The goal of this thesis is to predict future prospects for transatlantic relations by analyzing the major political disagreements between the US and Europe in the area of security and defense, from the beginning of the Cold War until today.A special focus is placed on the rift following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The research is based on existing literature on the topic as well as interviews with academics who have focused on it in their studies. The literature includes books, articles, reports, newspapers, journals, policy papers, and other similar written resources.
The conclusion is that the well being of transatlantic relations is undisputedly in the very best interests of both parties, at least today and for the next decades. It is fair to suggest that that fact will keep preventing the transatlantic alliance from falling apart in the foreseeable future, since Europe will remain the best ally of choice for the US, and vice versa. It would be self destructive for both parties to weaken these important ties, as well as harmful for international security as a whole. In a more distant future, it can be foreseen that the transatlantic alliance might even become more important, with the likely rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and the US's and Europe's relative decline in world influence. At that point the transatlantic allies might fully reunite in order to balance the new global powers.
Another possibility is that a multipolar world would emerge, with four or five global powers relatively independent from one another. Alliances in a multipolar system are in general flexible and constantly shifting. Consequently, the transatlantic alliance might become weaker in such kind of a system.
Vilborg Ása Guðjónsdóttir holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Iceland, studying at the University of Miami as an exchange student 2006-2007. She has her Bachelors of Science in Business Administration from Reykjavík University, Iceland. She is currently a Project Manager at the Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small States Studies, at the University of Iceland.
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October 21, 2009
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So these kind of anarchism/fanaticism will always be there - wishing to paint the perspective and even alter the line of sight of many a policy-makers. Fortunately, saner voices abound too. It is always useful to have saner voices in such 'religious cacophony' - no matter how much these "religious cacophony" protagonists attempt to find a relevance and legitimation for themselves (many often usher in tragedies to vindicate their already fallacious stands).
The trajectory of the future would depend upon how far these voices of cacophony succeed and where (the "western hemisphere" is one white-noise area as is the reactionary middle-east with South Asia being merely a leech that seeks to feed off those noises). The voices of sanity are strong and many a state would be forced to take measures that defend them from such cacophonies. So whether or not one likes these protagonists of "religious cacophony" - one has to admit that they are bound to affect certain developments. In that, it is prudent to look at the voices of sanity that also abound and that would yet be silent - in the impact that they have.
The idea of the "western hemisphere" has to be defended adequately - as a zone of democracy and not some kind of "christian democracy" that is exclusive within and also without. This defence can only be done by the same forces that arise as "religious cacophony" - though to their protagonists in Washington or Berlin or Paris - they may seem to make sense. One hopes not. The attempt to turn the transatlantic community to a near approximation with the Islamic states of the Arabian Peninsula is hardly useful or productive. But that attempt does remain a valid concern.
The notions of freedom and democracy are not currencies in global politics like they are or may be in the domestic policies. Confusing the domestic audience with the global arena or equating the global arena with the domestic audience is usually counter-productive and dangerous. The aspirations towards freedom and democracy are natural aspirations and their expressions shall differ - given the differences amidst people. The separation of the state and the Church remains a central area here.
The future of the transatlantic relations will depend greatly upon which voices it raises and listens to. The fear is there of the transatlantic world turning into a claustrophobic medival morass at home with advanced technological gadgets. That is the fear. The rise of other powers (some of them already are powerful enough and at near parity with the US in the military sense) that enjoy a lesser myopic view and greater legitimacy in the global arena would be a crucial factor. That is inevitable. How the transatlantic community defines itself is something that its academia definitely does not help it much with - but which remains a crucial aspect for its future and its survival.