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The EU’s signals towards the Western Balkans are fairly mixed: Soon, the bloc will drop all visa requirements for citizens from Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. At the same time, however, rapprochement with Croatia and Macedonia is halted following the escalation of bilateral conflicts with their EU member state neighbours Slovenia and Greece. The EU itself seems to stand helpless in the face of these disputes. How could this happen?

These contradictory signs are first and foremost a consequence of the EU’s polity structure. While the Commission acts as a supranational institution, the member states in the Council are bound by their domestic functional logics. Moreover, decisions on enlargement only come about by consent from the latter. Calls for an arbitrating role of the EU in these conflicts therefore miss the point, because the EU became a party to those conflicts, at the latest when Slovenia and Greece used their veto in the Council to boost their bilateral negotiation power.

This is why recent efforts by the French and the Czech presidency, as well as mediation by the Commission failed: The arbitrators are timid because they need to get along with the blocking countries. Key EU players have acknowledged this fact lately. The conflicts are most recently referred to as “bilateral”. Also, the Swedish presidency completely refused to play any mediatory role.

The only alternative to open EU brokering is building up diplomatic pressure by member states. However, this is impeded by the current political climate: Instead of having a strong push factor around like Germany in Eastern enlargement, this time there are several retarding factors impeding EU expansion. These include the current economic downturn and the conclusion of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, itself a symptom of the unfinished consolidation of big bang enlargement. Hence, for now time is on the side of the brakemen.

The EU’s incapacity to act is accompanied by complex and deadlocked conflict constellations in the countries concerned. Due to sensitive questions of recent statehood, politicians on all sides resort to mobilisation of national sentiment in order to generate legitimacy for a tougher political line.

The name question in Macedonia is potentially disruptive to interethnic relations and thereby to stability in the country. While Slav-Macedonian national feelings are stirred up, the Albanian population becomes further alienated as it sees its most important goal endangered, namely higher living standards through EU accession.

In Croatia, contrary to early apprehensions of a national-conservative coup within the ruling HDZ, the party will retain a pro-European orientation. However, reform dynamics are likely to further deteriorate, especially in neuralgic areas as depoliticization of the administration and the judiciary.

Disconnecting the candidate countries from EU solidarity will significantly weaken the disciplining effects of EU conditionality and in the long run reverse progress already made. The EU’s primary interest in Southeast-European enlargement is stabilization of the region. It is somewhat ironic that in the current political climate, no constructive impulses can be expected from within the EU as long as this goal is not under immediate threat.

Only when the crises mentioned above are mastered can there be room again for fresh movement. Until then, EU member states should stick to the values of European solidarity and use diplomatic “massage” to relax hardened positions among all parties. Because of the widespread involvement of public opinion and high-flying emotions, it is of exceptional importance to find creative solutions allowing all sides to save face.

Political leaders in candidate countries should not lose focus on EU accession as being of long-term benefit to their countries. However, it will take time to dispel the emotionalized atmospheres and to generate a more constructive climate.

Nevertheless, this episode will tear long lasting wounds into the relations of the countries involved. The two Western Balkan accession candidates will become EU members sooner or later. Countries now ruthlessly trying to push through their national interest should not forget that they will have to deal with their adversaries at eye level – if not today, then tomorrow.

Tomislav Maršić is a researcher in the Division EU Integration at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin and currently visiting fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford University. He has previously worked at the Ministry for European Integration and Foreign Affairs in Zagreb.

Previous Balkan Week articles on Atlantic Community:

• Balkan Week: Could Current Conflicts Spark a New Balkan War?
• Balkan Week: Daniel Korski: Solving Europe's Bosnia Crisis
• Balkan Week Elizabeth Pond: Kosovo: Balkan Success Story and Future EU member?

Tomorrow: Wolfgang Stock: How Will Europe Protect Itself against the Nationalist Virus?

August 6, 2009

Gregor Schueler, University of St Andrews, Silver Contributor (35)

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The entire Admission process for the Balkan countries has been messy and will likely continue to be so.

While some countries, like Croatia, are a lot closer to accession and have actually been a success story that seemed to prove the effectiveness of EU membership as an incentive for reform and development others like the Kosovo, Bosnia and Serbia are still tangled up in regional ethnic conflict and are hindering each others progress.
It is unfortunate that now Croatian membership has been vetoed as it is a set back not only for croatia but the entire region. If Croatia is too controversial to get integrated, how can conflict ridden countries like Kosovo or Bosnia hope to accession forward, especially since Serbia is likely to push into the opposite direction.

The above article illustrated well the many issues in EU expansion and I believe that because of the issues highlighted as well as economic reasons, it is much too early to seriously consider most of the Balkan countries for EU membership. Already there are sharp differences between western and central Europe on the one hand and eastern and southern europe on the other in terms of economic development. These will hopefully flatten out in the near future as those countries profit from EU membership in terms of trade and transfer payments. However, the more countries of lesser current economic stability are added the more fragile and disrupted the European economy and community will become, especially when two or more of its member states have serious unresolved political disputes.

The capacity to act needs to be the number one priority and the membership of too many countries that have serious issue with each other will block the EU on any policy and legislature. Diplomacy needs to first improve the interrelations on the Balkan. The European Community needs to remain a benign friendly place that can catalyze the emergence of a European civil society and identity.

August 6, 2009

Rudi Guraziu, International Business and Diplomatic Exchange , Silver Contributor (36)

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This is an excellent analysis! However, it is necessary to explore the reasons behind the veto threats. In the case of Slovenia-Croatia border dispute, obviously the EU (through Slovenia) wants to make it clear that it could still pull the rug from under Croatian membership. This is because they certainly do not want to carry another ‘Cyprus’ problem within EU.

As regards the bizarre name dispute between Greece and Macedonia – both countries should be considering each other sensitivities in the quest towards a political solution. As Joschka Fisher (former German foreign minister) said once at Chatham House: it is strange to name Skopje’s Airport after Alexander the Great if you know the Airport. ‘it is a little bit over the top’!

That said, despite the obvious element of enlargement fatigue the Western Balkans membership prospective seems to have been solved. Still, this cannot be taken for granted as long as the EU Member States use the membership conditionality as a tool to pursue their bilateral issues.

August 6, 2009

Stefanie Jennifer Tetenburg, King's College London, Silver Contributor (58)

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With regards to the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute, it should also be taken into account that Slovenia might be setting a dangerous precedent; Croatia is also in dispute with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina due to territorial issues. Therefore it's not unlikely that Croatia would take on a similar strategy (of using its veto to resolve its bilateral issues) after it has joined the EU.

On top of that, the EU's apparent inability to deal with these issues, reduces incentives in the Balkans (notably Serbia and Kosovo) to meet EU requirements. So therefore these bilateral disputes may have far reaching effects in slowing down this race-to-the-top phenomenon that we have witnessed over the last years.

And although the Croatian-Slovenian and Greek-Macedonian issues are clearly bilateral, the EU should not underestimate the potential impacts of these realities and actively engage with them. Considering how far these disputes date back, it seems unlikely that they can be resolved with outside help (i.e. mediation). And Slovenia and Greece should not expect to be the 'winning parties' merely by the fact that they're EU-members and they're neighbours are not. Instead a fair bargaining process should be the chosen path. After all, as Mr. Marsic points out, at some point they will have to work together in the EU as well.

August 7, 2009

Nikolina-Romana Milunovic, Zeppelin University, Silver Contributor (52)

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Dear Ms. Tetenburg,
I agree with you on the assertion that the EU must not underestimate the potential impacts of current Balkan realities and the Union's indifference toward them.
Do you believe that EU citizens would support or oppose the accession of other Balkan countries?
Further, having spent some time in Croatia this year, I can assure you that the country's dispute with BIH or Serbia due to territorial issues is merely a remainder of previous conflicts and concentrates on very few citizens at the Croatian-Bosnian border. I am afraid that this sort of differing opinions will prevail in the Balkans for quite some time. However, the Croatian Government (and the Bosnian for that matter) is not involved. Given the economic bonds of these countries and their rising efforts toward mutual dialogue, EU membership perspectives should not be impaired by this.

August 7, 2009

Joshua Posaner, SOAS, Silver Contributor (73)

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Mr Marsic,

Thank you for your extremely interesting article. I am certainly no expert on the issue but from my perspective surely it is inevitable that these states will gain EU membership one day. So, it stands to reason that it will prove counter productive for Slovenia and Greece to behave so stubbornly now.

However, whether valid arguments or not both Athens and Ljubljana must only see the issue of EU membership as leverage. Once accession is completed it would become increasingly unlikely that a resolution favorable to the blockers will be found. In the interest of achieving what Slovenia believes is fair, in access to international waters, it believes it is equally fairly vetoing Croatia’s membership despite the completion of all ‘Copenhagen criteria’. This is where the EU should come in. The two issues of border and maritime integrity should be separated from EU membership.

As Ms Tetenburg so aptly pits it, the EU should not behave like an exclusive club in which its members are right by default. Instead it should engage with these issues and seek to play the role of mediator continentally. The failure of the Swedish Presidency to make any attempt to do so is in my opinion an example of a basic EU failure to engage with the issues stalling Europe’s progress. The argument may be that it cannot become involved in bilateral diplomatic disputes in fear of splitting its pack but in the two conflicts spoken of there does not have to be a clear right/wrong or winner/loser scenario. Just a solution will do.

Perhaps all this serves to do is to alienate the Balkan states. After reaching the standards needed for EU accession, Croatian is now faced with an apparently insurmountable blockade pushing it further away. I accept the argument that economically unstable states may temporarily disrupt the EU economy but is it not the point of the union to be inclusive and not exclusive?

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