Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "US, EU, Russia: Not a Zero-Sum Game"

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October 6, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

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Whereas it's fully agreeable that the security environment in late first decade of XXIst century has changed in comparison to late XXth century, it should be also accepted that the actors the Author calls to take action have changed. The EU of 2008 is not the one of 1998. NATO of 2008 is not the one of 1998. The enlargements have made the two organisations much more complicated, with the EU being almost unable to reach consensus on any serious internal matter, let alone international crisis involving the traditional powers. Take the story of the new treaty for example - it showed there's no unity in the Union any more. NATO on the other hand, has been made irrelevant by the US, when it decided to act single-handed against terrorism and only changed its mind when things begun to go badly in Afghanistan. Calls to take action by the EU and NATO, may face no response, as there could not be one response in such complex environment. Neither the EU nor NATO seem to have a common understanding of these new emerging threats and in result are unlikely to forge a common security policy, except for a tradition, the binding treaties and a few security slogans, like "fight terrorism", "prevent energy crisis", "defend the mandate territory". The pan-European or northern-hemisphere security system is just another of such slogans, with little substance but a lot of charm - another illusion to me. Let's face the reality - neither NATO nor the EU in their current state are able to comprehend and build such a new security system. Instability is there to stay for the time being.

October 6, 2008

Member deleted

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I only can agree with comment of Marek that "neither NATO nor the EU in their current state are able to comprehend and build such a new security system". However I am more optimistic about possibility of stability. Excluding EU there still is two major players on the ground. I believe that Russia can adjust its policy well when they find benefits of that and if US anymore is not crossing Russia's red lines. Also change is possible with US foreign policy after their election. Then we have EU. The EU is too big to decide anything significant. The way out can be similar model than last week summit about bank crisis, where big EU powers try to find a common solution even if the smaller ones are crying outside about their lost influence. This EU core could act together also security questions. Sure its against EU's core values and ideals but it may be a priority question to select actions on the ground or proud statements.

October 6, 2008

A Russian in Germany

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"...If we accept the axiom that European security can be built with or without Russia, but never against Russia"

Why should we? European security was built against the USSR. There is no obvious reason why the situation now should be considered any different, except that there exist new threats.

There certainly exist common strategic interests shared by the West and Russia. But these interests are neither understood nor promoted by Russian ruling elite. They do not even try to say otherwise, as they tried some time before.

"...if the US adopted the same prudent policy toward Russia that it uses to balance pressure on regimes which are far less democratic"

Wasn't that exactly the policy of the West all the time since downfall of the USSR? The West wrote Russia off and got Putin.

October 6, 2008

Francisco J. Ruiz, Spanish Armed Forces, Gold Contributor (116)

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For the "anonymous" Russian in Germany:

Obviously, sir, you have a resentment (surely justified) against the politicians ruling your country, who I agree are far from perfect, but you should recognize that they have improved the situation for the ordinary people (probably they have become millionaires at the same time), after the 90's debacle. In any case, I simply am not interested on the Russian internal affairs, sorry about it.

Related to your arguments, I just can't believe you think that the situation dealing with Russia now is similar to the one during the USSR era and the Cold War: that wouldn't resist a critical analysis from any point of view (specially from the ideological one). Threats, as you recognized, are different, and nowadays equally affect Russia, the EU and the US. In addition to that, the collaboration of Russia for the operations in Afghanistan and in "Active Endeavour" was extremely valuable, and if we disregard this we will harm our own security.

I wouldn't define the American policies towards Russia in the nineties as "prudent": they dictated the economic reform policies from the IMF, they occupied the strategic gap created by the demise of the USSR, they didn't care about the Russian posture in Kosovo, they promoted the pipelines bypassing Russia. At the same time, the Russian people were starving and the mafias controlling the country. If Putin was the price to be paid to end that situation, it has been worth for a majority in the country.

Some states and some people are trying to impose their hate against Russia in order to shape the way the West deals with it, but the interests at stake are too valuable to leave them to reach that goal.

Thank you very much for your comments and best regards.

October 6, 2008

Francisco J. Ruiz, Spanish Armed Forces, Gold Contributor (116)

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For Marek and Ari:

I fully agree that neither NATO nor the EU in their current state are able to comprehend and build such a new security system; that is the reason why we should try to change them.

In the case of NATO, I firmly believe that there is not solution. An old fashion organization, created as a military defensive alliance against a clear enemy (the USSR), it has tried to remain as a valid instrument in the post Cold War era, but that has proved to be impossible after 9/11.

In the case of the EU, I think is the organization best suited for a comprehensive approach to security, as it could integrate all the elements of power (diplomacy, economy, military and information) in a coordinated fashion. Of course, we would need first to fully develop the Common European Foreign and Security Policies, something that I agree is extremely difficult after the expansion to the East. The solution: the one commented by Mr. Rusila, to create a “hard core” in the Union and a two-speeds model for Security and Defense approaches (that would be a great topic for an article).

On strategic planning you should study where you are (something well described by you), where should you be (the real topic of my article), and how you get there, being the latter the strategic plan that should be implemented to reach the desired end state. This end state is what I was trying to describe on my article, basically outlining the required strategies. This is “food for though” for debate, which is very much appreciated.

Thank you very much for your comments and best regards.

October 6, 2008

A Russian in Germany

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"...I simply am not interested on the Russian internal affairs, sorry about it.";

Then you have a problem, because Russian foreign policy is secondary to the internal one. It is wrong to believe that anti-Western rhetoric is used there merely for brainwashing reasons. Even if the ruling elite does not completely believes in what they say to Russians, they do act in full correspondence to.

"...I just can't believe you think that the situation dealing with Russia now is similar to the one during the USSR era and the Cold War: that wouldn't resist a critical analysis from any point of view (specially from the ideological one)";

Yes I do. The Cold War is often described as a state when the opponents are ideologically motivated. This is a quite disputable view. I don't think that a concrete ideology plays any sufficient role here. In any case it does not apply to Russia, where ideology always played a subordinate role. Observe how quickly it switched from an absolute Orthodox monarchy to left Communism, then to right Stalinism, then to "liberal" Socialism, then to autarchy. Each of these apparently "tectonic" change took no longer than 5 years. Does not it tell anything to you?

The state we have now has all signs of a Cold War:

1. Russia considers the West as an enemy;
2. Russia opposes each move of the West;
3. Russia supports any possible opposition to the West, no matter how abominable;
4. Russia interferes into the affairs of smaller states on its borders trying to make satellites out of them;
5. The means used for the above range from painful to weak Russia economic support to direct military intervention.

A very important point is that Russia is prepared to take heavy economical and military losses in order to pursue 2-4.

The differences to 50-80s are not qualitative. Just because Russian resources are much more limited now (and will rapidly shrink the future).

"...I wouldn't define the American policies towards Russia in the nineties as "prudent";

I agree with these words, but not with what you mean. The only way Russia could be supported then, must have necessarily included something similar to the denazification of Germany, including political figures like Gorbachev and Yelzin. The downfall of Russia happened because the nomenclature retained all its power.

"...Some states and some people are trying to impose their hate against Russia in order to shape the way the West deals with it, but the interests at stake are too valuable to leave them to reach that goal.";

A conspiracy theory? "Russofobia" is the word now used in Russia in order to describe the enemies' motives, especially of the West, of liberals and, of course, of Jews. How handy...

Wouldn't it be better for the West to finally try to understand what is going on in Russia? Let me quote you again:

"...I simply am not interested on the Russian internal affairs, sorry about it."

October 6, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"A Russian", you make an interesting argument decoupling Russian policy from ideology, perhaps persuasive. It reminds me of a link I saw elsewhere (HT: My Soup Is). There are a couple of videos circa the early 80's in which a Soviet defector explains the metods used to undermine western societies.

http://mysoupis.blogspot.com/2008/10/propaganda-style-kgb.html

A few thoughts ran through my mind while listening to this:

A) It apparently worked, but for all that did not save the USSR.
B) A 30-40 year plan with a 20-year phase one - nice job security for many nomenklatura.
C) Is he taking credit for something which would have happened anyway?
D) When actively undermining other societies it's best to take steps to shore up one's own lest it collapse around one's ears even as onr triumphs. Or - did the KGB manage to bring the US down - in time for the Chinese to pick up the spoils?

I guess finally E) It's probably best to try to build ones own prosperity in one's own country rather than try to undermine others with such great efforts. How many very smart men were employed by KGB to achieve very little when they could have managed internal enterprises well and creatively to enrich the USSR? And in that respect are not Putin's efforts to bring back the 'good old days' ultimately sterile and bootless?

My understanding is that the USSR wasn't all that different in many ways from the Czars, nd KGB in particular was a close follow-on from the Czarist Section Five. Can you extend your argument back into pre-Revolution times?

October 7, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1102)

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When the Author says "simply am not interested on the Russian internal affairs", it is right to remind Him that only few countries have a foreign policy on its own and the huge majority of countries, including his own, derives the foreign policy from the internal one. Let us just note the U-turn that Spain has made on the Iraq war and the presence of its troops there after the elections in 2004, after the Madrid bombings. Wasn't it purely due to internal political situation that Spain withdrew? Many other examples to be quoted from our European court, Germany, France, Great Britan etc... Therefore it is wrong not to include internal politics in foreign policy asessments. It is also quite misleading to apply purely analytical, academic reasoning to analysing international politics. Perceptions do matter, whatever the pundits can or can not believe. Feelings way across Europe, in Spain, may be quite different from what people of Central and Eastern Europe feel about their mighty neighbour. It is a matter of fact that Russia is perceived as aggressive, unpredictable and hostile power in much of the CE and in should be accepted even in Spain. It is also a matter of fact that the West, especially NATO, the US and its closest allies are generally perceived as hostile in Russia. The Author concludes that "the interests at stake are too valuable", but stops short from detailing what these interests are and to whom are they so valuable. And the value itself is relative, isn't it?

October 7, 2008

A Russian in Germany

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Donald, thank you for a very interesting link (a bit nostalgic too). His criticism of the lefties is still actual. What is wrong in my opinion, is that he thinks that the movement was insinuated by the KGB. I think it rather is native to the West, it is a will to self-destruction, a part of Western reflection. Observe, how promptly they switched to support aggressive Islam, how close became they anti-Semitic. All this is absolutely incompatible with Socialism, which is anti-clerical and cosmopolitan. But anti-Americanism is still there. What can be more suicidal to the West? What is true, is that these useful idiots will be on the top of the Proscription lists of new Masters.

“…My understanding is that the USSR wasn't all that different in many ways from the Czars, nd KGB in particular was a close follow-on from the Czarist Section Five.”

It was the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery until 1880. Later its functions were transferred to the Department for Defense of Public Security and Order. In its best times the secret policy had no more than a thousand men. It was absolutely incapable to deal with professional revolutionaries. Most of them served their Siberian exile sentences no longer they needed to reach the local train station. It was quite “vegetarian” on all accounts.

The most important difference to KGB is that the former effectively was a part of legal practice and correction system. In Stalin times it also had economical (state slavery) and scientific functions (atomic project etc). Czar’s secret policy wasn’t even close to that.

“…Can you extend your argument back into pre-Revolution times?”

I think that Czarist Russia never opposed the West as a whole. It had a normal for those days imperial policy, nothing special. In high society French was the spoken language. Its problem was a huge middle class movement similar to modern leftists and that the last two Czars were clinical idiots. (The last and the most stupid is now an official saint.) This middle class was then physically destroyed, as expected…

Marek, I agree with you, except that common interests indeed exist. It is just so that Russian rulers do not consider them their own. (In order to separate "flies and cutlets.")

October 7, 2008

Francisco J. Ruiz, Spanish Armed Forces, Gold Contributor (116)

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For the Russian in Germany:

Well, I poorly expressed myself when I said “I’m not interested on Russian internal affairs”. As a matter of fact, I am. What I was trying to say is that, even recognizing the mutual influence between internal and external policies, a realistic and analytic approach should be focused on the consequences of the external actions of a country, in this case Russia, and on the way these policies could be shaped in our own interest. In general, that is easier when you don’t try to give paternal lessons to other countries about how to organize themselves.

Regarding your evaluation of the current Russian policies to the West, I would comment:

1. “Russia considers the West as an enemy”.
Only 53% of the Russian population, in accordance with recent polls, perceives NATO as a threat. The figure is, by far, smaller when talking about the EU or the West as a whole. The official Russian doctrine calls for cooperation in all areas, no for confrontation, as many in the west (including, for instance, Robert Kagan in the book “The return of history”) are recommending.

2. “Russia opposes each move of the West”.
Only when the Russian interest are at stake, and the Russian opinion has been ignored (as in the Kosovo declaration of independence); that is something that any sovereign country would (and should) do.

3. “Russia supports any possible opposition to the West, no matter how abominable”. Let’s talk about the “number one” threat, international terrorism. Has Russia supported Al-Qaeda? I don’t think so. Could we say the same about Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Pakistan? Well…Does the West or the US use the same fierce rhetoric against these countries than the one used against Russia? The answer is no.

4. “Russia interferes into the affairs of smaller states on its borders trying to make satellites out of them. The means used for the above range from painful to weak Russia economic support to direct military intervention.”
That is a logical ambition for any great power along history; the Russians can call it now the “nearest abroad”, or the Americans issue the “Monroe’s doctrine” and invade their western hemispheric neighbors for decades (Mexico, Panama, Grenade, Dominican Republic, Haiti…).

The ideological debate would be worth of a whole discussion, but you recognized that the new-Russia has changed of ideology, apparently, several times in 5 years. Considering that the USSR held almost the same ideology for 70 years (and the role played by Marxism), I see that we agree on the difference. Additionally, the bitter rhetoric of the Soviets against the West was quite different of the one of the current Russian leaders, for instance in the mentioned “The Foreign Policy concept of the Russian Federation".

On the other hand, we can’t forget that the USSR was not militarily defeated at the end of the Cold War (as Germany was in WWII); it was an internal collapse of the system, in part due the unexpected consequences of the “perestroika” reforms, in part due to the activities of some reformist politicians. Russia in 1992 was not a defeated enemy, but the West in general considered that, and now we are paying the consequences.

And finally, and talking about “Russofobia”, I’m not sure it exists, but what it's evident is that most of the opinions in forums like this (and in the media) are openly against Russia since that country is back defending its strategic interests, so it is worth trying to balance that tendency giving some other point of view.

Many thanks for your comments.

October 7, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"Therefore it is wrong not to include internal politics in foreign policy asessments."

Ummm, yes. One huge fallacy that many in Europe seem to hold is that US internal politics need not to be taken account of in dealing with what many see as a monolithic hegenomic US government. There is a price to be paid for that view, and I think it is fast approaching.

When the worse effects of the current banking crisis has been averted, Iraq mopped up & stablilized, and Afghnistan resolved one way or another, there is going to be a huge psychological need for the US to curl up into itself and 'take a vacation' from history.

To a degree this would have happened anyway as it did after Vietnam. But unlike Vietnam Europe has contributed hugely (and I think unnecessarily) to the degree of trauma felt in the US; and Europe will end up footing a lot of the bill for this retreat in the end.

Not least Spain and of course Germany. The Zapatero withdrawal from Iraq was both necessary and extremely cackhanded. Style points matter in such things, and Zapatero deliberately did as much damage as he possibly could in disengaging. He unilaterally did a great deal of damage not only to Spanish-American relations but also to European-American relationships.

For an example on how to handle a withdrawal one needs to look at how Italy managed the same thing. PM Berlusconi gave a year's notice, and PM Prodi (a left-wing candidate who displaced Berlusconi) handled the matter with dignity and full consideration to American feelings. Italy remains in good terms with the US.

By contrast, Zapatero ripped Spanish troops out of Iraq with two weeks notice or less & sought to damage Bush as much as he could. Instead he tore a gaping wound in US-Spanish relations and taught the American public a lasting lesson on the meaniung of European-American 'friendship' - a lesson which will take at least another decade to wear away.

Had Zapatero taken as much as 6 months to do the job and done it less publically (through diplomats) the damage would have been far less profound. This is why we emnploy diplomats.

What does Germany have to do with this? Nothing, except that Germany has delivered an entirely different lesson. AND set a precedent which the US can follow and which any President seeking to pander to the national mood for withdrawal can drive the USS Nimitz through.

The German precedent is the 'none of our business' attitude which seems to drive much if not all of Germany's dealings with the auslanders in recent years. I used to take it personally, seeing it as specific to the US, but that thesis has been proven mistaken; Deutschland does it even to her EU partners!

Afghanistan is not Germany's business except for making policy and contributing less than the bare minimum which reasonably would be expected. But that is a 'US War'.

This week German Finance Minister Steinbrueck made it clear that the financial crisis now engulfing the EU is not Germany's business and will be dealt with by building a Festung Deutschland.

"He said Monday that he and Chancellor Angela Merkel were considering creating a "shield" that would protect the country's entire financial sector, and that a Europe-wide shield or bailout was out of the question. "The chancellor and I reject a European shield because we as Germans do not want to pay into a big pot where we do not have control and do not know where German money might be used," he said in a separate interview with WDR 2 radio."

Well THAT sounds familiar - it's the German policy toward Afghanistan brought home.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081006/ap_on_bi_ge/eu_europe_meltdown;...

Let me repeat: this is a precedent the size of the North Sea. The US could adopt a similar policy toward NATO - that it's a 'European problem', not really much of our concern. Russia? T^he US merely adopts the German policy of 'partnership' with Russia, another precedent. No need to be rivals merely because Putin threatens former satellites like the Baltic states, Poland, and Germany.

Germany? Yes. Once upon a time there was a country called East Germany....

The US wants to take a holidy; and Europe has shown the way....

October 7, 2008

Francisco J. Ruiz, Spanish Armed Forces, Gold Contributor (116)

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For Marek:

You are right pointing out the influence of the internal affairs on the foreign policy of a country, but I hope you also agree that the influence is very different depending on the country. Spain, as you mention, it’s an example of what a serious nation should not be, as well as every time we change the government from one party to the other, we shift 180 degrees our foreign policies. The external action of a nation should be a coordinated policy, as well as strategic planning and many years of effort are necessary to get the desired end state.

Related to the academic and analytic reasoning, I work on a scholar environment, something that conditions the way I think and write. In any case, and if we want "Atlantic Community" having an actual value as a strategic discussion forum, I think that the articles should be based more on academic research and less on personal perceptions, something that even an illiterate could express.

I understand and deeply respect the perception of Russia in the CEE countries but, as well as the EU is not continuously paying attention to the Spanish problems and perceptions about the Maghreb, the world fisheries or the illegal traffic of human beings, we should not have to overcome the east reticence against Russia every time that we should deal with it on a coordinated fashion.

And finally, and related to your comment about the “interests at stake”, they were enumerated on the initial article, being the basic one to accomplish the strategic objectives of the three actors (US, EU and Russia), goals that happen to be the same on a 90% , as well as we face common threats for security.

We are talking about WMD proliferation (Russia has a great leverage over Iran, and it has been actively participating in the “six-parts” talks about North Korea), failing states (Russia tried, without any success, to get the western support against the Taliban regime on the nineties, due to the support provided to the Chechen rebels), interruption of the flow of vital supplies (Europe strongly depends on the Russian natural resources: that is not the case of Spain, but I don’t need to give you any detail about he gas pipes on the Baltic bypassing Poland or about the current job of the former German chancellor, Mr. Schroeder), and finally Islamic radical terrorism (which somebody could consider different depending on the country, but that for me is the same in Madrid or in Beslan).

Many thank for your comments.

October 7, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"What is wrong in my opinion, is that he thinks that the movement was insinuated by the KGB. I think it rather is native to the West, it is a will to self-destruction, a part of Western reflection."

Russian, I think you are correct about the US. When one looks further back one can see these kinds of self-destructive movements even predating the rise of the USSR, though perhaps not quite a numerous or as outside-directed as the US communist Party was for a while during the 40's and 50's. Nevertheless those movements survived the discrediting of the USSR, which I think shows there is a psychological need for it somewhere.

In Europe I think it depends on the country. I think the long-term close friendship between Germany and the US was ultimately poisoned by the collapse and absorbtion of East Germany, which brought huge numbers of new citizens who had been indoctrinated in the essential evil of the US while also cutting many of the ties of common interest which bound the US and Europe together. These newcomers had long since lost their regard for their Stasi masters and for the USSR; however that did nothing to reduce their loathing for the US whose longer-term policies helped free them. It wasn't obvious in 1989 but it's obvious now....

I think the final act of the drama is to follow, the dissolution of NATO either de Jure or de facto. In fact NATO is already dead de facto, and it is difficult to see circumstances which could breathe new life into the rotting corpse.

October 7, 2008

A Russian in Germany

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To Francisco

1. Russians traditionally mistrust everything said by the rulers. So the true indicator of Russian state policy towards the West is its mass media, which are 90% state-controlled. Take a look. The only difference to 70s, that the rhetoric is even more aggressive.

2. Don’t Russian interests are at stake when Iran tries to get the bomb? Kremlin blocks pressure on Iran solely because it believes that this could hurt America more than them. The word “more” is important, they are ready to harm Russia.

3. Don’t HAMAS, Syria, Iran qualify? The key here is an opposition to the West. Pakistan presently does not openly oppose to the West, so Putin does not care.

I agree that there is a huge problem with the Western policy. But how much support would the US get from the EU if they tried to press on Saudis, Egypt or Pakistan for democratic changes? The US tried in Iraq, and?

Nevertheless, the key difference is in motivations. If you asked Americans why they support Pakistan, you would get a bunch of rational reasons, motivated by national interests, World’s security etc. (Maybe, these reasons are all wrong, and it would be better to nuke Pakistan down. Seriously, where is any articulated EU position towards Pakistan?) But Russian policy is irrational. It is motivated largely by its opposition to the West. Can anybody believe in that backing Iran or sending rusty ships to the shores of Venezuela could be in Russian interests?

4. “Logical ambition”? This is exactly the problem, that Russia operates the logic of the XIX century. The means it applies stem from that time too. Note that if the West accepted this logic then that would mean a hot war.

“…Russia in 1992 was not a defeated enemy, but the West in general considered that, and now we are paying the consequences.“

Shudder. From this follows, that the only way for Russia to join the club of civilized nations is a defeat in a devastating war! Otherwise we have to accept Russia as an undefeated imperial regime. But your initial proposition was that Russia must be considered a partner, an “imperial partner,” I conclude. And the common interests could be?

[BTW, you said that Spain is not serious, but it is amazing how Spaniards found strength and will to do after Franco's times what Russians miserably failed.]

About Russophobia

It is a symbol of faith used for mobilization. How else would you explain to your people a lack of international support to occupation of Georgia and other "glorious" deeds? In 70s it was Capitalists, now it is Russophobes. It can become bikers in the future. Ideologies of hatred are substitutable.

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The biggest error the EU might make is to sell its ideals for oil, gas, security, economic prosperity. Russia is not a serious threat. Lack of ideals is.

October 8, 2008

Victor Kaminin

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I do not believe that "a Russian in Germany" is actually Russian. Probably it doesn't matter. What matters is that great majority of Russian people will strongly disagree with him. Hate never wins.

It’s very encouraging to see that more Europeans think ”cooperation” and see Europe as our common house.

October 8, 2008

Joerg Wolf, Atlantic Community, Editor

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@ A Russian in Germany

We believe that commenters are taken more seriously, if they reveal their real identity rather than use a nickname.

Therefore I have to ask you to please identify yourself, when you comment here.

In fact, it would be best, if you would register for free and fill out the personal profile.

October 8, 2008

David Neil Lebhar, Atlantic Community, Gold Contributor (134)

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Dear Francisco,

Re: the potential two-speed and "hard-core" Defense and Security system:

Wouldn't such a two-speed system create even more dis-unity and inequality in an already divided EU? Couldn't it contribute to the "we contribute more, so we deserve more" attitude in the relationships among the EU members and even in future treaties? One could suggest that, ultimately, under such a system foreign policy decisions would be made by the "Big 3" in Europe, and only subsequently by "the rest." I think the current EU involvement in Afghanistan is relevant in this regard - wasn't it a meeting in London between France, Germany, and Britain where much of Europe's Afghan policy was decided, and wasn't Solana (i.e. the CFSP) only invited as an afterthought?

Foreign policy cooperation among EU member states, and among any states for that matter, is unarguably important/necessary, but it could be that the most effective cooperation would still come from states as such, i.e., independent, sovereign states pursuing foreign policy strategies that reflect their interests, which include making alliances and cooperating with other sates. Granted, many states within the EU will have similar objectives and, therefore, one should expect that cooperation among EU member states would be high. But, to implement a system (and I emphasize the rigid connotation of system here) that tries to direct foreign policy among states seems inefficient by definition, and a system which highlights differences/inequalities of contributions by recognizing "two-speeds" seems even more divisive. Perhaps this is a tangent of the regulation vs. de-regulation financial argument, only imposed now on foreign policy; I would suggest that de-regulated foreign policy cooperation between states is most practical/efficient, although admittedly under the current circumstances regulation seems to have gained some "leverage."

October 8, 2008

Francisco J. Ruiz, Spanish Armed Forces, Gold Contributor (116)

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Dear David:

In Spain we use to say something that could be translated as “the best solution is enemy of the good one”. I agree, of course, that in a perfect EU no “two-speed” system would be needed, but reality is far from the ideal. The key point is that, in real life, when you become a member of a “private” club you acquire not only privileges, but also obligations. In the case of the Union, the privileges are huge: cohesion funds, access to common markets, free movement of your nationals, and so on and so forth.

Talking about obligations, every applying nation should accomplish the Copenhagen criteria (basically good governance practices and human rights respect) before becoming a member. Economic stability is also a basic criteria, but we can see that, even after the treaty of the Union was signed and the European Security and Defense Policy incorporated as a part of the second pillar, the new (an the old) members are not forced to accomplish any criteria in that realm.

For instance, when we discuss about “contribution”, we shouldn’t focus on the whole defense budgets, but on the GDP percentages assigned to them. What I meant is that if a nation wanted to participate in the ESDP (and that is a sovereign decision) it should be forced to devote at least 2% of its GDP to defense (something that my own country is far from reach). More requirements: to participate in the EDA, in the Battle Groups…all of this in proportion to each nation potential: same proportion, same privileges.

Every nation can keep its own strategic interest besides the ones shared with the other members, and that would be specially true for the “big guys on the block”, but I consider that the small countries barely have any particular threat or strategic interest different of the global ones, as reflected in the European Security Strategy. That would allow some ESDP participants to specialize their forces in order to contribute to the common action (for example, with sea/airlift or focusing its forces on a specific warfare, as Belgium has made with Mine Warfare at sea).

But, finally, let’s go back to your hesitations about a “two-speed” model. Do all the EU members belong to the Euro-zone? The obvious answer is no: for instance, The UK and Denmark are not interested (by the moment), and many of the new eastern members still don’t accomplish the requirements. Do all the EU members belong to the Schengen free transit agreement? No way: the UK and Ireland are not interested, and some no-members participate, as Suisse. Even for the current ESDP there are exceptions: Denmark doesn’t participate at all.

So we already have several “two-speed” models in place, therefore I don’t consider a problem to foster a “reinforced cooperation” in the security realm for these nations willing to go further on the only, for me, reasonable way ahead: a strong and united Europe, able to use all its resources for the comprehensive approach to security.

October 8, 2008

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Two speed model is reality in EU, speech about common ESDP, foreign policy etc. are fairy tales. One example we got today when UN Genaral assembly voted, if the will get ICJ opinion about Kosovo case (if the independence of Kosovo is made according international law or not). Some half of dozen EU members voted yes, most abstained. It is example that common EU position is for statements and not for real politics.

October 9, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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"...If we accept the axiom that European security can be built with or without Russia, but never against Russia"

There is something of a aparadox in this statement. Current European security policy assumes that the US stays in NATO. But there needs to be a reason for the US to stay in NATO, and the supposed Russian 'threat' has traditionally supplied that need.

If we redifine NATO so that Russia is no longer seen as a threat, another advantage to the US for staying in NATO must be constructed. Earnest efforts were made toward thagt end during the 90's to give NATO a role outside Europe. But the reaction after 9/11 has shown this 'mission' for the utter tissue-paper sham that it always was.

Another problem is that NATO has arguably three tracks. Judging by defense spending by GDP the US and possiboy Eastern Europe are track one (GT 3%), the UK and perhaps a few others track 2 (2-3% of GDP - France may qualify at the margin), and virtually everyone else track 3 (LT 2%), with Germany bringing up the bottom.

How long do you believe this Frankenstein of an alliance can keep walking?

October 11, 2008

Marie Claude

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Don and the russian person (and the others)

may-be this article of AT will talk to you

http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/10/why_obamas_communist_connect...

I found it accurate for the description of the insidiousity of a propaganda discourse

As I said before, we need Russia as a partner and not as an ennemi, if we leave Russia alone, then she'll return to her past daemons, that's not our interest, in the occurence for Afghanistaan war, the jihadists are hiding in the former URSS countries as well as in Pakistan. Russia could be the gendarme that empechs them to cross the borders, as in the same time surveying her minorities that participate to the war with the Talibani fighters

October 11, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

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Marie, I read the piece and I'm afraid I just don't see the threat.

1) The US is not going to go communist because of the election of one man. Show me an example of ANY major western country going communist because of an election. Possibly Czechoslovakia in 1948, but don''t forget they were very much under the thumb of the USSR at the time and later. And that wasn't one man anyway.

2) Obama isn't a communist. Some of the people he's known are. The most prominent was Bill Ayers. But Obama and Ayers weren't all that close even during the 90's. And Ayers is no Stalinist - more of a intellectual leftist with some weird ideas. His communist streak is theoretical 'early Marx'. In a communist takeover people like Ayers are typically the first to be put up against the wall and shot. I've known several people who were further left than Ayers is, and even learned some things from them. That does not (I assure you) make me a communist! I can't see any compelling reason to believe otherwise of Obama.

He also knew a communist journalist named Frank Marshall Davis while growing up in Hawaii. Apparently 'Frank' was a friend of his grandfather. There is no reason to think 'Frank' was particularly influential on young Obama. Marshall was a writer and an organizer, but marginalized (and tolerated) in Hawaii. Kind of a picaresque character, but not the most obvious candidate to create the Manchurian Candidate. I think I would have enjoyed arguing with him myself.

Saul Alinsky was also mentioned, but he died in 1972, long before Obama arrived on the scene. Alinsky may have trained and mentored the man who hired Obama as a 'communiity organiser'. Again, I can't see Alinsky as a threat. His motto was 'think globally act locally', and he was most noted for the view that the Left needed to work for and recruit blue-collar white workers - hard hats, a view that 60's radicals like Hillary Clinton and John Kerry spurned to their cost.

So to the extent that Obama has been influenced by people like Alinsky - I say it's a good thing. The US needs a party which is for the working joe and jane, and right now it doesn't have one. Perhaps Obama can change that - it's one reason I'm voting for him.

October 11, 2008

Marie Claude

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uh, Don I should have more precise, I ment how a "lefty" mentality is shaped

October 11, 2008

Heinrich Bonnenberg, Energiewerke Nord
DGAP, Platinum Contributor (358)

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Thanks to all for this marvellous high grade discussion.
In the meantime I go forward step by step to push Pan-European understanding, based on the three essentials
1. EUROPE = EU + RUSSIA + UKRAINE + OTHERS
2. EU is not NATO
3. US is a competing friend (in regeneration).

Next step:
At October 24th 2008 the very renowned German historian and journalist Professor Dr. Michael Stürmer will speak and discuss at the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Scienes (as part of the project "European Cultural Dialog"). His subject is " RUSSIA'S IMPORTANCE FOR EUROPE. A paper will be printed and distributed in German, Russian and English.

October 14, 2008

amarjyoti acharya

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There are a few things that immediately brings forth the question: the envisaging of the EU-US-Russia relationship within the zero-sum game expression. Are there zero-sum sum games' activities involved directly? The emergence of the EU alongwith NATO (after two world wars where the original theatre has been Europe) obviously negates the notion of zero-sum game activities that so determined the cold war as well as realist perspectives. The image of billiard ball states that classical realism espoused vis-a-vis the emergence of the European Union as a successful co-operative of states are very opposite images that one gathers. The emergence of NATO and the continued deployment of NATO merely underlines the overcoming of mindsets that led Europe to two world wars. Moreover a Europe that also hosts NATO, alongwith its evolution as a Union - though again not in the classical sense of a state with its subsidiary units, beggars the assumption of such realist 'dire straits' situation. But what we do see is the acceptance of both NATO and the EU to a degree where one forgets easily the meaning of the zero-sum game expression that continues to be a reality for many other states and regions of the world.
The emergence of other threats again do not point to a zero-sum scenario, ahould those problems be addressed just as the earlier zero-sum game situation within Europe has been addressed. The emerging threats are less from states per se, and more from a growing cognizance of a globalized world that is creating inter-dependencies and yet exhibiting, perhaps, a certain mindset that believes rather naively and dangerously in the re-writing of the norms and rules of interactions. In other words, the attempted re-enactment of a realist world scenario seen as more of a Hobbesian nightmare of Machiavelliean interpretation than the realism of Hans Morgantheau - by this mindset, within a globalized reality, is a serious threat. The threats are less military than the threat of infiltration and destruction - guerilla tactics adopted at trade as well as information-technology levels - as points of entry, where the infiltration of the civil society may prove difficult. Post-modern terrorism, when it gets state-sponsored, under the guise of 'new cultural politics of difference' envisages an engagement that moves away from a realist prescriptive practices, while the cognizance remains unaltered: Of such emerging threats. It is less the issue, in such cases of informed dissent and more the case of strategically blind political elites of particular states, who may be endangering global stability and security, for their petty local gains. It is much more difficult to deal with states that sponsor this rabidity.
Given the backdrop of rising religious nationalism - and the European experience as the emergence of both the EU and the NATO: Well, with cognizance of what is at stake and the nature of what is that what threatens - one would need a complex and sophisticated methods of engagement. It goes without saying that the prisoners of both the cold war mindset and class-room lectures on International Relations' - 'new politics of difference' - are not a part of the solution.

October 16, 2009

Dara Hallinan

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Much of the preceeding discussion seems to be based on the assumption that the aims persued by Russia can be considered in within the same qualitative and quantitative framework as those persued by Europe and the U.S., and that a move toward a more collaborative security agenda should be based on the fact that, for the time being, there appears to be a certain overlap in goals.

This may prove to be a correct assumption in the sphere of foreign policy, but before this assumption can be made, perhaps the foundations of this convergence in goals should be considered.

Russia remains somewhat of an enigma internally and it is the internal manoevering and internal issues that shape the (often confusing) end result of Russian foreign policy.

Thus against a background of increased movement away from the European and U.S. models of democracy, and away from the European perceptions of Human Rights, and indeed away from a will to follow Europe and America in the trends and goals they set, is it possible to concretely suggest that the communal goals have a communal content to them?

Unquestionably in an age of increased interconnectedness there must be cooperation, but perhaps the level and form of this cooperation should be analysed from the overlap in principle and direction, as well as just overall goals.

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October 6, 2008 | 26 comments | Print Your Opinion

US, EU, Russia: Not a Zero-Sum Game

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