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Atlantic-community.org members generally agreed that the goals of the international mission in Afghanistan must be the development of good local governance: the aim must be a less corrupt Afghan state with full domestic engagement and a definition of success that is culturally appropriate in the Afghan context – and does not merely mean an emulation of western-style democracy (Sontz, Swierczynski). Our members developed the following key suggestions towards improving the ISAF mission:

1. The appeal of the Taliban must be reduced and rule of law improved.

Limiting the Taliban’s support base is crucial (Lawson). There is some debate as to whether negotiating with the Taliban is a viable policy option now (Daiyar, Singh), though in the long run, some political agreements will have to come about (Sajjad). In the medium term, offering positive incentives such as secure salaries or lower-level positions in government institutions to non-ideological combatants is necessary. By encouraging these groups to become invested in the political development of Afghanistan, the mission will affect lasting military and political stability, as well as improve the government’s legitimacy (Kuovo).

While this is a way to reduce the pool the Taliban draws its combatants from, preventing the higher echelons, namely militia leaders and those with proven records of human rights violations, from prominent roles in governments – local and national – is essential towards the development and improvement of the rule of law (Kuovo).

2. The functioning of the state must be improved by decentralizing power.

There is general agreement that much room exists to improve the functioning of the state. The governing structure or “polity” needs to be reorganized, devolving power away from the center into a loose federation of provinces (Burki), giving formal, institutionalized primacy to local levels of governance (Marton). In doing so, the international community must focus its efforts on building local institutions and structures that focus on improving the legal and justice systems, addressing rising poverty, and increasing relative regional autonomy (Hanifi, Degeratu). Implementing small scale, civic projects that engage local organizations are necessary to achieve this end (Scheller). These should have a primary focus on public works projects – sanitation, paving Kabul, local hydro-electric projects, training Afghans in construction, etc. (Gouttierre).

Extending the reach of the central government, which has characterized international policy, is a major motivating factor of the insurgency (Mason). Thus, the emerging focus on training good provincial and district-level public servants must be further developed, as it is preparing the way for less power concentrated in Kabul and will ultimately contribute to better governance (Marton).

3. Corruption must be understood within cultural contexts before it can be reduced.

A major cause of corruption is the excessive amount of external capital plus the absence of local structures to effectively absorb it (Liebl), thus local institutions must precede external ‘development’ capital (Hanifi)

Furthermore, corruption must be understood in a cultural context, where certain services require a ‘fee’ that Afghans consider to be merely a transaction cost (Scheller). However, on a local and national level, ‘development’ capital as well as international projects must focus on transferring legitimate control of security and resource management to official institutions, by improving the Afghan National Army and Police training and as well as the salaries of government employees – this will have the effect of countering the influence of the local strong-men who have taken over the security sector (Degeratu, Hanifi).

Atlantic Memos showcase the best ideas and arguments from debates in the Open Think Tank www.atlantic-community.org. Please take the next step and help us spread the word. You can download a PDF copy of this Atlantic Memo to distribute to your local or national decision-makers. The recommendations expressed above come from your Atlantic Community.

Compiled by Stefan Ducich

February 11, 2010

Jevgeni Ossinovski, London School of Economics and Political Science, (2)

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I have a question concerning the second proposal. Although I broadly agree, I think Afghanistan needs to be very cautious with decentralization, lest regional differences become exploited by other actors (mainly Taliban, but perhaps even India/Pakistan).

What mechanisms should be established to prevent such potentially disastrous developments?"

February 12, 2010

Jai Singh, NA, (7)

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Part and parcel of reducing the appeal of the Taliban and establishing the rule of law (from the perspective of the state) is the mitigation of corruption. There was a recent news article on the topic of corruption containing surveys of Afghans in regards to their ranked order of issues of importance. First and foremost, of even greater importance than security and economic opportunity, was the issue of corruption. Reported figures on the value of capital misallocated secondary to corruption rival that of the illicit opium trade.

Even with the strict adherence (on a stated basis) to Shari'a Law, the Taliban has been, on a historical basis, able to obtain acquiescence on the part of the broader population because it has simply been less corrupt. NATO-ISAF and more importantly the Afghan central government must provide security in conjunction with a corruption-mitigated environment if there is going to be any reasonable basis for long-term stability. Building infrastructure, as a mechanism for providing economic opportunity, without security for the same will amount to a Sisyphean task.

Decentralization of power must be managed very carefully given the long history of the extancy of the same coupled with the Afghan tribal structure in regards to the primary identifier of affiliation of individuals within a region in question (i.e. affiliation to the local tribal leader rather than the central state). The weak 'confederation of states' model does not bode well if nation building (distinguished from state building) is viewed as a goal.

July 10, 2010

Lawrence Efana

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Working on best ways to improve governance is always going to be useful in addressing how governments must and should reach out to the people. In this particular case, three important strategies have been lifted up. Up to the present, we have seen one or the other form of active experiment with each separately or integrally. The outcome is becoming quite unpleasant and here one must not forget the character of the region. Rationalization of the strategies, should be logical under normal circumstances, but with the type of war ongoing, such circumstances seem absent - with the result that one is seeing efforts aborted here and there.

It is good to set things right when "people" feel they go wrong, but there must also be some workable conditionality for that. At this stage of the efforts and investments, the mission is becoming more difficult in spite of best attempts with the strategies. It seems to me that it is now time to re-frame the key questions on how to get Afghanistan - a country in that "queer" region] right on problems of nation and state-building. Key questions must seriously think of how to reach out on peace as the death toll we see seems senseless: How must ISAF make those they want to help understand and accept/reassess character of the region as a whole?

Perhaps in the name of helping, "international projects" - if accepted and appreciated should be steered to focus on transferring legitimate control of security and resource management to official institutions: spearheaded 'by improving the Afghan National Army and Police training'. It will not help to forget that good governance is indeed conditional and that under conditions, which are chaotic it is hard to realize it even in relative terms. Afghan reality is unprecedented and romanticizing it is of little help: if poised to side-track key and hard questions - including the lucrative drug trade.

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