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March 6, 2009

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

"The war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan could have been won in December of 2001" - claims the Author and I do envy him on self-confidence. Let's recall the situation after 9/11: the US was not only unprepared for an attack on its soil, but also wasn't ready for a huge expedition like invading Afghanistan. This was achieved two years later in Iraq, and maybe it was a misplaced effort. Bombing Tora Bora wouldn't help, the US Air Force didn't even have sufficient weaponry to "smoke'em out". I agree that Bush was wrong not to accept NATO's assistance but let's be clear, NATO forces also were unprepared for such an operation then. It was the notion of war on terror that brought some important re-structuring decissions to NATO, not the other way round. Now the situation is more complex as the Afghan safe-haven for terrorism has spread to once-allied Pakistan. Taking Russia on board, a step that NATO and US are making right now, may help but would probably not solve all the problems. Let's face it: the hunt for Bin Laden may last for decades and it is very likely that he'll see the Prophet sooner than anyone with M16 shoots him.

March 8, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

I question the assumption that 'time is running out' in Afghanistan. Instead of just asserting it as a given, perhaps the author might wish to substantiate his thesis? Certainly the pressures on certain areas of Afghanistan are greater, but much of Afghanistan is little more dangerous than in 2005 or 2006.

Could this not be an offensive led by Al Queda? And might not there be potential fissures between native Pashtun and the foreigners not unlike the fissure between the Iraqi Sunni's and Al Queda, which might be used by talking to Pashtun leaders (whether they style themselves 'Taliban' or not)? I think so. I have heard of tensions between Pashtuns and foreigners going back to 9/11, which came as a horrible surprise to much of the Taliban. Possibly all of it. They were not consulted, but they paid the price. And that is exactly how some of the Taliban view it.

The game is not over in Afghanistan, it may just be moving into the next phases

There may be a danger of certain parts of the coalition pulling out in the longer term, but that is not a crisis of Afghanistan as much as it is a crisis of NATO.

March 10, 2009

Urs Schrade, University of Heidelberg, Silver Contributor (36)

According to Mr. Smith's article the right moment for international troops to leave Afghanistan is as soon as an agreement with the Taliban is reached and the war is over.

In my opinion the success of such an early exit strategy is highly questionable. From recent statebuilding literature we know that the reestablishment of statehood (democratic or not) depends not just on the absence of war but also on a country's economic welfare and its working state institutions. After eight years of war Afghanistan is an exceptionally poor country with little working state institutions. Hence, if international troops would leave Afghanistan immediately once the war is over, the country would likely fall back into war within short time.

I agree, the most important task for President Obama and his European allies should be the end of the war and not Afghanistan's transformation into democracy in the short term. Nevertheless, once the absence of war is achieved, international troops should stay in the country to secure peace. At least until local owners and/or international actors have built up minimal working state institutions and the country's economy has recovered from war.

March 11, 2009

Natalie Chwalisz

The author argues that negotiating with the Taliban and ending the war sooner the later, foregoing attempts to establish a democracy, is the reasonable exit strategy. I am however dubious that the Taliban is a force with whom to be negotiated. Rather, it is a dangerous, totalitarian movement abusing the rights of people it controls, limiting Afghanistan’s development and posing—due to its long-standing cooperation with Al Qaeda— a serious threat to the West. The Taliban originated as an ideological Pashtun policing force that rapidly evolved into a totalitarian movement enforcing strictly, yet cruelly arbitrarily, the austere moral code of Pashtun villages on the multi-ethnic territory it took over. It spread its power brutally, at the expense of non-Pashtuns: the much-published human rights abuses committed against women pale in comparison to the ethnic cleansing of Hazara men in the north. It has resisted diplomatic efforts and has been impervious to any outside force, excluding Bin Laden; even its former sponsor, Pakistan, could not negotiate with the Taliban.

Why are we to suppose that Taliban has changed? We have already changed our backs once on Afghanistan, as military leaders who strove towards a participatory and representative through a loya jirga and regional power sharing struggled against the Taliban onslaught. It would be a serious mistake to accommodate the Taliban now.

Similarly, I believe we would be mistaken to think that NATO will be able to leave Afghanistan soon. The current situation is dire and success will depend on forming a government reflective of Afghan regional power dynamics and tribal relations. Stabilizing the country, building an effective police and military force, and restraining the poppy-industry are all short-term objectives essential to providing the space for peaceful political developments. Infra-structure programs and investment into future economic development will be vital to change public opinion in favor of the NATO presence.

Afghanistan is a country deeply formed by decades of warfare that destroyed its infrastructure and hampered its development. The poppy industry and with it the rising drug addiction problems are undoing the little police training NATO provided. While Afghans maybe tiring of foreign presence, currently, their government is not in the position to protect them. Rather then weighing a sooner rather then later exit strategy, NATO forces ought to concentrate on establishing a viable state in Afghanistan, in the interest of Afghan and Western interests.

March 11, 2009

Rob Steer, Freelance, Gold Contributor (100)

This is a really interesting post Natalie.

The hope for Obama must be that he can appeal to the moderate elements of the Taliban who could potentially spread a more progressive and conciliatory message.

That will be only the first part of the battle as you quite rightly have identified, further work is required to strengthen the country's infrastructure.

I would be interested to know whether other members think such an approach will succeed, both in terms of ending armed conflict, and securing a sustainable and democratic future for Afghanistan

March 14, 2009

Ilyas M. Mohsin, PPP, Platinum Contributor (296)

I wrote an article in the daily Nation this week which may be of some help to my colleagues:-
Afghanistan: The Onerous Outreach.
President Obama appears to be concentrating on his job vigorously. As the US is beset by many pressures at home and abroad, Obama is consciously trying to cut the losses to start with. In his recent interview with the New York Times, he highlighted his predicament by saying, “Look I wish I had the luxury of just dealing with a modest recession or just dealing with health care or just dealing with energy or just dealing with Iraq or just dealing with Afghanistan,….I don’t have that luxury, and I don’t think the American people do, either.” All these curses hit the US under the last Administration which functioned, generally, as Thomas Gray said, “, where ignorance is bliss, ‘Tis a folly to be wise.” Obama, in sharp contrast to his naïve but pro-rich predecessor, appears to be an accomplished advocate of his country. His experiences in life, education and travel around the world make him an unusually well-informed American. Despite being very young he is able to use a statesmanlike lingo which may serve his own country as well the world in a big way.
Since taking over he has made quite impressive statements about Afghanistan which reflect his, generally, well-advised worldview. Besides launching a special envoy, Holbrooke, he has setup a body to review the policy in Pak-Afg area which underlines his efforts at developing a regional approach to the trouble thrashing the area. Though India, reportedly, managed to persuade Obama to keep it out of the jurisdiction of the special envoy yet the fact remains that she is very much involved in more than one way. It has considerable influence in Kabul and it is seen, generally, as provoking the Jihadi elements in this region due to its ‘occupation’ of Kashmir. Being knowledgeable, Obama knows that if he behaves like his predecessor, the US would suffer further blows to its power globally which could make Afghanistan his “Vietnam”, as the Newsweek recently forecast. His utterances underscore the fact that he knows that Afghanistan can unleash horrors which may make Vietnam look like a rough rugby-ruse.
No wonder Obama told NYT that the US was not winning the war in Afghanistan despite the decreed dispatch of 17000 more troops. Being conscious of history, topography, culture/religion, he conceded that a conventional victory was not possible therein. As such he appeared, generally, inclined to trying the approach adopted by Gen Petraeus in dealing with Iraq. It consisted, almost, of buying the loyalties of the Sunni triangle against Al Qaeda and promoting a co-existence between the various communities as well as his own forces. The Gen has been emphasizing that use of money for specific purposes can prove deadlier than bullets/bombs as it ingratiates the foreign troops with the public. He won quite an acclaim in the US corridors of power for his success in Baghdad till he moved over to the central command.
Petraeus is a wise man who wants to try his Iraqi model in Afghanistan to improve the situation. However, he could see through the fact that occupation of Kashmir remained a red rag for the extremists in this area. Obama’ comments indicate that he knows the convolution of the mission in Afghanistan. As the US saw a downbeat-year 2008 for the foreign forces despite George W’ desperate attempts to start a negotiation-process with the Taliban, nothing much has changed lately. Displaying his incisive insight, unlike his predecessor, he considered the fact that the Iraqi-mantra may not work in Afghanistan. “The situation in Afghanistan is, if anything, more complex,” he highlighted and added, “you have a less governed region, a history of fierce independence among tribes. Those tribes are multiple and sometimes at cross-purposes, and so figuring all that out is going to be much more a challenge.” His assessment appears to be realistic at the outset of his Presidency which is fully borne out by the ground realities. The foreign forces face fearful odds particularly in South/East and they are trying to shed their arrogance of power/macho tactics etc to cultivate a soft image among the locals. The latest Economist avers that on the orders of General David McKiernan, the NATO commander in Afghanistan, the blue signs summarizing the new acumen are attached all around the headquarters in Kabul: “WE can’t win if YOU drive recklessly. Think about it.”
It remains to be seen if the new US President can pursue his defined option in Afghanistan. The hatred and ill-will provoked by George W’ strange policies make a terrible menace. Besides the destruction caused by occupation/merciless bombing, corrupt Governance, ‘freedom-fighters’ etc, there are 3 factors which keep on boiling the cauldron. First, the drone attacks which, generally, end up killing innocent civilians besides some ‘suspects’ are adding constantly to the ranks of the extremists. This is so because such deaths have to be avenged by the survivors as per the local belief/culture. As Karzai is helpless, the aggrieved people join hands with the Taliban to inflict vengeance. Second, the stories coming from the inhuman experiences of those released from Gitmo etc are spreading serious resentment against the perpetrators of such atrocities. For example nobody can understand how or why the ex-Ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef, was commandeered by the US and dispatched by Pakistan to Gitmo. He was tortured for 3 years therein. His book in Pashto depicting the predicament of ‘suspects’, many of whom were proved innocent like himself after long imprisonment terms, has created quite a stir in the area. Third, the US etc could not achieve the targets of reconstruction etc visualized by the Bonn Conference of 2002 after the ouster of the Taliban from power. The latter had lost the battle as well as, generally, the goodwill. However, corruption, lack of justice, unemployment bred haunting insecurity which have hastened the reemergence of Taliban. Thanks to the Northern warlords, original allies of the status quo, Opium cultivation is at its highest which contributes 1/3 of the GDP of Afghanistan. Driven against the wall the Pashtuns also followed suit under the patronage of the Taliban. This earns them good money and accounts for the aggressive campaign against the foreign forces.
US will need some honest brokers to reach a settlement with the insurgents in Afghanistan/Pakistan which is also suffering due to the spill-over of the prevailing mess. So far the Taliban insist on ending the ‘occupation’ before any talks can be held. Despite all the complications, Pakistan can still influence the Taliban etc on the basis of faith like Saudi Arabia. Obama can make history pursuing a rapprochement in this area which would remove all the red rags for the Jihadis. That would end the Vietnam-complex against him. It would also bolster US position in this roundabout of the world as Toynbee puts it which is a gateway to Central Asia/Caspian region.

March 15, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Good morning, Mr. Smith,

Thank you for your comments. In light of recent developments, it is fair to comment that the Obama Administration is seeking transatlantic cooperation in ways that allow for different European contributions on the civilian side to envisage a qualitatively enhanced NATO presence in Afghanistan. This is likely to be a topic of on-going discussion in anticipation of the Alliance's 60th Anniversary Summit this spring.

The Europeans realize that it is in no country's interest for NATO to fail in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how France's reintegration into the integrated military command (IMC) structure will impact on NATO's contribution in Afghanistan and on the development of EU-NATO relations in the months and years ahead.

After the 2003-2008 European Security Strategy Review, the ball is very much in Europe's court to define the ways in which internal coordination can be improved among the Union's institutions and member states to maximize contributions in civilian areas like police training.

Exacerbating differences across the Atlantic over European troop contributions in the midst of a global economic/financial crisis as well as a difficult election year for the Germans is counterproductive. Thinking creatively about ways in which the transatlantic community may contribute to building state-capacity in Afghanistan is a constructive way ahead.

Instead of measuring success or failure in terms of the ability to transform Afghanistan into a liberal democracy, the focus can be on helping the Afghans help themselves in a political and social context through institutional reform on a sector by sector basis, which could allow the state over time to promote genuine economic and legal reforms for its people.

The road ahead is clearly a complex and difficult one. Pulling out is not an option for the United States. Staying in Afghanistan to assist in state-building capacity is a challenge for transatlantic cohesion. State failures across the globe call for new thinking about multilateral cooperation. Cooperation between America and Europe is taking shape within institutions established for very different purposes at a time when a multipolar world was not on the horizon.

Sincerely, Colette Mazzucelli

March 16, 2009

Patrick Edwin Moran, Wake Forest University, Platinum Contributor (207)

One great need in Afghanistan is for better educational opportunities for its citizens. It has been a while since I tried to find resources for students writing in to a list-serve in the hope of finding some way to pursue their education outside of Afghanistan. I was disappointed to see that there were virtually no financial aid opportunities for them.

Am I just failing to put the right terms in my Google searches? And how about better financial aid for students who want a university education and could benefit from study there if they could only afford it?

I hope it is too early to declare defeat in Afghanistan because it would be a defeat for the average person living in that country.

March 16, 2009

Patrick Edwin Moran, Wake Forest University, Platinum Contributor (207)

I have to agree that "transforming Afghanistan into a liberal democracy is impossible," but only in the sense that this judgment implies (1) that it is the U.S. that would be doing the transforming, and (2) that any hope of an organic transformation in the short term is an impossibility.

To say that Afghanistan cannot transform into a liberal democracy would be like looking at Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor and saying that it could never cast off its emperor and ruling classes.

What are the inputs that would move any similar country toward a liberal democracy? Having a national election and picking someone whom virtually none of the people know anything about could have a very negative outcome unless the individual so chosen just happened to be a person with the right ideals and with the savvy to get the great inertia of the country moving reliably in the correct direction. Having local elections where people get experience muddling through and in the process learning that choosing a good local leader can require even more ability than examining the mouth of a horse one is thinking of buying. To make that happen there needs to be some kind of national organization that can hold itself together long enough that the country can learn to choose its own leaders. That national leadership may not appear to be democratic. And if such a government were to be toppled by a democratic election, that might be the last democratic election for a long time.

A consortium of nations interested in the stability and long-term viability of Afghanistan could perform many useful functions were it able to find ways that member nations could coordinate their activities. Building up a well educated citizenry that is economically sound would not be a bad outcome in itself, and the history of other nations has indicated that the more power there is in the middle the less the top can lord itself over others.