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December 2, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Dear Julia,

Thanks for the insightful ideas you have shared in this article. I think we share the paradigmatic position that the development of a common stance between the EU and the US is an indispensable variable in this complex policy equation on global environmental governance. :)

I just wanted to ask for clarification on the over-arching theme of your policy paradigm; that is, the need to focus on European civil society and the EU. In the entirety of your article, there were only two sentences that appear to support your basic argument about the EU and the European civil society. Let me cite it: “This is founded in my conviction that firstly, given the US political system, leeway for a more ambitious climate policy is currently greater in the EU. Secondly, well-meant policy recommendations aimed at the US, which often display a lack of knowledge not only of US climate policy initiatives but also of the underlying discourse and debates, rather bear the danger of alienating the US.”

Thus, what do you mean by a ‘more ambitious climate policy’? I would also be glad if you can elaborate more on your second justification about this ‘lack of knowledge of US climate policy initiatives’. On a less important note, I was just a bit surprised with the way the article has tried to justify the cardinal position that you have put forward in this debate – which is putting the limelight on European civil society and the EU. The two justifications that you have mentioned only talk about the failures within US politics vis-à-vis environmental governance; and not really talking about the normative and the practical considerations why we must invest much of our political capital and optimism in the European civil society and the EU. This appears to be a non-sequitur argument since the only rhetorical justification for your proposal is only based on the apparent supposition that “there’s something wrong in the state-driven US and therefore we should turn to the EU and European civil society”. But what is so special within the EU and the Euro-level civil society? This is something that appears to be seriously-lacking in the article. As you may have been aware how European civil society may have some problems as well in terms of democratic deficit (see Beate 2010; Majone 2010; Bellamy 2010 – all in the Journal of European Public Policy; among many others criticizing the democratic deficit in the EU, but you may see Moravscik 2004 for a classic response on this democratic deficit debate) also on a defense on the democratic deficit debate within the EU ). But of course this is another debate.

What would be interesting to note though is on how European civil society could be the most effective means through which policy initiatives on environmental governance can be directed? What do you exactly mean by European civil society? Is your conceptualization of this term implies that there is a monolithic and homogenous interest within the Euro-level civil society?

More importantly, at the ideational level, I have strong reservations against the way you somehow juxtapose an ‘apparently-promising(?)’ European civil society with an ‘apparently-problematic’ US which is state-driven. At the praxis level, perhaps it would be better if you can elucidate further on how this civil society could indeed be promising. Perhaps it would also be worthwhile if you could somehow talk about how European civil society was so successful and impactful in terms of pushing the political agenda towards sustainable environmental governance. Honestly, when you said that “policy recommendations should be directed toward European civil society and the EU, as US policy is increasingly state driven”, I have the impression that you are somehow painting the picture of ‘state versus civil society’(which I sincerely hope that this is not the case). My take on this is that there is a symbiotic interdependence between the state and civil society to take a successful public policy that may best advance public interest; and in this case, fighting climate change. Also, I also have serious doubts about how you painted the US failures as ‘state-driven’, since one may possibly argue how American civil society may also have some shortcomings in advancing a a successful agenda in fighting climate change. Thus, it may be more prudent to argue that the more plausible strategy is to make sure that American and European civil societies are somehow very much vigilant on how their respective governments address climate change.

On a less important note, let me just refer to your statement: “In the US, the role of president Obama is a decisive factor in prioritizing Climate Change as a political issue- both among US citizens and on the national political agenda.” This statement somehow dismisses the complexities of American politics (and any kind of politics, for that matter). From a new institutionalisms point of view(see Pierson, Thelen, Immergut, Hay, Schmidtt, Mahoney etc), I think that one must be able to consider that Obama (as a political agent) is part of a big, complex, historically-embedded structures such as institutions. Aside from the apparent institutional inertia within American social and political institutions (with all the climate change deniers, etc etc), political agency seems to have been overtaken by structures; that is, despite a very strong Obama (as agent), structures (institional inertia) may have, to a large extent, impede whatever good policies may have been put forward in the table.

In addition, in terms of the over-all structure of the article, I just felt that it could have been better if you have tried to provide a very substantive justification of ‘EU and Euro civil society’ since it appears that a large chunk was devoted to characterizing the need for transatlantic partnership but there was a very (apparently) limited justification on your over-all strategy, which was the EU and Euro civil society.

I am sure that readers will be looking forward to your clarification. Thanks a lot. :)

Best wishes,
Santino

December 2, 2010

Ntambaazi Williams George, University of Osnabrueck, Germany, Silver Contributor (41)

Dear Julia,

My antenna to write rose again when you in the middle of your article raised the important point of prioritizing climate change as a political issue (and who to play a decisive role). Climate change catastrophes will most especially affect those nations removed or blocked from the centers of global political life.

Of course , the leadership (political) role of the EU has been an overemphasised policy recommendation from also various contributors on this forum. It provides a single best example of how majority of observers acknowledge the limitations of existing policies on climate change. We also seem to be in agreement that forging of cooperative political relations taking into stock those already set in motion will deliver an acceptable climate deal.

In essense, Iam also arguing that the EU has a slight adavantage ahead of the US (relatively limited institutional inertia roadblocks in relation to its political agents ...see Santino above). We all seem to summarize that the EU is in a better position at least of today to organise political support for highly complex climate policies that produce benefits for the wider world (Please note: Iam not trying to compare who is better than who BUT who is more likely to take the initiative)

The centrality of politics as a gateway of better climate policies means that state intervention contributes heavily to the interests of ordinally citizens. However, the political world and set up particularly in the US is populated by very powerful people, interests and formidable institutions that are hostile to the purposes of some public-spirited officials. In the US domestic political environment we always expect such policies to stimulate a negative response from voters, even though many voters are often unaware of the specific advantages in relation to the costs imposed on each individual even beyond the transatlantic set up.

I thank you

December 2, 2010

Jan Schierkolk, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Gold Contributor (86)

Hey Julia,

To say this right off the bat:

I really liked your article. It features sound analysis and practicable recommendations based on it. In the case of your bullet points, they are sometimes ready to be copy-pasted into our eventual group document in my opinion (although then they will often have to be made more concrete). You are sometimes clearly ahead of current policy, and always at the pulse of current discussions. Also, I mostly agree with your positions. And thanks for bringing up the Green Fund, I think especially its eventual (hopefully equitable!!) participatory structure is of utmost importance, although I personally would have even more far-reaching ambitions for any such structure, see tomorrow. So, just to put any critique into perspective: it’s really a great article. BUT:

Like with Philip’s piece (that I equally praised), unfortunately I see nothing truly innovative in it, nothing AHEAD OF current discussions. And given the immense inherent constraints of the current way of dealing with climate change and its discussion itself, THIS of all things is what I am most looking for here.


Now to a few details of what you wrote. You will see, most of it doesn’t conflict with what you say, but provides recognition, additional ideas, and interpretation:

As I said to Philip before, pointing out regional U.S. initiatives is good and important because of their pivotal role of showing the national level what can actually be done. Also, on another note, some of them actually comprise sizeable economies that in Europe would be legitimate states in their own right. Therefore both of you are right, they should not be belittled.

Yes, smaller and more handy forums are important to initiate CC negotiation processes, but risk sidelining the UN one, where at the very least eventually everyone has to have their say, too. Although this is far from desirable, in the current way of dealing with things there will even have to be made compromises between complete equality and a minimum of needed efficiency – which is unfortunately all but low. Tricky.

About the EU, I also agree when you seem to say that the EU is rightfully seen as a climate leader, but risks losing this position by ambivalence and strong differences between members and an overall relative slump in recent commitment. That, on a side note, even is exacerbated if we step away from the isolated analysis of climate change (which may be the exercise here) and widen the view to sustainability in general, which is the only way forward in my opinion. Briefly, then we get to the point that massive reliance on nuclear energy (like the French, and recently again increasingly the U.S.) may cut GHG emissions, but will create tons of problems for future generations, maybe even just as much as climate change would have done. I am referring to this on a side note, as it illustrates one of the many issues making up the EU’s ambivalence as a still not unified actor. I often see little comprehension for this on the part of international partners, which further hinders EU efforts. In this context, I missed references to the need to CUT energy and other CONSUMPTION, something I liked a lot about Edson’s piece. I think they nicely would have fit into your context. Or do you disagree on substance?

Yes, I agree, the still current economic crisis is a challenge, drawing away attention and means from combating climate change. The especially sad part however, and you didn’t hit on that, is that it could also have been an opportunity (past tense, largely). Because, bank bailouts aside, once you have had to spend these huge amounts to revive our economies, that could well have been done to jumpstart sustainability in unprecedented ways in the process. The concepts were there, like the German Greens’ (or others’) Green New Deal, but poorly advertised and received publicly. By the way, THIS is something that I would have done even against public opinion, Edson. But ironically, these ideas were and still are often best employed outside the West, like in South Korea, and that looks unlikely to change until the end of at least this crisis. We shouldn’t hope for the next one just for that (; but seriously, here, the West has much to regret. Maybe this will take a few years to sink in. So much about our climate leadership, or lack thereof because of not putting our money where our mouth is, even when we spend it almost for the mere sake of spending it.

I agree in principle when you say the U.S.’s (and Obama’s) political constraints on climate action should be much better recognized on this side of the Atlantic, and that the U.S. should therefore be positively engaged, or “met half-way”, as you put it. Also, the EU should cooperate with the U.S. and try to reach a common position vis-à-vis developing countries. I would, however, stress that this should mainly be a position of massive support, and rarely of pressure. Also, Europeans should, unlike in Copenhagen, recognize the limits of such “meeting half-way” approaches, and do so quicker. I think I hinted at this before in a comment, about potential reservations against integrated transatlantic emissions trade. In extreme cases this means: noble words aside, if the U.S. keeps de-facto teaming up with other climate laggards to water down commitments so it can keep hiding behind them as culprits, Europe should not be a part of this. But as an open calling out of that behaviour would probably itself lead to counterproductive distractions, the best strategy would then be to take the high road, stride ahead on emission cuts, extend our greatest support to developing countries, and wait for the U.S. to realize how much power and influence it actually gives away by staying stubborn. If that doesn’t help, then we can talk about trade sanctions, and then there would be broad global support to institutionalize them, if necessary even outside the unanimity-bound WTO. I really hope it doesn’t get there (which is why I advocate for ways to get out of this negative game) - but just to have spelled it out: not alienating the U.S. is of utmost importance, but should never be the supreme end in itself. I bet you agree.

Diplomatic initiatives like the mentioned Transantic Climate Bridge are good, but so far it is really hard to measure their actual impact. As you (rightly, I believe) pointed out, Julia, tackling climate change is seen more as a national security issue than one of global necessity by many in the U.S. that should be used more efficiently. I believe that instead of only doing what any NGO could (foster and transmit knowledge), European diplomats would be best employed in making clear that the U.S.’s slowly but surely loosing its unique global leadership role also increasingly has to do with failure to sufficiently act on climate change. In addition, there are good indirect diplomatic ways to make that point: Finland, for instance, has an IMPRESSIVE sustainability agenda, and it applies for a seat for the next period of the U.N. Security Council. The entire EU should support them and thus ensure their election (and also the election of others based on sustainability efforts, which have to be made a criterion for support in international institutions globally. Let’s please put this into our group document later, by the way). Just IMAGINE what this would do to demonstrate to the world the importance of green actions even on hard power, if a 5m population country suddenly enters the holy grail of international affairs on THAT basis!! (All of this is not to say that other, additional measures, like the Climate Bridge, should not be pursued. But let’s always look hard at what respective tools and organs would be best positioned to achieve something).

Again, thanks for the good work Julia. Looking forwards to any responses, by anyone.

Jan

December 2, 2010

Julia Franziska Grauvogel, University of Tübingen, Silver Contributor (38)

Dear Santino,

Thank you very much for discussion my essay in depth and raising a number of important issues.

Let me first of all clarify what I mean by a lack on US climate policy initiatives: As already mentioned our discussion by several people, initiatives on state level such as the regional green house gas initiative but also domestic restrictions such as Byrd-Hagel resolution often unknown or not appreciated when discussion the US stance on climate change.

I will know turn to your very substantive issues that you raised related to the European civil society. I don’t want to create the impression that in European civil society everything is going well (to put it in a rather bold way) and I appreciate your account of the democratic deficit, which I second. I rather directed my recommendations towards EU and EU civil society because leeway bigger as said in my intro because of a) more interest in EU than in US as opinion polls show b) that even though also within the EU its is difficult to find common position, it is still more likely (also because EU interested in using topic to prove its actor quality) that overcoming the reluctance of Senate in the US and c) instead on engaging in the usual-finger pointing exercise, I decided to rather build on existing promising initiatives (which I find on both sides oft he Atlantic as I pointed out in my article) and promising positions in int. negotiations (which I currently rather observe with regard to the EU).
Hopefully this clarifies my initial sentence of “policy recommendations should be directed toward European civil society and the EU” which my no means was intended to paint the picture of state vs. civil society and I thank you for outlining how this could be mistaken!

Furthermore, I don’t suggest that there is a monolithic interest within the EU – an issue that I made clear by pointing towards difficulties of finding a common position, nor within European civil society. Those recommendations directed towards civil society – which I definitely do not regard as a panacea – are mostly those who suggest to meet the US half-way and encourage existing initiative in the US. I totally agree that the aim must be to make sure that American and European civil societies are somehow very much vigilant on how their respective governments address climate change (and I don’t think this contradicts my analysis in any way!).

As regards your reference to my insistence on Obama being crucial to raise the issue as over simplistic, I would like to underline the following: I am pretty sure that I depicted the complexity of the US political system in great detail in my article. Thus, I don’t suggest that Obama alone is crucial in developing ambitious climate policy in the US. Rather, he is of utmost importance when it comes to raising the issue or keeping it on the agenda – as illustrated by the current decreased in attention as soon as he turned his attention towards domestic economic issues.

I hope I did not forget any substantive issues you raised. If so, please excuse me (I am quite busy studying for an exam tomorrow) and remind me – I promise I will then come back to them!

Julia

December 2, 2010

Julia Franziska Grauvogel, University of Tübingen, Silver Contributor (38)

Dear Ntambaazi,

Thank you for your comment! I agree with you that in the case of climate change, ironically those who contributed most to global warming and those who are now at the center of the discussion (the US, EU) are ironically those who will suffer the lest from the disastrous effects and that we need to take into account (or ideally even more: base our policy on) the voices of those who will be most severely affected, that is the global south. I guess I underlined my commitment to such a perspective, when I talked about equitable governance and representation in a global green fund, but this can be only one aspect of many.

If you have further suggestions of how to address the failures of current climate policy that you have pointed out, I would be really interested in your suggestions!
Looking forward to your response,
Julia

December 2, 2010

Julia Franziska Grauvogel, University of Tübingen, Silver Contributor (38)

Dear Jan,

first of all thank you for appreciating my analysis… I guess it goes without saying that I was really glad to hear it. :-) In order to be concise, I won’t restate all the valuable points of recognition and additional ideas that you provided, but just response the some of the substantive points you raised.

You said that you could not find anything ahead of current discussions, anything truly innovative in my essay. Let me quickly respond to that: I could well imagine writing an essay that paints the picture of a totally changed world, less based on consumerism (an important issue brought up by Edson) etc. However, I understood the aim of these essays to be slightly different, namely to develop concrete (and thus also feasible) policy proposals for one of the most pressing issues of our time, whose solution cannot be postponed until we manage to entirely change our way of living (which will however be necessary in the long run). Maybe this clarifies the focus of my article. I noted that our essays somehow differ as regards this initial focus and I guess that is an issue we have to solve when writing our common memo: do we want to provide an idea of how our world should develop in the next 20 years, do we want to rather focus on short-term, immediate and feasible solution or – even better – how can we reconcile those two perspectives.

Thank you for raising the opportunities linked to the financial crisis, on which I strongly agree. In my initial essay I had actually included a paragraph on the evaluation of governments spending programs during the crisis in which I suggested to evaluate them carefully in order to establish best practices (only to present a very brief summary of the idea).

Finally I totally support your idea of using more efficiently the fact that climate change has become an issue of national security for the US. I my opinion, this can be one of the most valuable starting points for engaging the US in substantive climate policy and its importance can probably not be overestimated. As regards this aspect, I also really like your idea of supporting Finland’s aspirations based on its sustainability agenda and I would really like to include it in our group document.

Thank you again for your very valuable additional interpretations and insights and I am really looking forward to read and comment on your article tomorrow!
Julia

December 2, 2010

Philip Strothmann, Free University Berlin, Gold Contributor (76)

Dear Julia,

let me start by underlining that I really like your article, though I agree in many points with the others. Since you've just answered them I'll try to focus on a few other points I came across.

First of all I'm not sure whether your assessment of climate change as a national security issue has really gained track in the debate so far. If so, it should be easier for republicans to support actions against it - which they unfortunately don't (see my comment below my piece). I believe that the question right now is rather whether climate change at all is considered to be an issue, before trying to find out under which general theme the topic should be discussed. However, be it energy security as I put forward, national security or environmental aspects, you're right that we've to address all possible angles to help raise awareness.

In addition, I question your assessment of only "lightly altered domestic political conditions" in the US. I believe I made my argument clear in my piece and comments, however, let me say this. With a majority in the House of Representatives and 60 votes in the Senate, the Democrats had an unprecedented window-of-opportunity to push the climate issue. Unfortunately they didn't use it and - in contrast to your point - Obama did not use his political full power to weigh in on the debate. From a domestic policy focussing on health care was understandable, from an environmental point of view we've lost a huge opportunity that is unlikely to come back in the near future.

Furthermore, I like that you emphasized the inherent problems of the EU and as such took a slightly different focus than I did. The strength of the EU in Kyoto and around 2007 was that they had agreed prior to the conferences on a clear strategy and negotiations points. In contrast to this, for example in Poznan, negotiations were significantly hampered as the EU summit took place at the same time and everybody had to wait for the EU to agree upon their stance. Another problem we face is that the EU relies heavily on the willingness of their strongest economies to go forward. While Germany used for example the entire year 2007 and especially the G8 summit in Heiligendamm to push for strong action on climate change, the current German policy focus has shifted back to a rather economy-driven one and thus it was the once praised Merkel that blocked progressive actions, for example with regard to the automobile industry.

Moreover, as stressed by Jan, the economic crisis should not be seen as an excuse for inaction but as a huge missed window-of-opportunity. To this end the EU and Germany in specific failed to use the bailout money to create a shift towards a more sustainable society. While China spend the money best in terms of supporting various renewable energies, enhancing public transport systems and the like, even the US had a better strategy to push more for more sustainability. A chilling example for this enormous fail is the German "Abwrackprämie" that a) supported one of the most polluting sectors and b) did not even link the incentive to environmental criteria as many others did. Still, according to the REN 21 Renewable Energy Report "Some $188 billion in green stimulus funding had been alloca ted to renewable energy and energy efficiency. Of that, only around 9 percent had actually been spent at the end of 2009." Accordingly one policy recommendation should be to ease administrative procedures that hamper the spending of the already allocated money.
Moreover, according to the report, the total investment capacity went up from $130 billion in 2008 to $150 billion in 2009. Interestingly, while the investment in the United States from $24 in 2008 dropped to $15 in 2009, in China and Germany it rose from $15 - $19 in 2008 to $25 - $30 billion on renewables capacity. Though you're right that in some areas the investment dropped by about 6 percent.

On another issue I'd like to ask how you bring together your call for stronger US targets with your proposition not to propose policy recommendations aimed at the US due to "the danger of alienating the US". Isn't this entire debate over policy recommendations for both sides, the EU and the US and shouldn't it be our very goal to not come up with "well meant but lacking insight" recommendations but with ones that are based on our knowledge that is hopefully not only "well meant" but with substance? I'm not sure whether you meant it that way but since you only propose actions for the EU I would like a clarification on that point, maybe I got you wrong?

Moreover, I'm a bit confused by your assertion that the EU did not accept the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”? That very principle is part of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC and as such the EU has de facto accepted it? Moreover, I would highly question your take on the principle. While you ask for acknowledging the "different responsibilities" part you seem to neglect the "common" one. It is without question that the emerging and developing countries should not have to bear the same burden as the developed ones, but that cannot be an argument for giving them a free pass on binding commitments. As discussed over the last couple of days, there is no way that we find a solution without seeing emissions significantly reduced as well in emerging countries. This might be provocative, but I am of the opinion that targets have to have a binding character, no matter to whom they apply.

Finally I very much like your proposal for the Green Fund. Moreover I wholeheartedly agree with your demand for a more coherent stand in the international negotiations of the EU, but would love to see a more substantive proposal on how to achieve it. Finally I very much welcome your points with regard to the CDM etc.

Alright, I hope I have not touched upon points you already answered, today I've only very little time to take part in this debate and thus could not read everything in detail.

Thanks for your understanding, Philip

December 2, 2010

Edson Ziso, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Silver Contributor (46)

Dear Julia

I find your article very concise and lucid as you undoubtedly demonstrate your grasp of issues you discuss. Your approach, (which i see as pinned more on optimism in the EU and the US in this fight) is for me consistent. Further I will not repeat other concerns as they have been well raised by colleagues who have written before me.

I would be happy to get a small clarification though. Your second policy recommendation would be that the EU join the US and China and 'seek to establish a new threesome leadership of climate protection'. I certainly understand where your argument is coming from especially as some colleagues have assigned the EU and US responsibility, but my fears are that should we leave leadership of climate protection to a select few countries?. Would it not be better to urge the EU to actually use its influence to argue for a more broad-based leadership than a club of 3. As Ntambaazi alluded to, may of the effects are being felt more elsewhere and what would be your thought on, say, adding voices of such countries probably as a stance towards a more robust leadership for globally owned climate change action?

I would be glad to get your opinion.

Edson

December 2, 2010

Ntambaazi Williams George, University of Osnabrueck, Germany, Silver Contributor (41)

Dear Julia,

Thanks for sparing your very limited time to reply to most of our stands in face of an impending semister examination you have to attend too. Please, I wish you success. I will try to be brief as possible in order to attend to my also very tight schedule on this side of the planet.

1. Iam hugely impressed, that contrally to the slightly initial wrong misconception of majority of the atlantic community comrades, there is now intellectual consensus that the EU/ US can not albeit successfully go alone on the climate change fight. We have on this special forum diagonized the health confusion, limitations and a hot rod of controversies especially on the political arena (deeply scruitinizing their domestic/national vs global political intricancies) that the two world leading power blocks can face if they temper not to bring or seem to neglect other more affected players. But more importantly, most opinion articles and views are highlighting areas of compromise in terms of superior advantages that grant the EU and US a lee way to lead day today and tomorrows climate change initiatives.

2. For further suggestions (as per your request) on how we can try to address the failures on the current climate policies, .......I am on this forum in agreement with the vast majority of policy recommendations. The stand out point being that, there are several important strategic and related areas and privilages that give the EU and the US a symbiotic relationship to build further patnerships with other blocks to come up with a more realistic assessment (way forward) on the climate change dilemmas of our time.

I thank you

December 2, 2010

Julia Franziska Grauvogel, University of Tübingen, Silver Contributor (38)

Dear Phillip,

First of all thank you for devoting some of your limited time to discussion my article. I wholeheartedly agree on your assessment of the failure of the EU and Germany to engage in substantive ecological modernization – an issue we seem to agree on in the debate thus far.

As regards my characterization of an only "lightly altered domestic political conditions" I base this assessment on two aspects that seem crucial to me: a) public opinion which does not attribute much more importance tot he issue of climate change and is not more favorable towards strict international climate change legislation than in the time oft he Bush administration and b) the Senate’s position which is key but basically remains and has always remained as reluctant as traditionally expressed.

Concerning the whole issue of “common but differentiated responsibility” I mentioned that the US (not that the EU as you have mistakenly read) must accept this principle. Moreover, I don’t agree with your call for binding targets for developing and emerging economies, precisely because I am a strong believer in the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”. I outlined a possible way forward in the discussion of another article that I’ll cite here and am very interested in your stance!

“For example, many have suggested that on the basis of the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility", developed countries shall commit to legally binding emission reductions while emerging economies - especially China, India and Brazil - also propose reduction targets compared to a development as usual scenario that are verifiable and accountable, but not legally binding (since they are supposed to have different obligations than the historical big emitters). One might ague that the US would never agree to such an approach, but surprisingly the US chief negotiator Pershing had signaled US agreement with such an approach before Copenhagen, a concession that should not be forgotten.”

Finally you asked for more concrete proposals to foster a more coherent position of the EU. First I believe that the basket approach for sharing emission reductions worked quite well for the first commitment period of the KP and should be revitalized. Secondly I believe that it is also a manner of better strategic coordination. I was in Copenhagen last year and when speaking to delegates from different EU countries (and yes, I am well aware that these were official positions, but some were speaking quite frankly nevertheless), their positions often appeared very similar. However, different initiatives from a number of countries (such as France as regards funding) created an image of disunity that heavily impacted the EU position during negotiations. Thirdly, I believe substantive agreement must be reached on certain substantive issues where EU countries have in fact diverging interests (LULUCF being one) in order to be able to speak with one voice in a credible manner.

I hope I could further clarify my position and I am looking forward to your response on the issue of binding targets.
Julia

December 2, 2010

Julia Franziska Grauvogel, University of Tübingen, Silver Contributor (38)

Dear Edson,

first of all thank you for your important but also really concise remark which allows me to respond before I have to get back to studying for my exam tomorrow. ;-)

As I have pointed out in my response to Ntambaazi I do believe that those you will suffer and already suffer most from global warming, that is the global south, shall have a greater say in international negotiations, and especially in topics relevant for them, for example the distribution of adaptation and mitigation money by a global green fund. Nevertheless (and despite the fact that I highlighted the dangers of bypassing the UN negotiations) I believe that an agreement between the US, the EU and China is crucial when it comes to emission targets… And since I still hope (even though it may seems idealistically at the moment) that countries will agree on targets for a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol or even a new framework including emerging economies, I regard a leadership of the US, the EU and China (in this area – and that might have been not as clear as possible in my article) as crucial.

Best wishes,
Julia

December 2, 2010

Jan Schierkolk, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Gold Contributor (86)

Hello everyone,

thanks for the very good and substantial debate. I'll keep it short now, as I can agree with most of what I read. So just a few points:

Yes, Julia, you are right about the differences between long-term visions and short-term policy recommendations, and about it being hard to do both justice, especially with limitations as we have them here. But as you say yourself, those two need to be connected. Unfortunately, this is probably the hardest exercise in any public policy issue, because: its needs are hardly served by simply throwing ideas for long- and short term measures together. One actually HAS TO LEAD TO THE OTHER. And that's what I value most, but missed in your article. Again, this critique comes before the backdrop of much merited appraisal by me and others. But I can't help but sustain it.

Philip, thanks for your details on wasted stimulus money. Be it the "Abwrackprämie" or "Cash for Clunkers", while jobs were indeed saved by them, much potential for needed changes (and many other, anyways more sustainable jobs) was wasted on the altar of special interests, chief among them still highly unregulated banks and auto industries. If there was an opportunity to fight in Edison's sense, it was this one. And I am not even beginning to get into the insane global, but especially U.S., defense spending.

Speaking of fighting, however, I slightly have to disagree on another note, if I understood you correctly. Yes, political conditions in the U.S. get tougher now, BUT:

1. We are currently still in the Democrats-dominated Congress' "lame duck session", i.e. in a window of opportunity, to use your expression.

2. In general: I don't get this whole obsession with the need for 60 vote "super majorities" in the Senate. Frankly, this to me rather seems like an excuse by many Dems, including our beloved Obama, who on almost any policy issue have their own powerful and rich special interests to feed to get the outright insane contributions this system allows and even requires for winning elections and thus staying on the job. And I am not even singling out "Blue Dogs", i.e. disguised Republicans. Honestly, here I would recommend to stand up and fight, at least for most important issues, like climate change. Dare the Republicans to actually filibuster something for a few weeks if necessary. If that paralyzes the entire legislation process for so long, finally the country will pay attention and look up what this is actually about. Glenn Beck surely won't have arguments for that long. If he ever has.

If the Democrats' support erodes now, no wonder. Winning an election mostly by getting young people out on "hope" and "change" like hardly ever before, and then not putting up a fight (at least on climate change, what should especially concern THEM) might have put me off, to. That comes in addition to young people generally being hard to mobilize for mid-terms.

Well, I argue against picking hopeless fights, like the one over carbon taxes. But a bit more ambition is surely needed. If you meant THAT, Edson, then we weren't that far from each other on this, after all.

Cheers everyone,

Jan

December 2, 2010

Jan Schierkolk, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Gold Contributor (86)

I meant "fight in Edson's sense", not Edison's hahaha, although we sure need to be inventive... Sorry Edson, no intention here.

December 3, 2010

Philip Strothmann, Free University Berlin, Gold Contributor (76)

Dear Julia, Jan,

sorry for not getting back to you earlier. I run a small NGO and thus sometimes have way more to do than I wish…. ;) Having said that, let me get back to you in regards to your answer to my questions.

With regard to the political situation within the US I see it a bit different. I think you're right with regard to the public perception, however, I really believe that if Obama had really pushed for it, he would have had a chance to get the votes. Maybe instead of trying to get a bipartisan bill the progressive Dems should have focussed more on the Blue Democrats, the more conservative ones. In any case, this chance has past. However, now after the midterms we've a very different situation in that it is not only the Senate, but more importantly the House that wlll block any progress. The climate change committee will not continue to exist and if you take a look at the likely new GOP agenda with a focus on "jobs, debt and terror" (http://www.rollcall.com/news/-201089-1.html). If you continue reading Sen. Alexander's wishlist, climate change, energy security or anything that would even come close to action on this issue is not listed. In conclusion, while there had been a LITTLE chance to get things done in the 111th Congress, the 112th is definitely not going to do anything on this issue and that is a major change.

With regard to Jan, have you seen the agenda Harry Reid put up for the remaining 2 weeks and the answer of the Republicans? (http://bit.ly/dZPTbt) It's all out tax cuts! So no hopes on that front (BTW, Reid had nothing on our topic on his agenda as well). In regards to the Democrats you're right but I guess my answer to Julia answers your comment as well. There was a chance, now there's none.

Moreover, my bad of reading your statement with regards to the "common but differentiate" principle wrong. Furthermore I'm not saying that emerging and developed countries should have fixed targets. But I don't know whether not having any legally binding targets is a way forward. You talk about the targets relative to the BAU scenario which I had initially in mind when I wrote about it. My point is, even if all developed countries would immediately stop emitting GHG, it still wouldn't be enough. We need especially the BRICS on board and to this end, why not differentiating between them and the developing countries? I'm still of the opinion that - whatever target or target frame we could come up with - it should be legally binding. If it wasn't, why would we have it in the first place? (I know, very pessimistic take on "moral power" but still) I doubt that they would be willing to accept this and I see every argument against it, but still from a "environmentally necessity" point of view I would love to have it. Just because it emphasizes the necessity that we all need to take responsibility and commit ourselves to it.

Thanks for clarifying your EU coordination argument. I really think it's important to find ways to overcome the problems you described in your initial piece :)