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March 22, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

Warm congrats from a fellow King's and Middle East Studies alumnus! I think your core argument is clear and I agree with many points you raise. I especially like the fact that you do not anticipate to change the nature of the MD, but instead to cooperate with other organizations, in this case the OSCE, that would fulfill tasks where they can claim legitimacy.

I have a few points where I have reservations. On the broader picture, my main doubt lies in the fact that it may not be enough to foster stronger NATO-OSCE ties to address the challenges in the region. The EU, and other European agencies, should also be taken into account. Otherwise, it may be difficult to achieve much.

Moreover, the OSCE has been incapable to take its Mediterranean Dialogue off the ground, mostly because there has not been the same effort from some members to derive attention away from the East where the OSCE is better positioned. Consequently, its experience in the region is fairly limited, so it would need to invest additional human and financial resources to live up to the challenge. This is not insignificant due to its small budget and its overall lack of appeal from the wealthiest members. The OSCE has been in surviving mode for many years. But, it could foster a fresh impetus to encourage deeper involvement in the Arab world, and most specifically in Southern Mediterranean countries.

I have doubts that the cooperation with NATO will resolve the funding issue. First of all, I don't see the mechanism that could enable a joint NATO-OSCE cooperation to have its own standing budget. In a large sense, that would create a separate organization. Second, "the funding clout of the U.S. behind NATO" has disappeared. The organization is highly in debt and Allies' defense budgets are decreasing to a point where the NATO budget is invariably damaged. The only option I see for increasing funding (or to put it more realistically a reallocation of budget for that region) is at the EU level and within the U.S. federal budget. In that sense, more coordination between the EU, as the organization which coordinates and leads the neighborhood policy, and the U.S. might be plausible and result into better-funded programs. But the programs would be directed toward certain areas, such as the two initiatives Geoffrey laid out and some ideas raised by Josiah. It could also include some of the things the OSCE does, such as election monitoring, legislation drafting, judicial reform, etc. This is one of the OSCE's main problems: EU member states will favor the EU as an organization to carry out such programs rather than the OSCE.

My last point is just a matter of clarification. When you write "This is because the Mediterranean Dialogue itself is structured to cope predominantly with the fields of military affairs, crisis management and consultation to combat terrorism", the crisis management component is by a wide majority military, not civilian.

Overall, I think you are right not to want to expand the functional perimeter of the Mediterranean Dialogue - it will never happen anyway - and a cooperation with the OSCE definitely has merits (one of them would be to include Russia with all the reservations that some may have). Your article only strengthens the fact that a core element of our memo should be to think about other organizations NATO can cooperate with.

March 22, 2012

Yasmin Jeanice Mattox, St. John Fisher College Graduate International Studies Program Alumna and Government Contract Analyst, Silver Contributor (29)

Congrats, Gillian, on being a finalist and having a great article.
I just have a couple of comments. First, I think it was wise to suggest a tighter collaboration between the Mediterranean Dialogue and the OSCE. While I also believe Vivien brings up a great point too that the EU should also be involved, I think the OSCE should be utilized more in the region. It has many things that it can offer, if as Vivien also asserted, it was taken more seriously by its wealthier members.
While I share some of the funding concerns Vivien brought up, I think the part of your article that gave me the most pause is when you state, “With the funding clout of the United States behind NATO, a sufficient injection into the budget of a linked OSCE-NATO cooperative response would enable a substantially stronger active solution to assist the needs of the transitional process underway in regional partner countries.” Vivien touched upon this too.
The main red flag for me, especially as an American, is where you bring up “the funding clout of the United States behind NATO.” True, the United States carries the heaviest financial and military burden for NATO, but that is a burden that is sure to change both for financial and political reasons. It is unsustainable and it’s unpopular domestically, especially in a sluggish American economy with soaring deficits and an electorate that wonders why Europeans closer to the region can’t be responsible for funding such projects, particularly if they are new ones that go beyond that which the U.S. has already committed. This competition’s next category is Smart Defense and this funding issue goes to the heart of it in many ways. The idea of pooling, sharing, and doing more with less is now the name of the game. The U.S. really is so overextended that unless something changes I don’t see the United States being on board with this. That is, especially if it’s responsible for funding much of it. It’s already trying to do what it can to disentangle itself from the region, financially and militarily, as quickly as is realistically possible. It’s trying to cut back, and not add on new projects to fund, so I worry about plans that only make mention of U.S. funding clout and not that of any other country, at least as presented in your article.

Thanks.

March 22, 2012

Josiah Jason Surface, University of Washington, Silver Contributor (33)

Gillian,

Congrats on the excellent paper and for making it onto the shortlist. I appreciate your astute observation that NATO must work within the limited roles that it has defined for itself, i.e. issues of security. At the same time you recognize that NATO cannot fail to more fully engage the budding governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, therefore you wisely recommend that NATO partner with the OSCE to achieve its goals in the Mediterranean.

I have only one reservation about such advice. Perhaps the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya will desire to work with the OSCE. Already we have seen that Tunisia is willing to work with the OSCE and that is to be expected because by all accounts, Tunisia out of the three, is most likely to be a success story. Meaning that because Tunisia is more secular and more open to democracy it may be more likely to succeed in creating a stable government. If Tunisia is open to democracy, then it is also likely that Tunisia would be open to organizations like the OSCE.

However, Egypt seems to be of a different mindset. Already the military, which currently rules Egypt, seems to be suspicious of western NGOs as well as their workers. This view of NGOs might develop into outright hostility if the military relinquishes political control in June of this year. Therefore, one has to wonder, will the OSCE be able to engage governments such as the Egyptian government? Also considering that the OSCE is overwhelmingly populated by western nations, will this be a turn off for Arab states that do not have as friendly ties with the west as Tunisia?

Despite these questions I am grateful that you recognize that NATO will need to partner with other organizations in order to achieve its objectives in and around the Mediterranean. Also, you chose an excellent organization to highlight, for it seems that the OSCE is a sort of catchall group that has experience in variety of different societal and political areas. However, I still remain concerned about the ability of the OSCE to engage certain nations in Mediterranean.

March 22, 2012

Gillian Kennedy, King's College London, Gold Contributor (107)

Thank you all so much for comments. Some of the suggestions you've made I think have been really good additions to my own recommendations, and are a serious consideration for the joint memo that we will construct. Firstly, Vivien I think that fostering closer links between a NATO-OSCE led strategy with the additional help of the EU is an excellent idea. It's true that the OSCE has been focused more on the East, and in particular Afghanistan; but I think a united push by a multitude of regional agencies could be a stronger influence at this time. Moreover, with EU involved or rather the European Mediterranean Partnership, there could be a serious inter-agency strategy developed to assist the MENA states.
Egypt, as I've said and I think Josiah mentioned this also is a significant geopolitical player in the region. Given the fact that Mr. Amr Moussa (one of the top favorites to win the presidential election and on good terms with the Muslim Brotherhood) signed the Barcelona Process in 1995, this is certainly a good omen for further involvement and commitment of the Egyptians in a cooperative sense.
Seeing as the Barcelona Process included provisions to help develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in that framework each state is different in its choice of a political, sociocultural, economic and judicial system; this something that I think could be incorporated with our memo as a policy recommendation in addition to the NATO-OSCE partnership that I have discussed.

Regarding the funding concerns that both Vivien and Yasmin have highlighted. I think that if the OSCE were to foster closer links with NATO this might help their funding process. It's trust that the OSCE has not received much attention from policy makers over the past few years, but this is something that could be strengthened by working with other regional agencies. Yasmin mentioned the idea of pooling funds, and considering the budgetary restraints that the EU and US are currently facing, this could be a wise decision. My main reason for suggesting the OSCE was because I felt that Tunisia, Egypt and Libya need assistance in key areas such as the development of a stronger and more independent civil society in conjunction with electoral monitoring. This is something the OSCE is well placed to do, and which has more experience than the MD.

Vivien, just to clarify my position on the MD in its structure. I stated that, 'the Mediterranean Dialogue itself is structured to cope predominantly with the fields of military affairs, crisis management and consultation to combat terrorism". Maybe I didn't make this quite as clear as I intended. My point here was that I think that area of crisis management could be stretched to deal with a civilian crisis management situation. Again, this in my mind is about bringing about fair and free elections. Crisis management to deter a military state from stealing the elections is something that an independent and inter-agency grouping could assist in, at least in a pressurizing sense.

Also, Josiah you mention that you had some concerns with regards the Egyptian case. I think in many ways Egypt is more suited then others for the OSCE-NATO assistance. The OSCE in its engagement with Tunisia has proven that it can work effectively with one of the MD partner states. Moreover, it's dealings with a far more fractious nation, such as Afghanistan demonstrates that it can assist states far more fragmented then Egypt. Also, I think that given Egypt's fragile economic position it is highly unlikely to turn away from an organization with Western ties too quickly. The United States, during the Mubarak era gave large US aid assistance to the Egyptians. The Freedom and Justice Party would be very unwise to shut their doors to all Western involved organizations given how much their economy is reliant on assistance and tourism. The OSCE with NATO will need to alleviate fears of any Western incursions by working with highly respected members within the Egyptian state and its civil society in order to gain its trust. This is possible, but it will need to be a strategy of carrot and stick, so that incentives can encourage stability and security in both Egypt and the wider MENA region. I hope that we can develop some of these ideas further in the memo.

March 23, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

Congratulations on a great paper Gillian. Cooperation is clearly necessary for success, and I think you've made a strong case for why the OCSE should be one of the organizations that NATO cooperates with. Many of the programs and recommendations that I and others put together might be best facilitated by NATO and the OCSE working together. That said, cooperation with OCSE is only one component necessary for success, and we need to work together to hammer out a more concrete and thorough path forward.

NATO (and the OCSE ) need to articulate an overall vision for their policy involvement in the region, both in terms of defining goals and generally ensuring that their motives are not questioned. In short, a coherent vision serves to enhance NATO's legitimacy in a region where legitimacy is greatly needed, and although your recommendation is sound, it lacks this important dimension. This, combined with the need for a long-term focus, is why I advocate that aid to the region should be focus on the young. Focusing on the youth is not only effective policy, but by keeping the emphasis on the generation that initiated the anti-authoritarian protests, we are also implicitly highlighting the principle of self-determination that they themselves stood up for.

March 23, 2012

Alexander Corbeil, Atlantic Council of Canada, Gold Contributor (101)

Hello Gillian,

Thank you for a very enjoyable policy paper, I believe that you provide and clear and concise argument for why NATO should enlist the help of OSCE. You state that, “This Arab awakening can hopefully begin the process of inclusiveness by allowing a multitude of conflicting voices to come together to achieve consensus in a new democratic Arab landscape.” I fully agree with this statement and believe that for this to be achieved the current climate of political openness needs to be extended in the future.

The Tunisian observer experience of the OSCE puts this organization at the forefront of democratic reconciliation within North Africa. Furthermore its previous successes in the Former Yugoslavia and Balkans and the organizations mantra, that there are three core facets of security: economic, environmental, and fundamental freedoms ensure that it is the right IGO for the job. Furthermore, its long standing institutional dialogue and cooperation with a number of Middle East and North African (MENA) states (including Egypt and Tunisia) allow the OSCE to work upon deep routed historical relationships in this transitional process. Libya has also previously involved itself in OSCE meetings, and thus could be fully included as a Mediterranean Partner State in the future.

But what have the issues been for OSCE in the Middle East? The Mediterranean Partners have a status akin to that of observer and it has been argued that there is a lack of vision when the organization participates with countries from the southern rim of the Mediterranean. To allow these countries to become Participating States could embolden their governments to fully involve themselves in any reconstruction and institutional development process. The Bucharest Plan for Action for Combating Terrorism (2001) refers to this need to broaden the dialogue, a precondition which I believe is necessary before any joint NATO-OSCE endeavor takes place. Instead of a two way tackling of the post-Arab Spring environment, it would be wise to include the expertise and regional knowledge of a variety of IGOs. Thus, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Arab League, and African Union should be tapped in order to help with the issues of regional security and the reconstruction process. In addition, as the Arab League has attempted to play a wider role in the Arab Spring process, most notably its observer mission in Syria, I believe it would be willing to join an international development project.

OSCE has also been less successful in reaching out to non-governmental organizations in the region. In July 2011 a three day human rights and election monitoring workshop was held for civil society groups from Egypt, this initiative is a good start but must be vastly expanded and the miniscule budget devoted to the MENA region should be increased. The organization should also repeat on a quarterly basis the joint OSCE-MP Countries Conference for Civil Society , as this is an indispensible asset to democratic advancement. Coupled with the issue of civil society has been the inability of OSCE to push forward human rights agendas with the MP countries. Given that this region is arguably the hardest in which to table such resolutions the OSCE has on multiple occasions stated that its mission must be seen in the context of cooperation with the United Nations and regional IGOS – again going back to my argument that the Arab League should be involved in a much publicized way. I must also agree with Geoffrey that an articulated policy vision is highly required that encompasses how OSCE will work with other bodies in the region.

The OSCE suffers from one major problem in dealing with these post-revolutionary countries. Although it must be applauded for continuing its established procedures in the case of the above mentioned North African countries, the fact that a request for assistance must first come from an MP country largely stifles any independent assistance that civil society could request. Furthermore, there is a possibility of foreseen tensions between MP countries that will implement reforms and those that most likely will not or stifle them (Tunisia and Egypt for example).

Lastly, regarding your remark that the OSCE through its Mediterranean Dialogue could deter the military from stealing elections, I do not believe this to be the case. IGOs to large extent have been unable to stem the tide of authoritarian takeovers, the recent coup in Mali and the inability to bring an end to the Syria crisis by the Arab League highlights this. Instead, individual states with economic linkages and military relations with the armed forces in Tunisia and Egypt have both the resources and political histories needed to curb any attempts at military coups or creeping re-entrenchment of authoritarianism. You are right in your response to argue that a carrot and stick approach is needed to ensure that democracy takes hold, and that Egypt’s economic position ensures that such a strategy would be beneficial.

Congratulations on a very well thought out piece, I look forward to adding parts of your recommendations into the policy memo.