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March 20, 2012

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

Dear Vivien,

most would agree that cooperation and engagement should be pursued. Formally, I would also agree, but the crucial question at which the people in the MENA countries will look at is the content. Who do you want to engage and who would you see as illegitimate to receive benefits of cooperation?

The people want to know how NATO (and most would identify NATO as part of the Western or the Christian world) reacts to such urging issues as the crackdown in Syria or ethnic tensions and conflicts. In that sense I do not understand why you claim security is "not a pressing issue for those countries". True, NATO is not popular among the people in the region, but what do you think about the interpretation that this is due to indifference and lack of vision? The people notice that the leaders of the Western world (and NATO thereof) are indifferent to engaging a brutal dictator, Islamists on the rise or whoever in power who can safeguard interests in resources or prevent refugee influx to Europe.

March 20, 2012

Atena

Thank you for this great article. I definitely agree with the need for more coordination between the EU and NATO on this particular issue!

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

Congratulations on the article, which is well-written and does a good job explaining the obstacles to cooperation before the Arab Spring. While I agree with some of your recommendations, I am not sure how much the article it effectively addresses the greatest security challenges that emerge from the region's transformation. I see the failure to engage society at a deeper level part of an issue, and your critique of past NATO policy is also perhaps tied to the limits of state-based interaction.

Clarifying objectives is always a positive step forward, and this is something we should definitely considering putting into our memo. Yet I question whether the positive results that come of it will be significant in scale. A change in rhetoric might seem only superficial, especially to a population that has become very wary of the difference between words and action. What do you think NATO can offer that it has yet to clarify? We will need to determine these things for our memo, or else the recommendation risks appearing too vague and a bit too cliché to be useful.

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

In terms of your second recommendation, I do like the idea of NATO sending inclusive gestures to post-revolt nations, particularly ones that signal a desire for partnership. Yet I am concerned that the Article 4 suggestion offers as many risks as it does rewards. We do not yet know where these new governments are headed. Although we hope they will evolve into stable democracies, there remains a significant risk that post-revolutionary governments could collapse, decay into autocracies, or become engulfed in civil conflicts. What happens if one of the leaders who we have agreed to "consult together" is threatened by civil war, or by an uprising against his own then-autocrat regime? Tripoli is less likely to be threatened by a foreign invasion than it is by tribal leaders near Benghazi. Will NATO be obligated to consult with autocratic or anti-liberal leaders if the democratic nature of the Arab Spring falters? I feel that there is too much uncertainty in the region right now to seriously consider inviting post-Arab Spring states to accede to Article 4, something that might also aggravate other pro-NATO, non-member states that have not been given such an option.

Tied to the above question is the issue of relevance - since the biggest security threat to the region come from internal instability, of what real use is acceding to an article that protects from external threats? If NATO doesn't want to help governments deal with internal threats and external threats are not a major issue, than I am not sure how useful accession to Article 4 is, especially considering all of the risks involved.

That said, it is a creative idea that emphasizes two-way partnership and highlight the need for us to make recommendations that foster a sense of equal partnership between NATO and the Arab world.

March 20, 2012

Yasmin Jeanice Mattox, St. John Fisher College Graduate International Studies Program Alumna and Government Contract Analyst, Silver Contributor (29)

Congratulations, Vivien, on a great article and being in the top 5.

Your second recommendation sounds like a great idea; however I do have a couple of questions and issues concerning it. Also, Geoffrey, I agree with your comments and I think mine are similar to yours.

First, I think you are absolutely correct in that allowing partner countries to agree and therefore commit to comply with Article 4 would be a confidence-building measure, as you put it. However, with respect to consideration for NATO’s desire to get in better touch with the region’s now mobilized youth, what happens when in countries like Egypt, for instance, soon-to-be elected national leaders fear security threats from youth revolts? In such a case, would NATO heed the call of concern of national leaders or that of youth movements who may be at odds with new national leaders? How do we reconcile this, not only in a case like Egypt but in other Arab Spring states? In short, your recommendation seems a like a good one when dealing with Arab states’ fears of external threats, but what about its implementation when the fear is of the people and groups whom NATO and other Western intergovernmental organizations have supported, like the youth and youth movements? If there is a conflict between the State and the people, how do we, in good faith, play for both teams, so to speak? What effects does this have on our need and ability to establish stronger ties with national leaderships and the youth? On this point, I would say that while I, like Geoffrey, wonder about the usefulness of having Arab states accede to Article 4, what comes to mind for me a bit more is the can of worms we’ll open if we are forced to choose sides, much in the same manner we are accustomed to doing, thus further eroding trust amongst the people and credibility amongst Arab leaders who would then view NATO as without direction and lacking a real game plan.

Second, regarding your third idea, which is great and sounds very similar to the objectives of “pooling and sharing” resources expressed in Smart Defense, which countries do you envision would or should take the lead?

Thanks.

March 20, 2012

Costinel Anuta, George Marshall - Romania Association, Silver Contributor (37)

Thank you for sharing your ideas with us. Just a few thoughts on your article.
First of all, in the assessment of partnerships a potential model to be used also for the MD countries could be the Planning and Review Process (PARP) launched in the framework of NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68277.htm). The PARP guides and measures progress in defence and military transformation efforts of Partner countries through a coherent mechanism involving the establishment of a package of Partnership Goals and their periodical assessment.
Secondly, regarding the Article 4 issue I don't think it will be legally possible to make the MD partners to accede to the Washington Treaty since the treaty itself is the framework for NATO membership only. But you have a point and in my opinion the solution to implement this issue would be to follow the model of the article 8 in the PfP Framework Document (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-210E541D-21B00290/natolive/official_...) - "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security."

March 20, 2012

Gillian Kennedy, King's College London, Gold Contributor (107)

Vivien, thank you for excellent article which I must say is very pragmatic in it's assessment of the realties facing NATO as a partner with the MENA region. I agree with you that it has never been deemed a major player in the region, and suffers from a poor image.

Regarding your suggested recommendations to overcome such a deficit in public image and in genuine assistance to the region, I particularly find your idea of NATO joining forces with other actors, especially other regional agencies to offer what you called, 'multifaceted technical assistance programs' as a promising proposal. In terms of 'selling' the concept of NATO's assistance to the region, this could certainly help to alleviate any connotations with foreign intervention.

Moreover, as an additional incentive, maybe it would be an idea to invite these new transitional states together as a block group to coordinate with other agencies at a interstate conference where discussions on issues of high importance to post revolutionary societies in the MENA region could take place.
For example, you cited the EBRD. I think this is a very wise suggestion as a possible agency partner for NATO. Since states such as Egypt are in a fragile state presently due to high unemployment and an economy further stunted by the chaos since the revolution this would be particularly fruitful. The EBRD specializes in working towards the stimulation of market activity by seeking approaches to financing smaller projects, mobilizing investment, and encouraging ongoing economic reform. These initiatives have already been utilized to help alleviate poverty in the post Soviet Union countries and I think this definitely an area for greater collaboration with our MD partner states.

On another of your policy recommendations I am however a bit more cautious. The idea of MD partners acceding to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty is an interesting concept, but the possibility of partner states being forced by treaty to take sides in possible territorial disputes could result in tumultuous ramifications in an already fractious region. Considering Israel's membership in the MD and with the very real potential of an Islamist led government in Egypt about to come to fruition, I find the accession to the Washington Treaty to be a complex and slightly limiting area of cooperation. I agree with Geoffrey’s assessment here in that given the uncertainty in the region, the accession of partner states to Article 4 could be a case of too much too soon.

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

As to your third recommendation, I agree with Gillian. The fact that all five of the finalist articles recommend some sort of technical assistance and/or inter-institutional cooperation indicates that these should be core components of our policy memo. Though you seemed a bit skeptical of my policy suggestions, I think they fit right in with your third recommendation. While NATO might not be the ideal organization to implement every project, as you point out, it is in a logical position to facilitate the multifaceted technical assistance that we both advocate. Though your paper does not go into specifics, I believe that any comprehensive assistance package should include a training aspect. Partner countries likely will welcome such an offer, although of course we need to be cautious and culturally/historically sensitive in the way we present things.

March 20, 2012

Josiah Jason Surface, University of Washington, Silver Contributor (33)

Hey Vivien, I admire your superb grasp of the situation in the Mediterranean. You seem to possess a deep understanding of how the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya might respond to any overtures made by NATO. At the same time you have clearly stated that NATO's role in the future of these nations will be constrained by its role as a security organization, which proves that you also are knowledgable concerning NATO's role in the Mediterranean. Based on these two observations I would suggest that the portion of your article that leads up to your recommendations might serve as the intro to our collaborative memo.

However, I must issue a word of caution. While it is certainly important to reach reforms via incentives, it is equally important to use the right incentives. To be more specific, extending article four of the North Atlantic Treaty to the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya may be an effective way of enticing these states and causing them to be more open to reforms and to establishing relations with NATO and perhaps the EU. However, the provisions laid out in article four may cause NATO more problems than positive returns. For example, would NATO really want to be consulting with Egypt because it feels threatened by Israel, or perhaps NATO would be drawn into consulting with Egypt because its security is threatened by a counter attack by Israel after Egypt had given supplies to the Palestinians so that they could attack Israel. I know that these scenarios may seem far fetched and that such suggestions may seem like an attempt to resort to "what ifs?", but such complications should be considered as possible future realities if NATO were to extend article four to nations like Egypt. Perhaps such consultations with Egypt might look like NATO privately encouraging Egypt to avoid antagonistic or hostile actions aimed at Israel, who is a strong ally of the United States as well as many other NATO members. Such a relationship might prove for the best, but at the same time, such a relationship with Egypt could entangle NATO in Arab and Israeli conflicts as well as Palestinian and Israeli conflicts. This is something that NATO should consider strongly before it were to grant article four to Egypt.

While extending article four to Egypt might prove problematic for NATO in the future, there are not obvious complications that could result by extending such a privilege to Tunisia and Libya primarily because these two nations are not located in close proximity to Israel. However, if NATO were to extend article four to Tunisia and Libya it would also have to do so for Egypt as well, otherwise Egypt might feel isolated. Such a risk would not be worth taking because Egypt especially needs to be engaged by NATO and the EU and not excluded.

Therefore, while extending article four of the North Atlantic Treaty may seem like an excellent incentive that NATO could offer to Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it might also prove to be a source of great problems for NATO. Problems that NATO currently does not have a direct responsibility to deal with and may prefer to remain aloof from in the future.

March 20, 2012

Josiah Jason Surface, University of Washington, Silver Contributor (33)

In regards to the comments that have been posted so far I agree with the concerns that both Gillian and Geoffrey have expressed concerning Vivien's recommendation that article four be extended to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. However, I also agree with Costinel that a solution might be found in extending article eight of the Partnership for Peace framework to the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. For this would allow NATO to offer an incentive to these nations while also providing NATO with enough space to distance itself from these nations and especially Egypt should various conflicts with Israel arise. Also, I suggest in my article that NATO should add other elements of the Partnership for Peace program into the Mediterranean Dialogue so as to provide a more legitimate foundation or pretext for training individuals from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and to help provide the subject matter in which these individuals could be trained.

Considering the proposals I have already made it should come as no surprise that I also agree with Geoffrey's suggestion that some kind of recommendation concerning NATO and the training of willing individuals be they diplomats, government officials, members of the military, or simply citizens from Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya, should find a place in our policy memo.

March 20, 2012

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

Again, as nobody answered my question I put it in other words:

The security situation in the Sinai is deteriorating, sectarian violence is the norm in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria is on the brink or - depending on the interpretation - in the midst of a civil war.

Yet, the discussion here so far, at least I have the impression, circles around rather technocratic issues. Is that what the people want to hear? What vision can you give them? The measures you propose here, do the depend on something or are they indifferent to whom they address?

March 20, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

Let me first say I'm grateful to all your challenging and insightful comments. I will try to address your remarks as much as and as precisely as possible.

Because many comments have touched upon Article 4, I will start with this one. I see that it is indeed very audacious, and perhaps too much so. And I realize that two points were missing in my argument which avoids a comprehensive understanding.

1. What I have in mind is indeed what happens within the PfP, as underlined by Costinel: a NAC+MD partners meeting. I do not anticipate any NAC meeting with Egypt talking about Israel without the latter in the room. The Alliance and NATO have been careful to avoid being trapped in such conundrums, so no need to do encourage awkward situations.

2. The overall objective is to encourage intra-regional security cooperation. This has been a long-time goal for NATO, to no avail so far. However, NATO is the only organization that has kept Arab countries and Israel at the table, notwithstanding a few thorny times. But even among many Arab states, there is a lack of confidence among each other. Increased Maghrebin cooperation could be valuable, but it has not materialized (a recent 5+5 meeting held promising hopes though). If an MD country wants to bring up Article 4-like concern to the Alliance, then it would require all other MD partners to agree to participate. It may decrease the chances of such meetings taking place, but if/when it happens it can encourage MD countries to talk to each other on security issues, such as terrorist groups, WMD proliferation. It could take place in other formats: the NAC is one, but not the only option, the Military Committee is another.

Would the Alliance be seen as taking sides in case of civil wars or popular uprisings? This is a valid point, but we have to remember that consulting is merely exchanging - no action can be taken - Article 5 is completely out of the picture here. Let's hope that the Allies, as democratic countries, would not advocate for counter-democratic measures. This could actually turn out to be useful for countries either trying to build democracies or actually ruled by authoritarian leaders. However, I'm doubtful they would come to NATO to talk about civil wars and popular uprisings. What would their interest be? They risk looking like fools aimlessly running the gauntlet... Allow me a bit of stretched analogy: France never invoked Article 4 when it was in war in Algeria in the late 1950s-1960s despite the fact it was part of France at that time. It knew it would not receive a warm welcome at the NAC.

The MD does not have a framework as legally binding and institutionalized as the PfP. As mentioned in the piece, the idea was originally to be as flexible as possible to be à la carte. I think it's fair to say, though hard to implement, that it is time to condition the cooperation a little more, but equally to incentivize it further.

March 20, 2012

Geoffrey Phillip Levin, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), Silver Contributor (61)

Niklas, you bring up a valid point and have asked some very important questions. I think one reason why the most pressing present day issues you bring up were not address earlier is because writers were asked to present ideas to foster long-term partnerships between these states and NATO. The four issues you list are each major issues that require their own in-depth analysis separate from a broad, 800-word editorial. You are correct in that those are major issues today, but I am not sure if any of us have been focused on finding a way to resolve the eroding security situation in the Sinai. I certainly that the SSR and police training is important and would highlight that in the long-term, but issues such as the Sinai and Lebanon are complex on so many levels.

Second, it is true that technocratic reforms and state-based engagement fails to offer any a compelling vision for partnership to broader Arab audience, which I think it what you mean with your question (correct me if I am wrong, Niklas). I suggest highlighting young adult engagement and training as a way of adding a forward-thinking component to the partnership. This would create a sense of broader mission that dry upper-level engagement and technocratic reform does not. While this article has several strengths, I think you point out that one of its weaknesses might be institutional tunnel-vision, displaying a deep understanding of the current capabilities of NATO but perhaps not fully appreciating the great challenges and opportunities that have emerged from the Arab Spring.

March 21, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

Let me now address other concerns as well.

Geoffrey, I think there are a few areas where clarification is needed. Action Plans agreed between the Allies and the partner countries lack prioritization (I). I doubt the situation has changed with the new Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), but the former programs were an enumeration of priorities, which in the end identified no priorities... Moreover, I think there is a need for a more condition-based framework document (II), which is something the Allies and NATO have refrained from, because they fear it would alienate the partners. Some may indeed be reluctant to agree to a new more constrained framework, but I think again it's time to show that partnership is not a free ride. What is the point of dedicating human and financial resources, when there is in fact no interest? The à la carte approach has been favored since 1994. If not now, when to change it? There will never be "the" perfect time. But it's important that the Allies agree on clearer and realistic priorities to achieve progress in cooperation with the MD (III). The military side has been working on this issue, but the civilian side is stalling.

Yasmin, the third idea would be a bit different than pooling and sharing, because here it would be inter-institutional. I think what is essential today for many countries is to receive technical assistance on a wide range of issues. Egypt is very reluctant to see anyone take part of its internal development... for now. The transition will be rocky and long, so we need to start contemplating inter-institutional cooperation now, because the institutional and perception obstacles are numerous, and if/when those countries are amicable to the idea of cooperation we must stand ready. Geoffrey, I took issue with your proposals, because I think NATO is not equipped for such programs, but the programs themselves would be valuable if carried out by other institutions.

Using PARP elements for the assessment, or even extending PARP to MD partners as argued by several Allies, it is an issue that I think cannot be resolved before you have more political partnership with MD partners. We have to realize that the Mediterranean Dialogue is more than 95 percent military oriented and I don't see any need or reason to change that if there is not a more political (but consequently binding) framework. Again, injecting some conditionality to the MD has been on the tables of the military side, but the civilian side is more guarded on the issue.

Niklas, I think Geoffrey addressed your question. I wanted however to come back to your very first comment. I did not say "security [was] not a pressing issue for those countries", but that defense sector reform was not a pressing issue, which are two unrelated issues. Our proposals may be technocratic and minor in the larger picture, but as I have argued, NATO is not a major player in the region. Moreover, for many political and symbolic reasons, it is very sensitive for the Allies, and members of the Alliance, or even more for NATO, as a political-military organization, to position themselves on or even discuss issues that have no direct impact on their territories. It explains for instance why there has been so much reluctance to discuss Iran at the NAC for instance.

March 21, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

Looking at the different comments, suggestions, I see possible inclusions in the policy memo:

1. Clearly, we will have to see what kind of cooperation NATO can foster, but more than that we kind of multifaceted package can be worked out.

2. I hope that I have been able to mitigate some of the criticisms regarding the Article 4 proposal, which presented as such, may be misleading I agree. However, I can see some interest to bring it forward in the memo. I think it could encourage more cooperation with NATO, but maybe it could also foster more discussion among MD partners on security issues.

3. I would favor a mention on more conditionality. We should not look desperate to cooperate if, as I wrote, the receiving end is not responding. If we incentivize further, and offer an appealing package, it is doubtful substantial and effective cooperation will rise. NATO may end up doing less in some countries, but maybe more in others (let's not forget that NATO is under enormous financial constraints).

On that note, I would like to thank you all again for your comments, both positive and critical.

March 21, 2012

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

Geoffrey, you indeed got my point.

The rising Islamists have grassroots-networks and immense funding, the nationalists oftenly have military power and training in handling civil unrests. The liberal and secular-minded people have no platforms in the media, no money and no organizational basis - the only thing they have is their hope and vision in the idea. Yet, and this is the most bizarre occurence of the events followed by the Arab Spring, those whom they look up to in the Western states have no hope in them: as soon as so many commentators agonized about the weakness of the liberals and their failure, favor and policy action turned towards the Islamists and the old establishments exactly cheered by the arguments of "cultural sensivity" and "acknowledgement of the popular will".

The other actors in the region have absolutely no doubt in the validity and superiority of their concept of society. Turkey seeks to export its Islam-democracy-synthesis, leaning more and more towards the religious side. Money from the oil-rich countries flows constantly into the hands of (the various types of) Islamists enabling them popular support and organizational base. Only the "West" (as such not existent of course) despicts its own values and retreats from the arena as Western commentators are sure their values (if one can call it that anymore) are not fit to the Muslim world - this is what Fouad Ajami used to describe as "Arab execptionalism". Consequently, the liberals and the seculars are the only ones in the Arab Spring totally left alone without any backing. Who cannot understand people turning against them as the whole idea of freedom and democracy seems only to be backened by the European states as long as it involves the supply of oil and gas?

So I ask, how can we offer them a vision of a better future?

March 21, 2012

Yasmin Jeanice Mattox, St. John Fisher College Graduate International Studies Program Alumna and Government Contract Analyst, Silver Contributor (29)

Vivien, I agree with you; Article 5 is certainly different from Article 4 and since you are referring only to Article 4 there would be no expectation of action, only the implementation of a broader discourse. I agree with that, but I still worry that NATO has had such a muddled and unproductive discourse with the governments and people of the Arab MD partner countries, that I think to some, even the validation of unpopular national leaders' concerns would be looked upon with anger and create public diplomacy problems. Right or wrong, perception is often everything and how NATO validates some concerns over others, or those of one actor or group before another, can create problems. But, the point, I suppose, is that you can't please everyone! You win some, you lose some as it is said.

I don't think, though, that it's such a stretch that leaders would vocalize concerns should civil uprisings reach critical levels, especially if there is foreign, if only regional, interference in internal matters via the funding and the arming of those whom leaders would designate as the perpetrators. If anything, I'd suggest they'd perhaps be opportunists trying to see what reactions, both rhetorical and policy-wse, such concerns would elicit from NATO member states. But, I understand your point and I do agree that for relatively easy to contain uprisings and internal issues, Arab leaders would not care to mention them to NATO for fear of looking like fools and weak.

Thanks, Vivien, for the clarification of your third point. I do think inter-institutional cooperation could work, could be very useful and is actually much needed.

You have written a really interesting piece and provided great, thoughtful and polite rebuttals to criticism, which is always so incredibly appreciated. Kudos to you and Geoffrey for your ideas so far!

March 21, 2012

Alexander Corbeil, Atlantic Council of Canada, Gold Contributor (101)

Hello Vivien and congratulations on being a fellow finalist. Your policy paper is highly impressive and I must agree with Geoffrey that your recommendations, in calling for greater clarification of NATO initiatives and goals, should be adopted in the final policy memo. In terms of procedural initiatives, your policy prescriptions are refreshing and are exactly the sort of constructive criticism needed to embolden NATO in its tackling of post-Arab Spring issues.

That being said, in my opinion you do not provide any concrete steps toward solidifying democratic governance in post-revolutionary countries. You state that, “The Arab uprisings have highlighted an important lesson: how little the EU and NATO have influenced the regional leadership and developments”, stretching this theme into your eventual policy recommendations. I believe that this statement and the associated core narrative of this piece to be untrue. Given the highly interrelated nature of relationships between North African autocracies and the member states of NATO, one would suggest that the latter group was highly influential during this transitional period. Looking outside the scope of the Mediterranean Dialogue, bilateral relations between NATO members and these autocracies were highly correlated to their eventual downfall.

In regards to Egypt, the Obama Administration’s call for Hosni Mubarak to step aside was a green light for the generals to fully support the uprising and push the president from power. This was not chiefly due to America’s preeminent position in the world but rather due to the historical linkages between both countries’ armed forces and governments, most notably the roughly $1.3 billion annually given to the Egyptian military. The Libyan situation was highly dictated by NATO members, foremost by the undertaking of Operation Unified Protector, but also through the withdrawal of crucial economic support to the Gaddafi regime. Case in point is the example of Italy, the chief purchaser of Libyan oil, whose divestment from Gaddafi’s fields helped to dry up regime coffers.

NATO countries have robust relationships with kingmakers in all three of the North African countries effected by the Arab Spring and must utilize these channels at this crucial period in order to help lay the foundations for accountable democratic governance. To fail to do so would lead to the devolution of the current open political space, a precursor to the establishment of liberal democratic governance. In addition failure to act could lead to the possible retrenchment of authoritarianism as alluded to by Geoffrey in his comment above.

I agree that cooperation should be incentivized, not solely for the youth of the Arab Spring nor any resultant government, but rather for those who truly hold power in each country. But mere gestures, such as the accession to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, will not incentivize the Arab world into participation with NATO or any other Western intergovernmental body, particularly given probably accusations of neo-colonialism. This does not mean that NATO should not approach these fledgling governments with gestures of mutual cooperation, but rather the incentivizing process should take a form which ensures that new governments and political kingmakers cannot usurp meaningful reforms that carry the best interests of their populaces.

NATO should pair with international organizations that can provide a robust and complete package of reform initiatives. Though, we should also not overlook the strengths of this defence organization. The “small-niche” of Security Sector Reform is drastically important to providing a peaceful end to the Libyan civil-war, the country’s adoption of democracy, and hopefully its ascension to the Mediterranean Dialogue. Defence education and training is also pertinent in creating a military atmosphere that allows for the professionalization of the armed forces of Tunisia and Egypt, and their eventual adoption of a bureaucratic structure that allows for a separation of powers. A combined effort with various other international governmental organizations is the right path forward, and can provide a robust and complete package of reform initiatives. Given the lack of expertise and experience within NATO (as an IGO) I fully agree with a multi-organizational approach.

My core issue with this policy paper is that it seems to encourage NATO and its members to take a back seat during this transformative process. I believe that it is highly dangerous, both for the people of the region, who have fought so hard for democratic representation, and for the future relationship between NATO and post-Arab Spring countries. Although scholars do not fully agree on the paths that lead to genuine democracy, some core points have arisen from academic debates. It is believed that democracies emerge from conflicts between actors, with each participant group having been able to mobilize political resources in a confrontational manner. We have witnessed this with the Arab uprisings (not to mention during the previous breakdown of the Soviet Union). People power, mobilized by democratic actors, presented a surmountable challenge to authoritarian rule, leading to a political opening in the region that was previously unthinkable.

This opening must not be wasted for there is a second and pertinent step to democratic consolidation---the redistribution of political resources. Without the creation of an open playing field, those in a dominant position (the political kingmakers) are free to limit meaningful reforms in order to safeguard their hegemony over the political sphere. This will surely comet at the expense of those who have fought for a truly democratic society. Thus, a redistribution of political resources in order to allow weaker parties (i.e. those who protested for democracy) to challenge those in dominant positions is both needed and time sensitive.

This can be achieved through institutional creation and developmental initiatives aimed at creating a participatory civil society – issues which I will tackle during my defence.
I look forward to working with you on the policy memo, and believe that your procedural recommendations are greatly beneficial.

March 21, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

Alexander, thank you very much for your comments. Please allow me to reply as I think it is important to address them.

When I say "the EU" or "NATO", I speak of the organizations, not their member states. It is important to make the difference, and it is too seldom the case. We can argue whether EU or NATO countries have been influential, but we can't argue that the EU and NATO have not.

On the Article 4, I agree that it is not the bedrock of the grand strategy NATO can develop on partnerships with the Arab world. Yet, as I argue, there is little NATO can do, so the more it incentivizes with tools that it can offer and expertise it can claim, the better.

With respect to your last point, you have touched upon what I think is the core debate for Western policymakers: shall we be active and engage right away or be patient, show what we can offer and wait for partners' willingness to cooperate? I think the former option has little value at this stage. If you have a wall in front of you, how do you want to engage? If the only thing you can do, as was the case before, is to say "let's cooperate: here are all the activities we provide and you can pick and choose," what is the point? I understand your point that we should partake in the first step of democratic process. However, most countries don't want any political interference, and Egypt is the perfect example of how guarded one can be.

Moreover, we have not a clear idea of how to assist those countries: through institutions, through bilateral cooperation, through a mix of both, who does what? etc. This debate is ongoing and it is a fundamental one. What we did before failed, so what now? Political cooperation is today of little interest to most countries; what they want is financial contributions and technical assistance in various fields. We can at least strengthen the latter, but we should be as coordinated and structured in our approach as possible. Technical cooperation should not be discarded as trivial: all cooperation activities and programs are inherently value-based driven. Yet, a value-based policy with stentorian calls to democratize the region has failed. Let's be more subtle and effective.

It is essential to promote democracy support programs either at the state- or society-level. Strengthening the civil society is a great idea as well as law-enforcement training, but this is not NATO's job (it is the EU's, member states and/or other CSOs).

In our policy memo, we will have to be very careful about differentiating NATO as an organization that runs programs based on mandates given by and under the monitoring of the Allies, and the Allies themselves, as sovereign countries, which run their own cooperation as well, often independently while in parallel to NATO's. NATO's role and prerogatives are very unlikely to be expanded in the region. Many countries will disapprove of such evolutions.

March 23, 2012

Alexander Corbeil, Atlantic Council of Canada, Gold Contributor (101)

Hello Vivien,

Thank you for your concise and quick response to my comments. You state that the European Union and NATO as organizations have not been influential during the Arab Spring, but that it could be argued that individual members have been. NATO as an organization has been highly influential, especially in the case of Libya, Operation Unified Protector showed that the Western world could come to the defence of an Arab populace under siege. Furthermore, it established bilateral links between the National Transition Council and NATO. Although NATO’s air campaign was a great success, history will judge the West not solely on the ouster of Gaddafi but the aftermath of Libyan transition---the country is now sliding towards civil conflict and this must be stopped for both the sake of the Libyan people and the reputation of the West. The European Union was also involved in isolating the Gaddafi regime through its sanctions on Libyan banks, oil firms, and freezing assets in foreign banks, not to mention restricting the travel of governmental officials. Tunisia and Egypt were also largely effected by policies and actions emanating from the West.

Furthermore, both organizations are influential in the post-Arab Spring process, the EU through the diversification of its oil and gas needs and NATO because of its expertise in Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. The fact that member states should be differentiate from these organizations is true (especially for our upcoming memo) and I apologize if my comments did not make a distinction between these entities. That being said, each member state is part and parcel of any undertaking, and the fact that both organizations comprise some of the biggest economies and militaries in the world, in addition to some of the most important academic institutions should not be overlooked. NATO should not go at it alone; I do not argue this, as it would be futile to any endeavor given the parameters of its operational capacity. Partnerships are needed with various NGOs and Western IGOs with expertise and historical accomplishments in democratic transitions.

Arab governments do not want political interference, this I agree with you, but we must step away from the previous train of thought on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Up until these uprisings, autocratic regimes utilized (and the SCAF still does) Western interference as a political facade, one which allowed them to undertake abusive policies in the name of nationalism. What has changed, and should be noted in our discussion, is the composition of domestic political sphere in each country. We are witnessing a fragile transitional phase that has allowed for the opening of political discourse, an opportunity that should not be wasted. Public opinion is now the arbiter of political change, as Arab youths continue to protest for freer polities---the West through NATO in combination with other organizations can help them eventually achieve this goal.

You argue that what the West has done in terms of democratic advancement failed to increase the democratic credentials of Arab states. I must beg to differ on this point. Although Western democratic initiatives were not the sole or primary catalyst to upheaval in the region, there is a strong correlation between policies, especially those emanating from America and the Arab Spring. Many neo-conservative analysts have pointed to the statement of Condelleza Rice during her address at Cairo University nearly two years ago when she stated that America values liberty over stability in the region. I must highly disagree with this analysis, as many proponents of the Bush administration have overstepped the ramifications of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative of 2003. That being said, the enactment of “fairer elections” in the region, particularly in Egypt, allowed for the participation of political elements that had been previously denied access to the electoral forum. The usurpation of their victories sent shockwaves through the Arab Street, signifying that openings within the regime would not lead to meaningful reformation of the political system. Thus, this is partially why youth were emboldened to take up their causes in an extra-political manner.

These regimes do want technical assistance and financial contribution, but shouldn’t this be part of an incentivized process that is tied to political freedoms? This can be undertaken through a structured and coordinated process, linking NATO to NGOs, IGOs, and individual experts on wide-ranging issues from constitutional development to the creation of democratic checks and balances.

I am not calling for a value-driven imposition of democratic values that is undertaken with all the lightning and thunder of the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq. Rather, I am a proponent of a negotiated top down and grassroots initiative that quietly lays the ground work for democracy through an incentivized process (whether militarily, economically, or otherwise) that sees Western experts and organizations aiding these states through a mutually beneficial relationship.

NATO’s prerogatives should be expanded in the region, but as you have rightly noted, this will not be welcomed by other countries. Given increased piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden with the Chinese military, the presence of a NATO-Russia strategic partnership, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, shouldn’t we expand our linkages with these actors who have so much at stake in the Arab world, particularly its stability? I believe this would help realize NATO’s “New Era of Partnerships” as stated in the NATO 2020 report.

March 23, 2012

Vivien Pertusot, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Gold Contributor (87)

Thank you Alexander for your comments and while we may present things differently I see many junctures.

Before singling them out, I would like to come back to your first point. I did not say that NATO and the EU had not been influential during the Arab uprisings, but that they had not been influential before. NATO can't claim much visible and political success with the MD and the EU certainly not with the dead Barcelona Process or even the European Neighborhood Policy. Individual countries have often been more influential be it because of the financial and/or political commitment to certain countries (we could debate on the impact of American policies on the uprisings, but we would diverge from the topic). As for the post-uprisings period, I think it's too early to judge whether any of the two organizations has been influential.

For the rest, as said, I see many of points of convergence. You ask "These regimes do want technical assistance and financial contribution, but shouldn’t this be part of an incentivized process that is tied to political freedoms?" Absolutely. This is what I mean by incentivizing while conditionalizing. The more our offer to cooperate is appealing, the more the cost of not cooperating is high, and we need to have a first success to brand, to put it bluntly. Today, it's Tunisia, because it's the only country that has been actively reaching out (Tunisian PM's first visit was in Brussels to meet with the European Commission - but he did not go to the NATO HQ). But as I argue, we should stand ready, but we should foist our cooperation. So as you say we can be "quietly lay the ground work for democracy", which I also raised.

As for the question of expansion, I reiterate the fact that NATO's prerogatives will not be expanded. I don't really understand your point regarding "expanding the linkages." It is true that Russia, China, ICI countries (in particular Qatar but also the UAE) have stakes in the region and NATO already has contacts with them on the region (at least with Russia and to a lesser extent China with whom the cooperation is nascent). So talking about the region with those players can be worth it. Yet it would be wiser and more productive to have a common approach among Western institutions, mainly the EU, NATO and why not the OSCE, and individual countries, which have their own interests and sometimes agenda, to avoid uncoordinated - and possibly contradictory - messages sent to those countries.

September 27, 2012

Uchiiha

A joint military eiexcrse between the United States, and South Korea takes place. China responds with another large scale joint military eiexcrse with Russia. North Korea launches ICBM long range rocket test, that fails. Reports China sold North Korea the launch vehicle. Pakistan launches their ICBM missile test, successfull. India lunches their ICBM missile test, successfull.