Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

February 4, 2011 |  8 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Topic Rules of Disengagement

Elizabeth Royall: President Barack Obama and the NATO community must strengthen their resolve to South Asia and communicate their commitment to Afghanistan and its neighbors; otherwise, the regional players will continue to hedge their bets and problems will remain intractable. Guarantees on short term policy in Afghanistan need to be given to ensure future stability.

Winter is the season of anticipation. The world catches its breath, hunkers down, and waits for spring. In Washington, the pundits and politicians lower their voices after the elections and before the next round of elections. Halfway around the world, Afghanistan and Pakistan wait with bated breath to see if the increased troop levels, change in focus, and regional strategy unveiled in 2009 will yield returns, and more importantly, if America will disengage from the region in the coming year.

We are in the endgame of Afghanistan - we just don't know how it will end. Like drying cement, changing the imprint is possible, but only for a limited time. Unfortunately for President Barack Obama, the cement was poured before he came into office, and the past 21 months have been a last ditch effort to change the imprint. In July of next year, Obama plans to start withdrawing troops, though recently he began to shy away from that date, as well as his commitment to have foreign soldiers out by 2014. We don't know how much time there is left before the die is set. That will be determined by Kandahar and Quetta just as much as by Washington and Brussels.

And so, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zadari, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and Osama bin Laden wait. They wait to see if the searchlight of American foreign policy will drift to another region; moved by a new crisis, a new trouble zone, or simply American impatience. Perhaps the midterm elections best demonstrated what Afghanistan and Pakistan knew all along: Americans are impatient and fickle. In just two years, Obamania dissipated and calls for change and hope turned to shouts of anger and despair. Those who had championed Obama's shift of focus from Iraq to Afghanistan felt betrayed when they discovered that meant sending more soldiers in harm's way. Many didn't realize that once bumper stickers turned into policy, the consequences are real.

Unfortunately, many countries' welfare depends on the American electorate's mood. As a result, people in South Asia watch US domestic developments to see what the New Year will hold for their countries. Meanwhile, many of the problems in South Asia are frozen; waiting to see if Afghanistan stabilizes, waiting to see if US engagement in South Asia will survive the coming years, and waiting to see who will wield American power in 2013. Until those answers become clear, the actors will hedge their bets, and solutions will prove illusory.

Pakistan is playing both sides: taking American money and arms while supporting its favored militants. Yet the United States can do little to stop this duplicity until it no longer it requires Pakistan's assistance in Afghanistan. Pakistan has limited motivation to curry favor and a healthy relationship with Karzai if it is busy preparing for Afghanistan's collapse. While 75 percent of Afghans view the Taliban "very unfavorably" according to a 2009 ABC News/BBC poll, Afghans and Pakistanis need to know which will survive ­­-- the Afghan government or the Taliban? Likewise, the Pakistani-Indian relationship cannot heal while the two play games of passive aggression in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the United States cannot consider solutions in Kashmir without being preoccupied by the mitigating factors of its involvement in Afghanistan and its dependency on Pakistan.

Afghanistan is the cornerstone of US policy in South Asia. The more you know about Afghanistan, the more problems and difficulties you will see. But Americans and NATO members must not be scared away. Afghans want the international community to commit to stabilizing their country, but avoid conflict with the local Taliban in preparation for when international forces leave. Until we see if the cornerstone will stay strong, Afghanistan's neighbors are left in a holding pattern.

So what must the United States and Obama do this winter? Be patient, but reassure the region. Hold a conference similar to the 2001 Bonn Conference, and secure an agreement among the neighbors stating: Afghanistan will remain a permanently neutral country, Afghanistan's territory will not be used against the interests of its neighbors, Afghanistan's neighbors cannot use their territory against the interests of Afghanistan, the Durand Line will be recognized by all parties as the Afghan-Pakistani border, and the United States and NATO will have no permanent military presence in Afghanistan but will act as guarantors of this agreement. Such a treaty would calm the fears of abandonment among Afghanistan's neighbors and prevent bet-hedging by giving reassurances calming deep-seated fears. Most importantly, America and NATO must commit to South Asia that they will keep their watchful eyes on the region. For what matters most is not on what date military forces leave, but what the international community does after that date.

Elizabeth Royall is pursuing an MA in Security Studies at Georgetown University.

 

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's competition, "Empowering Women in International Relations". It coincides with the 10th Anniversary of UN resolution 1325 which calls for increasing the influence of women in all aspects of peace and security.

The contest is sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

You can find out more about the competition here.

  • 6
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
 
Comments
Greg Randolph Lawson

February 4, 2011

  • 4
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
The problem is, Afghanistan will always remain a chip in the ongoing struggle between Pakistan and Afghanistan. America and NATO has never come to grips with the fact that the real problem lies in Pakistan. Until Pakistan and India resolve (in whatever way they can) their fundamental differences, Afghanistan will always be a problem.

The U.S. and NATO need to recalibrate. This can be done by toning down expectations and keeping just enough pressure on various parties through off-shore balancing and targeted special force strikes against metastasizing threats.

Hoping for Afghanistan to be more than the tumultuous region it has been since before Alexander the Great, is a dream. The West simply wants to avoid allowing it to become an easy planning station for terrorist attacks as it did in the years leading up to 9/11. That is the core interest in Afghanistan.

Now, as it relates to Pakistan, that is another, far more complicated story.
 
Greg Randolph Lawson

February 4, 2011

  • 0
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
I should clarify in above section, I meant "The problem is, Afghanistan will always remain a chip in the ongoing struggle between Pakistan and India." I assume most people understood the typo, but I wanted to be certain.
 
Felix F. Seidler

February 5, 2011

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Elizabeth,

Thanks for the interesting article.

Nevertheless, the US will stay engaged in the whole region. They just cannot risk Pakistan´s nukes falling into Al Qaida´s hands. Furthermore, there will be US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Currently, US forces extend Bagram Air Force near Kabul. Moreover, established bases in Northern and Western Afghanistan are going to be outfitted for a longer presence. After the Lisbon Summit, Barack Obama stated, moreover, US forces will be Afghanistan after 2014 (“counterterrorism capability”). His policy is not about a complete withdrawal, rather about Afghans “have taken the lead”.

Quote from Obama´s statement:
“Our goal is that the Afghans have taken the lead in 2014 and in the same way that we have transitioned in Iraq, we will have successfully transitioned so that we are still providing a training and support function. (…). The other thing that I'm pretty confident we will still be doing after 2014 is maintaining a counterterrorism capability until we have confidence that al Qaeda is no longer operative and is no longer a threat to the American homeland and to American allies and personnel around the world. And so it's going to be important for us to continue to have platforms to be able to execute those counterterrorism operations. (…). But my goal is to make sure that by 2014 we have transitioned, Afghans are in the lead, and it is a goal to make sure that we are not still engaged in combat operations of the sort that we're involved with now. Certainly our footprint will have been significantly reduced. But beyond that, it's hard to anticipate exactly what is going to be necessary to keep the American people safe as of 2014. I'll make that determination when I get there.”
Source: http://projects.washingtonpost.com/obama-speeches/speech/505/

Anyway, German politician´s language and Lisbon´s NATO-Afghanistan Declaration underline, however, Western forces in Afghanistan will receive a new mandate under a modified label.

Merkel, Guttenberg and Westerwelle as well as the oppositional Social Democratic Party´s leader Sigmar Gabriel continuously say, after 2014, there will be no “combat troops”. Nobody used the wording “no troops”, rather all named it “no combat troops”. Hence, even Germany´s Bundeswehr is likely to continue its presence. In an interview with “Rheinische Post” General Patraeus pointed out, furthermore, a military element will be needed in Afghanistan after 2014.

Instead, for two reasons the US will not leave Afghanistan. Firstly, the country has an enormous geopolitical and strategic importance. No other country within the region will allow the US to sustain major military bases like Bagram. Second, Afghanistan´s minerals, the Oil and Gas in the country´s north and the “Turkeminstan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline” (TAPI) are in US interest´s focus.

The ongoing withdrawal debates are not about a complete removal of troops. Instead, NATO seeks a face saving end for ISAF. Otherwise the alliance´s image would suffer. Try to image how the world would perceive NATO after a complete fail of ISAF. Anyway, in Lisbon´s NATO-Afghanistan Declaration both parties reaffirmed a long term partnership. Even if ISAF is ended formally, the alliance cannot risk Afghanistan to fall back in pre-2001 circumstances. Thus, we will not see an entire cut off. Probably, 2014´s NATO summit will declare, however, ISAF has been successful, end the mandate and start a new consulting, training and support mission. Potentially, states may even continue their work without a NATO flag to close alliance´s Afghan chapter.

Useful links:
Ackerman, Spencer (2010): U.S. Supersizes Afghan Mega-Base as Withdrawal Date Looms. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/u-s-afghan-mega-base/
Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2010): NATO weaves South Asian web. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LL23Df05.html
Rheinische Post (2010): Interview mit Isaf-Kommandeur Petraeus. http://www.rp-online.de/politik/ausland/Der-Druck-auf-die-Taliban-w...
Shachtman, Noah (2010): Army Plans $100 Million Special Ops HQ in Afghanistan. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/army-plans-100-mil-spec-ops...
 
Marcel  Lewicki

February 7, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Elizabeth,

thank your for your interesting article on a very important topic. Ten years after the intervention, Afghanistan is not the model country that the Bush administration wanted it to be (at first). You pointed out that "the cement was poured" before Obama took over - that also means that many mistakes - sometimes near-irreversible mistakes - had already been made by the Bush administration, the repercussions of which still influence Western decision-making in Afghanistan.

Because the Bush administration and US top brass were unwilling to put American troops on the ground, they empowered Northern Alliance warlords through millions dollars worth of assistance to fight (and in the end take down) the Taliban regime - money and matériel they later used to fortify their own positions as militia leaders and regional governors, money that for the most part allowed them to stay independent from central government control. Thus, the US strategy had severely weakened - if not crippled - the Afghan central government before it even came into being.

Then ISAF was installed in Afghanistan and in a gruellingly slow process spread out across the countryside to provide stability, both in Kabul and in the provinces. A large American contingent, however, remained independent from ISAF control and preferred to "fight terrorists" in the mountains straddling the Afghan-Pakistani border, mostly oblivious to the efforts other nations made in other parts of the country. And while the attention was focused more on Iraq, Western leaders, be they from the US, Britain or Germany, perferred to more or less ignore Afghanistan for many years as long as it would not become a hotspot in election debates.

A couple of years back, Afghans still had a mostly positive image of ISAF troops and a negative attitude towards the Taliban that had oppressed large parts of the population for such a long time. Today, ISAF's prestige is almost completely gone - and the opinion about US troops that operate independently of ISAF is even worse. It was part of ISAF's strategy to spread out into the communities – especially the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should work closely with local authorities and ISAF soldiers should patrol public places like bazars to reassure Afghans of their safety. But what happened? A string of IED bombings and suicide attacks forced ISAF troops back into their barracks and US air strikes like the devastating attack in near Kunduz in 2008 coupled with insurgent attacks on civilians led to a mounting civilian death toll. The bazar patrols are mostly gone and ISAF troops travel through in heavily armoured convoys, and sometimes, according to a German television report, sometimes allegedly pay off local militias for protection.

And while recent reports see ISAF and Afghan troops gaining the upper hand over the Taliban and affiliated groups in some areas, other parts of the country remain in the grip of Taliban, local militias and warlords. Opium production is still rife and farmers without any government or international support are often left almost no choice but to plant poppy seeds. Large swathes of the population – especially girls and women – still have no access to education. This is the scenario in which politicians from Germany and also from the US and Britain talk about reducing troop strengths, but on the other hand point out their commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan's broken society.

This picture of course looks overly bleak and I am sure that there are many local "bright spots" where the efforts of local communities, international and national NGOs, Western aid workers and military really made a difference and changed things for the better. Also, it is of course very easy to criticise decisions with the hindsight of ten years.
However, I believe Western leaders make many of the same mistakes they made from 2001 on – not using enough troops, not enganging enough with Afghan society, not acknowledging Pakistan's – and especially the ISI's – often detrimental influence in Afghanistan, not respecting local traditions while on the other hand not advocating reforms in the central government, not standing up to local warlords and militia leaders and showering Karzai's central government with money while not enforcing its conditionality.

I believe what Obama and other Western leaders will have to do now is take a long, hard look at what happened in the last ten years, and look especially at what went wrong, to stop repeating the same old mistakes over and over again. The situation in Afghanistan is, as you say, intractable and, even if it sounds a little clichéd, there are no easy solutions. The American President has a special obligation not to "lay low", but to remain committed at such an important juncture. He needs to encourage wavering nations like Germany to stick to their commitments in Afghanistan and to not cut back their troops before the situation allows it. And he has to, and there I agree with you, keep a watchful eye on Presidents Karzai and Zadari. More than that, he has to let them know in clear terms that he supports courageous reforms in both countries, and that he will stand by them in times of need. On the other hand, he will have to make clear to Pakistan that the government will have to hold its intelligence services at a tighter leash, and to Afghanistan that it has to act swiftly against corruption and election fraud. Obama has the tools he needs – he should use them.
 
Elizabeth  Royall

February 8, 2011

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Thank you all for your thoughtful responses to my piece. I'd like to take the opportunity to respond to some of your comments in the aim of continuing the conversation.

Greg-
I agree with you that Afghanistan is but one piece of the puzzle that is South Asia. The region will remain unstable on one level or another until the regional security issues are resolved, especially the India-Pakistan rivalry. In this way, Afghanistan (and the United States) is just a pawn of Pakistan's policy towards India. But that does not mean progress cannot be made--look at the conflict in Cyprus, where conflict has been going on for decades and is somewhat intractable, but the casualty levels are incredibly low. However, toning down expectations may be useful in the West, but in South Asia, it leads to troubling responses. Afghanistan will look for funding and support elsewhere (most likely India or Iran), which will cause Pakistan to increase aid to the Taliban to check non-Pakistani influences in Afghanistan, and many Afghans will turn to the Taliban to provide the stability that lowered expectations cannot. And I caution you from taking an episodic look at Afghanistan's history; while there have been many periods of conflict, there have also been large periods of relative peace. Look at the 1930s-70s Afghanistan, and look at Europe's history, which also witnessed many periods of war.

Felix-
I may have been unclear in my article, but I don't believe the United States or NATO will pull out completely in the near term. I am concerned that political and economic pressure may cause a decrease in force and civilian aid strength in the next few years that will hurt Afghanistan's interest and hamper its reconstruction and stability. But in my article, I was mostly addressing the importance of Afghan (and Pakistani) perception of ISAF's longevity. Most of the public do not understand the machinations of U.S. and European policy and politics and that such lowered or altered expectations are primarily focused on maintaining political will at home. Any decrease in aid or support or wavering is seen in rather black and white terms, which fuels both mental and physical insecurity as well as bet-hedging. Thanks for the links.

Marcel-
I agree completely with you that many of the problems we face today in Afghanistan are a result of the mismanagement, inattention, and poor policy choices of the Bush Administration. If proper strategies, focus, and resources were applied in 2001, Afghanistan would look very different today. I've written on the topic before, but in this essay, I wanted more of a forward-thinking, prescriptive piece. The situation is, as you say, bleak; but I have hope that if the international community can commit to sound policy and resource allocation in the next few years, Afghanistan can stabilize, though it will likely never escape the insidious problems of its neighborhood completely. In general, I also agree with your policy recommendations, though I am less optimistic that Obama can put much pressure on Pakistan--they are trapped in a self-defeating cycle of mutual dependency that is near impossible to break while America is involved in Afghanistan.
 
Aigerim  Shilibekova

February 11, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Elizabeth,

Thank you for your thought-provoking article.

Along with your analysis of AF-PAK situation and the US approach to the regional security and stability, however I think it would be great to add your vision of China, a very important but usually 'invisible' actor in this area. Particularly if to consider Taliban's AK-47 made in China and Chinese support for Pakistan, I am curious what if the clues to regional security lie in a different dimension?

Thank you in advance and good luck.
 
Marcel  Lewicki

February 13, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Elizabeth,

I agree with you on Pakistan, it is very difficult to effect any change there while the US is involved in Afghanistan. That is also down to the US, and the West in general, as they have never tried to reach out to the Pakistani population and explain what they are actually doing in the border region. Predator attacks on Pakistani soil were quickly whipped up to be a major embarrassment for the Pakistani government and a rallying cause for anti-American feelings.

This is the same kind of arrogance that could come back to haunt the West in Egypt. By propping up autocratic regimes, be their leaders' names Musharraf or Mubarak, the West has done a lot to alienate the people. Moreover, in light of a very low educational level and big economic woes, anti-Western populists, especially in Pakistan, had a field day. I believe when it comes to dealing with countries like Pakistan and Egypt - where there is a strong sense of national pride - the West will finally have to start dealing with them eye to eye. Accepting their objections, for instance when it comes to attacks on Pakistani soil (incidentally very probably a breach of international law), and accepting them as equals would be a first step, both for Pakistan and for Egypt. Otherwise the whole AfPak condrunum will remain a self-fulfilling prophecy and in the end, the West will have to quit the whole area with its tail between its legs.
 
Elizabeth  Royall

February 19, 2011

  • 0
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Aigerim--

Let me preface this comment by admitting that I am not a China expert in any sense of the word, so what follows is based on my knowledge of their activities in South Asia, not any real insight into China's strategic calculations.

China is an important actor in Afghanistan and Pakistan and should be included on any future summits on the future of the region. China shares a (small) border with Afghanistan and has contributed to reconstruction in the country. China has increased its involvement & projects in developing countries which I believe is an effort to 1) establish influence in developing nations and dependence on Chinese goods and services and 2) gain access to natural resources and markets for goods.

China is more important to Pakistan, with which China has had a relationship for decades. After the US, China is the largest source of weapons and military to Pakistan. This further reduces US leverage over Pakistan, because if the US does cut off military aid to Pakistan, Pakistan will simply get materials from China, as she has done in the past. In fact, in 1976 China gave Pakistan the materials and weapon design for building a nuclear bomb. China has an interest in supporting Pakistan in order to hinder regional dominance by India, which China sees as a regional power and economic rival.

For these reasons, China needs to be involved in conversations on the future of South Asia.
Tags: | Afghanistan | China | Pakistan |
 

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org


Community

You are in the archive of all articles published on atlantic-community.org from 2007 to 2012. To read the latest articles from our open think tank and network with community members, please go to our new website