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In past years, Iran has continued working on its nuclear program and trouble on this issue is still present. But Iran's nuclear program itself is not the sticking point. Who would complain about an Iranian government of convinced pacifists willing to use nuclear energy? Hence, the issue is the regime and its ideology.

There is no doubt of the programs' military component. Evidence of this includes enrichment activities, camouflage tactics, and ballistic missiles. To function, medium range missiles need to carry a warhead. Activities, which are 100% civilian, have no need for camouflage. Ahmadinejad and his supporters are working towards having the 'red button' and they would not be unlikely to push it.

By trying to talk about how much uranium Iran should be allowed to enrich and on what level, the current approach fails to address the real problem. Ahmadinejad's regime will not lose its will to work on 'the bomb'. Furthermore, previous negotiations were little more than unsuccessful talks about the circumstances and contents of negotiations. Western politicians' statements, confirming their will to talk to the Mr. Ahmadinejad about how to negotiate the nuclear program, will be useless. If the Iranians took negotiations seriously, US intelligence in 2009 would not have found the new enrichment facility in Ghom.

But the show must go on. Only to keep Teheran thinking, Western governments would not reveal their real intentions. To solve the problem, there is no need to talk with Ahmadinejad. It is time to talk about him and act. But, solutions can only be found inside Iran. Military actions are not a valid choice. The consequences would be too drastic and the impact not enduring. What is bombed can be rebuilt, even if it takes some time. Forced regime change would not be an enduring solution. How would the Iranians react if they had a government imposed by the West? Take a look at Iraq or Afghanistan.

Issues inside Iran are to be solved by Iranians themselves. Thus, the question is not how to play on the field. It is how to coach the right teams' players. As the 2009 Green Revolution shows, the team the West should support, offers a number of excellent players and has serious chances to win the proverbial cup.

First of all, the Westerners seriously have to accept the Iranians' pride. Developing and controlling nuclear energy is a question of status for Iran. Thus, nobody should question Iran's right to use nuclear power and to enrich uranium. Additionally, a US or Israeli air strike should be denied absolutely. Besides its non-enduring impact, Iranians, who fear a military attack on their country, would be more likely to support their current regime. This is not in the interests of the West.

Support for political opponents of Ahmadinejad is in Western interests. Such actors and their political agendas have to be recognized and accepted by the West. The more anti-Ahmadinejad activists become known to the outside world, the harder it will become for the regime will be able to oppress their activities. You cannot jail, dispose or even torture famous people, because the international response would be too high to pay.

Besides the political support, coaching the whole range of anti-Ahmadinejad media is the essential mission. Not everybody has internet access. So, press and TV are needed for `offliners´. Radio is critical to reach people far from the cities. Where newspapers and TV are not available, battery-powered radios are the only information source. Iranians, seeking technical advice or material support, have to receive it.

The internet is a top priority. Numbers of Iranian internet users are growing. Sharing information online is the easiest way to inform the world. Thus, Iranian blogs should be promoted. Bloggers should be encouraged to share more information and views of what is happening currently in the country. Especially by using videos and social networks like Facebook. The more people know about Iranian bloggers' updates and events in Iran, the more people will share it. Consequently, the positive effect is that Iranian reformers would not feel in alone in their struggle. Each team needs fans for its support. And Iranians would realize that their whole country is not perceived as a threat by the West, but rather their regime and its ideology. People could acknowledge that it is Ahmadinejad and his gang, who prevent the country from a respected place in the international community. All people in the world share the will to live in peace, freedom and prosperity. Through a growing media, more Iranians would learn about Ahmadinejad`s extremist ideology, and the role that it plays as a barrier to the outside world.

Thus, the strategy must be to convince Iranians to get rid of the Ahmadinejad system. But as we saw through the elections fraud of 2009, just convincing Iranians alone is no guarantee of success. Circumstances for success need to be created. Elections have to be free and fair. Of course Iranians would never accept election monitoring by Westerners. But elections supervised and approved by (Shia) Muslims could be an acceptable solution. Such experienced observers could be found in international Organizations like the UN, NGOs or Muslim countries like Lebanon, Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia. Moderate clerics would work out religious support, if not fearing repressions thereafter. And no establishment has a chance of survival by working continually against the stated and elected majorities will.

This strategy may not guarantee immediate success, but immediate success is not necessary. As said before, what is bombed can be rebuilt. Westerners and Iranians need an enduring long term solution, not another worthless compromise document. Only Iranian players on an Iranian field can win this cup.

Felix Seidler is a student of Political Science, Law and History at Würzburg University.

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.

Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Iran's Nuclear Program" here.

October 27, 2010

Alexander Pyka, Bucerius Law School, Gold Contributor (105)

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I am truly sorry to spoil your interesting approach from a perspective of law - but that being my professional background I just cannot help myself and I hope it can contribute something to the discussion.

You write, in essence, "[...] the strategy must be to convince Iranians to get rid of the Ahmadinejad system." I admittedly have not yet analysed this to a vast extend, but such interferrence with Iran's inner politics would with the utmost probability be against international law (e.g. Art. 2 Nr. 7 UNCh). And I strongly believe that this serves a function, imagining the reverse szenario of Iran trying to convince Israelis to revolt against their current regime. Or any other two nations. Would we really want that?
Also from a historical perspective - besides my view that regime change should not be an option in foreign policy in any case - I doubt that Iranians would be very receptive of western-backed influence towards regime change in any form. Such influence, namely in the CIA/British coup against Mossadegh - their first and until today last democratically elected leader - and the subsequent installation of the Shah was exactely what brought them the unfortunate current regime.


While I further believe that there is more being done "behind the scenes" than you or any of us probably know (just take a look at the first presumed cyber-attack on Iran by Stuxnet), I think we have to ask ourselves when formulating policy recommendations for a new Iran-strategy: do we want them to remain within the framwork of legality/international law? I believe that doing so offers a broad range of advantages.

October 27, 2010

Felix Haass, University of Tuebingen, Silver Contributor (55)

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In addition to Alexander’s excellent on points on the legal doubtfulness of interfering in Iran’s domestic politics (this would not only violating the UN Charter but also the 1981 accord between Iran and the U.S. which freed the hostages and stated that the U.S. would not “intervene directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iranian affairs), most of Iran’s opposition groups simply are not willing to accept financial support of the United States or Europe. What is more, aggressive external support of regime change through funding and supporting Iranian opposition groups could backfire, since it delegitimizes opposition groups – even if they don’t actually take money from the State Department - in Iran, where U.S. policy is still widely detested.

Thus, any support for the Iranian opposition movement has to be critically scrutinized otherwise it might easily undermine the very goal it is aimed at.

October 27, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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Dear Alexander,

Thank you for comment. I really appreciate you critique. Your objections are highly considerable.

But not everything in international politics is about law, which is even a political construct. Hence, writings and actions are widely differing. As we are talking about politics, the most important issues are things said and done. Thus, the political will is the critical point. All governments, including the Iranian, have their excellent jurists to reconstruct the interpretation of “interference” in case Art. 2 Nr. 7 UNCh. The Kosovo War in 1999 is an illustrative example of reconstructing norms by governments.

My argument is to “convince Iranians” by the media and public diplomacy, explicitly not by any kind of covered action. Such media engagements have been taken part in the world for more than 60 years now, without been prohibited by international law. Remember Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, Radio Moscow or all kinds of Satellite TV.

I am convinced, that free expression of opinion, open dialogue and information sharing among people will have much more positive impact, than any paper written.

October 27, 2010

Alexandra Dobra, Warwick University - Cambridge University - York University, Silver Contributor (63)

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"The internet is a top priority. Numbers of Iranian internet users are growing. Sharing information online is the easiest way to inform the world. Thus, Iranian blogs should be promoted."

Indeed, the internet is vital for revitalizing political participation. In this line, the plebiscitary model of democracy – the expression of opinions can be facilitated by webs – as well as deliberative models of democracy – conceiving the internet as a new tool for increasing participation – share a common ground. Furthermore, for Habermas' public sphere, the Internet can provide a many-to-many medium which is accessible to all lambda people so that they can discuss matters of public concern unrestrictedly, with "guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions" (Habermas, 1964).

October 27, 2010

Sascha Lohmann, Goethe University Frankfurt, Platinum Contributor (203)

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Dear Felix,

Your proposal aims at one foreign policy instrument that is still available for the West apart from coercive means and the use of force. More precisely, your proposal focuses on how the West can support (critical) voices in Iran to make themselves heard in the face of censorship and widespread oppression of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech. Following your line of argumentation, I am absolutely with you to concede without ifs and buts that Iran has an inalienable right to the peaceful use nuclear energy as a signatory state of the NPT (leaving aside the facts that it is certainly not the most effective alternative to satisfy energy demands as well the highly unstable geological region with frequent earthquakes). Furthermore, I support your claim that the military option needs to be taken (if not entirely but definitely from the center) of the table.

Besides that, there are two caveats I want to elaborate on more closely in the following. Firstly, your line of argumentation is mainly based on an unrealistic assumption of the power of technology, a common bias in the aftermath of the disputed presidential elections that has been revaluated in the meantime. Secondly, your successive policy recommendations suffer from a rather simplistic assessment of the Iranian president, wrongly treating him as the main obstacle to a sustainable and peaceful solution.

Let me begin with the first: You have made a great proposition. However, you might not be aware of it that your proposed recommendations have already been discussed frequently in policy circles across the Atlantic. US lawmakers have readily embraced the idea of giving direct material assistance to the Iranian people while bypassing the regime. Consequentially, some propositions such as the transfer of communication technology do indeed already exist (the ban on exporting these kinds of goods has been lifted recently by the Obama administration). Again others, such as the Iran Human Rights Sanctions Act, sponsored by Senator John McCain, are currently debated in Congress. All of those measures share one and the same idea: that the direct and indirect support of democratic change from within Iranian society will eventually lead to regime change.

Regrettably, this view lacks a deeper understanding of the widespread consensus that exists across the political spectrum concerning the issue which you are, strangely enough, also acknowledging: the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, another political leadership will not necessarily change the conflictual situation per se.

This brings me to my second point. You single out the current regime and its ideology as being mainly responsible for letting the conflict escalate further . But this is only partly right as the current president of Iran is facing serious problem and stiff opposition at home. In this regard, the nuclear program remains the last major project that he is theoretically able to finish with success, as all of his others have already failed. As a matter of fact, inflation is escalating and unemployment is running high and the recent subsidy cuts will further erode his political power. Because of that, Ahmadinejad is actually not such a bad negotiating partner as you are assuming. He desperately needs a major victory and his repeated statements that Iran is ready for further negotiations must be seen in this context.

The recently discovered funding of Shiite groups in Afghanistan (that stand in opposition to the different Taleban groups) has revealed one thing: US and Iranian interests are indeed more aligned than, for example, US and Pakistani interests are. The question is how to overcome the ideological barriers that exist. I have made a proposition in my paper for a possible way forward on this issue.

October 27, 2010

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

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Felix, I think you offer some good assessments of the issues to be concerned. We especially agree on the point that the Iranian regime´s breakdown should be enforced.

I also agree with your comment on the role of the international law. I always wonder, why the international law is consistently hold to protect Iran, but in a vast amont of times against Israel. I recently did some work on the relationship between Israel and the UN and the status of international law. I don´t want to stress that point out, but give a hint on the institutional deficiancy.

Immanuel Kant knows, what I am talking about:

"[...] can thus taking the place of the positive idea of a world republic (if not all should be lost) only be a negative surrogate of a war defending, existing, and ever expanding federal governance, to hinder the power of the right-shying, hostile tendency, but with stable risk of their occurrence."

(From the essay "Perpetual Peace")

The UN cannot be world government, as an arithmetic ratio does assume a sovereign entity, who forces individuals to comply with the law. Kant knew that this principle cannot be transferred from individuals to the transmission between the states. The states are still together in a kind of anarchy. The application of international law is merely an expression of power relations among the states - but they can never be common law as long as there is no sovereign entity.

Going back to your remarks:

1. I would not attach so much importance on the internet. It appears to me, that despite the incredible transparency of the brutal suppression of the protests, there was no adequate reaction in Western countries. If anything, they were only meant well, but not seriously interested in the problem. And I would strongly defend that thesis, because I was participating in every protest in Germany against the regime. There were some exile-Iranians, Jewish organizations and a handful of others.

2. The project of the Islamic Revolution was one of the destruction of the old culture. The people of Iran have nothing to do with the Iranian regime. They hate it and want to get rid of it. Seriously addressing the people in Iran would be to assist them in this endeavor.

3. For this reason, I also miss the counter-argument against outside intervention. Actually I am not of the opinion that Iraq is such a bad example, but you can get the general consensus to leave without reason for explanation. As I also say, it does not require direct intervention from outside, instead a breakdown by isolating the regime should be enforced. Trade with the Western partners provides the regime the armament it needs to perpetuate its rule. This has to stop then the opposition can succeed.

October 28, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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Dear Sascha, Dear Niklas,

I thank you both for your comments. Especially you, Sascha. You made some very good remarks.

Further, I would like to underline my argument, of Iran´s regime being the essential problem. Subsequently, this problem divides into the `school´ the Iranian president comes from, the ideology ruling in Teheran for 31 years now and, henceforth, the actions following the speeches.

In 1992 the Hezbollah attacked the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, according to Sueddetusche Zeitung (s. below), on order of Teheran.

Iran has constantly enforced its efforts to upgrade and extend its missile capabilities. As I wrote in my article, those missiles need to carry a warhead to make any sense. Hence, the NATO´s current debate about missile defence is not more as an acknowledgement, that an Iran with armed with nuclear medium range missiles will be pretty likely.

During the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006, the Hezbollah damaged an Israeli warship seriously by an Iranian C-802 surface to sea warhead. Training and operational facilities were provided by Iran´s revolutionry gaurds. Such an action can be seen as a test by Iran, because, if Hezbollah is able to seriously damage an Israeli ship, Iran´s military may be able to do the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, Iran restocked Hezbollah´s missilie capabilties after the War, including Scud missiles.

Addtionally, Iran supports the Hamas and, as Wikileaks recently highlighted, even insurgents in Iraq. Thus, we can assert, than Iran´s revolutionary guards conducted a greater number of aggressive actions. Furthermore, the actions I mentioned are those, which became publicly kown.

In consequence, Iran showed non-peaceful, rather agressive, behavior and Ahmadinejad´s recent Lebanon visit underlined, that this is not about to change. Hence, it is not the program itself, rather the regimes intentions and ideology, which make the program a possible threat. Anymore, it is remarkable, that no goverment, whether NATO or non-NATO denies the necessity of missile defence. Russia could easily summon NATO, when would have an absolutly wrong percept. Instead, NATO and Moscow negotiate about Russia becoming part of missile defence systems.

Finally, we should focus on decisionmakers minds. As I pointed out in an other comment, humans, socialized in very different circumstances, have widely differing understandings of `rationallity´.

- http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/argentinien-haftbefehl-gegen-ex-...

October 28, 2010

Tobias Heinrich Siegfried Sauer, Universität Trier, Gold Contributor (84)

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Felix,

thank you very much for your proposal.

I'm with you when you propose not to concentrate too much on Ahmadinejad and his regime but to get engaged with the population and faciliating their access to information. I also agree that public diplomacy should be bolstered. However, I do not think that the West's assessment of Ahamdinejad is needed in Iran. Last years protests made clear enough, that there exists a strong opposition. Instead, public diplomacy should be used to communciate the world's actions against Iran and show clearly what has to be done to have sanctions suspended and the fruits of incenties harvested.

One major problem is that the West so far has not yed decided on a coherent and realistic strategy. It is demanding the end of Uranium enrichment, a goal that is quite unrealistic given the domestic support for such activities, which are also legal under the NPT. This support also indicates that Ahmadinejad is not the main problem (as Sascha argued earlier).

Before using public diplmace, the West has to decide on its goals: What does the West want? More realistic objectives might be helpful, as the signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol and full cooperation with the IAEA. "Concrete reciprocity" might be a useful way forward, that definitely should be communicated clearly - to the leadership and, also, to the Iranian public.

October 28, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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Dear Tobias,

Thank you for your comment. I fully agree with most of your arguments.

No doubt, a strong opposition exists, as I mentioned in my article. Furthermore, the public diplomacy (PD) efforts you propose are also part of the PD, which I consider to be necessary.

As a second: Yes! The West has define its aims! You proposals in this case are pretty helpful.

However, I have to underline again, the main issue is the foresight that a person like Ahmadinejad could have `the finger on the red button´.

October 28, 2010

Nina Keim, Bohnen Kallmorgen & Partner, (5)

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Felix,

Thank you for your insightful recommendation on how to improve the current situation in Iran. I agree with you that the internet has a tremendous potential in empowering the Iranian population and spreading the voices of eye witnesses.

However, recent developments have shown that Web 2.0 tools are not only powerful to promote democracy but also to empower conservative regimes and radical voices. The Iranian Cyber Army serves as an example.

Spreading its propaganda messages in English and Arabic and hacking Twitter, the Iranian Cyber Army follows its mission to “conquer the virtual space”. Members of the Iranian Cyber Army receive cutting-edge cyberspace training. According to a Newsweek article, they are trained in “writing weblogs, social networking, psychological operations, protection from Internet spying, mobile phones and their capabilities, Basij cybercenters and videogames that would allow penetration into virtual space.”

Having the objectives and practices of the Cyber Army in mind, I recommend taking a second look at the Iranian blogosphere. While there are many Iranian bloggers providing reliable information and helping to inform the public about Iran, there are also pro-government bloggers who – undercover – try to influence the virtual debate. Especially as an outsider to the Iranian culture, it is not always easy to differentiate between the reformist and the pro-government bloggers.

Promoting Iranian bloggers, as you suggest, is a valuable suggestion to increase the Iranian voices heard. And yet, Westerners need to caution their engagement in order not to put the reformist bloggers at risk.

Source: http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/04/stuxnet-worm-latest-attack-in-gr...

Tags: | Iran | Cyber Army | internet |

October 28, 2010

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

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As I argued in an other article on Atlantic Community on October 12, "Cyber security is one of the 21st Century’s biggest challenges".

However, beside the Iranian Cyber Army we have U.S., German, British, French, Russian, Chinese, etc. and non-state cyber armies and signal intelligence. Sadly, surveillance, hacking and propaganda are issues every onliner has to deal with.

Indeed, we should consider human creativity´s positive effects. In the past, we have seen a number of activists and bloggers, not only in Iran, who found their niche. Hence, you are right, those are the folks Westerners should "not put (...) at risk."

Addtionally, I could imagine, some of the countries from above force their own counter-cyber intelligence against the Iranian cyber army.

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