RSS

A speech on Russia by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the week before last conveyed a key point: Russia's own integration into the world - a highly desirable objective - is jeopardized if at the same time Moscow has a policy of crushing democratic development along Russia's borders. This approach might have had a positive effect even three years ago. That was before Kremlin became dismissive of Russia's need for membership in the WTO but long after Vladimir Putin began to pursue policies "increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad."

Today Russian leaders, satisfied that America is tied up in knots in other parts of the world, have a mindset that Russia can do what it wishes, especially in Europe and Eurasia. Indeed, President Dmitri Medvedev was quick to dismiss Rice's words: "No new outside factors, let alone outside pressure on Russia, will change our strategic course."

In Central and Eastern Europe, from Estonia to the Balkans, there is a pronounced fear that, as former Czech President Vaclav Havel put it, "Russia is once more losing awareness of where it begins and where it ends." Medvedev's talk of Russia's "privileged interests" in its neighborhood, combined with a proposed 25 percent increase in defense spending, are alarming. Even before Russia invaded Georgia, 71 percent of Poles were concerned about Russia's behavior toward its neighbors, according to the German Marshall Fund's 2008 survey.

The concerns of America's friends should be America's concerns. After the 9/11 attacks, Central and Eastern European countries proved to be staunch allies in meeting America's challenges abroad, often in the face of public opposition. Polish commandos from the elite "GROM" unit stormed Iraqi facilities in the early phases of the war in Iraq, and Polish officers commanded one of four military zones there. Ukraine, Romania and Slovakia contributed troops, as did Hungary and Lithuania. Czech weapons specialists were deployed in case of chemical attack.

Central and Eastern European leaders felt that in supporting America, they were standing up to predominantly antiwar European powers at their peril. At the time, President Jacques Chirac of France even hinted that countries joining America's efforts in Iraq could find their bids for EU membership blocked.

Today the Central Europeans' solidarity with America is in need of reassurance that the United States is committed to their independence, integrity and stability. Until recently, the lack of Western reaction to Russian intimidation of the former Soviet states, whether cyberattacks on Estonia, the use of energy supply as a political weapon against Lithuania and the Czech Rupublic, interference with Ukraine's elections, made many worry that their sovereignty is subordinate to US strategic interests with Russia.

In her speech, Rice emphasized that negative Russian behavior "did not go unnoticed." But, despite his freedom agenda, President Bush was silent when early signs of Putin's rollback of democracy were clear, and therefore helped to create an impression among Kremlin leaders that Putin's actions would be ignored because of Russia's strategic value.

Gaining Russia's support in matters of international security and the pursuit of positive Russian behavior in the former Soviet bloc are not mutually exclusive. American strategy should reflect a mixed nature of shared as well as conflicting interests.

Russia is in a position to offer help in tackling security threats, including Iran's development of nuclear weapons and the ongoing challenge with North Korea. Russia's chemical and biological agent stockpiles and expertise make cooperation important to prevent their proliferation. But seeking support on these challenges - and it is actually in Russia's own interest to do so - does not mean the Bush administration should remain silent about negative trends.

Washington should have responded much earlier to Kremlin accusations that the so-called color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan are products of American policy to transform the region into a zone of US control. American and European leaders should have been clear that these transitions are part of a process of what's been happening in Europe for more than 50 years.

And while America should say to Russia that the road to the West is open to you, the US also must support the new states around Russia. In particular, the US should continue to patiently draw Ukraine into the West. Helping Ukraine is not an anti-Russia policy. It is a policy which supports Ukraine and paves the way for Russia to be part of the West, should Russia want that. Indeed, the drop in the Russian stock market following Russia's aggression in Georgia shows that Russia is not immune to global financial pressures.

It's unlikely that there's a Kremlin "master plan" guiding Russia's actions toward her neighbors. Instead, Russia's actions are driven variably by ambition and nostalgia, confusion or misinterpretation, irritation or resentment. Our long-range goal should be to create a context in which Russia understands that working together with the United States and European Union will make it more prosperous, secure and free.

Ultimately, US policymakers should bear a simple proposition in mind: Wishful thinking and expedient sloganeering (looking into Putin's soul and seeing a democrat) are not substitutes for strategy.

Mark Brzezinski, a Washington lawyer, served as Director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council in the Clinton administration. He is a member of Atlantic Community advisory board. This article was originally published on October 8th in International Herald Tribune and is republished here with kind permission from the author.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Francisco J. Ruiz: US, EU, Russia: Not a Zero-Sum Game
• Hall Gardner: Redefine the Concept of Independence
• Colette Grace Mazzucelli: The Georgian Flaw in Transatlantic Security

October 9, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

• 5
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

While agreeing with the Author that realism must prevail in US and the West's policy towards Russia, I think he is wrong to judge that there is no master-plan behind the Kremlin's actions. The master plan is - and has always been - to protect the vast and vulnerable Russian Heartland and keep enemies (real or fake) at bay. In the Soviet Union Russia was protected by two buffer zones: satellite countries making the outer circle on the western front and the soviet republics making the inner circle. Less than 20 years ago the outer circle suddenly collapsed and subsequently much of the inner circle was pierced through. Russia felt exposed and fragile but in the 1990's it was unable to make up for the losses in its security perception. Now it feels much stronger and does what it can to rebuild the buffer zones, wherever possible. For natural reasons, tradition and resentment, the former soviet republics and former satellite countries are the main target. The much discussed resurgent Russia is in fact Russia in fear and despair, Russia that seeks to regain traditional safety in a no-man's land between "us and them". The US problem is that the no-man's land consists of the US new allies, NATO new members or NATO-hopefuls and it is rightly noticed above that some of them have been taken for granted, also for Russia's sake. The examples of Georgia and Ukraine, where political instability seems to be a rule rather than exception, suggest that Russia is regaining some of the buffer-zones. The next US president should manage these issues in concert with the EU and NATO to compose a relevant mix of policies.

Tags: | US | Russia | NATO | EU |

October 13, 2008

Marie Claude

• 6
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

I am afraid there are bad news from the western front, they are likely to miss liquidities to ensure their former programs :

http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44010

Also I believe that the eastern EU republics have always relied more on the US than on EU, that their inner biquering towards Russia have had a long life that they pursued while joining EU, that Russia was betrayed by the US that had promissed no more Nato extension after that the firsts joined this organisation when the wall fall.

Also while Nationalism is becoming more evident in Russia, the russian repression in Georgia was ment to stop the US conquest of the former URSS republics through Nato adhesion., that apparently weren't afraid to attack big Bear, believing that the US would support them.

We have seen that the US army heads were silent, their concern was only to form military troops for their purpose in Irak, but not for fighting against georgian ennemies, in the contrary to Bush and Rice, but that's the only thing they can do.

Now, indeed, it's time for realism, and really be part of EU, and I am afraid for these countries that look for the American dream, it's over

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org