My paper, written in cooperation with Paul Ingram and published by the British American Security Information Council, discusses the rationale behind the practice of nuclear sharing within NATO. It explains that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe is the legacy left from an outdated security agenda and no longer serves a credible purpose within NATO's nuclear posture. Despite this, neither US nor European decision-makers are willing to discuss withdrawal prospects. The paper examines each of the countries that host US nuclear weapons - Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the UK and Belgium - and discusses their political dimension in relation to NATO nuclear sharing.
Claudine Lamond has recently graduated from the Australian National University hoding a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations, and a Bachelor of Asian Studies, Security and Strategic Studies, and Japanese.
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March 11, 2009
Dr. David Garcia Cantalapiedra
• "Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the majority of security threats considered within NATO".
• "NATO’s nuclear sharing is the source of considerable disquiet amongst some member states within the NPT. It substantially weakens the authority of NATO states to demand stronger non-proliferation mechanisms essential to strengthening European and global security, and surely undermines any claim on the part of NATO members to having the necessary political will to engage in serious moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons".
• "NATO states’ inability to resolve the problem allows Russia to avoid its disarmament responsibilities with respect to its far more substantial arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons".
Starting with the latter, I think that the presence of 300 TNW in Europe are not an excuse for Russia to avoid dissarmament responsabilities, or reducing its reliance on TNW (some 20.000 warheads!!). The issue is rather its lack of capacity on modernization and funds for its conventional forces and its view of weakness vis-a-vis the US in military terms. In fact its last documents on National Security and Military Doctrine during the last 10 years expands the reliance in these weapons.
Secondly, some of the most important threats recognized by NATO and Member States are WMD and the so called Rogue States. Although there is no sense to talk about Nuclear Deterrence in a Cold War sense currently, there is risks ahead as a Nuclear-armed Iran that gives a renewed sense to Nuclear Deterrence. A Nuclear-armed Iran would produce a Security Dilemma in the Greater Middle East that could create a Nuclear Arms race among some neighbours of Iran. In the same vein, there is a clear change in the Chinese Nuclear doctrine and modernization to expand the role of Nuclear Weapons in Chinese security policy. This could push countries as India or even Japan to reconsider their postures.
Finally, The paper talks only of Nuclear Sharing and US TNW, but not say a word about the "European Nuclear Power", that is, France.
The international security environment is changing quickly and it is being seriously shacked by economic crisis. This will create important security problems in the near future. Politically, the US-Europe link in NATO through the commitment of US TNW in Europe could still be useful in the future in spite of his perceived low usefulness in operational terms. Then I think there are some reasons to reconsider the role of TNW in Europe but there are other very important to be include also in the debate. Thanks.