes: 1) To enable French-German cooperation by the US guaranteeing French security vis Germany and 2) to defend Europe against the USSR.

Rationale #1 has long since been accomplished which leaves us with rationale #2. Bringing Russia into NATO may well be desireable but would also leave NATO as an alliance sans mission. If Russia were to join NATO that would mean that the US extends a security guarantee to Russia while implicitly tieing Russia's hands on matters like Chechnya. I doubt the US wishes to or needs to extend this guarantee and am very certain that Russia does not wish to be controlled - and see little reason why it should be!

Might it not be better simply to dissolve NATO? Certainly I see little reason to extend NATO to Ukraine/Georgia - Russian paranoia is quite justified in this matter. But Russian paranoia can be moderated if the US were to remove itself from NATO; in that case Russia would simply be facing a European security alliance.

April 9, 2008

Lukas Vitalijus, Institute for European Studies, University of British Columbia, Silver Contributor (54)

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Sir,

Thank you for an interesting approach on NATO-Russia relations.

However, despite of all good intentions building 'a shared vision' or community between Russia and the West one must be aware of not falling into a wishful thinking.

Russia has no intention in joining NATO or the EU. It is a power of its own.

NATO is not a anti-Russian military alliance, but it needs a rationale of functioning and Russia definitely plays its role well.

and, finally, lets not forget a key principle:

each country (whether its Ukraine or Georgia, or the Baltic States previously) has a right to choose the alliance they want to belong.

April 9, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"NATO is not a anti-Russian military alliance, but it needs a rationale of functioning and Russia definitely plays its role well."

NATO is not anti-Russian from the POV of most people living in most NATO countries. I imagine that in the newer members many people do so regard the alliance. And in Russia - how do you imagine the Russians view NATO?

If I were a Russian watching the expansion of NATO to the former Warsaw Pact countries and even to certain countries formerly part of the USSR (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and now possibly Ukraine and Georgia) I think I would definately see NATO as a force aggressively encroaching upon areas which are traditionally in the Russian sphere of influence. That should not necessarily stop NATO expansion - but we should not hold any illusions that the Russians will see this as friendly in any way - they will not.

April 9, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

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Dr Kellner's points on defining NATO's and Russia's roles in global security framework are important and relevant. Whether they can be defined as common, is subject to debate - and a political processes taking place on both sides. What dr Kellner seems to suggest is a grand vision of a Russia-NATO concert in face of new security challanges and threats which do not discriminate their targets on the basis Cold War divisions. That's an interesing and tempting idea of a NEW WORLD that has not yet arrived. I agree with Don Stadler that it is more difficult to be envisioned by NATO's new members than by, say, "old Europe". And creating such a concert - however may be valuable to both Russia's and NATO's security - requires some concessions on both sides. In other words: is NATO ready to accept Russia as it is now or what changes would it require for NATO to accept such a strong partnership with Russia? Who needs to move over more? The rationale of expansion so far was not quite common defence but expanding democracy, rule of law and the so-called western values to the former soviet bloc and breaking the Yalta order by promoting independent decissions of sovereign states as to the military alliances they want to contribute to. The issue of Ukraine and Georgia probably goes further that path - and that's the reason, Don, which you can't see. Whether that path is still relevant in the time of new security challenges and threats - that is a separate question, extremely important and urgently topical for both NATO, potential applicants and for Russia. Finally, the forces behind the new challanges and threats also play on the old divisions to some extent - and as long as they do, a major shift, like a NATO-Russia concert, seems beyond reality.

Tags: | NATO | Russia |

April 9, 2008

Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College, Platinum Contributor (327)

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This discussion is long overdue.

Before we can discuss new roles for NATO, we do need to determine whether one of its operative missions--containing a large Eurasian power centered at Moscow--is still operative.

Here there are major divergences, in my view.

It seems that Western European states have no fear whatsoever of a military threat from Russia, see it largely as a European power, one with major problems but nothing that requires isolation or active containment, and see an interdependent evolution where Russia becomes more tied to Europe. I haven't met any Spaniards, French, Germans or Italians who are afraid of Russia or see it as a threat. Even on the energy issue, they feel that interdependence is the solution.

Central Europeans I don't believe have any real fear of a Russian invasion or occupation but are concerned about the continuation of Russian influence, especially economic. Some, like the Hungarians and Slovaks (and further south, the Greeks) feel more confident that they can harness Russia's resurging power and influence to bolster their own interests.

The Eastern Europeans who at present are outside of NATO and the EU desire membership in order to counter or remove altogether Russia's continued leverage. They feel that in the absence of such membership guarantees that economic and political forces are inexorably drawing them back into a Moscow-based orbit.

For Western and Central Europeans, both northern and southern, the question is whether or not such a process occurring in Eastern Europe threatens their security or vital interests. I think this helps to explain the divergences at Bucharest.

April 9, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"Before we can discuss new roles for NATO, we do need to determine whether one of its operative missions—containing a large Eurasian power centered at Moscow—is still operative."

Absolutely true, because this is the central question around which NATO is (now) constructed. If Russia is no longer a threat then the last major reason for the formation of the alliance is gone. There were two major reasons to form NATO in 1948 as I understand it - to enable Germany to join the emerging EC provide a US guarantee that Germany could not start another major war (as she had done three times between 1870 and 1939), and to restrain the ambitions of the USSR in Central and Southern Europe.

The first (and arguably more important mission has long since been accomplished, and now it appears that the second mission has also been accomplished.

I think a central question facing NATO is whether US (and Canadian) participation in NATO (or it's successor organisation) is necessary any more. The preponderance of the evidence is that it is not, I think. The measurement I use is the willingness or unwillingness of the continental European members of NATO to 'pay' the US for it's participation, payment being reckoned in support both public and within NATO councils, in willingness to keep up their own national defense and not rely upon the US to do the job, etc.

The unwillingness exhibeted in Afghanistan shows me that there is little or no willingness to pay any price to maintain the alliance on the part of these countries - si I think the US ought to amicably split from NATO.

April 10, 2008

Ilyas M. Mohsin, PPP, Platinum Contributor (296)

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A higly thought-provoking paradim/ discussion.
it appears that the breakup of the Soviet Union has not ended the cold war psyche, generally, on all sides. Accordingly, the posture of making Russia join the NATO appears to have been just a facade-builiding exercise.
The Russians are loath to forget what happened to them during the occupation of Afganistan. I recently attended a seminar in Copenhagen and the body-language of the Russian delegation, because they seldom spoke English, betrayed their revulsion towards a uni-polar world.
If the NATO can inspire such confidence as to make the Russians believe that the energy-reserves in the area would not be 'taken over' by the US etc, surely we may develop a broader understanding among all concerned which would be a harbinger of Global harmony/ dvelopment. However, till then the subject is achievable but fragile.

April 12, 2008

Member deleted

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It seems that the relevance behind NATO was begining to diminish with the disbanding of the WARSAW Pact and the dis-integration of the Soviet Union. That was the immediate raison d'etre ofr NATO. Granted. But quite a few (the earlier European Coal & Steel agreements, etc) of such agreements have evoleved into a European Union. The declaration by France of its reserving the use of Nuclear weapons against any state - similar to an earlier declaration by Russia - point to the rather insecure security that NATO presents and (also by itself) the rather insecure 'threat' that NATO may pose to Russia.
Why should Russia join NATO? Yet, again why should NATO be declared irrelevant? The cold war nostalgia - similar to the Stockholm Syndrome - still holds sway in many minds. But then, the world has changed. The threats no longer are from solid state actors of contending super-blocs, but rather from disparate sources that is global and quite amorphous. New Age philosophies and new Age peace with its attempted post-modern synthesis of the mystical and the scientifc has also brought forth the pre-modern superstitions and fanaticisms armed with modern technology. The two are different. The new age protagonists need the security of a democratic state while their alter egos threaten them as well as the modern democratic state that is the post-modern's best guarantee against the pre-modern. It no longer seems to be a world of conflicts of concentrated and well identifiable ideological differences gone awry. Rather the absence of such threats as the cold war has laid bare the hitherto ignored variables of threat that have evolved in its technological access and capacity and usually far too dispersed and yet networked - in a globe rendered a village via technology. The networked nature of European space and the networked nature of this global 'uncivil' society present interesting contrast. While the cold war may have been a typical transatlantic phenomenon with global implications, the globe was never contained wholly in such bi-polar imaginations and the absence of what is seen as propelling many debates in security studies.
The various regional security complexes engendered by the Cold War sytemic constraints still retain their charm and utility for the security studies' equivalent of the Stockholm Syndrome. Their outspinning out of their erstwhile firmly anchored orbits can and do tie up with the pre-modern (and the historical imagination behind many such agendas and pursuits) and its accessibility to technology that can portend a serious security threat that perhaps is not readily detectable unless the body shows symptoms of fever.
NATO and Russia and any other security partnership would need to evolve in a global world not dictated by the bi-polar constraints nor should the bi-polar constraints be needed to be re-imposed in other locales or forms like having tri-polar or quadri-polar arrangements in place, just to humour the arms-industry and its cold-war remanants.
For security to be in place and be relevant - for bodies like NATO - would be not to be merely a rehash of Kosovo - in its role and its expansion - but rather for its survival and relevance in the strategic sense without lending any more impetus to the global forces of disparate but networked protests that are only now begining to be visible under the carpet - as quite a mountain. That inchoate mountain is the new threat and while NATO would still be relevant as a new body that can take on in its role to be the transatlantic arm in defence of democracy and conditions of peace, declarations by states like France point out to the reality of the differences of perception within the key-players of NATO.
NATO can best be relevant as the defnce and the guarantee of security for the new age from the old-age (not human biological but as a social process).

Tags: | NATO | security |

April 14, 2008

franchie

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"The declaration by France of its reserving the use of Nuclear weapons against any state "

Chirac said that while visiting a nuclear submarines station. It wasn't ment in the Nato context but more he addressed a signal to Iran, that was threatening during the UN discussions.

I agree with Don, the actual NATO is a moribond. Let'see how an EU defense can replace it. Actually, the US could join for specific missions, as an outsider, as the Frenchs were /are since 1967, also for the Russians ; depends on the missions. De Gaulle already talk, at the creation of the EU, that EU should start from the Atlantic and go till Ural.

April 16, 2008

Member deleted

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Yes. May be true. The intention is not to mis-understand France's position via-a-vis NATO. Russia had made a similar comment over the right to use its nuclear weapon against any aggressor state or nation or group.
Comments like these by states or their elites usually betray minimum of two aspects:

1. Their lack of confidence in the usual or 'traditional' means available with a state, i.e. deterrence via punitive actions that accrue naturally from states that enjoy the 4 (four) classical markers of a state as in their reach, power, willingness and the ability. The breakdown of the 'perceptual' retributive capacity of a state that naturally deters aggressors when needing the mention of the final solution - nuclear weapons are such 'final solutions'. This then naturally re-affirms my point of the new kinds of threats that states may face and that such declarations betray.

2. The perceptual aspect of a state's isolation where its membership of particular 'defence-block(s)' should have guaranteed it against having the need for making any statements of unilateral actions involving the 'final solution'. Not that the NATO is moribund necessarily, but that the NATO needs to be re-imagined to address the newer threats that forces a state or its elites to make such statements of the 'final analysis', when being a part of it.

April 16, 2008

franchie

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I think, Chirac's sentence was more ment in a "communication" perspective toward US, saying there that France and the US shared the same point of view on Iran ; one know how communications were difficult with washington in Chirac's times, and opportunity "evenments" were used as sign

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