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September 24, 2009 |  12 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Anna  Nadgrodkiewicz

The Shield's Dangerous Fallout

Anna Nadgrodkiewicz: The cancellation of the missile defense shield in its initially proposed form was inevitable for many. However, this has made the fallout no less dramatic as the risk of setting a dangerous precedent of appeasement with Russia increases.

Despite voices of dismay on both sides of the Atlantic, President Obama’s decision to scrap the plans for a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic surprised no one. Already during the election campaign then-candidate Obama made it clear he was going to seriously reconsider the idea, which really just meant one thing. On many levels the American withdrawal from the shield project was an upsetting move – but it also brought a moment of much needed clarity.

In a way, Washington’s decision was a relief for governments in Warsaw and Prague, ending months of tortured political maneuvers to nominally keep the door open for cooperation on the shield while simultaneously downplaying the implications of its likely cancellation. Another uncomfortable aspect of that maneuvering was the fact that the majority of Poles and Czechs remained reticent about the shield, the commitment of their respective government to the project notwithstanding.

If anybody is to blame for that prolonged stalemate, it was the Bush administration. Bush never clearly explained the rationale or feasibility of this undertaking and urged America’s Central European allies to commit to it knowing full well that a) it would antagonize Russia, and b) the necessary support didn’t exist in the States. As a result, the final call was left up to the skeptical new White House team and in the meantime both Poland and the Czech Republic were left in a state of limbo.

For all those reasons Obama’s decision to take the shield off life support was a good thing. How it was implemented – and how that augurs for the future – is a different story. The person who picked the date of the announcement must have been the same one who chose a DVD collection as a gift for Gordon Brown. By backing out of the defense deal on September 17, the 70th anniversary of Soviet Russia’s invasion of Poland at the beginning of WWII, the U.S. touched a nerve recalling a moment in history when, not for the first or the last time, that part of Europe was thrown under the bus by the West.

It is not Obama’s decision on the shield per se that did the damage. What’s truly troubling is the Administration’s utter lack of understanding of Central Europe’s history and contemporary aspirations it demonstrated. That does not bode well for the future. Apart from picking almost any other date to make the announcement, Washington should have coupled it with concrete commitments to reassure Poland and the Czech Republic that although the tactic may be changing, the goal remains the same: an equal and respectful security partnership. The standard restating of Article V and vague language about some future cooperation on a revamped missile defense system just won’t do.

A dangerous precedent of appeasing Russia at the cost of Central Europe has been set. If it morphs into a de facto veto power over what military installations may or may not be present in the new NATO member countries, the Alliance will become meaningless. A weak NATO fundamentally undermines not just the security of the region but also the vital national interest of the United States.

So where do we go from here? Faith in Obama’s ability to foster a trusted security relationship with Central Europe has been deeply shaken and the administration doesn’t seem to give a clear indication that it really cares. Distracted by Afghanistan, Iraq, health care reform, economic meltdown, and a host of other pressing issues, the White House has clearly relegated Central Europe to the back burner. Through the mishandling of the missile shield fiasco, the Obama administration has alienated its staunchest allies in Europe in exchange for a dubious future payoff in its relationship with Russia. The time to make amends and change the tone of a rapidly souring relationship with the Central European allies is now.

Anna Nadgrodkiewicz is a member of Washington DC-based American Polish Forum, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing issues of significance to the United States and Poland in the 21st century.

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Marek  Swierczynski

September 24, 2009

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In order to prevent an inevitable deterioration of trust in NATO and the US, Obama should quickly prove that his statements about changing but not scrapping the missile defence system are more than a cheap pain-killer for the Eastern European allies. This will require offering upgrade opportunities for NATO's eastern flank air and missile defences and maybe putting some SM-3 armed AEGIS vessels on regular patrols in the Med and perhaps also Baltic Sea. Other steps may include pushing NATO to formulate operational defence plans for the new member-states, which - according to press reports - are still not there 10 years after the historic enlargement of 1999. Symptoms of lost confidence in the US and NATO are already visible in the CEE countries. The US staunchest allies - to date - are discussing timetables for ISAF-troops withdrawal and proposing a regional security treaty - both undermining the goals that shaped their foreign and security policies for two decades. The EU is apparently not ready to take the security responsibilities from NATO - and with the Lisbon Treaty still on hold - it does not have means to do so. If CEE feels left behind by the US and NATO, a dangerous security vacuum may see the anxious leaders decomposing the structures they've struggled for so long to join.
 
Jakob  Schirmer

September 24, 2009

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If the give-up of the missile defense shield - which would have divided up Europe again - is a positive thing one should not mock the announcement on what anniversary ever it has been placed. One should not criticise such symbolism if the matter itself is appreciated. In my opinion such formal awkwardness should not be overestimated. Important is that the strategic partition of Europe is preventet. By the way, I think one should not speak of "appeasement" in regard to Russia. In my opinion it is indeed necessary to integrate Russia in the European and Western strategic thinking.
 
Alexey  Krasnov

September 25, 2009

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I completely agree with Mr. Schirmer on that 'appeasement' language in regard to Russia is only going to make the situation worse. Isn't it time for Western political analysts to follow the lead of Mr.Obama and stop speaking and thinking about Russia in antagonistic terms. The Soviet Union has long ceased to exist and no security threats for Eastern Europe are going to emanate from Russia in the near future. In fact, Russia has always supported creation of the so-called pan-European security system. It does not really want to revive its Soviet Empire. It simply wishes to find its place in the civilized world of the 21st Century. If you don't believe in the 'peaceful nature' of Russia per se (which is understandable after the war in Georgia), my confidence in the absence of any ill designs towards Eastern Europe can be explained by the simple fact of the Russian weakness. Does anyone really believe that Russia with its in many ways Third World economy will attack members of the EU and NATO? I'm not speaking of the military aspect of this move, although I deeply doubt that the Russian army is able to succeed in such an attack with even minimal counter-action on the part of the EU and the US (war in Georgia revealed many of the Russia's military weaknesses that go to the basics of Russia's military system). What is even more problematic for Russia is the political consequence of any attack on Eastern Europe. During the crisis, Russian Government has fully understood the country's economic underdevelopment and its over-reliance on energy prices. As follows from numerous official statements as well as the Russia's ongoing desire to join WTO, Russian officials see its future only as part of the global economy and friend of the West. It might wish to keep its influence in the post-Soviet space, but more ambitious geopolitical goals are unachievable and even harmful for Russia. Eastern and Central European countries are members of the EU and NATO, Georgia is not. That's the difference that should not be underestimated.

Another thing that should not be underestimated is what the author of the article calls Obama's 'dubious future payoff in its relationship with Russia'. Co-operative Russia may be much more helpful to the current US administration's undertakings on the international scene than co-operative Eastern Europe (which, with respect, is likely to keep being co-operative for many years to come in any event).

Moreover, what I don't understand in the Anna Nadgrodkiewicz's article is the linkage of missile defence system to NATO. How can one speak of Russia's 'de facto veto power over what military installations may or may not be present in the new NATO member countries'? First of all, not all the NATO members (such as France) are necessarily supportive of the shield, which was negotiated on the bi-lateral basis between the US and Poland and the US and the Czech Republic even without unequivocal support of Eastern European population. Secondly, it has to be recalled that the official NATO's line is that of co-operation and consultation with Russia and there is nothing bad if NATO is able to listen to Russia's concerns in order to keep peace on the European continent (don't forget about the NATO-Russia Council, which gives Russia voice in the NATO matters). Finally, the official aim of the shield was to defend Europe from Iran. The tone of the article is certainly closer to reality and fully reveals all the hypocrisy of the Bush administration. The fact that Obama is not ready to continue with this hypocrisy should be only welcomed!
Tags: | US | Russia | NATO | missile defense system |
 
Unregistered User

September 25, 2009

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It took India "one shot to the moon to find water" and show the world its future
orientation, it was Thomas Jefferson, who's prognosis of 1802 is reality of today:
"....I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing
armies. If ( the American ) people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow
up around the banks will deprive the peolpe of all property and their children wake up
homeless on the continent their fathers conquered...". and it was Colette G. Mazzucelli,
who so eloquently phrased "...the dominance of banks at the center of a system, which
take less and less into consideration the disenfranchment of more and more who are left without voice economically, and therefore politically, including those millions out of the loop in the industrialized democracies..".
Yet, Europe and with that the EU ( old and new ) are caught in this web of historic confusion by simply avoiding to even try to learn from the cause and effect equation
of its historic past.
It seems that the younger generation feels quite comfortable to discuss, try to predict
and even resolve present and future mainly political issues while relying only on their knowledge base of 1948 and after, or simply "... they are wrong and we are right...". This is not only very short sighted, but also, I am afraid, somewhat "historically illiterate ".

Around 1891 the Russian Czars were approached to introduce a monetary system,
which is basically in use in the Western World, the Czars refused and asked the people
proposing the system to leave the country. The system and people moved West....
At the time of the French Revolution Germany consisted of 300 small city states, principalities, dukedoms and so forth, which were consolidated between the times of Napleon and Bismarck into one State. And within 50 years they became one of the world's great powers. What happened as a result of that?
There was a conspiracy between Englan, France and Russia to slap down Germany.
There isn't one historian in the world who can find a valid reason why those three countries decided to wipe Germany off the map politically.
Then there was WWI and for Britain not to be humiliated in defeat , the Balfour
Declaration was the answer. The American people were never told,- they never knew why they went into World War I.
Versailles, where the trouble really started. The United States had crushed Germany.
-----The information I am referring to is from one of the participants of the Paris Peace
Conference in 1919-------
After parceling out Europe the head of the Jewish Delegation said:" How about Palestine for us?". And for the first time to the knowledge of the Germans, they produced this
Balfour Declaration. ---The Germans reacted.---
After a while, the Jews of the world called a meeting in Amsterdam in 1933 and they said to Germany: " You fire Hitler, and you put every Jew back into his former position, whether
he was a communist or no matter what he was. You can't treat us that way. And we, the Jews of the world, are serving an ultimatum upon you." The Jews of the world now declared a Holy War against Germany.------
In Europe's East, Germany found itself in a territorial dispute with then Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia had signed a non agression agreement with Britain and France.
In addition, Poland had also staioned troops within Czecholslovakia.
It seems now, from documents made available, that when Germany started to claim the territory of Czecholsovakia, France and Britain did not come through on their
commitment and yielded to Germany, while Poland still had troops stationed there
as it is opined.
Britain and France, as it is understood, preferred an entanglement of the Germans in the East, rather than in Europe's West..
Important now, Germany and Russia signed a non agression agreement, which Germany
broke by declaring war with Russia. It is known, that Stalin was in disbelief and stayed in
seclusion for about five days before reacting to the circumstances.-------

We all know 1948 was the year for the introduction of a new world currency system
on a grand and commanding scale,-- especially after 1891.

With Sweden supporting a CEE, the rest of the EU muddling in" Doerferpolitik",
the Czech Republic and Poland still remain the facilitators of European tension. while Brirain, France are blaming Germany for their misfortunes in Afghanistan.
Simply, all the talk about " appeasement with Russia", or the "military vacuum in CEE"
is all misconceived, because the problem is not Russia, the problem are
the confrontational countries of the European Union--- as they are not united by any means.
Not only in EU contributions, but also economically Germany is "carrying" the EU.
Ploand and the Baltic Sates have received more EU contributions when compared to other countries. I hope this will not cause the " conspiracy" to be repeated and will split Europe into two entities, "Euro Zone" and Britain's and also Sweden's desired CEE.

NATO's not honored promise to the Russian Federation to stop its aggressive desire for expansion to the East, could possibly want one to compare to Hitler's breaking his non-aggression pact with Stalin.

Finally, comparing markets by scale, NAFTA is certainly not pleased to be runner up
to the EU. Recent desires by the G20 to perhaps scale back money market
control by USA/ Britain showed no sign of acceptance and should serve as confirmation of above.

HRF








Tags: | athens/shield |
 
Anna  Nadgrodkiewicz

September 25, 2009

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Diplomacy consists of style and substance and as such can and should be judged on the merits of both (or lack thereof as the case may be). The substance of the Obama administration's backing out of the missile shield deal has its merits. The puzzlingly awkward manner in which it was done does not. It didn't really win the U.S. any additional points with Russia but instead alienated loyal allies whose governments wasted a lot of political capital on America's indecision.

Jakob Schirmer fears "the strategic partition of Europe." But how should we describe the perspective of "resetting" (which seems to be the preferred term these days) the West's relations with increasingly authoritarian Russia at the cost of Central Europe's trust? Integrating Russia into the European security is a great idea but the question remains on what terms. If it's done under PM Putin's premise that the Soviet Union’s collapse was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, than pardon my skepticism of the pan-European security system as an alternative to NATO. It sounds more like an arrangement where "security" means that the EU and the U.S. stay out of conflicts in Russia’s back yard while the definition of that back yard is still open for discussion.

Whatever the aim of the shield was set by the Bush administration, for better or worse it became a litmus test for America's commitment to the partnership with its Central European allies. If the Obama administration played its cards better, it could have made a conciliatory gesture to Russia AND send a strong signal to Poland, the Czech Republic, and other countries in the region that this partnership remains strong. That's what good diplomacy is and it's not to late to start using it.
 
Marie-Claude  Corneauster

September 25, 2009

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Not only in EU contributions, but also economically Germany is "carrying" the EU

er hmm, I heard that money crisis didn't hurt Germany !!!!

WTF, you're the biggest contribuator, because you're the country with the biggest poppulation !

Now, as your birth rate is one of the lowest of EU, by 2050 France will have passed over Germany by 5 millions inhabitant, unless you let Turkey enter into EU, then that would be Turkey !

and thanks for the laugh of the history revisitation, I guess we'll have to watch out !
 
Marie-Claude  Corneauster

September 25, 2009

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Obama seems to be a more clever politician than a domestic gifts suplier !

He is progressively disengaging from EU, that he holds as rich enough to take care of its security, time to wake up !

which EU contry is ready to increase its army expenses up to the UK and France levels ?
 
Unregistered User

September 26, 2009

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Whilst Hans Reuther-Fix's view of the history of 20th Century European events is idiosyncratic to say the least, there is much truth in it. I would, however, like to comment on his assertion that Poland is a "facilitator of European tension". He doesn't develop the thesis further, so I am making the assumption that he is referring to Polish-Russian relations, and the presumed negative effect they have on the broader EU - Russian dialogues.

There is no secret to the nature of current Polish - Russian relations: for the Poles at least they are based on opposing national myths first, selective views of history second, with realpolitik taking a very subservient third place. Both societies are still in a process of intense internal dialogue about their experiences of the recent past, as the removal of the discipline, or rather the straitjacket of authoritarian ideology has provided an intellectual freedom to explore, define and crystallize various ideas. In a purely academic scenario this would be a lively debate which could take a few lifetimes to resolve and provide much education and entertainment. The tragedy, and sometimes comedy of the situation is that this spills over into the political and inter-governmental arenas, with wider implications in the general European context.

In an ideal world, all events prior to 1989 would be argued by historians, and be out of bounds to politicians, and would be prohibited in parliamentary discussions in both camps, which would then focus on security, trade and the future of the common European homeland. I would argue, however, that the political leadership in Russia has thoroughly outmanoeuvred successive Polish governments. For its own internal reasons, the Kremlin has re-evaluated the recent Russian past, and edited its history for didactic reasons, and for the sake of social cohesion in a still evolving new Russia. This new history is so at odds with the Polish experience, with literally millions of people affected (my own father was sentenced to twelve years in Siberia for being Polish and being able to read and write), that there is the inevitabe, and regular kneejerk reaction from Polish politicians,who alas have not yet attained the maturity or sangfroid of their Western colleagues.

Manipulation of the Polish psyche suits Russia very well, but the same can be said of their attitude to Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and other post-Soviet satellites. It enables Russia to show the apparent lack of cohesion in the EU, and justifies its focus on having strong relationships with individual EU members rather than with dealing with the EU as a whole. My sense is that the Russians see an ever-integrating EU with some concern - it is an unknown future quantity, with unknown implications for a still economically weak Russia.

My fervent hope is that Polish governments will see through these games, but my expectation is that some time will elapse before they reach a level of maturity that will enable an effective and measured Russian policy that will sit well with their Western partners.
 
Member deleted

September 27, 2009

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I support the comments from both Mr Schirmer and Ms. Krasnov regarding appeasement and the need to "integrate Russia in the European and Western strategic thinking." To me, this doesn't necessarily imply forsaking the security of European allies for the sake of Russia, or that the EU and US should stay out of Russia's backyard. Rather, in the first instance, by integrating the Russian position and attitudes into “European and Western strategic thinking”; I believe this can have a tangible benefit for all, including Central Europe (integrating Russia into the European security system itself would be a long-term process and challenge – something for another posting).

Whatever the issue of the day may be, recognizing and applying the context of the Russian position/approach to the matter can be beneficial (not to say this hasn’t been done previously, but the Russian position may have been discounted in the broader context). As nice as it would be to address international issues in isolation, many are interdependent and deliberations should be considered as such. Given recent Iranian nuclear developments and the “cryptic letter”, whether by design or not, applying the Russian context to issues can make a difference in furthering national and international interests. So is this appeasement, or careful consideration of the issue, the related parties, the related issues and potential implications (both positive and negative)? I believe the latter.
 
Cosmo  Macfarlane

September 28, 2009

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Agreed, the FP situation created by this decision is a nightmare, but it was still the right decision. Given the foreign policy abilities of the Obama team I think there's an opportunity to approach the Russia from a different angle anyway. In my view Russia's foreign policy stance is largely a product of its internal problems and given that US-Russian relations weren't really going anywhere anyway it may be worth throwing away a card just to see if some mid to long-term progress can be made.
 
Member deleted

September 28, 2009

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I agree with Mr. Macfarlane's comments above. The loss of the missile shield (or its reorganization, as the case may be) is easily justifiable when you consider the strides it makes in nudging Russia towards consensus on other future issues such as North Korea and the much talked about arms race that may or may not be forming in South America thanks to Russian military sales.

This was a classic security dilemma - one side balancing internally while the other pushes back. What will be interesting to see is whether this sets a precedent for more dynamic situations in the future, such as Russian forces in the contested areas of Georgia.
 
Kurt  Fisher

October 4, 2009

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With the EU report that Georgia attacks provoked the war with Russia last year despite claims to the contrary, I believe that the US repositioning on this issue was timely as the US anticipated this announcement and could use the report as a buffer against those who weild the appeasement dictum. I agree with Alexey Krasnov, that the past cold war antagonisms are no longer relevant.

America needs to assess it's security dilemma's in conjunction with it's limitations, given the two wars. Russia's cooperation on the Iran front is crucial (although not expected) and this gesture to correct another failed Bush foreign policy decision was entirely appropriate sans it's untimely announcement.

The planned placement of missiles there was a deliberate threat, not a deterrent to Russian power or ambitions, and their removal allows us to concentrate on the Iran issue, and lets not forget Russia's cooperation in securing logistical support in Afghanistan.
 

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