Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

August 1, 2011 |  5 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Nagorno-Karabakh: A Frozen Conflict Threatens to Thaw

Orkhan Gafarli: Before a ceasefire took effect in 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh War took the lives of over 20,000 people. Now, the “frozen” conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is threatening to heat up once again. Both countries must implement democratic reform if a lasting peace is ever to be reached.

The Armenian-majority enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh officially lies within the territory of Azerbaijan. However, occupying Armenian forces have made its status uncertain since the official end of the war in 1994. Negotiations mediated by foreign powers have made modest progress, but observers worry it is not fast enough. With Armenia still occupying a total of 16% of Azerbaijani land, the current state of the south Caucasus is untenable.

Both sides have shown little willingness to compromise; indeed, both seem far fonder of provocation. Azerbaijan is pouring 5% of its GDP ($3 billion per year) into its army while its president, Ilham Aliev, regularly alludes to a reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia, meanwhile, has refused to withdraw from the territory. Added up, the military posturing and hard-line attitudes taken by both countries produce a potentially lethal mix.

Hope remains, however, that the conflict could reach a peaceful end. A 2007 protocol known as the Madrid Principles saw three foreign powers – Russia, the United States and France – work with the two foes to draft a set of objectives to help bring the conflict to a close. The idea is that Armenia withdraw from all Azerbaijani regions outside Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the disputed territory itself gain “interim status”, giving it some international legitimacy but stopping short of full independence.

The framework set by the Madrid Principles is clear enough, but if a long-term resolution is ever to be met, drastic democratic reforms are necessary in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Currently, both states are under semi-authoritarian rule where basic democratic rights are regularly repressed. Azerbaijan is ranked 134th in Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, tied with the failed state of Zimbabwe. Without robust democratic mechanisms in place, leaders in both countries are held unaccountable for even their most irresponsible provocations.

Democratic deficit and ethnic strife between Armenians and Azerbaijanis are not the only factors at play. Each of the foreign actors in Nagorno-Karabakh also has major strategic interests in the south Caucasus region, which often conflict. Russia salivates at the economic opportunities in the oil-rich region, while neighboring Turkey also seeks to maximize its influence. Non-Russian gas and oil pipelines have the US and the EU eager stabilize the region, and the south Caucasus is critical as a supply route for the Western effort in Afghanistan.

Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, recently sat with his counterparts, Armenia’s Serzh Sargsyan and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliev, for the fifth set of trilateral talks that observers hope will coax the two sides closer to a permanent peace. The mediated dialog between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a sign of positive progress. But for all the deal-making behind closed doors, both leaders continue their bellicose rhetoric in public, with the effect of reinforcing hard-line popular attitudes at home.

With both sides still maintaining troop presence along the disputed border, experts are understandably skeptical about the prospects of a lasting peace. The situation is so volatile that, instead of risking a weaker position by making concessions for a peace deal, both Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to prefer the limbo of the status quo.

Before any action along the lines of the Madrid Principles can be taken, a thorough analysis must be made of the risks and rewards of a movement towards a deal. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan must make significant democratic reforms and crack down on corruption. The conflicting interests of Russia, Turkey, the US and the EU in the region must also be taken into account. Any movement towards a lasting peace carries risks, but further inaction will only prolong this frozen conflict until it inevitably reignites.

Orkhan Gafarli is a researcher at the Kafkassam think tank. 

  • 4
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
 
Comments
Unregistered User

August 1, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
thanks for comment
 
Eva  Maria Krockow

August 2, 2011

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Orkhan,

Thank you very much for your contribution, which highlights the existence of an important trouble spot that could threaten political peace and stability in a strategic region connecting Europe with Asia.

In my opinion, the trilateral peace negotiations with Russia do not suffice to counteract far-reaching hostilities between the two countries. As you rightly pointed out, the conflict cannot be geographically reduced to the area of Nagorno-Karabakh. One has to take into account the overall political context of South Caucasus, addressing other major problems such as the deadlocked conflict between Armenia and Turkey at the same time.

Political talks will therefore have to unite all countries of the region as well as Russia and Turkey. The EU could be a good mediator due to its active engagement with the South Caucasus as part of its Eastern Neighbourhood programme and because of its ongoing dialogue with Turkey (e.g. on the subject of membership conditions).
 
Amrit Deecke Naresh

August 4, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Thanks, Eva, for your insightful comment. It is indeed a very delicate situation that has implications far beyond the fate of the roughly 140,000 people living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

When there are so many conflicting international interests -- economic (for oil), geostrategic (for military supply routes), and nationalist (between Armenia and Turkey, especially) -- a resolution must be reached that has as its #1 priority the security and stability of the two states directly involved: Azerbaijan and Armenia.

It is tempting for nationalists in these two countries to decry the peace process as just another example of Western meddling in a profitable region. So, while foreign mediation will be necessary to bring both Armenia and Azerbaijan to the negotiating table, any resolution must be on their own terms. For once both countries are ensured the integrity of their borders, democratic reform will be far more likely. Secure borders and stable democracy in both countries must be the ultimate goal of any peace talks because, in addition to securing local human rights, democracy would finally open the gates for the investment that all international players -- the EU, US, Russia and Turkey -- have sought for so long.

As ever, humanitarian and democratic goals are totally intertwined with economic and geostrategic ones. We should hope that the peace talks allow all the various goals to be fulfilled -- but the goal of a stable and sustainable democracy must come first.
Tags: | Armenia | Azerbaijan | war | Conflict Prevention | Russia | EU | US | Turkey |
 
Orkhan  Gafarli

August 5, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Thank you very much for comment.
 
Unregistered User

September 25, 2012

  • 0
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
For even more fun, we can compare and cotanrst the positions on Azerbaijan (Israel and Turkey vs Russia) with those on Cyprus (Israel and Russia vs Turkey and Syria), Syria (Russia vs Turkey, with Israel on the sidelines), etc. Foreign relations are not exactly transitive. Putin is very popular with the ex-pat Russian Jewish community in Israel. More so than in Russia? Actually, as ironic as it is, there are probably more Israeli citizens who have a high opinion of Putin than there are who have a high opinion of Obama. There are probably more Israeli citizens who have a high opinion of WigWag than there are who have a high opinion of Obama.
 

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org


Community

You are in the archive of all articles published on atlantic-community.org from 2007 to 2012. To read the latest articles from our open think tank and network with community members, please go to our new website