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August 3, 2010

Darrell Calvin Brown, City College of San Francisco/SFSU, Gold Contributor (130)

I would be interested in knowing who the author of the article would see in the position of General (ISAF)and for what reasons?

August 4, 2010

Karsten M. Jung, University of Bonn, Bronze Contributor (17)

As argued in the article, it will be key for the U.S. and allied governments to muster real political and military support for the "comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy" rather than just rhetorical advocacy. I am thus of the opinion that Gen. Petraeus was the best candidate and choice available for the position. Not only is he a committed advocate of the "comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy", but his strong track record in Iraq and the solid respect he enjoys with members of both parties in the U.S. and with important allies also mean that he has significant political capital to weigh in when negotiating strategic and tactical issues with the civilian side. Without altering the basic strategy, he has thus already begun to devise and push through some important first steps of which we are likely to see more soon.

August 6, 2010

Member deleted

Beginning the article, the author asserts that the lack of demonstrable progress in Afghanistan during the past year under Gen. McChrystal's command was in no part attributable to any "significant conceptual shortcomings of the 'comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy'. This is an absolutely ridiculous argument that betrays a total misunderstanding of the 'comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy' being implemented in Afghanistan and why it is inherently doomed to fail. According to the standards of the U.S. Army’s own Counterinsurgency Manual, current political realities in Afghanistan and inadequate resources preclude the possibility of success for ISAF’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, successful counterinsurgency campaigns must have a legitimate and capable central government as a strategic partner, which is clearly not the case in Afghanistan. Second, the number of counterinsurgent forces is insufficiently small according to force-sizing metrics for a campaign this size. If the objectives of the international military campaign in Afghanistan are unachievable by its own standards, the only logical conclusion is that the mission must be changed.

August 6, 2010

Member deleted

It is eminently clear that the strategy being pursued by ISAF forces is not viable. The rational conclusion, therefore, is that the international community should immediately reduce its military footprint and begin withdrawal of combat forces. Reduced international military involvement would undercut the motivating factor behind terrorism and insurgency: the perception of international forces as foreign occupiers imposing a corrupt and illegitimate central government. In addition, it would significantly lower collateral damage and civilian casualties, thereby reducing the grievances and injustices that foster the insurgency.

Reduced international military involvement does not mean that the international coalition will abandon all of ISAF’s functions and objectives. Rather, the mission of ISAF will shift to protecting the capital and major population centers. Opponents to this strategy argue that this will restrain the ability of the U.S. and its international partners to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban and the return of Al-Qaeda to Afghanistan. They argue that once the U.S. pulls out, the Taliban will soon take over the country once again and provide a safe-haven and staging ground for transnational terrorism. However, this is a specious assertion that fails to account for the strengths and successes of previous U.S. military strategy. The U.S. and its international partners can prevent the Taliban’s resurgence and Al-Qaeda’s return through a strategy of off-shore balancing, which utilizes air and naval power in conjunction with partnerships with native Afghan security forces. This strategy was a spectacular success as practiced during the 2001 invasion. Using 100 Central Intelligence Agency officers, 350 U.S. Special Forces soldiers, and 15, 000 Afghans in conjunction with air and naval power, the U.S. managed to overthrow the Taliban regime and decimate Al-Qaeda in less than three months. There is no reason why current conditions preclude a similar strategy of off-shore balancing from succeeding in the future in Afghanistan. Arguably, current conditions are actually better suited for such an approach given that the U.S. and its international partners now have a stronger relationship with native Afghan security forces and augmented intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

August 6, 2010

Member deleted

July 2010 was the deadliest month for U.S. forces in the nine-year war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the article above titled "Success Remains Possible in Afghanistan" advances the argument that Americans should not fall weary from this burden. According to the author, Americans are supposed to insure "success" in Afghanistan by relying on the hope that Karzai's government, the U.S., and its coalition partners will increase their "political commitment" to the international effort in the next year.

Neither adequately providing concrete examples of "success" or the ambiguously defined increase in "political commitment", one is left wondering where are the reasons why success remains if at all possible? The authors offers the same boilerplate seen elsewhere by those prognosticating "success" in Afghanistan. If only the U.S. and coalition partners can jump-start the second most corrupt government in the world on the path to "protect", "represent", and "serve" the population of Afghanistan in the next few years, we will have "success".

Has the author been reading the news lately? Why should we hold out hope for Karzai's ability to change and improve? The central government led by President Hamid Karzai is widely perceived by Afghans as incompetent, corrupt, and illegitimate. In 2009, Afghanistan was ranked as the second most corrupt country in the world, which marked a fall from ranking fifth-worst the previous year. According to the 2009 Freedom House report, “Afghanistan's civil liberties rating declined…and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free due to rising insecurity and increasing corruption and inefficiency in government institutions.” In the wake of national Presidential and Provincial Council elections marred by government collusion in massive fraud, vote-rigging, and outright manipulation, the perception of Karzai’s government as corrupt and illegitimate has only been reinforced.

This is in the wake of numerous reports of the Karzai's goverments open corruption and inefficiency. Recently, stories indicate billions of dollars of money, both aid and drug funds, being openly flown out of Kabul International Airport. All of it linked to high officials in the central government of course. And all the more scandalous considering the annual GDP of Afghanistan hovers just above $10 billion (2008: $10.6 billion.) This is all on top of the strange reports of Karzai's own erratic and strange personal behavior, which I will not get into here for the sake of brevity (just search for it).

When the U.S. initially invaded Afghanistan, "success" was defined as destroying Al-Qaeda and toppling the detestable Taliban government that harbored them. The U.S. partially achieved the first goal and definitively achieved the second. Apparently, there are now currently only a couple hundred Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan at the most. In addition, it is believed that Bin Laden as well as Al-Qaeda Central now reside across the fictitious imaginary Durand Line in Pakistan. We also know that Al-Qaeda does not need Afghanistan as a safe haven for launching attacks since they can rely on locations elsewhere in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, etc.

Thus, one is left wondering why a massive nation building exercise in Central Asia in partnership with corrupt, venal regime is necessary for securing the national security of the U.S. or their coalition partners? The U.S. and its coalition partners should recognize that their strategic interests in Afghanistan are limited. The U.S. and its coalition partners can meet the objectives of counterterrorism and prevent the return of a large-scale Al-Qaeda presence and safe haven for transnational terrorism through a more limited international military presence.

August 11, 2010

Karsten M. Jung, University of Bonn, Bronze Contributor (17)

The argument that "current political realities in Afghanistan and inadequate resources preclude the possibility of success for ISAF’s counterinsurgency campaign" is precisely the one made in the article. In fact, a lack of commitment on the part of both the Afghan and allied governments are cited as the primary causes for the limited progress made over the past year.
Unlike Mr. DuBois, who appears inclined to accept defeat and relinquish any international responsibility for Afghanistan as a country or for broader regional stability, however, this author believes not only that such a responsibility exists (out of moral considerations), but that acting upon it is in the best interest of and still possible for the ISAF coalition.
Much beyond "destroying Al-Qaeda and toppling the detestable Taliban government", the U.S. and its allies share a vital interest in stabilizing and pacifying not only Afghanistan as a potential safe haven for terrorists, but also a broader region which is home to two nuclear powers, one Islamic theocracy seeking nuclear weapons, various kinds of cross-border, inter-ethnic conflicts, countless drug traffickers financing terrorist and insurgent activities as well as other significant threats to international peace and security.
While acting on these threats is critical, it cannot be done successfully by the "offshore balancing" method suggested above: While air strikes and special forces alone may be appropriate means for toppling a regime (as has been shown in 2001 and 2003), it should have become abundantly clear thereafter (in both Afghanistan and Iraq) that they do not establish and secure stability. They are consequently insufficient for the complex, multidimensional task of stabilization and nation-building that is now facing the international community in Afghanistan. It is against this background that a "comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign" remains the best and most promising means for the international community to act upon its interests in Afghanistan and the U.S. and its allies should seek to establish the requisite preconditions for it to succeed.
With regard to the second of these preconditions, the provision of adequate resources, the initiative rests entirely with the coalition, and it is in reference to this fact that the article speaks of the need for additional political commitment on the part of allied governments. If they chose (and continue to chose) a counterinsurgency strategy, they need to commit the military and civilian resources necessary to see it through.
The second part of the equation, "current political realities in Afghanistan", is not as fully within allied control. Nevertheless, the ISAF coalition does not have to rely entirely on the hope for the Karzai government to act on what essentially is its own long-term self-interest (referred to in the article as the need for additional political commitment on the part of the Afghan authorities). Structured incentives in particular provide an instrument through which the international community can accelerate progress towards the establishment of the necessary preconditions for a successful counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan as well.

August 15, 2010

Khalid Ahmed Chaudry

How can you win a war on behalf of the people not willing to support you, due to many reasons. First they don't have any faith in the intentions of forces involved in this so called war on terrorism.
Second they blame their government for corruption (in other words lootting and plundering whatever coming in as aid for development).Thirdly number of civillian casualities is the main reason that there is hatred in the hearts and minds of Afghan's (even those helping joint actions,in civil or uniform).

Building infrastructure in Afghanistan was not a mission impossible as just cupple of years were required but one can see no progress. Women empowerment, schoold,college and universities,hopsitals etc etc would have helped to change of the Afghan mind set. One can ask please let us know the scale of progress.

Supporting some tribes and killing others have been a source of ever incresing hatred and violance among the Afghans,which means irrepairable losses to Afghan unity for coming centuries.

I don't know killing those who are opponent of the present Afghan regime can be called a victory, while I personaly consider this as a global tregedy and global defeat of those against war and conflicts on our planet. I am sure non would be victorious at the end but yes our world will be facing more bloodshed and violance in result of this, making ever cornor of the world un-safe.

Afghanistan should be left for the Afghan folks,let them choose their leaders and the system of government as they would like, the role of policing needs to be stopped. Afghan people know how to survive and one should believe me "they will do much better".

Why can't USA, the European Union and rest of the world send their sodiers to fight against poverty,hunger in place of using sophisticated weapons killing fellow human beings and helping the weapon industries and the weapon traders to flursh !!!

August 19, 2010

Paul-Robert Lookman, http://geopolitiek-in-perspectief.blogspot.com/, Platinum Contributor (295)

During the last decade we have been fed lots of “wonderful” stories about Afghanistan and why we should send “our boys and girls” there. The way I perceive it, Mr Jung’s is just another pledge to stay the course, for better or for worse. The truth of the matter is: all these narratives are window dressing aimed at the electorates, to conceal the true geopolitical and mercantile objectives of the world’s sole superpower.

For what it is worth, I support Brett W. DuBois’ comments, which I feel are not only very much to the point, but also essential to put things in perspective in a debate like this on a site like this.

August 24, 2010

Karsten M. Jung, University of Bonn, Bronze Contributor (17)

I very much appreciate the controversial debate that my contribution has triggered - obviously, that was the primary reason for publishing it on this site.
Instead of repeating previous arguments in response to the most recent comments, I intend here just to emphasize a few points that may be worth considering:

Whatever one may think of the (stated and unstated) reasons leading to the decision to go to war in Afghanistan, that decision has been made and cannot be easily reversed. Thus, while it is obviously critical to discuss the merits and justification of the Afghan campaign with a view to similar situations that will most certainly arise in the future, such a debate cannot resolve - and should be carefully distinguished from - the more practical and immediate problem of how to get out of the Afghan mess that for better or worse we are in. It is to this latter debate that my article sought to make a contribution.
In contrast to Mr. Chaudry, I do not believe it a feasible and/or realistic option at present to leave "Afghanistan ... for the Afghan folks". While it may well be true that "Afghan people know how to survive and ... 'they will do much better'", the problem faced by the United States and its allies is a much broader one defined not only by the Afghans', but also – like it or not – by their own interests (of which the welfare of the Afghan people is an important, but not the only one). I hope that – if not the article itself – at least my comment of August 11 has clearly stated the objectives (including the geopolitical ones) that are at stake in Afghanistan from the perspective of the coalition members. Against this background, I would be obviously curious what the other "true geopolitical and mercantile objectives" referred to by Mr. Lookman would be?
Finally, as far as the "wonderful" stories are concerned, I presume it to be sufficiently obvious that no one would consider Afghan girls' right to go to school or Afghan women's right to run for public office a national interest important enough to go to war for.