Iran’s nuclear program has been a cause of concern for the international community after the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities was revealed in 2002 and 2003. Since then, suspicions mounted about Tehran’s intentions with its civilian nuclear program: Tehran signed but did not ratify the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards Agreements; hence the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot carry out enhanced verification inspections to verify Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This creates concerns with transparency. The most serious issue is Iran’s uranium enrichment program, which could allow Iran to develop highly enriched uranium to manufacture a nuclear weapon, should a political decision be made in that regard. Tehran argues that uranium enrichment is an “inalienable right,” so it will not halt its program. Coupled with lack of transparency, this insistence only fuels worries and suspicions over Iran’s real intentions.
Turkey, an actively involved country in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, has a different perception: Although it has endorsed that proliferation is a threat to security mostly for the Turkish public and the government, but Iran’s nuclear program is not a serious threat, and concerns for proliferation are exaggerated. The Turkish Prime Minister goes further by arguing that “those who speak to this issue should eliminate nuclear weapons from their own country.” The political and economic élite think that Turkey should not sever ties with its neighbors with whom it has several trade relations. Iran is the second main supplier of natural gas, on which Turkey is highly dependent, thus good neighborly relations are essential for economic and regional stability.
On the other hand, Turkey is a NATO ally, and has strategic relations with the United States, so it would not be able to remain outside of an undertaking against Iran even if it abhors a military option. What is more worrisome is that in case of a military operation against Iran, Turkey would be a likely target of retaliation. Therefore, it is vital for Ankara to keep Iran on track through diplomacy, and to prevent the “escalation of the conflict” to an extent that may require military action.
The absence of war between Turkey and Iran for several centuries is owed largely to the rough strategic balance between the two, which would be dramatically changed should Iran acquire nuclear capability. However, Ankara is committed to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and its non-nuclear-weapon status. In fact, it has its own plans for nuclear energy generation, but these plans have already been an item in the broader the debate on regional proliferation due to the security dilemma which can be triggered by a nuclear Iran.
Turkey is convinced that the issue can indeed be addressed through diplomacy alone: Ankara has recently set a new direction in foreign policy which foresees “zero problems” with neighbors” and a greater role in regional affairs. These policies emphasize dialogue and cooperation as the basis of security. Therefore, Ankara avoids confrontational discourse with Tehran. It is aware that if diplomacy fails, Turkey will be the country which will be affected the worst from the outcomes. In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil managed to convince Iran of a nuclear swap deal, by which it would have its uranium enriched out of its borders. However, around the same time, the United States took the support of Russia and China for sanctions on Iran. Turkey reacted strongly to sanctions by casting a “No” vote in the Security Council, particularly because it undermined the swap agreement. The most important consequence was that it underlined the gap between the two countries regarding their threat perceptions from Iran’s nuclear program. It seems that neither Turkey nor the United States are fully aware that their perceptions differ as such. It is important to bridge that gap, especially because of its possible implications on other endeavors concerning regional security.
The analysis of Iran’s nuclear program in Ankara takes little note of the politics and technology of proliferation. Security issues, particularly nonproliferation, are understudied topics in the Turkish academia except a few experts. There is little coverage in the media, too, since traditionally these issues have been tackled by the security elite. The public, politicians, journalists and most academics are unfamiliar with the technological processes towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They also seem to have understudied Iran’s threat perceptions, interest in regional supremacy and the history of its nuclear program that could give an idea on Tehran’s motivations. The perception in Turkey is that the international community, particularly the United States, is applying excessive pressure on Iran, and accuses Tehran for something it has not committed. Ankara is also upset that the nuclear swap deal for which the Turkish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister spent great effort, was left aside and instead sanctions were passed.
On the other side of the coin, the United States seems to have little grasp of Turkey’s concerns, its ties with Iran, and its vital national interest to keep Iran in the diplomatic table. The difference in threat perceptions and the lack of mutual awareness of this gap are likely to create problems throughout efforts towards the resolution of the Iran issue. Turkey’s refusal to name Iran as the threat in the missile defense deployment talks was also an extension of this difference in perceptions.
All in all, bridging this perception gap is not impossible. A helpful strategy would be to provide a forum to Turkish and US experts, academics and officials to learn and discuss the technological and political aspects of proliferation, and to understand each other. The United States underlines the significance of Turkey for its interests in the region. Indeed, Turkey “speaks the same language” with Iran regarding regional issues, and used this as an advantage during the talks. Hence, increased US-Turkish interaction would also be invaluable for mutual understanding and to harmonize the allies’ interests.
Dr. Sebnem Udum teaches at Hacettepe University's International Relations Department. Her areas of focus are Turkish foreign and security policy, nonproliferation, nuclear energy, Europe and the Middle East.
This article was submitted for the atlantic-community.org's competition: "Empowering Women in International Relations." It coincides with the 10th Anniversary of UN resolution 1325 calling for an increased influence of women in all aspects of peace and security. The contest is sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
You can read more submissions from the competition here.
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September 30, 2011
John William Boasi, NYU SCPS (Center for Global Affairs), (3)
I took much pleasure reading this opinion of yours, and it takes me by surprise that there are no other comments as of yet. Allow me to offer a student's take on what is in my opinion a touchy policy issue for the United States and the region.
Often when thinking of American concerns regarding the stepping-up of the Iranian nuclear program, thoughts inevitably stray to treatment of North Korea, a declared nuclear power with an arguably more unstable and erratic administration than the Islamic Republic of Iran. For those nations on the immediate border (i.e., South Korea, and China to some extent), as well as Japan, concerns about the program are understandably high and made known to the international community. When test missiles are fired out into the Pacific Ocean, one might not even blame South Korea and Japan for desiring a nuclear weapons program of their own as a regional deterrent. The strategy of the United States in this scenario, however, appear to me as being markedly different than those pursued with respect to Iran, and the lessons learned here should be applied in kind.
Similarly to the diplomatic policy towards Iran, the United States does not maintain a consular relationship with North Korea. However, it is important to note that there have been, at times, direct talks between officials of the two nations, ranging from the results of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework of 1994, to the participation in the Six-Party Talks. While dialogue has not often been agreeable or amounted to immediate success, the mere presence of a direct talk enhances the probability that understanding and conciliation can occur to the benefit of not only the two main parties, but those regional nations who must bear with the consequences on a daily basis. The committing of diplomats with authority to speak on behalf of our national interests, such as the esteemed Christopher Hill, the former American Head of Delegation for the Six-Party Talks, sends a positive sign that the United States is prepared to take matters seriously and with a degree of sincerity. Conversely, when Undersecretary of State William Burns represented the Bush administration (43) at Iran's uranium enrichment talks, he was not authorized to have a one-on-one conversation with his Iranian counterpart, and could only "listen" to proposals placed on the table. It is baffling at times to note the stark difference in treatment for a country with declared powers, and one which is still in a formulatory stage. Turkey puts itself at a significant advantage in this respect over the United States, which you have duly noted, for its active participation in the talks can express opinions in their proper environment, as compared to the rhetoric utilized for media or public consumption. While relying on Turkish expertise is certainly helpful, an improvement would definitely be seen if American officials dedicate themselves to a more meaningful role in the discourse.
Barry Posen has written an excellent article on this precise issue of living with a nuclear Iran. While focusing mainly upon the American reaction to this potential reality, he does briefly touch upon Turkey - in fact, the same point as you made on nuclear energy, though he goes further to use the example to disprove the nuclear domino theory that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon (if the United States position was realized), the Middle East would follow in suit. The main thing to take away from it, especially in light of your article, is the contrast of international relations theory applications between both the United States and Turkey. Once more, a brief comparison to the American stance on North Korea I think needs to be made to point out inconsistencies that might otherwise have remedied any concerns with Iran. At least with the government of Kim Jong-Il, foreign policy framers are pursuing courses alongside a liberal or constructivist path, fully engaging with other nations and creating new definitions on what once might have been deemed grounds for a military response. Stated in the last paragraph, the United States is a full partner in the Six-Party Talks when they are opened, but additionally, it recognizes the use of nuclear power as a bargaining chip for North Korean demands. While not belittling the potential for future harm that can come from the program, the realization of this idea was evolutionary from a more black-and-white perception that a realist might invoke for security, this latter theory being seen in the discourse with Iran. The United States is viewing this too strictly in national security senses, which leads back to your point of misunderstanding Turkey's aims (as well as Iran's). Turkey, the country more likely to incur damage in the hypothetical case of Iranian nuclear aggression, is ironically the more level-headed, consistently reevaluating and reshaping policy to come to terms with the realities of the region. Tactics are implemented with acknowledgement to history, current affairs, and a greater attunement to the sensitivity of the Middle East. Turkey should serve as a model to readjust American foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear program by fostering a desire to truly understand underlying motives that the realist perspective is conveniently obscuring.