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October 27, 2008

Anni Müller

Thanks for this insightful article. However, I don't agree that the war in Afghanistan can be won by integrating even more foreign nations in the fight. In fact, the war has to be won in Afghanistan with the help and agreement of ALL parts of Afghan society and with the support of Afghanistan's neighbors (including Iran).
In general, I think that the Afghan government and the Allies will need to integrate the enemies of the democratization process in negotiations. The Taliban will never be completely "eradicated" no matter how many troops we send. In fact, the equation right now seems to be: more troops = more insurgents/Taliban (I don't agree with equating all insurgents with Taliban but as this is what the article does I stick with this definition). As long as they have not been given a position/role in the new order they will constantly endanger peace and that the new republic will constantly have to fight against them - the resources needed for this fight could be better used in education or infrastructure.
Thus, my recommendation would be to start negotiations without any pre-conditions and to include other powers that could play a harmful role (Iran/Pakistan) in order mitigate their threat.

October 27, 2008

Michael Schuster, University of Vienna, Silver Contributor (69)

@ Anni

"I don't agree that the war in Afghanistan can be won by integrating even more foreign nations in the fight."

NATO does not have enough troops in Afghanistan to win. And its member states are not willing to send much more troops.

Thus you need more foreign nations, esp. since the Afghan army still needs many months -- if not years -- to provide security and stabililty.

October 27, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

It is quite clear that any power-sharing agreement with the Taleban, struck after lenghty negotiations, would wipe out the current government of Afghanistan. That's why they oppose it so fiercely. I can even understand that they're trying to execute some pressure in the international media. But let's face it: now the chief "messenger of surrender, admitting defeat" is the US secretary of defence Robert Gates. The US administration has opened a path towards a settlement with the Taleban and it is a question of when rather than if it goeas down that path. And NATO will be more than happy to follow.

October 27, 2008

Hadi Raza

True: "...Islamic terrorists have the same outlook towards Russia, China, India and others as they do towards the United States. It's high time to involve regional powers in the war in Afghanistan to prevent history from repeating itself."

October 27, 2008

Kabir

It was really a good article. One thing Taliban starts from where the borders of logic and humanity end.
They are made for destruction and there is no use of them in this specific time period when the phenomena of democracy, human rights and reconstruction etc. are going on.
One more thing should be kept in mind the distance Afghanistan traveled since last 7 years is irreversible and we have to go ahead. There is no any sense to go back to harsh and heart rending period.
It is always wise to destroy the thing which is coming to destroy you. Taliban is like a sub branch of Al Qaeda, they don’t believe in peace. They should be abolished through well coordinated efforts.

From Kabul

October 27, 2008

Khaliq

I agree with the fact that there should be no negotiations with the Taliban at all. But where I differ is in their meeting "key conditions." This too would be admitting defeat, albeit in a different guise.

The Taliban are war criminals. They are the ones responsible for the massacres of thousands of civilians in Bamiyan, Samangan, Kandak Pusht, Mazar-e-Sharif and other areas. Are the collective memories of Afghan and foreign politicians so short? We just cannot sit with a gang of mass murderers and war criminals and share power with them. The world didn't negotiate with Saddam, or Pinochet, or Melosovic or Goering of the Nazi Party. The world cannot negotiate with the Taliban. As an Afghanistani, I believe it is selling out on the souls and lives of the thousands who lost their them -- and the thousands who continue to do so today -- in the hands of the Taliban.

Let is not make the weakness of will from the international community become a downgradation of morals andour collective humanity. Talks are done with civilized human beings, not war criminals and brutes.

What we can do with the Taliban, however, is stop their supply line of arms. We can talk to supplier nations and/or corporations to freeze their supply of arms, ammunition and money. We can work on counter-narcotics to dry up their supply of cash. We can work on creating jobs so that no longer should a desperate Afghan or Pakistani have to join the Taliban to put bread on the table. And while we're doing that, we should suppress any attempts from the Taliban to disturb the peace and perpetrate their war crimes. This can deter them; negotiations will further fan them.

And yes, the international community should commit more troops. Afghanistan is now their collective responsibility, and the Afghan people and security institutions need their security, training and expertise. Chickening out should not be an option.

October 27, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"The world didn't negotiate with Saddam, or Pinochet, or Melosovic or Goering of the Nazi Party."

Well, yes it did. Pinochet doesn't belong on that list, he was a strongman rather than a mass murderer. But you could put Franco in his place I suppose, even though Franco wasn't strictly speaking a mass-murderer either. But 750,000 people died in the Spanish Civil War of the 30's, one of the worst of the century apart from the 2 world wars. Pinochet was much more efficient in mounting his coup.

Point is that while Pinochet and Franco weren't exactly members in good standing in the international system - they were tolerated. As was Saddam Hussein prior to the Kuwait invasion (and even after, by some - the French and others). Even while he was killing a million of his pople. Goering of Germany was never foreign minister, but Chamberlain and Stalin dealt with Ribbentrop and Hitler to their later dismay of course.

So can the west 'deal' with the Taliban? Probably not, if what is meant is really surrender of Afghanistan to their gentle minstrations. Can the west deal with their allies? Yes, assuming the result isn't to give the Taliban power again. Cn the west deal with ex-Taliban? Yes, again. Could ex Talibanis even form part of an Afghan government? Again, yes. Politics can be a supple business; what a man was a decade ago isn't necessarily what he is now.

Negociation implies talking to the other side. One of the primary factors which caused Iraq to settle down (somewhat) is when US forces were ordered to start speaking with Sunni leaders in the 'Sunni triangle'. They discovered that they had interests in common. The US leaders wished to end the bloodbath in the Sunni Triangle; so did the local Sunni leaders, quelle surprise! That left the Sunni foreigners calling themselves Al Queda on the short end of the stick.

I am absolutely in favor of talking to the 'other side' in Afghanistan. Whether some of those leaders once formed part of the group calling themselves Taliban matters less than where they are today. Could be there might be some common ground - without selling out the rest of the country....

October 27, 2008

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)

The question whether to talk with Insurgents in Afghanistan is not about whether we like them or not. To describe them as evil is no substitute for a sound strategy. In fact, contrary to what was claimed above, other countries did negotiate with the Nazis, with Saddam and with Milosevic. Pinochet was never even bothered while in power.
Negotiations are not a reward, given to someone whose positions we hold in high esteem, but part of a strategy designed to bring as closer towards our goals. So the questions that should be asked is: do negotiations advance or diminish our standing in Afghanistan? Do the advantages outweigh the disadvantages?

First - why negotiations? The western strategy as of 2001 basically called for limited armed presence designed to prevent Afghanistan from sliding back into chaos, mostly by deterring the much-feared warlords. Legitimacy, so the paradigm, would be grow out of a democratically elected government and some reconstruction measures.
So far, this strategy didn't achieve the desired results. Finding themselves in the middle of an unpopular and seemingly worsening war, parts of the western populations as well as politicians question the whole mission. 'Chickening out' is an option, when the costs outweigh the benefits - and this is a common perception. Lacking the political will at home, negotiating with whomever emerges to be willing to negotiate is indeed an option.

This leeds directly to the second question: negotiations with whom? The insurgents - as has been noted in the first comment - are not identical with the Taliban of 1994 - 2001. While some of the former Taliban have more or less opted out of the armed insurgency, others have joined the fight against what is seen as the second occupation in the last 30 years. The insurgency thus seems to be a patchwork rug rather than a tightly organized movement. The persons named in the Saudi press (Mullah Muhammad Tayyib Agha, Mawlawi Muhammad Kabir, Mawlawi Arslan Rahmani, Wakil Ahmad Motawakil, Mullah Ahmad Yar, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef and Abdul Hakim Mujahid - see http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=10906&article=4...) are all associated with the "Old Taliban" rather the new insurgents.

Next question - should there be conditions? I would suggest it's a rather rhetorical question - you negotiate exactly because you want to achieve a result. Having your opponent to lay his arms down is what you want to achieve in negotiations, not as a pre-condition.

And what are the benefits compared to the costs of negotiations? Although the insurgents can and will paint any form of negotiations as a sign of weakness of the government and the international community - the comments on alemara or in as-Somood show, that they have no doubts about the wavering will of the "occupiers" even now. It is a fact, that the west is not under all conditions committed to its mission in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, it's more than unlikely that the insurgency can be ended by negotiations. What can be achieved is a weaknening of the insurgency - and that seems a worthy goal. I even suggest, that a timeline for a retreat of the western forces should not be excluded from the negotiations: after all it is the very presence of foreign forces, once supposed to bring stability, that now seems to drive large parts of the insurgency.

As seen in the comments above, there are many issues involved ('Afghanistanis' vs. 'Afghans', 'progress' seen as 'moral corruption' by others, crimes and massacers perpetuated by one side vs. crimes and massacers perpetuated by others). Still, politics - as Bismarck famously remarked - is the 'art of the possible'. We must not lose sight of the 'possible' while running after the 'desirable'.

October 28, 2008

Patrick Edwin Moran, Wake Forest University, Platinum Contributor (207)

How many competing centers of power are there in Afghanistan? What are the motivations that give each faction its adherents? Can any of these factions be seen as capable of cooperating? Or are the all mutually opposed?

Factions are inevitable in any society, and to the extent that any one of them has any interests other than preserving the unity of the nation, that faction exerts a centrifugal impulse. The central government needs to have an attractive force of its own. In other words, the center has to attract a sufficient number of citizens to its cause to counteract the centrifugal interests. Faction members have to subordinate, to some degree, their narrow self interests to the interests of the nation.

One of the functions that religion can perform is to deliver worldly power to religious authorities. How the religious impulses and the power impulses play off each other in different individuals is difficult to assess. But it is often difficult for one religious faction to be accepting of any other religious faction. If the leadership of a religious group is strongly influenced by political motivations, it has further reasons for opposing itself to other factions that have religious credentials. Very many of the believers in Elat/Elohim/Allaha/Allah, ironically, seem to regard the believers in cognate groups as their greatest enemies. As if there were already not enough divisiveness from that source, there are also ethnic differences with which to contend.

Take the Taliban as a worst case example, then. Of how many followers is this group comprised? For many good reasons the followers cannot and should not be killed. So what elements of interest can attract Taliban members to give allegiance to the state? Simple giving the Taliban control of the central government would not solve the problem. The center cannot be a faction; it must be something that unites the factions. Is there, among at least some members, an allegiance to nation, to home communities, to humanity, to anything other than their own leadership and their own community? If there are interests that compete with Taliban orthodoxy, can the center build on these interests to secure the allegiance of these individuals?

What does it take to secure the allegiance of any faction member to a central government? In the end, one hopes for a state of durable trust. In the beginning, however, there is still no reason for trust. The central government must show promise of delivering on several goods for all members of the community, and over time it must prove reliable in delivering these advantages to all. It is not merely a question of whether citizens get to vote for their leaders. The state must convince citizens that it is a reliable guarantor of the core interests of each faction, and each faction must in turn refrain from infringing upon the similarly protected core interests of other factions.

If the leadership of any faction is selfish, if that leadership is not open to seeing any other point of view as valid or seeing the members of any other group as having equal value to themselves, then the prognosis for their acting as genuine community members is poor.

If the leadership of any faction cannot find a way to subordinate group interests to national interests, then that leadership will be a powerful obstacle to national unity.

The leadership of any faction generally cannot deliver the allegiance of its members to any other group, or even to the central government. At best, the leadership can function to educate the faction members to their proper place as members of a greater unity. We see the opposite behavior among some political party leaders in the U.S., so securing true unity in a more turbulent situation is surely going to be a difficult enterprise.

The center must secure the allegiance of individuals. To do so, it may need to fence with the leaders of many factions, and seek more active cooperation with the leaders of more progressive factions. Still, the primary task is to offer the individual freedom within a set of rules to which everyone can agree. Humanity has been working out slightly different sets of rules since the dawn of civilization. The main problem has been that governments offer the fruits of civilization, the protection of human rights and economic opportunity, etc., to members of its own nation (which may exclude slaves or other groups living within national borders) but deny the same benefits to others.

Can the central government of Afghanistan prove itself to be the protector of the fair interests of all? If so, then the next step must be to demonstrate its good behavior to all members of the nation so as to secure their allegiance to the center. If that result can be achieved for majority populations of each faction, then the non-accepting members of society will be reduced to the status of splinter groups comparable to the militias that crop up from time to time in the United States.

In the short term, how much to negotiate with the Taliban leadership should depend on the results of preliminary talks designed to discover whether there is any willingness to subordinate their interests to the interests of the state. Realistically, it is almost impossible to change the character structure of any adult, and particularly that of any person who has been in prolonged warfare and/or political conflict. But one may always hope.

October 28, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

To Don:
It's a pity you did not mention Stalin as one of mass-murderers first class, with whom not only did "the world" negotiate, but promoted him to one "the world's" rulers.
To All: Secretary Gates was right when he was quoted as saying that "most wars end in some kind of negotiations", and the sooner he starts these, the fewer people in Afghanistan will die both from US bombings and from Taleban IED's. Once the truce with the Taleban is in place, some kind of peace-keeping mission (currently known as ISAF) could be installed to help the country (countries?) help itself. Otherwise this war could last forever and in 20 years time nobody will have known about the real roots of it. Peaceful settlement with the Taleban and other factions in Afghanistan - with exeption to al-Qaeda fighters - is probably the only face-saving that NATO and the US can not afford to neglect.

October 28, 2008

Meredith L. Nicoll, Altantic Community, Silver Contributor (45)

I am sure you many of you have already seen the article "Tea with the Taliban?" by David Ignatius in the Washington Post a few days ago, but for those of you who have not, here is a summary for you with a link to the article:

http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/items/view/%22Tea_with_the_...

October 28, 2008

Abbas Daiyar, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (184)

To Marek Swierczynski:
"It is quite clear that any power-sharing agreement with the Taleban, struck after lenghty negotiations, would wipe out the current government of Afghanistan. That's why they oppose it so fiercely."

Afghan Government is not opposing negotiations rather President Karzai requested Saudis to mediate for talks with Taliban. Political analysts in Kabul believe, Karzai after 7 years of bloodbath beat the drum of negotiations as part of his campaign for the upcoming presidential campaign in 2009. He wants to secure his vote bank (from Pushtoons—all Taliban are pushtoons) and, bring repute for him against the prevailing phenomena that Mr. Karzai has no authority out of the palace and capital Kabul. Political gurus beleive, if President Karzai had sincere intention to bring stability, he would have started talks with Taliban hardliners long ago.

"The US administration has opened a path towards a settlement with the Taleban and it is a question of when rather than if it goeas down that path. And NATO will be more than happy to follow."

NATO members with leading number of troops have already expressed concerns over the talks. Germany and Italy are skeptical of the negotiations.

October 28, 2008

Abbas Daiyar, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (184)

To Donald Stadler, and ALL

"I am absolutely in favor of talking to the 'other side' in Afghanistan. Whether some of those leaders once formed part of the group calling themselves Taliban matters less than where they are today."

Taliban stands where they did a decade ago, and want to impose what they did during their rise (banning female educaiton, mass murder of religious minorities and so). Just two weeks ago Taliban killed 31 civilians beheading 7 of them. Following this, large number of people across the provinces came out on roads chanting against Taliban.
Last week the evils shot dead a foreign aid worker, Gayle William--a dual African-British national—in Kabul, simply blaming she preaches Christianity. They are burning girls’ school. Stoning women to death simply putting a label of prostitute. Do we surrender (negotiate) to them accepting their demands and abovementioned brutalities?

October 28, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Dear Abbas,

To me 'Taliban' is kind of a brand name for Pashtoon, but I suspect that there are differences between Pashtoons, and even differences between Pashtoons who took the name of 'Taliban' a decade ago. Some Taliban are hard core, but I suspect others joined for other reasons; things like jobs, influence, money, etc.

In Iraq the US has found that there are differences between people formerly labled 'Sunni' and even within 'Shia'.

I think it's possible that some Taliban aren't necessarily evil or committed to the things you rightly decry. Certainly the Pashtoons cannot be excluded from the government of Afghanistan - they control major parts of the south I believe. It could well be that most of the Pashtoom leadership called themselves 'Taliban' at one time.

Can we exclude the Pashtoon leadership from the talks because most of them once were Taliban? I think that would never work!

October 28, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Marek, I didn't mention Stalin because I was replying to an assertion that the west didn't talk to a list of nasties, so I replied specifically to that list with a digression about Pinochet and Franco.

You are correct about Stalin; indeed Stalin is the poster boy for mass-murderers approved by many in the west.

How they did this was to deny the impact of Stalin on the USSR. Even as late as the early 80's there was this denial; I attended a seminar led by a scholar who made the shocking claim that Stalin had murdered 10 million people in his country. Most 'Russian experts' thoroughly debunked this specious claim a the time, inclusing my own professors.

The records were opened during the 80's and it turned out that the scholar had been wrong, because Stalin had murdered 30 million, not 10 million.

Even so there are people still in denial even today. But not too many any mre.

October 28, 2008

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)

I still cannot agree with two of Mr. Daiyar's central points: that negotiations are equal to surrender and that the Taliban as such are 'evil'.

No doubt that Taliban and Neo-Taliban have committed serious crimes. But then again, they are not the only ones to have done so. In the late 70s and 80s, communists and Mujahiddin alike committed crimes against each other - as well as against countless civilians. In the 90s it was not only Hekmatyars troops who killed, raped and massacred. People suffered under Massoud's, Dostum's, Sayyaf's, Mazari's troops - to name just a few. Do we now want to ban all of their sub-commanders and followers from politics? While I admire the courage of someone who - like Malalai Joya - demands just that, I cannot see it as a viable option. Once again we do have to distinguish between the desirable and the achievable. True, there are Millions of Afghans who did not participate in any bloodshed and did not commit any crimes. The problem is, that those who did are chiefly the ones, who wield power and influence. Sidelining them was not possible until now and I doubt it will be in the future. Many (though probably not all) Afghans, who suffered under other forces more than they did under the Taliban, will not understand, if we refuse to talk to Taliban while their former tormentors are courted by or even part of the government.
One might even mention, that of course right now afghan civilians are killed by coalition forces. There are more than just a few Afghans, who perceive coalition forces as brutal occupiers. While I do not share this perception at all (I served several times as a soldier with ISAF), we still must not overlook that the notion of 'who is evil' depends on the personal point of view and can hardly be a guideline for politics.

So what about negotiations? Even if you single out the Taliban as 'more evil' than all the others, you still need a strategy to deal with them. Mr. Daiyar suggested, that by intergrating China, Russia and Iran, somehow the Taliban can be defeated. The problem is, that the insurgency grew stronger in the last years, despite (or even right because of) the presence of a large force of foreign soldiers. This has not encouraged western public and politicians. While perhaps not likely for the next future, a western military pull-out from Afghanistan is far from impossible.
As has been argued above, constantly negotiating with opponents is the norm, rather than the exception in politics. Once again, negotiations alone mean no concessions - concessions can be the result of negotiations, but only if the opponent is also ready for compromises that are then deemed worth. So I cannot understand why Mr. Daiyar sees negotiations as a form of surrender. Will the insurgents gain credibility by negotiations with the government? I doubt this, they have at least as much to lose as the government (which they label as totally illegitimate) if serious negotiations became public.

Another question is, whether negotiations (which - as Mr. Daiyar rightly points out - have not ocurred so far) can bring violence to a an end anytime soon. I doubt this. Neither seem the Taliban strong enough, to actually conquer large parts of Afghanistan again (which in turn could threaten the government into compliance), neither can they accept something short of a retreat of the foreign forces. This in turn would leave Mr. Karzai without control of his Pashtun power-base - not a very desirable position for a president.

So yes, I see the talks as more or less futile - but I am still convinced, that talks or negotiations without pre-conditions are highly rational and should not be condemned; the more so because a viable strategic alternative has not been found yet.

October 28, 2008

Abbas Daiyar, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (184)

To Florian Broschk:

"So I cannot understand why Mr. Daiyar sees negotiations as a form of surrender. Will the insurgents gain credibility by negotiations with the government?

We are embarking on negotiations from a weak position when insurgents are intensifying activities. I term it surrender because we are asking for it while the insurgents are defiantly rejecting to sit on table before their demands—withdrawals of foreign forces before talks---are not met. I term it defeat because intensifying insurgency is not because of the notion that insurgents are gaining fame and strength but its due to Government’s failure and wide corruption. There are other regional political factors too including cross-border infiltration, Iran-US cold war in the fields of Afghanistan.
There are no visible agendas to talk with Taliban because they not only oppose and fight against Karzai or Afghan Government. Their problems lie in the Afghan Constitution. They do not believe on democratic values. Most importantly, no one is asking Afghan public, whether they support negotiations with Taliban?
Secondly, the factor behind Karzai’s initiative, to talk with Taliban, asking Saudi for mediation, is not merely sincere for stability rather it is a campaign for the upcoming presidential elections in 2009.

October 29, 2008

Abbas Daiyar, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (184)

Talking to Taliban is Foolish
Read it here http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6768db2a-597e-11dd-90f8-000077b07658.html...

November 2, 2008

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

Sometimes I have the impression that the discussion tackles Afghanistan as if all was fine before the Taleban (and other "insurgents"?) started a comeback and are now threatening the order. But in fact there never was order and - especially in the south - there was never a true attempt of western powers to restore it. And there was never a true attempt to talk with "insurgents". But for the sake of whom are we there, if not of that of local people, to whom the "insurgents" belong?

The beginning of the current development lies in the year 2002: at this time the U.S. refused to cooperate with local officials of the Afghan government, which means in essence imposing their will on the country, and degrading the elected Afghan government to a shadow body. Its interference with the actions of the occupying powers in the south already ended the short experiment of Afghan democratic self-rule. If we want to know why the Afghan government is unable to execrise control, and is not trusted by its people, this is one reason. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/south_asia/2125247.stm

During the "war on terror" in the south, even the British allies considered some U.S. actions as "unreasonable". See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/26/afghanistan.september11 If we do not more deeply investigate who did what, we will not be able to understand and to find solutions for the current situation. I guess we are now harvesting what was sown in these days of "collateral damage" (and of course during the following years).

Negotiations without preconditions and with all stakeholders are a prerequiste if any long-term progress shall be achieved in Afghanistan. But, of course, it is a surrender as well - and in the end, people will probably demand that the western forces leave Afghanistan (like in Iraq right now). Well, perhaps that would be not so bad... but maybe some people are afraid that then some ugly details of the Afghanistan occupation will come to light. Just remember that the international war crime court is still not able to judge members of certain nations....

November 2, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"During the “war on terror” in the south, even the British allies considered some U.S. actions as “unreasonable”. "

Herr, Lucke, that is not what the piece actually said. The British commander was under the orders of a US general but asserted that he has 'veto' power over any orders he considered unreasonable. But (direct quote):

"But Bgdr Lane, whose commandos are expected to be ready for action by the middle of April, said he did not expect to have to use his "veto power" in deciding which missions his troops would take."

I know for a fact that you can find evidence of disagreement between US and British commanders, particularly in Iraq. But this was not it.

November 2, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

The Taliban say there is nothing to talk about. Then again, the inter-Taliban lines of communication seem to be a trifle tenuous, though perhaps non-existant would be a better description: http://www.newsweek.com/id/166825

"This is not a political campaign for policy change or power sharing or cabinet ministries," We are waging jihad to bring Islamic law back to Afghanistan."

"The refusal to negotiate comes straight from the Taliban's supreme leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, says Sabir, who did not want his full name used: "

But....

"The trouble is, Sabir hasn't seen Mullah Omar in years, and he doesn't know of anyone who has. Internet posts released in Mullah Omar's name on Muslim holy days are the only hint that the one-eyed Commander of the Faithful is still alive."

Hmmmm.

This also was very interesting:

"The 9/11 attacks and the resulting U.S. invasion are a source of deep resentment among the Taliban. "Today we are fighting because of Al Qaeda," Sabir complains. "We lost our Islamic state. Al Qaeda lost nothing."

Also, what is the Taliban? It appears the organisation structure is a bit mnore complex than in 2001. Quite a bit of what is clled Taliban may in fact simply be allies of Taliban.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/165584?tid=relatedcl